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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The term socialism is used comprehensively in this paper.

It

includes communists, left wing socialists, centrist socialists, and
Social Democrats.

The attitudes of these various groups and parties

towards each other during the Weimar Republic determined their attitude
towards National Socialism.

Together, they represented a majority

movement but because of their division, they failed to pass the supreme
political test of the 1920's by not preventing the rise of National
Socialism.

The communists thought that they could let the National

Socialists do the job of disposing of the Social Democrats before
taking over from an otherwise epheme.ral fascist movement.
Democrats were blind to the National Socialist danger.

The Social

Their official

chief publicist,for example, Friedrich Stampfer, believed in November
1932 that the National Socialist movement had run its course and would
fade away before long to leave the Social Democrats in their traditional position as the strongest party of the Weimar democratic system.
Only the socialist splinter parties assessed the political situation
realistically.
The shock of the National Socialist assumption of power had
presumably awakened the Social Democrats and the communists to reality.
In their emigration, they professed to be antifascists first and fore-

1

2

most.

In order to be effective in that role, they had to stop doing

abroad what had led to their failure at home.

A disunited, self-

disruptive emigration could not win the credibility it needed to be
taken seriously in its various host countries.

A reconciliation

between communists and Social Democrats in a United Front would have
been the most radical reversal of their previous rivalry.

The concept

of the Popular Front was based on an additional reconciliation between
the socialist and the bourgeois groups.

A more simple and practical

change would have been an end to intra-socialist recriminations and
an exclusive concentration on antifascism without any formal political
group association.

There was also the possibility of a so-called

socialist concentration without communists.

In these respects, this

paper studies the attitudes and the activities of the German socialist
emigration in the United States.
The political environment in this country added another dimension to the work of the socialist emigrants.

American socialism had

begun to decline in the 1920's before reaching significant proportions.
After 1933, it fell into dissolution as the result of a belated polarization into right wing and left wing groups which, in Europe, had
ta~en

place earlier.

In addition, these groups were mainly ethnic so

that there were small German American conservative, centrist,and left
wing socialist organizations with which the emigrants had to deal.
The divisiveness of the German American groups could compound that of
the emigrant groups.

On

the other hand, the former could furnish the

latter with established organizations and publications.

p
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The emigrant groups also needed contacts with the American
union federations, with at least one of the two major political parties
and with the government.

The establishment of the latter was subject

to political requirements which the emigrants could fulfill or fail to
meet with the respective consequences for their political prospects.
But they could adjust to American politics in more than one way.

For

the right wing socialists,for example, the choice depended on whether
they would'give precedence to antifascism or anti-communism.

An asso-

ciation with the American Federation of Labor would strengthen their
anti-communist bent which would, however, embarrass the government in
its wartime alliance with Russia.

In this sense, the American political

situation offered the German socialist emigrants alternatives which
they could perceive in terms of their political preferences.

p

CHAPTER II
THE STATE OF THE GERMAN AND OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
IN THE TWENTIES AND THIRTIES
The state of the German and of the American labor movement in
the twenties and thirties conditioned the history of the German socialist emigration in the United States.
Weimar Republic was divided.

The German labor movement of the

These divisions and their underlying

ideologies carried over into the emigration.
American labor movement were non-socialist.

The major groups of the
The small socialist move-

ment of the United States declined in the 1920's in innumerable splits.
By the time of the German socialist emigration, it had nearly disinte-.
grated except for the Communist Party and certain unions.
The German Socialist Party never had a homogeneous ideology.
During the First World War, it split over the issues of international
solidarity and nationalist support of the German war effort into the
two parties of the reduced Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Independent Socialist Party (USPD).

From then on, the SPD became very

defensive and distrusted all parties to its left.

1

The rise of commu-

nism and the German defeat in 1918 further complicated the crisis of
the German labor movement.

The German Communist Party (KPD) grew out

of the leftist components of the USPD.
1

The weakened Independent

Richard N. Hunt, German Social Democracy, 1918 - 1933 (Yale
University Press, 1964), p. 254.
4

,
5

Socialist Party could not survive long in the center between the KPD
and the SPD.

By 1922, its majority rejoined the SPD but never felt

comfortable there throughout the Weimar Republic.

2

The personal and

ideological distance between the traditional and the reintegrated Social
Democrats remained,and became unduly significant in the emigration.
The issues which had led to the foundation of the USPD were not resolved
with its disappearance.

The right wing of the SPD imposed its policy

of coalitions with non-socialist parties, the so-called policy of the
Grosse Koalition (great coalition).

In the process, it also assumed a

compromising position towards German rearmament.

3

The left wing of the

SPD amounted to nearly half the party at times but it was less confident and not proportionately represented in the national party execu-

.

tl.ve.

4
In this situation, the party would have benefitted from a sense

of fairness and toleration.

But the natural intolerance of the wartime

SPD was intensified by the challenge of the KPD.

The traditional SPD

became absorbed by its anti-communism and, in this context, treated the
5
t.1.ng w1.ng
.
. h suspl.Cl.on.
. .
.
o f th e par t y Wl.t
d l.Ssen

This behavioral pattern

reappeared in the emigration and especially in the American emigration.

2

.
Ibid., pp. 193-210.

3
Hanno Drechsler, Die Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (Marburg, 1965), pp. 32-50.
4

5

Hun~,

German Social Democracy,

~P·

210-229, 255.

Hans J. L. Adolph, Otto Wels und die Politik der Deutschen
Sozialdemokratie, 1894- 1939 (Berlin, 1971), pp. 118-145.

p
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The KPD was equally uncompromising towards its dissenting factions and
in its opposition to the SPD.

Each of the two parties believed that

it could make its progress only over the dead body of the other.

Thus,

both parties failed to perceive the challenge of National Socialism.
The dissenters in both parties often realized that only socialist solidarity could stop National Socialism.

But the SPD and the KPD

dismissed these warnings from within their own ranks and pushed the
dissenting factions out of the two major parties.

As a result, there

appeared in the late twenties and early thirties a number of splinter
groups such as the Kommunistische Partei Opposition (KPO, Communist
Party Opposition), the Sozialistische Arbeiter Partei (SAP, Socialist
Workers' Party), the Internationale Sozialistische Kampfbund (ISK,
International League·for the Socialist Struggle, and the Gruppe·Neubeginnen (NB, Group New Beginning).

These small parties were symbols

of the blindness of the two major parties towards National Socialism.
During the last years of the Weimar Republic, they issued numerous calls
for a United Front against Hitler which were ignored.
In the emigration, they became relatively important.

This

circumstance only helped to continue their difficulties with the two
major parties and especially with the SPD on the antecedents of the
Weimar Republic.

In fact, these antagonisms determined largely the

history of the German socialist emigration, especially in the United
States.

They became the priorities of the German socialist emigration

and created an emigrant atmosphere in which antifascism often receded
into the background.

The KPO, SAP, and ISK did not have organized groups

in the United States but NB rivaled the Social Democratic group in sig-

p
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nificance and served as rallying point for individual emigrants of the
other splinter parties.

The leaders of the latter often had curious

careers in that they successively participated in several splinter
groups.

Even within the same group, they often belonged to different

factions.

Many of these leaders ended up in the American emigration

where their party historical antecedents determined their mutual relationships in a mostly negative way.
isolated.

They usually chose to remain

At best, they had loose relations with NB.

The KPO which was founded in early 1929 grew out of a rightist
faction of the KPD.

6

This faction was predominant in the KPD in the

early twenties and advocated a policy of German communist independence
and of communist cooperation with other labor groups.

It wanted to

establish a United Front from above with the leadership of other socialist groups rather than a United Front from below that would only involve
their membership.

In accordance with the factional alignment in the

Russian Communist Party, this was considered rightist.

With the rise

of Stalin, a leftist policy of opposition to all non-communist parties
came into vogue.

Its purpose was to displace the pre-Stalin leadership

in the European communist parties.
in the KPD.

The rightists survived as a faction

In 1928, they even challenged its leadership.

But Stalin

viewed this conflict in the light of his campaign against Trotskist
remnants in the various communist parties.

The rightists were expelled

in January and February 1929.
6
K. H. Tjaden, Struktur and Funktion der KPD-Opposition
(Marburg, 1964).

8

The KPO was very active but had little success.

In 1932, it

split over the issue of a proper attitude towards the SAP.

A minority

advocated an association with all of the SAP on equal terms.

It was

expelled in January 1932 and joined the SAP where it played a controversial role.
to the KPD.

7

The majority unsuccessfully pursued its re-admission

Immediately after January 1933, it organized underground

groups and established an Auslandskomitee (exile party executive committee) in France.

In the Internationale Vereinigung der Kommunisti-

schen Opposition (IVKO, International Association of the Communistic
Opposition), the German emigrant group and the American KPO under Jay
Lovestone played major roles.

The IVKO fell apart in 1939 because of

the revisionism of Lovestone who renamed his group the Independent
Labor League of America.

8

As a result, the German emigrant group also

split into a- pro- and an anti-Lovestone faction.
evacuated to the United States.
did not get beyond Cuba.

9

The former was

The two main leaders of the latter

The International Relief Association (IRA)

took care of the evacuation of KPO and other leftist emigrants to the
United States or to other American countries.
Of the former KPO leaders in the United States, Erich Hausen
and Hans Tittel belonged to the pro•Lovestone faction.
Schreiner had left the KPO orbit.
7

Jakob Walcher, Paul Frolich, Rose

Ibid., pp. 288~291; Drechsler, Die SAP, pp. 148-153.

8
Tjaden, KPO, pp. 330, 331.
9

Albert

Ibid., pp. 339, 340.

9

Frblich-Wolfstein, Erna Halbe, Josef Lang and Karl Frank were the former
leaders of the minority that joined the SAP.
even more colorful career.

10

Of these, Frank had an

He became the main leader of the NB emigra-

tion and played a major role in the American emigration.

He was also

instrumental in evacuating his former fellow minority leaders to the
United States.
The SAP was founded by the purist faction of the SPD left wing
in the fall of 1931.

11

This demonstrated the lack of cohesion of the

left wing whose conciliatory faction remained in the SPD.

In the con-

frontation over the Bruning government, the left wing was divided in
its response to the right wing policy of toleration.

12

At the national

congress of 1931, the party expelled the left wing leaders Kurt Rosenfeld and Max Seydewitz for refusing to tolerate any further government
by emergency decrees.

13

During the more than two years before the

National Socialist assumption of power, the SAP tried desperately but
unsuccessfully to establish some kind of United Front against Hitler.
The chief promoter of these antifascist attempts was Rosenfeld.

He

carried on this work in the American emigration where he was a prominent representative of the German American Popular Front.
10

Ibid., Biographischer Anhang: p. 5: Karl Frank, Paul Frolich;
p. 7: Erich Hausen; p. 8: Joseph Lang, "Leo"; p. 10: Albert Schreiner;
p. 11: Hans Tittel; p. 12: Jakob Walcher; p. 13: Rose Wolfstein; also
footnote 15 of chapter I,l: pp. 80, 81: Walcher; footnote 16 of
chapter I, 1: pp. 81,82: Fr~lich.
11

Hunt, German Social Democracy, pp. 230-240; Drechsler, Die

SAP.
12
13

Ibid., pp. 56-63; Hunt, German Social Democracy, p. 231.
Ibid., p. 233; Drechsler, Die SAP, pp. 87-99.

10

But in America, Rosenfeld could not cooperate with the SAP
leaders who came to New York in 1940 and 1941.

These were the former

KPO minority leaders who later formed the aggressive left wing of the
SAP.

14

Before they could seize control of the party Rosenfeld and

Seydewitz dissolved the SAP in March 1933.
the convocation of a party congress.

15

But they proceeded with

There, they organized a SAP

underground structure with a domestic executive committee in Germany
and an exile executive committee in Prague and then in Paris.

Before

the beginning of the war, the SAP emigration in Paris disintegrated
completely.

One of its factions objected to close cooperation with

communist emigrants because of the Stalinist purges in the Trotskist
party of Spain during the Civil

War.

It was eventually expelled and

formed the group Neuer Weg (New Orientati9n).

The remaining SAP emi-

grants still disagreed over the degree of cooperation with the communists.

They would have split also if it had not been for the outbreak

of the war and the resulting refugee crisis in France.

16

A good number of the German socialists involved in the events
surrounding the SAP emigrated to the United States.
past differences, they failed to cooperate there.

Because of their
Of the former mem-

bers of the conciliatory left wing of the SPD, there were Siegfried
Aufhauser, the president of the Allgemeiner Freier Angestellten Bund
(AFA, General Independent White Collar Workers' Federation), the SPD
14 I b'd
L . , pp. 295-310.
15
16

Ibid., pp. 326-329.
Ibid., pp. 347-349.

11

executive member Georg Dietrich, Ernst Frankel, E. J. Gumbel, the antimilitarist theorist Arkadij Gurland, Siegfried Mark, Gerhard Seger, the
former general secretary of the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft (German
Society for International Peace) and member of the Reichstag, the
Reichstag member Toni Sender, Hans Siemsen and Walther Victor.

17

Most

of them had access neither to the established Social Democratic emigration in New York nor to the emigrants of the splinter groups with whom
they used to sympathize.

Other SAP leaders in America were the economic

theorist Fritz Sternberg, Will Schaber, the later editor of the German
Jewish immigrant weekly Aufbau, Ludwig Hacke, the former chairman of the
SAP district of Southwestern Saxony.

Of the socialists who had parti-

cipated in SAP related United Front activities, there was the pacifist
and economist

Alf~ns

Goldschmidt who later played a role in the German

American Popular Front.

There was also Helmut Wagner, a Saxon Social

Democrat who was expelled from the SPD for organizing left wing opposition groups.

18

Most prominently of the group New Orientation, there was

Erwin Bauer, a personal friend of Trotsky.

The left wing SAP leaders

who came to America have already been mentioned as former KPO right
wingers.

Before their evacuation to the United States, they crystallized

into the two factions around Walcher and Frolich.

Thus, all these SAP

leaders contributed to the atomization of the German socialist emigration in the United States.
None of them played a role in the American emigration except
17
18
and 183.

Ibid., pp. 21, 22.
olaf Ihlau, Die Roten Kampfer (Marburg, 1969), pp. 57, 58, 61,

12
Frank.

He was expelled from the SAP for his tendency to join the SPD

with a small group of SAP members.

He had also impatiently tried to

associate the miniscule SAP party militia, the Sozialistische Schutz~

(Socialist Defense League) of which he was the leader, with the

Eiserne Front

(~ron

Front) militia of the SPD and its Weimar coalition

After this expulsion, he became an SPD member in 1932.

partners.

19

But he was unhappy there with the indolence of the SPD towards National
Socialism and its unpreparedness for underground work.
The smallest of the four splinter groups discussed here was the
International League for the Socialist Struggle (ISK).

20

It was a

group of ethical socialists that was expelled from the SPD in 1926.
This was again a symptom of the SPD mentality which could not tolerate
the innocuous ISK idea of transforming society through moral leadership
rather than by revolution.

The League was a strong advocate of a

United Front against fascism.

For lack of a common working class can-

didate in the presidential elections of 1925, it recommended a vote for
t he

.

commun~st

can d ~'d ate, Ernst Th''l
a mann, as t h e 1esser

· 1 . 21

ev~

It

realized that the agrarian and the lower middle class were especially
liable to join the National Socialist movement and agreed with the
other splinter groups that National Socialism once in power would be
there to stay for a long while.

After January 1933, the ISK transformed

itself into an underground organization with an exile executive commit19
T·Ja d en, __Q,,
KP
p. 207 .
20

werner Link, Die Geschichte des Internationalen Jugenbundes
und des Internationalen Sozialistischen Kampfbundes (Marburg, 1964).
21

Ibid., pp. 154, 155.

13
tee.

It cooperated among others with the International Transport

workers' Federation (ITF) in Amsterdam and with the Einheitsverband
der Eisenbahner Deutschlands (Federation of the German National Railroad Workers).

22

But the arrests of 1937 and 1938 practically liqui-

dated the ISK underground groups in Germany.
A number of ISK emigrants escaped to America.

Anna Stein, a

leading ISK educator; Klara Deppe, the former secretary of the Hamburg
ISK district; and Hans Kakies arrived before the war.

After the French

defeat, about fifteen ISK functionaries escaped to the United States.

23

They received funds for their evacuation from one of their comrades in
Switzerland.

Among them were Erna Blencke, the former leader of a

Hannover based underground group, and Eva and Erich Lewinski who cooperated with the Social Democratic refugee committee in Marseille and
with the NB-related rescue committee in the United States.

The ISK

emigrants in America worked individually with American or German emigrant groups.
The most unusual of the socialist dissident organizations was
the New Beginning Group.

24

It was founded in 1931 by Walter LOwenheim

and was also called the Miles Group according to the pseudonym of its
founder.

It functioned within the SPD from which it recruited most of

22Ib.~ d . ' pp . 216' 217 •
23
24

Ibid., pp. 271, 272, 273.

Kurt Kliem, Der Sozialistische Widerstand gegen das Dritte
Reich dargestellt an der Gruppe Neu-Beginnen (Marburg, 1957), and
Edinger, Lewis J., German Exile Politics. The Social Democratic Executive Committee in the Nazi Era (University of California Press, 1956).
pp. 83-90, 96-98.

14
its members and from which it was never officially expelled.

According

to Lowenheim, only a new departure in theory and organization could defeat National Socialism.

In the face of fascism, a socialist revolu-

tion was only potential.

It required the patient and expert work of an

elitist organization whose underground cadres laid the foundation of a
counterrevolution.
lence.

Thus, NB was the underground organization par excel-

But by 1935, Lowenheim conceded the failure of his theory and

wanted to dissolve the NB Group.

In this situation, the NB Auslands-

leitung took over the organization.

Its leader was Frank who had

joined NB after 1933.
He reshaped the ideology of NB under the auspices of the
Revolutionary Socialists of Austria.

As a former Austrian socialist

who had left for Germany at the age of twenty-five, he was acquainted
with all Austrian socialist leaders and shared their activist approach
to antifascism.

This activism was based on a scientific realism that

relied on a study of the socio-economic conditions rather than on
revolutionary optimism.

Even under favorable conditions, socialist

progress could only come through activist leadership.

This dynamic

approach appealed to many European socialists who disliked the policy
of appeasement of the English and the French governments.

They saw in

it a third alternative to communism and Social Democracy.
The NB Group had the best organized underground organization
in Germany and a well connected executive committee abroad.

The latter

benefitted from the reputation of the Austrian emigrants who had made
a courageous stand against the Dollfuss regime in 1934.

It was favored

by a number of European labor parties and American labor groups as well

,
15
as by the Second Socialist International in Brussels, whose executive
secretary was the Austrian Friedrich Adler, and by some International
Union Trade Secretariates in Amsterdam.
During the first and second emigration in Czechoslovakia and
France, the issue of antifascism could unite the German socialists as
little as during the Weimar Republic.

Rather than solving the old

problems of the relationships between the various parties, the defeat
of the German labor movement created new ones.

The proportion of

strength between the two main parties and the splinter groups changed
after January 1933.

What the former lost the latter gained, so that

especially the SPD lost its confidence about its position within the
German labor movement in emigration and the splinter groups acquired
a new sense of significance.
ideology.

They still shared a common antifascist

Their reputation improved because their predictions about

National Socialism had come true.
underground and emigrant work.

Also, they were well prepared for

Numerically, they were at less of a

disadvantage at home and abroad than before.

The two main labor parties

and the unions had lost their former mass membership while the splinter
groups had always been top heavy with well qualified leaders.

In the

underground and abroad, the splinter groups could then compete with the
former giants of the Weimar Republic.
front ideologies.

They differed, however, in their

The SAP was the leader of the United Front advocates

but the NB Group preferred a concentration of all non-communist labor
groups.

The former approach was more attuned to the communist, the

latter to the Social Democratic emigration.

Yet, neither of the two_

major parties made good use of its opportunity so that after the second

,
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emigration, the German socialists were as divided as they had been at
the beginning of the first.
The Social Democrats felt insecure under the changed circumstances of the emigration.

The more militant European antifascists of

the exile countries blamed them for their poor performance against
.

Nat~ona

1

soc~a
. 1"~sm. 25

This lack of sympathy isolated the Social Demo-

crats and made them more defensive.
quarrels.

Also, defeat engendered internal

A number of SPD executives went abroad, first to the Saarland

and then to Czechoslovakia.

There, they experienced an abrupt change of

heart and called for a militant antifascism.

This annoyed the remaining

executives in Berlin who had not yet given up all hope for legal party
work.

As a result, each of the rump executive bodies claimed the final

party authority.

The SPD leaders in Prague constituted themselves as .

the exile executive of the SPD, the so-called Sopade.

26

In the result-

ing confusion, impatient second level SPD leaders in Germany organized
underground groups on their own initiative without recognizing the
jurisdiction of the Sopade.

They also cooperated with other socialist

underground groups. The Sopade was an exile head without much of a base
. 27
at home.
Also, Social Democratic emigrants in the Saarland, France
and elsewhere organized their own Landesgruppen in the absence of any
25
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central planning.

They claimed autonomy from the Sopade.

Together

with other socialist emigrants, they established the first border
stations for communication with adjacent underground groups in Germany.
The Sopade tried only later to integrat_e this system of border stations.
With the victory of National Socialism, the leftist policy of
German communism was outdated.

But a rightist policy came into its own

only after the VII. Congress of the Communist International in August
1935.

The communist German emigrants had rejected previous feelers of

the German splinter groups for an emigrant United Front.

When the call

from Moscow came they aimed at a comprehensive Popular Front rather
than a socialist United Front.

This strategy was geared to the defense

of the Soviet Union and did little to promote unity among the German
socialist emigration.
the right.

It outflanked the splinter group emigrants on

Thus, the most consistent advocates of a front against

Hitler were· left behind.
tion was divided.

The response of the Social Democratic emigra-

The Sopade in Prague agreed to talks with German

communist emigrants about practical matters but refused to issue a common manifesto.

It maintained this attitude towards the Popular Front

28
.
.
. P ar1s
. an d oth er West European c1t1es.
. .
negot1at1ons
1n

In the context

of the French Popular Front, the SPD Landesgruppe Frankreich (the
autonomous SPD emigrant group in France) and individual Social Democrats
participated in the experiment which Heinrich Mann sponsored in February
1936.

Albert Grzesinsky and Siegfried Aufnauser, two later members of

the Social Democratic group in New York, signed the manifesto of the
meeting at the Hotel Lutetia.
28

A group of SAP emigrants like Rosenfeld,

Adolph, Otto Wels, pp. 324-329.
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Walcher, Frolich and Willi Brandt also signed the manifesto which was
not followed up by other activities.

29

Later, the established Social

Democrats in New York were equally indecisive in their attitude towards
the first German American Popular Front.
not know where their interests lay.

For several years, they did

After the conclusion of the Hitler

Stalin Pact, they felt that anti-communism would give them the best
identity available.

The NB Group consistently abstained from United

and Popular Front discussions during the first two emigrations.

It was

mainly interested in a socialist concentration.
The Sopade was equally inconsistent in its response towards
cartel plans of the splinter groups.

In its hour of need, it tried to

regain its leadership with the revolutionary manifesto of January 28,
1934.

This document conceded that "the old apparatus no longer exists"

and pled for "new organizational forms".

The Sopade offered to serve

this revolutionary reorganization and promised to support "every group
whose revolutionary spirit guarantees that its activity contributes to
the downfall of the National Socialist dictatorship".

30

The Sopade

relied on the illegal network of NB and other groups and granted them
subsidies for their underground work.

By 1935, this honeymoon was over.

The Sopade felt betrayed by NB which had tried and failed to win an
independent seat in the Socialist International to be deducted from the
number of Sopade seats.
29
30

A further altercation occurred with the care-
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less handling by the Sopade of its documents about illegal contacts of
NB in Germany.
to

When a concerned Sopade secretary leaked the documents

Frank,who showed it to Adler of the Socialist International, the

Sopade charged the NB leader with bribery and conspiracy and cut off
all su b s1.'d'1.es. 31

This response of the exile executive was also condi-

tiqned by conspiratorial opposition within the Sopade which had little
to do with NB.
After this change of attitude towards NB and other socialist
groups, the Sopade relied more on its Mandatstheorie (the theory of its
mandate) for its emigrant legitimation.

It believed that it carried on

the mandate and the authority of the Weimar SPD because all Sopade
executives were elected or reelected at the emergency Reichskonferenz
(national conference of party leaders) of April 26, 1933.

32

This

gathering was a substitute for an ordinary national party convention
which was no longer feasible.

But the SPD leaders at this conference

did not intend to convey an unlimited mandate for the twelve years of
armed peace and international war of the Hitler era.

They still anti-

cipated a legal if reduced party activity and opposed the idea of
emigration.

The theory of the Sopade also disregarded the fact that a

party mandate was at best issued to the full reelected SPD executive.
But its Berlin section refused to recognize the authority of the emigrant section in Prague.
31

Nevertheless, the Sopade based its rejection
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of a socialist concentration during the thirties largely on its mandate
theory.
The occasion for such a concentration arose in 1938 after the
Austrian Anschluss and the German occupation of parts of Czechoslovakia.
This caused the second emigration which concentrated most emigrant
groups in France.

In June, 1938, the leader of the Austrian socialist

emigrants,Joseph Buttinger, addressed a call for the formation of a
socialist cartel to the Sopade, the autonomous SPD emigrant group in
France, to NB and eventually to the SAP.

The Sopade participated in a

debate on this issue in order to buy time and settle down in Paris.
Eventually, it rejected the idea of socialist emigrant unity.

It did

not want to lose its supposedly unique position and was afraid of
drowning in such a cartel arrangement.

In a symbolic act of question-

able legitimacy, it excluded Paul Hertz from the Sopade.

33

The

emergency national conference had chosen him as one of three executives
from the opposition to the former Weimar party executive.

Throughout

the first emigration, he promoted within the Sopade the idea of a
socialist concentration.

He also served as treasurer of NB and was on

close terms with the NB emigrant leaders and with NB and other underground groups in Germany.

The Social Democrats in New

Yor~

followed

the precedent of opposition to NB even though they could claim little
of the controversial statutory authority of the Sopade.

They did this

at a time when the Sopade toned down its own resentment of NB and other
splinter groups.

Their main fear was that of being outdone by the NB

organization in the United States.
33
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Thus, the stage was set for a
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fruitless antagonism that bedeviled the history of the German socialist
emigration in the United States.
The state of the American labor movement was not favorable for
the German socialist emigration,either.
ship of American labor groups.

The latter needed the sponsor-

But the demise of American socialism

coincided with the German socialist emigration.

This socialism had had

a modest start at the end of the nineteenth century which culminated in
the formation of the Socialist Labor Party (SLP).

This still radical

party had to give way to the reformist Socialist Party of America (SPA)
in 1901.

34

The SPA reached its peak before the First World War with

one-hundred-twenty-thousand members, and then suffered from its unpatriotic stand against American involvement in the war.

After the Russian

Revolution, the rise of.communism engulfed American socialism in a
debilitating series of party splits.

35

It decimated the SPA which

unsuccessfully tried to recover in its third party politics of the
twenties.

But the dreams of a new progressive Labor Party did not

materialize.
Thomas at

The Christian Socialist revival of the SPA under Norman

the end of the twenties was also shortlived.

36

It actually

contributed to the breakup of the SPA by introducing a new element into
a troubled party with no digestive capacity.
SPA occurred in 1936.

The major split of the

It produced a number of successor parties which

34
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did better than their mother party.
membership of below one thousand.
three parties.

By 1942, the SPA was left with a
American communism started out with

By Russian fiat, they were reduced to one by 1921.

By

that time, the Communist Party had lost most of the members whom it
had taken over from the- SPA.

Then it fumbled through the twenties with

changing directives from the Comintern.

At the end of the twenties, it

divested itself of its rightist opposition under Jay Lovestone and of
its Trotskist faction.

Then it enjoyed some prosperity during the

Popular Front period which coincided with the New Deal.
American socialism was largely an ethnic movement.

This cir-

cumstance had advantages and disadvantages for the German socialist
emigration.

The American Socialist and Communist parties consisted

partly of semi-autonomous language federations made up of local branches.
At the time of the SLP, the German element was the strongest.
declined with lessening immigration from Germany.

But it

By the end of the

thirties, the German percentage in the SPA and its successor parties
was negligible

SQ

that the socialist emigrants could not rely on much

ethnic party support.

The main German American legacy was the Neue

Volkszeitung which became the symbol of establishment for the Social
Democratic emigrants.
also small.

The Communist German language federation was

It bequeathed mainly its journalistic facilities to the

German splinter party emigration during the German American Popular
Front period.

German American unions played a minor role in the left

wing antifascist phenomenon of the latter.

The secondary German Ameri-

can labor organizations were also of debatable benefit to the socialist.
emigration.

For the sake of fraternal and cultural benefits, they

23
overcame disruptive ideological tendencies by accommodating communist,
left wing and right wing socialist factions within each organization.
For this reason, they were ideal Popular Front organizations.

But

they did not lend themselves to partisan support of competing emigrant
factions.

The Social Democratic emigrant group failed in its efforts

of monopolizing their support.

It tried hard to do so because these

secondary labor organizations represented the only, if limited, mass
basis for the organizational efforts of the emigrants.

These organi-

zations also contained the readership for the emigrant edited newspapers which always had German American predecessors.

The partisan

emigrant approach was out of tune with the practice of the secondary
labor organizations.
The Jewish labor groups turned out to be the most important for
the German socialist emigrants. They eclipsed the German element after
the mass emigration from the ghettos of Eastern Europe before and after
1900.

37

Most of these immigrants found employment with the Jewish

garment manufacturers of New York and, to a lesser extent, in other
East Coast cities and in Chicago.

38

The second wave of immigration

was especially strong and provided the mass membership of the Jewish
garment unions, of the Jewish language federation and of the Jewish
37
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fraternal organizations.

With it came Jewish socialists of the General

Jewish Workers' Union who constituted a second generation of Jewish
American leaders.

39

Because of these origins, Jewish socialist organi-

zations were mainly regionalized in New York.

In the communist exodus,

many members of the Jewish language federation left the Socialist
Party.

In the rump SPA, the Jewish socialists were divided among the

Old Guard and the Centrist factions.

The Jewish partisans of the Old

Guard played an important role in the breakup of the SPA and in the
formation of its successor parties.

The American Labor Party (ALP)

and the Liberal Party in New York were Jewish parties that eventually
completely replaced the Socialist Party of that state.

The garment

unions provided a synthesizing element in the Jewish labor movement.
Despite their socialist background, they affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor where they played an important role, especially
during the New Deal.

They were also the main advocates of industrial

unionism and became instrumental in the formation of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations in 1936.
The Jewish socialists provided a link between American and
European labor that was vital for the German socialist emigrants.
They had an ideological and cultural affinity with European socialism
because of their recent East European origins and their continuing ties
with Jewish labor there.

In the refugee crisis of 1940, they organized

the evacuation of their European comrades.
39
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limited ethnic purpose.

They formed the Jewish Labor Committee (JLC)

to combat antisemitism at home and abroad.

In this comprehensive

purpose, they included German socialist emigrants in their rescue
operation and became the main sponsors of these emigrants in this
country.

They also mediated between the emigrants and the AFL execu-

tive under William Green.
In general, the historical differences between the German and
the American labor movement complicated the association between emigrant and American groups.

Many American socialists disliked the

German Social Democrats for their nationalist support of the war effort
from 1914 to 1918 which split

~he

German party.

They sympathized with

the USPD which later caused jealousies in the emigration.

The Social-

ist Party of America had been exemplary in its nearly unanimous opposition to American military involvement.

40

It suffered for this stand

materially but it emerged ideologically intact from the war years.
What broke the spirit of the SPA was its inability to deal with the
issue of communism after the Bolshevist Revolution.

41

At first, very

few American socialists were unhappy about the establishment of the
.
um.on.
. 42
So~et

Even a right wing socialist like Abraham Cahan found

occasional praise for the proletarian government in Russia.
Differences arose only over the applicability of Russian
methods to the United States.
40
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and especially the Russian federation, had swelled by recent immigration from Imperial Russia.

After 1917, they got carried away by their

pride in the Bolshevist Revolution.

A majority of them believed that

their extremism could succeed if they dared to apply the surgical knife
to the body of the SPA and cut it down to the essential minority.

A

minority hoped to win over the whole Socialist Party to the new cause
but was repudiated.

After the initial splits, the fading SPA still

opted for the class struggle and against compromising political coalitions of the Weimar type.

In 1920, it was forced by a party referendum

to apply for affiliation with the Communist International but could not
comply with the conditions imposed by the latter.

The German Social

Democrats could not understand this lack of political discrimination
in the Socialist Party of America.

Only the successor parties of the

SPA were sufficiently rightist for the taste of the German Social
Democrats who by then had become emigrants.
The Christian Socialist revival under Norman Thomas only made
the SPA more foreign to German socialists and led to a destructive
polarization within the party.

The Socialist Party could stand the

increase in membership from below eight thousand to nearly twenty
thousand that accompanied the new leadership of Thomas.

But it could

not survive the overdose of an infusion of new elements.

These new

members were young and middle class.

They were mostly progressive in-

tellectuals or Christian Socialists with a college background and a
radical apprenticeship in the Intercollegiate Socialist Society.
43
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They did not fit easily into a labor party even though the ideological
difference between progressivism, Christian Socialism and democratic
socialism is marginal.

Instead of narrowing this gulf, Thomas symbol-

ized it with his animosity towards Morris Hillquit.

He personally led

the campaign for the ouster of the veteran national chairman from a
mere 1y h onorary

. .

pos~t~on.

44

He further strained the factional relations

with his progressive political ventures such as his municipal efforts
in New York which contributed to the demise of the Democratic Tammany
Hall establishment in 1933. 45

Under these circumstances, the party

failed to benefit from the propitious times of the depression.

The

defection of many socialists to the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt
was less a cause than a symptom.of socialist disunity.
Thomas might have saved the unity of the SPA if he had done the
necessary mediation.

Instead, he let his antipathy towards the Old

Guard get the better of him and supported the progressive intellectuals
even when he disagreed with their position.

46

He needed them in his

party and was afraid of losing them if they became isolated.

They were

called the Militants, more because of their evangelical social zeal
than for the radical vocabulary which served them as rhetoric in the
contest for control of the party.

To the German Social Democratic

emigrants, the Militants were as repulsive as to the Old Guard of the
SPA, especially after a Militant led delegation to the conference of
44
45
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the Socialist International of August 1933 in Paris humbled the guest
delegation of the German unionist and Social Democratic emigrants for
their recent indolence towards National Socialism and their inevitable
defeat.

Out of

resent~ent

for the Militants, the Old Guard defended

the German Social Democratic record of antifascism.
The early socialist emigrants in the United States witnessed
the further disruption of the SPA.

Both the Old Guard and the Militants

were determined to win control of the party or break it up.

47

The

emigrants became inevitably involved in these factional struggles which
influenced their history in the United States.

They criticized,

especially, the isolationist Declaration of Principles which the Militant minority submitted to the National convention of 1934 in Detroit.
This Declaration proposed mass resistance and a general strike against
American participation in a potential war.

The new party constitution

passed when Thomas threw in his lot and the votes of his delegate block
48
. h t h e M'l'
.
.
~ ~tant mLnorLty.

w~t

As a result, the Old Guard lost control

of the national-executive committee. 49
It fought back vigorously and not always legitimately.

First,

it conducted an expensive campaign before the party referendum and
lost.

The new Declaration was narrowly accepted with a voter partici-

pation of only 50%.

50

At that point, control of the vital New York
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City and State organizations of the SPA was at stake.

After the Old

Guard dissolved some city branches and replaced them with paper
branches,the Militants and Centrists set up a rival state organization
that was

. d
recogn~ze

by t he

.
1
nat~ona

.
execut~ve.
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The denouement of the

crisis came with the primary elections of the spring of 1936 which also
decided about the number of delegates that each faction could send to
the national convention in Cleveland.

The pro-Thomas group won with

56% of the vote and thirty delegates to the Old Guard's twelve.
latter could only fade out or bolt the party.

52

The

Its delegation was not

seated at the national convention when some of its leaders refused to
rise for the singing of the International.

They had already drawn up

plans for a new party which they called the Social Democratic Federation (SDF).
The SDF was a small party which did not live up to the expectations of its founders.

53

The Socialist Party of Wisconsin joined the

Farmer Labor Progressive Federation which was a member of the Progressive Party of Wisconsin.

For this reason, the Social Democratic

emigrant group could take no foothold in Milwaukee.

It did take over

the small German language branch of the SDF which it invited all Social
Democratic emigrants to join.

The moderate socialists of the garment

unions did not fit into the SDF.

They founded the American Labor Party

(ALP) so that they could deliver their entire vote to Roosevelt and
become independent New Deal partners.
51
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The ALP started out as a New
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York organization.

But its name was designed for national expansion

which made, however, little progress.
an important national role.

Nevertheless, the party played

The SDF was closely associated with the

ALP, almost in the form of a member organization.

It left most of the

candidacies for city, state and Congressional offices ·to the ALP and
supported all ALP candidates.

By 1938, the American Labor Party re-

placed the Socialist Party in New York.
to join the new party.

54

The latter advised its members

During the war years, the ALP fell victim to

a contest between its communist and progressive factions.

In 1944, the

progressive minority left the ALP and founded the Liberal Party which
also played an important electoral role.

The SDF remained an insigni-

ficant group.
After 1936, the SPA dwindled into non-existence.

55

Its isola-

tionism drove out the internationalist faction in 1940 and 1941.

56

The

latter constituted that portion of the SPA which sponsored the NB emigration in the United States.

A group of internationalists, led by

Reinhold Niebuhr, founded the Union for Democratic Action which supported the interventionist foreign policy of

Roosevelt.

57

Later,

another group dropped out which was centered around the United Auto
Workers and included Leonard Woodcock and Paul Porter of Kenosha, Wisconsin, the site of the American Motors Company.
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Both of them had been
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members of the national executive committee of the SPA.

Walter Reuther

had left the SPA in 1938 already because of an electoral quarrel with
the Trotskist faction in the Socialist Party.

58

nationalists to leave was the conciliatory Alfred
leader of the Massachusetts party.

One of the last interBaker Lewis, the

The SPA affiliate League for Indus-

trial Democracy also dissociated itself from Thomas and forced him to
resign from its board.

Two of its important officials were Mary Fox

and Anna Caples, the latter of whom married the NB leader, Frank.

All

of the above leaders supported or joined the NB sponsor organization,
the American Friends of German Freedom.
appeared by the end of the thirties.

Thus, the SPA had nearly dis-

But its successor organizations

sponsored either the Neubeginnen or the Social Democratic emigrant
group in the United States.
The communist party adjusted somewhat to American conditions
between 1918 and 1921, not without help from the Comintern.

The

revolutionary American purists were told by Lenin that left wing communism is "an infantile disorder".
had to unite.

The two existing communist parties

Their members had to join the other American labor

organizations in what was called a United Front from bel6w.

The united

communist party was still something of an underground organization.

By

December 1921, it shed this vestige of revolutionary conspiracy with
the formation of the open and legal Workers' Party which lasted until
1928.

By that year, it had expelled its unruly factions and took on

the name of Communist Party of America (CPA).
58
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A former left wing group
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of the SPA was largely responsible for the change to the Workers' Party.
This so-called Workers' Council had remained in the Socialist Party
and agitated for the association of the latter with the Third or Communist International in order to salvage the whole SPA for the proletarian cause.

After the failure of this strategy, the Workers'

Council campaigned for an open communist party and won the approval of
the Comintern.

59

While the socialist movement was breaking up in the 1930's,
the communist party was on an upswing, especially after 1935 when the
Comintern issued the policy of the United and Popular Front from above.
The CPA made a good public relations effort in these years and had a
certain organizational momentum.

It could rely on the pro-Sovietism

and antifascism of many American intellectuals.

The New Deal condoned

the Popular Front which involved labor organizations like the CIO and
even some unions of the AFL.

Their support was valuable for Roosevelt.·

But the impressiveness of the Popular Front was more on the level of
propaganda.

Its actual strength is difficult to determine.

American socialists and ex-socialists on the defensive.

It put the

They could not

trust a party that had wrecked the American socialist movement.

On the

other hand, they did not know what to make of the official acquiescence
in the Popular Front which made them feel uncertain in their anticommunism.
The German and Jewish sectors of the American labor movement
formed the ethnic context of the German socialist emigration in the
59
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United States.

The German language federation of the SPA began declin-

ing before the First World War.
communist party.

After the war, part of it left for the

A percentage of the remaining component found itself

in the Social Democratic Federation after the party split of 1936.
The German Social Democratic emigrants had an easy time of dominating
this small German language branch.

The communist party had a German

Bureau which coordinated and subordinated the various German party
locals.

Until 1925, its secretary had been Ludwig Lore.

60

He had

played an important role in the socialist movement before and after
the First World War.
Volkszeitung.

In the SPA, he

becam~

the editor of the New York

It was established as the German American daily by the

Socialist Labor Party and switched to the SPA with the German American
socialists who were instrumental in founding that party.

During the

American years of Trotsky, Lore became a friend of the Russian revolutionary.

In the confusion caused by the rise of communism, he played

a waiting game as one of the main leaders of the Workers' Council.
This also suited his position as editor of the Volkszeitung,which had
a mixed readership after 1918.

After the Workers' Council merged with

the Workers' Party, the Volkszeitung was at the disposal of the German
Bureau and became the official German American communist daily.

When

Stalin came to power, Lore had to pay for his Trotskism and for his
earlier aloofness from the communist party.

He was expelled in 1925

and carried on the Volkszeitung until 1931 as a paper in between the
60
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communist and Socialist Parties in accordance with its centrist readership of the secondary German labor organizations.
volkszeitung lasted until October 1932.

Without Lore, the

It was discontinued because

of factional difficulties,but reappeared two months later as the Neue
Volkszeitung (NVZ) with mainly conservative sponsorship.
ties, Lore was only a marginal socialist figure.

In the thir-

One of his associates

in the Workers' Council and later in the CPA, the German American
William F. Kruse, reappeared in 1942 in Chicago as the head of a German
American Volksfront group.
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As a right wing socialist paper, the Neue

Volkszeitung became involved in the factional struggles that preceded
the party split of May 1936.

With that mission accomplished, the

editorship of the NVZ was given to the Social Democratic emigrant,
Gerhard Seger, the same month.

The NVZ became the weekly of the German

branch of the Social Democratic Federation, whose strong Jewish branch
sponsored the conservative German emigrants.

Both the SDF and the NVZ

became rallying points for the official Social Democratic emigrant group.
Simultaneously

with the NVZ in December 1932, appeared the

Kampfsignal as the periodical of the left wing, non-communist socialists.
Front.

It hoped to become a major voice of a German American United
But it could only maintain itself for a few years against the

competition of the communist and Social Democratic press.

Its pub-

lishers included many former supporters and colleagues of Lore.

It was

also supported by some left wing branches of the secondary German

~einstein, The Decline of Socialism, pp. 171, 247; and Draper,
The Roots of American Communism, pp. 330, 331, 332, 342 footnote 28.
6
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American labor organizations such as the Arbeiter-Kranken-und SterbeKasse (AKStK,Workmenrs Benefit Fund), which will be discussed later.
An important figure in the latter organization was Otto Sattler, one
of the main centrist promoters of the German American United and Popular Front.

The Kampfsignal bore the same name as the paper of the

German SAP.

Its supporters were in contact with the leaders of the

German splinter party.

The German SAP founder, Rosenfeld, emigrated to

the United States where he cooperated closely with Sattler.
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After the expulsion of Lore, the German Bureau of the CPA had
to publish a new paper.

Der Arbeiter appeared from 1927 to 1937.

outlasted the period of communist leftism by two years.

It

They were

necessary in order to adjust to the new policy of the United and Popular
Front.

The result was the Deutsches Volksecho which was edited by

German leftist emigrants.
the German Bureau.

63

Some of them were probably associated with

But this connection would,in any case, have been

disguised during the Popular Front period.
An important affiliate of the German Bureau of the CPA was the
federation of the Deutsche Arbeiterklubs of North

America.

They were

United Front organizations but their formation predated the official
policy switch of the Comintern.

They tried to give organizational

expression to the antifascism of the German American workers.

In this

function, they were at first officially independent of the German Bureau.
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The DAK Yorkville in New York City was organized in December 1932.
Others followed in 1933 and 1934, including the DAK Milwaukee.
were federated in March 1934.

They

The two main organizers of the DAK's

were E. W. Mareg and Richard BekGran.
states after the First World War.

The latter had come to the United

He joined the Communist Party in

1930 and became a functionary of its German Bureau.

In 1935, the latter

made an end to the precarious independence of the DAK's by requesting
that their news bulletin become a supplement to Der Arbeiter, thus depriving it of its non-partisan character.

Mareg and BekGran were

disappointed about this change and left the CPA with a faction of the
DAK's.

They formed the Klub deutscher Antifaschisten (Club of German

Antifascists) in New York, and supported the journal Gegen den Strom
which BekGran published in imitation of the official paper of the
German communist party opposition.

Later, Gegen den Strom joined the

Social Democratic emigrants in denouncing the NB leader Frank as a
communist agent.
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The German American socialists also had a

f~w

parapolitical

.organizations such as the German American Forum and the German American
Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold (National Flag Black-Red-Geld, the militia
for the defense of the Weimar Republic).
the Wendekreis (Tropic).
organization.

The Forum was the successor of

It was a socialist educational and propaganda

In the thirties, its president was Frank Bohn, who later

headed the Social Democratic rescue effort in Southern France.

It

participated in the German American Popular Front for a short time with

64
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the Social Democratic emigrant Seger as its delegate.

The American

branch of the Reichsbanner had been organized in the late twenties by
German Social Democratic immigrants from the Weimar Republic.

Its

Chicago City branch participated longer in the Popular Front than the
New York branch.
There were also
and CIO.

a number of German American unions of the AFL

They were either socialist, Social Democratic, pro-communist,

independent laborite, conservative,or mixed.

Regarding their partici-

pation in the Popular Front, it is not always clear whether an entire
local or only a faction of it was a member.

In Chicago, there remained

few pro-Popular Front union locals after the movement for independent
labor politics in the twenties and thirties.

New York was better off

with locals of the International Association of Machinists, of the
Electrical Workers, Brewery Workers, and others.
More important and less politically oriented were the fraternal
and cultural German American labor organizations.

The largest of them

was the Workmen's Benefit Fund (AKStK). It was founded during the time
of Socialist Labor Party predominance in the 1880's and numbered one
thousand members at its first convention in 1892.

By 1901, its member-

ship rose to thirty thousand and by 1931, to fifty-eight thousand.
After some decline and recovery in the 1930's, it stabilized around
fifty thousand by 1939.

During the First World War, the AI<St:.K naturally

adhered to the antiwar resolution of the SPA.

The editor of its monthly

journal Solidaritat or Solidarity was relieved of his post for his proGerman and pro-war attitude.

He was replaced by Otto Sattler who held

this position until after the Second World War.

As a centrist socialist,
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he cooperated closely with Rosenfeld and other leftist emigrants in the
German American United and Popular Fronts.

Kruse was also an official

of the AKStK and used this position for his Popular Front activity.
The communist equivalent of the AKStK was the Arbeiter-Krankenund Sterbe-Versicherung (Workmens' Benefit Insurance) in which Ludwig
Lore was instrumental.
national Workers' Order.

It was the German American Branch of the InterOther communist organizations included several

German American branches of the International Labor Defense like the
Klara Zetkin branch of Yorkville, a German neighborhood on the East
Side of Manhattan.
The main cultural organizations were the Naturfreunde (Nature
Friends) and the Arbeitersangerbund (ASB, Federation of Workmen's
Choirs).
originated

The latter was a federation of
part~y

before 1900.

va~ious

individual groups that

Such local groups as the Ferdinand

LaSalle Women's Choir and the DeLeon Men's Choir in Chicago were probably members of the ASB.

The Nature Friends organization was started by

German and Austrian immigrants around 1910.

By 1939, there were twenty

local branches in the United States with eighteen nature camps throughout the country.

Camp Midvale in New Jersey became the scene of many

Popular Front activities during the thirties.

The movement originated

around 1890 in Vienna,and spread rapidly throughout Europe with a membership in the hundred thousands.

It made the contact of city workers

with nature financially possible.

The athletic clubs of the workers

were mostly organized on a local level such as the Soziale Turnverein
(the Social Turners) in Chicago.

The Soziale Turnhalle (Social Turners'

Hall)on Belmont and Lincoln Avenues served all German American labor

l
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organizations, including the Popular Front, for major events.
The Jewish socialist organizations had imitated,at
structure of the German establishment.

first~the

After some experimentation, the

early Jewish socialist groups were consolidated as an autonomous branch
of the Socialist Labor Party.

Jewish socialists of the SLP then organ-

ized the union federation of the Vereinigte Yiddishe Gewerkschaften or
United Hebrew Trades (UHT) which paralleled the Vereinigte Deutsche
Gewerkschaften (United German Trades).
unions as members of the UHT.

Then, they founded individual

These affiliated with the AFL in accord-

ance with German American reformism which abhorred dual unionism.
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Also, in 1892,the fraternal organization of the Arbeiterring or Workmen's Circle (WC) was founded in New York.
ization in 1910.

66

It became a national organ-

.

One problem of early Jewish socialism was the alienation between
socialist leaders and Yiddish working people from Eastern Europe.

The

first generation of these leaders was more Russian arid intellectual
than ethnic and political.

They spoke Russian even in private and were

part of the socialist component of the Russian Enlightenment that followed the Crimean War.

These international socialists were more inter-

ested in ideological debate than in labor organization.

One of these

debating societies was the Russian Labor Lyceum in New York.

Under the

influence of German American socialists, they turned toward the Yiddish
65
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speaking working class and started seriously to organize American Jewish
labor.

67

Two important leaders of the first generation were Morris

Hillquit and Abraham Cahan.

The former immigrated to the United States

in 1888 and eventually became the chairman of the Socialist Party.

The

latter came in 1882 and became the foremost Jewish socialist journalist.
The main work of Cahan was the Jewish Daily Forward.

In 1897,

he was instrumental in planning and establishing this Jewish socialist
daily which was named after the Vorwarts of the much admired German
Social Democratic Party.

68

This development paralleled the breakup of

the SLP which had controlled all socialist papers.

Cahan planned an

independent popular daily with the motto of "for the party but not by,
or of, the party".

Under his editorship, the Forward reached a circu-

lation of seventy-two thousand in 1907, and of over two hundred thousand
in its second decade.

On this basis, Cahan had a strong influence on

the development of the Jewish labor movement.

The Forward nearly mon-

opolized Jewish socialist propaganda and played a strong role in Jewish
labor disputes.

It often also controlled the strike funds.

Thus,

Cahan came to occupy a unique position in the Jewish and American labor
movement.

He developed the habit of acting independently and uncom-

promisingly,and resented the ascendancy of the second generation of
Jewish socialist leaders.

He displayed his stubbornness especially

during the factional fights within the SPA in the 1930's.
67
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His partisan-
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ship for the German Social Democrats was equally onesided and disruptive.
The decisive impulse to the American Jewish labor movement came
from the mass immigration of the post-1905 pogroms and its second generation Jewish socialist leaders.

The Jewish garment unions grew

rapidly and became cohesive organizations with a determined membership
and a common ideology.

The roots of these qualities were in the East

European labor movement whose General Jewish Workers' Union or Bund had
made considerable progress around 1900.

The main American Jewish

unions were the garment unions of the International Ladies' Garment
Workers (ILGWU), the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA),
and the United Hat and Cap Makers and Millinery Workers (UHCMWU).
were also Jewish unions of the furriers, painters and
workers.

There

co~struction

The Workmen's Circle also prospered on the new immigration

and rose to a membership of fifty thousand by 1915 and to over one hundred thousand in later years.

The ILGWU was founded in 1901 as the

successor of previous UHT unions.
during the

fac~ional

Depression.

After years of expansion, it declined

struggles of the twenties and the misery of the

But during the New Deal it rose to a membership of over

two hundred and fifty thousand and became the third largest union of
the AFL.
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Its president, David Dubinsky, became a vice president of

.

the AFL.

He cooperated loyally with Roosevelt and was instrumental in

founding the American Labor Party and the Liberal Party for this purpose.
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. ky was a
Du b ~ns

.

typ~ca

in Brest Litovsk in 1892.

1 secon d

.

generat~on

1ea d er. 70

He was born

At the age of fifteen, he became the secre-

tary of a Bund union local.

After repeated arrests, he was condemned

to exile in Siberia but escaped on the march there and came to New York
in 1911.

He worked in the SPA but concentrated on his career in the

garment unions.

As the leader of the strongest garment union, he also

had an influence on the German socialist emigration in the United States.
The ACWA was founded in 1914 as a rival union of the United
Garment Workers, an affiliate of the UHT and the AFL.
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In the strike

of 1910 against the Jewish garment manufacturers in Chicago, the United
Garment Workers insensitively betrayed the tailors of Chicago who revolted afterwards against their national union and founded their own
union of men's clothing workers four years later.

~he

ACWA soon out-

distanced its rival and reached a membership of one hundred twenty
thousand.

After a compromise with the United Garment Workers, it was

reconciled with the AFL for the two years from 1934 to 1936.

Before

and after this short AFL membership, it was an independent union and
was always more radical than the ILGWU.

It spearheaded the drive for

industrial unionism which ended with the formation of the CIO.

It re-

mained in the American Labor Party after the ILGWU had left the ALP for
the Liberal Party.
over thirty years.
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Sidney Hillman was the president of the ACWA for
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against the United Garment Workers.

He was born in Lithuania in 1887

and joined the Bund at the age of sixteen.

After six months in jail,

he left Russia during the post-1905 reaction and arrived in the United
States in 1907.

As a union leader of national stature, he held such

posts as· associate director of the War Production Board.

For the

German Social Democratic emigrants, he was too far to the left.
The most important Jewish leader for the German socialist emigrants was Charney B. Vladek.
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He was born in Minsk in 1886.

young age, he became a professional organizer for the Bund.
was his underground name which he later assumed permanently.
tation as an orator won him the name of "the second Lasalle".

At a

"Vladek"
His repuAt the

exile convention of the Russian socialists in London in 1907, Lenin
tried to win the votes of the Bund delegates by individually inviting
them to lunch.

To his later regret, Vladek voted for the group of

Lenin which broke away from the group of Plekhanov.
emigrated to the United States.
political career.

In 1908, Vladek

He joined the SPA and had a significant

He was the main conciliator in the SPA and despaired

over its breakup in 1936,which probably contributed to his early death
in 1938.

During the thirties, he promoted underground work in Poland

and encouraged the German socialist emigrants on his visits to Europe.
He had an evenhanded approach to .the latter and invited representatives
of the German garment unions, the Social Democratic and the NB emigration to the United States.

Had he lived longer, he would have estab-

lished some unity in the German socialist emigration in the United
73
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States.

The uneasy relationship between Vladek and Cahan had its after-

effects on the German socialist emigrants in America.

It symbolized the

antagonism between the first and second generation of Jewish socialist
leaders which was largely resolved by the thirties except for the Jewish
Daily Forward.

Cahan held on to the control of his creation and of the

Forward Publishing Association which was a stronghold of the Jewish
Old Guard.

As one of the main promoters of the Yiddish language and

literature and as a writer and poet of considerable talents, Vladek
became general manager of the Forward in 1916 but could not dislodge
Cahan.

The latter survived him by many years and played partisan poli-

tics with the German socialist emigrants.
After 1933, Vladek and Dubinsky were the two Jewish leaders
most instrumental in organizing American union aid for European underground work.

At first, they were concerned with the fate of the Bund

in Poland under the rightist government of Pilsudski.. But they were
also interested in assisting illegal groups in Germany and German
socialist emigrant groups.
Anti-Hitler Labor League.

For these purposes, they initiated the
The 1934 national convention of the AFL in

San Francisco discussed and accepted their proposal.

They had also in-

vited Walter Citrine, the president of the International Federation of
Trade Unions, to speak on behalf of the European underground and emigrant labor movement.

William Green, the president of the AFL, served

as chairman of the Labor League which established a Labor Chest for the
collection of funds.
ILGWU.

Dubinsky raised $64,000 the same year from the
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During the conflicts over the CIO, the Labor League fell into
abeyance and was eventually replaced by the Jewish Labor Committee
(JLC).
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The AFL gave an ultimatum to the garment unions as the organ-

izers of the Committee on Industtial Organization.

The latter then

left the AFL and became the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
ACWA participated in the CIO.

The

The ILGWU saved face by becoming inde-

pendent for two years before rejoining the AFL in 1937.
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For these

reasons, the Jewish labor organizations had to rely on themselves in
their fight against antisemitism at home and ·abroad.

The Jewish Labor

Committee comprised mainly the garment unions, the Workmen's Circle and
the American branch of the Bund.

Until 1941, it contributed $224,000

to the European underground labor movement.

In the refugee crisis of

the first war years, it organized the evacuation of several hundred
Bundists and European socialists to America.
But the

American labor movement could not provide adequate

sponsorship for the German socialist emigrants.

The remnant groups of

American socialism involved these emigrants in their own complexities
which reinforced an already well established German factionalism.
Because of this preoccupation with organizational politics, the antifascist work of the socialist emigrants took second place.
complished very little in the decade from 1935 to 1945.

They ac-

The period of

the German American Popular Front exemplifies the limits of interaction
between emigrant and American groups in an ethnic socialist context.
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CHAPTER III
THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE GERMAN AMERICAN
POPULAR FRONT 1934 - 1939
The German American component of the Popular Front movement is
difficult to define.

It was a native movement in which a few social-

ist emigrants served as leaders.

The ascendancy of the emigrants was

a gradual process that took place at the pace and rate of their arrival
from Europe.

An analysis of the German American Popular Front is,

therefore, a study in the complexity of political association and interaction.

The divisions of American and German socialism were con-

fusing already when considered separately.

Their combination in Popular

Front organizations of unclear initiatives and relations produced patterns even more difficult to disentangle.

In the associations between

ideologically equivalent native and emigrant factions some native organizations, and nearly all native newspapers ended up under emigrant
control.

The resulting ethnic mergers constituted the building blocks

of a Popular Front in which the respective ideologies and goals could
coexist only precariously in various phases of a double ascendancy.
Native control gave way to emigrant control.

Within this development,

centrist prominence was followed by a short period of limited factional
balance which then succumbed to leftist leadership.

These oscillations

followed the chronology of the United and Popular Fronts.
Front was a centrist invention for dealing with fascism.
46

The United
The commu-
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nists accepted it officially only in 1935 and then only as a prerequisite of their Popular Front.

The native and emigrant Social Democrats

went along temporarily only because of their involvement in the secondary and United Front-like German American labor organizations whose
participation in the Popular Front they could not prevent.

When the

Social Democrats formed their own political groups after the breakup of
the Socialist Party, they left the centrists at the mercy of the leftists.

With the decline of the SPA, the centrists no longer had a party

political home and became stuck in the Popular Front.

The latter

brought some centrist and leftist socialist emigrants together.

But it

also reinforced the Social Democratic phobia of intersocialist cooperation.
The first native Popular Front of centrist initiative was the
Antifaschistische Aktion (Antifascist Action Committee).

It folded

when the still unreformed communists tried to take it over.

The cen-

trists then attempted a non-partisan Popular Front in the DeutschAmerikanische Kultur Verband (DAKV, German American League for Culture)
that consisted of the secondary labor organizations and of some educational party affiliates.
above.

It went through all the phases mentioned

Rosenfeld reinforced the native centrists.

The Social Democrat-

ic emigrant, Seger, became its president until May 1936, the month the
Social Democratic Federation was formed, and Seger became the editor of
the Neue Volkszeitung.

After that, some Social Democratic labor groups

still belonged to the DAKV and the moderate German American, Frank Bohn,
became its president until 1938.

But for the year after the exit of

Seger, the initiative in the DAKV went to the Popular Front group of
Chicago.
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The latter consisted of the editors of the monthly Volksfront
and of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft fortschrittlicher deutsch-amerikanischer
Vereine (Action Committee of the Progressive German American Societies).
The Action Committee was founded in the spring of 1935, that is, before
the DAKV.

It included also some emigrants but the.ir proportion cannot

be sufficiently established.

Its organizer, Erich von Schrotter, a

recent immigrant from Austria, was also the chief editor of the Volksfront.

This Chicago group became the DAKV Chicago.

disposed of the only newspaper in the DAKV.

For a while, it

Its ideology was an Austrian

type antifascist activism whose antiwar stand paralleled Midwestern
isolationism.

The DAKV Chicago soon launched a campaign for expansion

in the Midwest and the Far West in the hope of winning a proportional
share of national executive authority at the first national convention
of the DAKV.
But the leftist emigrants in New York upstaged the Chicagoans
and took them under their protection.

They had arrived in this country

in 1937 and 1938 and edited the Deutsches Volksecho (DVE), the communist
Popular Front successor of the Arbeiter.

They first established their

ascendancy in the DAKV New York before synchronizing their preparations
for the national convention with the DAKV Chicago.
convention was postponed until 1938.

For more time, the

In the meantime, the

rep~esentative

of the DAKV New York made himself comfortable in the DAKV Chicago.

He

rivaled the organizational work of Schrotter and became co-editor of the
Volksfront.

The latter then fell in line with the emigrant policy of

all out support for President Roosevelt.

Part of the leftist prepara-

tion for the national convention was the campaign for an Einheitszeitung.

l

49
The latter would have combined the two New York papers of the Volksecho
and the Volkszeitung and left the Volksfront intact.

It conveniently

provided a positive appeal to the secondary labor organizations to the
detriment of the Social Democrats.
At the national convention, the emigrant-immigrant coalition

-

converted its Popular Front ascendancy into executive control of the
DAKV.

It shifted the executive seat to Chicago, out of reach of inter-

ference by non-leftist groups in New York.

The leftists strengthened

their position further with continued expansion.

The Chicago DAKV

attempted inter-ethnic antifascism in Chicago and in Hollywood.

The

New York DAKV was strengthened by two new member organizations, the
Volksfrontgruppe deutscher Emigranten (Popular Front Group of German
Emigrants) under Rosenfeld and the German American Writers' Association.
The latter included emigrant and native writers of socialist and liberal
persuasion but its leftist emigrants were predominant.
The political and diplomatic developments in Europe were unfavorable to the P9pular Front movement.

The latter lost its momentum

with the defeat of the front governments in France and Spain.

It

failed because of the appeasement policy of France and England and the
resulting diplomatic deal between Stalin and Hitler.

In the period of

DAKV decline, the Neue Volkszeitung tried unsuccessfully to wean the
secondary labor orbanizations away from the DAKV.

After the Hitler-

Stalin Pact, it openly denounced the DAKV and tried to organize its
own ethnic labor front.

The DAKV could not adjust to the new situation

at its second national convention in September 1939 in Cleveland.
reverted to a cultural and domestic emphasis in its ideology which

It

l
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concentrated on social and educational legislation.
attempt of changing its image failed.

But its main

German American conservative

cultural organizations wanted to deal even less with the DAKV in 1939
than before.

Under these circumstances, the Volksecho and the Volks-

front stopped publication.
Volksfront was over.

The first phase of the German American

The DAKV survived with the low profile of a pas-

sive federation of some locals of the secondary labor organizations.
The political climate of the years from 1939 to 1941 favored the activities of the Social Democratic emigrants.
The development of the Antifascist Action Committee exemplifies
the fate of centrist initiative in socialist front politics.

The sue-

cess of the latter hinged on the attitude of the left and right wing
factions.

The centrists could only count on the interest of their

United Front partners in the secondary labor organizations.

Sattler

and his followers in the Workmen's Benefit Fund initiated the Antifascist Action Committee.

For its foundation, eighty representatives of

German American labor organizations met at the New York Labor Temple in
February 1933.

1

As a political thinker and motivator and as the editor

of the Solidarity, Sattler had a certain moral influence but the extent
of his statutory leadership in the Benefit Fund is unclear.

In the

Action Committee the centrist factions of his and other secondary labor
organizations had to deal with communist groups like the German branch
1
Volksfront, (monthly, from November 1935 to March 1938; weekly,
from April 1938 to September 1939; published by the Action Committee of
Progressive German Societies in Chicago from November 1935 to February
1936; by the German American League for Culture in Chicago from March
1936 to September 1939), 3 June 1938; see also Die Einheitsfront (newspaper published in one issue by the Anti-fascist Action Committee, New
York), August 1934.
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of the Communist Party, the publishers of the Arbeiter, the Federation
of the Deutsch Amerikanische Arbeiterklubs (German American Workers'
Clubs), and the Rote Hilfe (Red Aid).

For political balance, the

German language group of the Socialist Party and the publishers of the
Neue Volkszeitung represented the Socialist side.

2

This fragile coali-

tion was able to publish its Einheitsfront only in the single issue of
August 1934.

When the communists succeeded in making support of their

Arbeiter a condition for further membership in the Action Committee,
the German language group of the SPA, the representatives of the NVZ
..
3
an d o f ot h er groups, lef t t h e f ront organ1zat1on.
As a result of the experience with the Action Committee, the
German American League for Culture was organized on a different basis
as its name implied.

It excluded political parties and consisted only

of the secondary labor organizations.

Its main initiators were, again,

Sattler and the Benefit Fund, "the heart of the DAKV".

Planning started

in the early summer of 1935, before the critical Comintern Congress in
Brussels, and ended with the formation of the League on September 23.

4

The ideology of the early DAKV was ethnically and domestically
oriented.

According to Sattler, the secondary labor organizations were

afraid of-National Socialist infiltration and of anti-German reaction
in this country.
2

The Benefit Fund amended its constitution by restrict-

Ibid.

3

Robert E. Cazden, The Free German and -Free Austrian Press and
Booktrade in the United States, 1933 to 1950 (Dissertation, Chicago,
1965; condensed published version), pp. 41, 42.

4

Volksfront, February 1936 and 3 June 1958.

,
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ing membership to antifascist German Americans.

The coalition of the

DAKV could perform even better the public relations task of identifying
its members with antifascism.

To the general German American constitu-

ency, Sattler presented antifascism in the form of an ethnic patriotism
which synthesized the German and the American heritage by way of the
German American contribution to the civilization of this country.

This

patriotism was simultaneously pro-German and pro-American and was supposed to counter the National Socialist appeal to the German Americans.
Some of the ideas of Sattler were somewhat farfetched.

He con-

ceded that the German American socialists had neglected the'Reimatgefunl"
(nostalgia for the province of birth) which results from the ties to the
home province rather than to the whole country of origin, as the scene
of childhood memories and the residence of relatives.

He complemented

these local values with the proposal of cultivating "a conscious and
deliberate link with Germany as a nation and with the German cultural
heritage".

5

For this purpose, Sattler proposed a German cultural pro-

gram designed to preserve the use of the German language in the United
States.

He deplored the failure of the early German American schools

founded by German American progressives.

As a substitute, he proposed

that German American students enroll in the German classes of public
schools and colleges.

The DAKV also planned to establish German li-

braries and eventually an academy of German culture.

Sattler did his

own research in German American history and contributed numerous articles to the Volksecho and the Volksfront.

With the help of this transi-
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tional link, the German heritage could also motivate a good immigrant
to defend American liberties.

The drawback of this approach was that

the conservative German Americans refused to follow a socialist lead
in the cultural sphere.
Sattler claimed later that his formula made the League for
Culture a lasting front organization.

This was true insofar as it

limited membership to the secondary labor organizations.

But these

integrated fraternal and cultural organizations were already based on
the principle of a United Front to which the DAKV added nothing new.
In turn, they
federation.

w~re

exposed to new stress by their membership in the

Their own factional struggles intensified when their pro-

and anti-DAKV segments contested the elections for their national
executives.

The· reason for the relative longevity of the DAKV was that

the secondary labor organizations were solid enough to withstand these
disruptions.

Some of the secondary labor organizations of the League,

like the Workers' Clubs, were party affiliates and represented party
interests.

They just happened to coincide with the purposes of the

DAKV when the Comintern proclaimed the Popular Front and the Socialists
could not leave a federation of the crucial secondary organizations to
the sole care of the communists.
The Socialists were quite prominent in the early DAKV.

One of

their main delegates was the Social Democratic emigrant, Seger.

He

represented the German American Forum of which Frank Bohn was the
president.
6

6

Seger was already a member of the constituting committee

rbid., November 1935.
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and then became the first president of the DAKV.

In this function, he

was an active organizer and was interested in the merger of the Chicago
Popular Front group with the Kulturverband.

During a promotional visit

to Chicago, he shared the speaker's forum and the main addresses with
Schrotter in a mass meeting of the Chicago group.

According to the
..
7
Volksfront, Seger "spoke with his usual objectivity and fairness'.'. He
was interested in the Chicago Popular Front for the same reason that
he joined the DAKV.

Both organizations consisted mainly of the frater-

nal and cultural labor organizations which constituted the main readership of the Neue Volkszeitung.
Two months later, the Chicago Popular Front was in, and Seger
was out of the DAKV.

As the new editor of the NVZ, he could no longer

remain president of the cultural federation.

Also, after the breakup

of the SPA and the formation of the Social Democratic Federation, the
conservative socialists had their own political home and intended to
play more of a right wing role.

The NVZ fell in line with this policy

and became critical of the DAKV.

The implacable anti-communist Cahan

of the Jewish Daily Forward had a hand in these developments.

Offi-

cially, Seger resigned from the DAKV because of an alleged communist
conspiracy to seize the main executive positions in the federation.

8

In vacating its presidency, Seger actually helped the leftists to take
over.
7
8

Ibid., February 1936 and March 1936.

Cazden, The Free German and Free Austrian Press, p. 44.
also Radkau, Die deutsche Emigration in den USA, p. 172.
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The admission of the Ch{cago group was expected to consolidate
the DAKV rather than to shift its center to Chicago.

As the Eastern

DAKV, the Chicago group consisted mainly of the secondary labor organizations.

It claimed the adherence of thirty-five groups which included

the Workers' Benefit Fund, the Nature Friends, the labor choirs,

th~

athletic clubs, several unions, and the Reichsbanner (a German American
branch of the militia for the defense of the Weimar Republic).

9

But

there were more recent immigrants and emigrants in the Chicago Popular
Front.

According to Maria Schrotter, the emigrants numbered several

hundred but there

i~

no other evidence to confirm this claim.

As a

result of its peculiar composition, the Chicago group was more ambitious
and energetic than the Eastern DAKV.

In its ideology, it paid attention

to both America and Europe.
Schrotter was a typical exponent of this attitude.
recent immigrant from Graz, Austria.

He was a

Before the First World War, he

had taught German literature at the University of Chicago for several
years.

In 1925, he returned to the same position.

Then, he switched

to Northwestern University, which dismissed him in 1928 in a purge of
leftist professors.
active in Austria.

According to his wife, he had not been politically
But he called himself once "an old revolutionary!'.

He was an activist antifascist of the Austrian type and conducted the
Chicago Popular Front accordingly.

His activism and his ideology

reinforced each other.
9

Volksfront, November 1935 and July 1936.
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Schrotter expressed his views often in the Volksfront which he
edited since November 1935.

Fascism was the crisis stage of capitalism

and was on the rise in all industrialized countries.
Marxism.

This was good

In the view of Schrotter, there was a fascist threat to

Austria and America from within and without.

The Chicago Popular Front

could fight fascism on the spot rather than wait for developments in
Germany and Italy.

Also, all industrialized nations were imperialistic

and contributed in some way to the international tensions that could
set off another war.

In the crisis of 1935, England, France and Italy

would have liked to divide up the "Ethiopean roast" but they nearly
fell out with each other in the process.
. an d
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To the Volksfront, the intentions of President Roosevelt in 1936 were
suspect.

He was "wavering, ••. he is unreliable .••• Should [Senator]

Borah win the succession we could be certain that a pacifist is in command and that America will not participate in a war."

For the Popular

Front, "the best thing for 1936 would be: no new world conflagration".
The remedy against fascism was the traditional socialist pacifism, the solidarity of the workers of the world against war which had
failed twenty years ago.

But Schrotter thought that the workers had

learned the lesson of the First World War: "This is not 1914.
learned something.
world.

We have

The United Front must be achieved in the whole

Only a strong United Front will be capable of preventing a war
10
11

Ibid., November 1935.
rbid., January 1936 and September 1936.

11
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that is already approaching from the East and the West."

12

The result

would be "the victory march of the liberation of all peoples" from
fascism and imperialism.

For the United States also, "the Popular

Front idea is probably the only salvation".

Schrotter warned that

"Roosevelt and his entourage are not unconditionally on the side of
freedom" for the colonies.

Therefore, the Popular Front "must counter

13
the threat that comes from Landon, Coughlin, Lemke and, or Roosevelt".
This approach was also the solution for Germany.

It was only "a matter

of time and of the United Front before the local disturbances would
merge into a powerful mass movement against Hitler".

The Chicago paper

appealed to the Sopade in Prague to assist such a German front.
role of the Soviet Union was secondary in this front theory.

14

The

The pro-

Sovietism of Schrotter paralleled that of many American liberals and
.

~nte

15
.
11 ectua 1 s ~n
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This positive ideology was geared for political action.

Chicago group was aggressive and activist.
12

The

It fought the local German

Ibid., December 1935.

13

Ibid., September 1936. Charles E. Coughlin, the "radio priese'
was a violent opponent of the Second New Deal. He felt that the inflationary currency policies of the latter did not go far enough. In 1934
he founded, therefore, the National Union for Social Justice which became the Union Party of the presidential elections of 1936. As a compromise candidate, he chose Congressman William Lemke who did not really
fit into this third party movement and was not a talented campaigner.
As a result, the cause of "Liberty Bell Bill" suffered some cracks in
the elections.
14
15

rbid., December 1935.
rbid., January 1937.
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American National Socialists not only in its newspaper but also in the
streets. 16

It organized demonstrations against their meetings which

were often protected by the police.

Its members went inside the meet-

ing places and participated in the discussions.

In a meeting of March

1938, Schrotter resisted some local stormtroopers who wanted to eject
h~.

He was arrested by the police and had to appear in court.

17

Such

incidents made good headlines in the Volksfront and even in. the Chicago
papers.

This side effect was not unintentional.
With this

mentalit~

it is not surprising that the Chicago group

advocated a political front rather than the non-partisan cultural concept of the DAKV.

Its inability to find political partners by early

1936 facilitated its merger with the DAKV.
did not forsake a political orientation.

But as the DAKV Chicago, it
An explanation in the Volks-

16

The German American National Socialists were organized in the
German American Bund. It succeeded in 1935 the Friends of the New
Germany which in turn was an outgrowth of the pre-1933 Teutonia Club.
The Bund was a very small organization. By 1939, it had fifty five
locals of which seventeen were in New York. According to Fortune Magazine, its membership amounted to no more than two thousand five hundred
while the statistics of the Justice Department counted forty-five locals
with six thousand six hundred seventeen members. The Weckruf, the pub- .
lication of the Bund, had one thousand one hundred sixty subscribers in
Chicago and only two hundred in New York. The Volksfront remarked somewhat apologetically that the main fascist danger lay in the number of
fellow travelers. Even the German government became disenchanted with
the awkward activities of the Bund. Its president Fritz Kuhn was physically prevented by the German ambassador Diekhof from rising for a
speech at the German Day rally of 1937 in New York. The German government had decided that it was not interested in the fomentation of antiGerman feelings in the United States. For references about the Bund
and Kuhn, see Sander A. Diamond, The Nazi movement in the United States,
1924-1941 (Cornell University Press, 1974); Radkau, Die deutsche Emigration in den USA, pp. 66 to 69; also Volksfront, 15 December 1937;
22 July 1938; 8 April 1939.
17

Chicago Daily News, 3 March 1938.
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convergence of spontaneous popular groups is completed. - Let us proceed with 'the organization of the antifascist front of attack.'"

20

It alleged that the idea for the conference had originated with several
progressive organizations of Wisconsin.

The purpose of the conference

was to promote the political Popular Front.

A delegate from Chicago

criticized the DAKV for being "still on the defensive and even too weak
for a successful defense" against National Socialist advances in the
German American societies.

A delegate from Detroit was displeased with

"the purely negative attitude of most organized antifascists".

He ad-

vised "a new orientation" through "self-criticism, a practical presentation of ideas, tactical versatility and speedy action".

He stated

flatly that "neutrality is no longer possible today" and that "not even
the League for Culture could completely isolate itself from political
questions".

In fact, "the political parties had an important function

in the Kulturkampf (the fight for cultural values)".
farmer-labor·party would
for Culture."

11

Campaigning for a

not conflict with the principles of the League

The conference decided to appeal to the national DAKV for

. 1 part1es.
.
.
.
t h e a dm1ss1on
o f po 1.1t~ca

21

In the Chicago paper, this antifascist conference was described
as a genuine Popular Front movement.
from four states.

It consisted of thirty delegates

They reached "full unanimity" in their discussions.

It was "amazing that people from four different American states who had
not previously talked or corresponded with each other wanted in princi20
21

Ibid., July 1936 and September 1936.
Ibid.
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ple all the same thing".

Schrotter encouraged them by pointing to the

progress of the Popular Front in France and Spain.

He emphasized the

need for the kind of "central combination in the local sphere" which
the Midwestern Popular Front was.

He hoped that the conference would

become "the first step for the unification of all German speaking
circles of America".
formed.

A permanent committee of six representatives was

The Volksfront became the official organ of the Midwestern

Popular Front to which it devoted a special section of every issue.

A

delegate of the DAKV New York was invited to witness these proceedings.
He understood that the DAKV Chicago was not willing to wait for the
.

nat~ona
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The Chicago group still had to reap the full benefits of its
local expansion.

For this purpose, it adopted a new constitution for

the Midwest, together with the DAKV Detroit, and asked the national
executive to accept its statutes as a constitutional proposal to a
prospective national convention.

According to the new arrangement, the

latter would take place annually and elect each time a new executive.
The national convention would proportionately represent the local DAKV
organizations.

For each thousand of its membership pool, a local DAKV

was entitled to one delegate.

23

In this way, the Chicago group could

make its weight felt in the national executive.
the numerical definition of the local membership.

The main problem was
It is difficult to

determine how a Benefit Fund local, for example, became part of the
DAKV.

But all its members were counted on the inflated DAKV list.
22
23

Ibid.
Ibid., November 1936.
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In the fall of 1936, the Chicago group had already an organizational headstart for the convention which was to take place in New York
in March 1937.

It pressed its advantage with a further expansion in

California in the winter of 1937.

In January of that year, it sent

Erich Rix on a lecture tour of the Far West.

24

He was a former official

of the Transport Workers' Union of Northern Germany and editor of a
union paper there.

He had been arrested in February 1933 and sent to

a concentration camp.
.
25
to Ch 1.cago.
Francisco.

After his release, friends helped him to come

In April 1937, he finally founded a

DAKV local in San

It had a membership pool of only three thousand which was

a sign of a modest labor base of secondary organizations such as the
Benefit Fund.

26

It came still in time for the national convention.

After the appearance of the Volksecho in New York, the latter was postponed by a full year to June 1938 in Chicago.
The editors of the Volksecho first established themselves on
the Popular Front scene in New York.

They did so by acquiring an auton-

omous front position and winning a corresponding influence in the DAKV.
The Volksecho became the organ of the DAKV in New York in the absence
24

Ibid., January 1937 •.

25

Interview with Mrs. Marie Schrotter, 10 December 1973;
Questionaire, Erich Krewet, pseudonym Erich Rix, filled out on 25 October 1969,Dokumentation zur Emigration, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte,
Munich, Federal Republic of Germany: Krewet was born in 1900 in Wuppertal,
Barmen. In 1935, after his imprisonment, he fled to Antwerp in Belgium
to join the German group of the International Transport Workers' Federation. He came to the United States in 1936 and stayed here until 1957.
After the war, he unsuccessfully appealed his exclusion by the National
Socialist government from employment as a sailor.
26

Volksfront, 15 April 1937 and 15 June 1937.
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of any other front newspaper.

It appeared first in February 1937.

27

Its editor was Stefan Heym who had arrived in the United States shortly
before.

During the Weimar Republic, his poems had appeared in social-

ist and liberal papers.
tional.
army.

28

Today, his literacy reputation is interna-

During the war, he received several medals in the American
But in 1953, he sent them back to President Eisenhower and left

the United States for East Germany because of the McCarthy hearings.
Another Volksecho writer was the leftist emigrant, Martin Hall.

He was

an irrepressible organizer and covered the whole country in his Popular
Front career from the East to the Midwest and the Far West.

After the

war, he became prominent in the propaganda division of the East German
government.
Goldschmidt,

Other Volksecho writers were the emigrants Rosenfeld,
29

.
..
Karl Obermann and Walter Schonstedt.

The ideology of the Volksecho was the Popular Front concept of
the Comintern.

It centered around the defense of the Soviet Union by

27

Deutsches Volksecho, (New York weekly, published from February
1937 to September 1939), 20 February 1937.
28

Radkau, Die deutsche Emigration, p. 170.

29 Alfons Goldschmidt was very interested in the international
Popular Front. His advocacy of a Latin American Popular Front was due
to his past economic research. In 1929, he had founded the Wirtschaftsinstitut Latein Amerika (Economic Institute for Latin America) . He was
also treasurer of the Deutsch-Amerikanisches Hilfskomitee zur Unterstutzung des spanischen Freiheitskampfes (German American Committee for
Aid to the Spanish Fight for Freedom). In February 1938, he reported
the collection of $3,410.21. Albert Einstein warmly supported the committee. The Volksecho cosponsored the American good will tour of
Ludwig Renn who was a general in the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. Renn was a German aristocrat, officer, and writer with
the original name of Vieth von Golzenau.
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collective security.

A sanitary cordon of Popular Front governments

was to keep National Socialist Germany in check.

The Volksecho liked

the interventionist tendencies of President Roosevelt.

It supported

him fully and asked him in a letter of April 1938 to join the international Popular Front.

30

It discarded the socialist theory of fascism

in all industrialized countries.

National Socialism became an isolated

evil in a worldwide contest with democracy.

The alternatives of "his-

torical significance" were regression or progress, barbarism or civilization, slavery or freedom.

The Volksecho asked all German Americans

to "confess unqualified loyalty to the democratic principles of the
United States".

31

The Volksecho was in a good position to gain influence in the
German American Popular Front.

The latter was more the affair of

ideologically committed individuals than of spontaneous masses.
depended on pointed propaganda.

It

With the control over information,

the Volksecho and the Volksfront could shape Popular Front opinion.
The former called this its service to the popular movement.

Critics

of the front media would have had to rely on them for voicing their
reservations.

The two newspapers were as important as the delegate

system for maintaining communication between the member organizations
of the DAKV.
30

In every issue, they published the weekly Vereinskalender

volksfront, 9 April 1938.

31 Ibid., 29 April 1938 and 16 September 1938.
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(organizations' schedules) and discussed the activities of the member
organizations.

They could exert pressure on these groups by criticizing

or praising them.

They could also dress up their reports on the groups

by suppressing negative developments and emphasizing positive ones.
Besides their publicistic advantage, the publishing associations of
the two front papers acted as front centers of their own.

These con-

sisted of delegates from the constituting groups of the DAKV and held
monthly conferences.

They organized picnics, summer festivals, dis-

cussion forums, protest meetings and demonstrations either alone, with
some of the DAKV member organizations or with friendly outside organizations.
During 1937 and early 1938, the Volksecho insistently wooed the
secondary labor organizations especially in preparation for the national
convention of the DAKV.

It patronized the meetings and conventions.

It admonished the German American Workers' Clubs to "fulfill their
mission as one of the main elements of the German American antifascist
movement".

32

They were told to "get on their way to the masses 11 and to

"bring together all progressive elements even beyond the confines of
·the workers".

33

The Volksecho approved the change of name to German

American Clubs for this purpose.

The national convention of the latter

in April 1938 gave unconditional support to the Volksecho.

It decided

further to develop the United and Popular Fronts and to extend its work
to the South and West.
32
33

It resolved to appeal to Roosevelt for his

Volksecho, 27 March 1937.
Ibid., 3 April 1937.
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support of collective security and to campaign for the repeal of the
Neutrality laws.

34

The Volksecho also promoted the Federation of Work-

mens' Choirs and the Nature Friends.

In its view, the latter had be-

come "points of concentration for the antifascist German population".

35

They were expected to grow into "a powerful organization" and were
recormnended for their integration into "the new unionist front".

36

Both groups repeatedly paid tribute to the Volksecho.
The only competition of the Volksecho for the influence over
the secondary labor organizations came from the Neue Volkszeitung.
Before the national convention of the DAKV, the Volksecho took special
care in neutralizing the Social Democratic appeal by starting a campaign for an Einheitszeitung (Consolidated Newspaper).

The latter

·would have absorbed the two New York papers, depriving the Social Democrats of their mouthpiece while leaving the Chicago Volksfront intact.
The NVZ had to reject this scheme.

It was thus put on the defensive

and was stigmatized as uncooperative which served the propaganda purposes of the Volksecho.

In May 1937, Hall had still professed his in-

terest in coexistence with the Volkszeitung.

There was, in his opinion

ample space for several newspapers in a field of a few million German

.
AmerLcan
work ers. 37

A week later, he asked already for cooperation

between the two papers.
34
35
36
37
38

38

During the surmner, the Volksecho prepared

Ibid., 9 April 1938.
Ibid., 22 May 1937.
Ibid., 29 May 1937.
tbid.' 1 May 1937.
Ibid., 8 May 1937.
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its call for the Einheitszeitung.

It built up publicity for the nation-

al convention of the Federation of Workmen's Choirs which took place in
September, in Cleveland.

There, the Brooklyn branch of the Federation

introduced a motion for an Einheitszeitung which was unanimously adopted,
that is, by twenty-two positive votes and forty-six abstentions.

Hall

covered the convention extensively and reported in a headline that "the
Federation of the Workmen's Choirs decides the unification of the antifascist press".

He elaborated that "the actual duplicating and, unfor-

tunately, often opposing work" of the two papers was self-defeating.
Only a unified front press could conduct the counterattack against the
Nazi agitation in the United States.

39

The Volksecho then wrote to all secondary labor organizations
for support of the Cleveland resolution.

In every issue of both front

papers, another local of another labor organization reiterated the call
for an Einheitszeitung.

Goldschmidt denied that Seger had made a new

paper out of the old NVZ and scored "his lack of evident journalistic
experience".

He thought that Seger "writes badly and his information

.
ff.LCLent
.
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The NVZ reacted very awkwardly.

In his address at the choirs'

convention, Seger admitted that he was "unfortunately not in the popular situation of the Volksecho representative".
39

In its protest letter

Ibid., 11 September 1937; Neue Volkszeitung, (New York weekly,
published by the Progressive Publishing Association fro~ 1933 to 1949),
9 October 1937; Radkau, Die deutsche Emigration, p. 171.
40

Volksecho, 25 December 1937.
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to the secondary labor organizations, the NVZ argued that it was the
older paper.

The Volksecho and the Volksfront were "Gegengri.indungen"

(counter-foundations).

They could discontinue publication if a single

antifascist paper was essential.

Somewhat facetiously, the NVZ also

mentioned its obligation to honor its advertisement contracts.

41

During

his visits to most of the secondary labor organizations, Seger claimed
that the NVZ was committed to "the scientific socialism of Marx and
Engels".

The special temporary task of antifascism could not absorb

this general tradition.

The NVZ devoted only a third of its space to

the antifascist cause while reserving another third for the social and
political problems of Europe and the remaining third for the developments in the United States.

The NVZ was more than an antifascist news-

paper of emigrants like the Volksecho.

It was not only against

thing but also for something, namely socialism.
liberal mask like the Volksecho.

some~

It could not assume a

It could not give up its opposition

to capitalism for temporary tactical reasons.

Seger added,somewhat

contemptously that the l±beral conversion that was implied in the Popular Front ideology made the existence of communist parties superfluous.
For conducting a liberal Popular Front policy, the League for Human
Rights would suffice.

Seger made the rhetorical offer that there would

have been no insuperable objections to a request by the DAKV for the
use of one page of the NVZ as a special Popular Front section.
pected that the Volksecho
of the NVZ.
41
42

42

~anted

He sus-

to benefit from the superior resources

All these rationalizations could not prevent the success

Ibid., 18 September 1937.
volkszeitung, 6 November 1937.
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states whereto he returned in 1936.

44

His novel "Das Lob des Lebens"

was serialized in the Volksecho.
For a complete preparation for the national convention, the
leftist emigrants in New York had to synchronize their Popular Front
work with the DAKV Chicago.
line with the Volksecho.
at the end of 1937.
merits.

They brought the Volksfront in editorial

This task fell to Hall, who came to Chicago

The Chicagoans could only emphasize their past

In expectation of Hall, the Volksfront invited its readers to

"imagine what the antifascist movement in America would be like today
without the work of the progressive Germans of
newspaper".

45

Chicago ••• and their

Shortly after the arrival of Hall, Schrotter reflected

. past as an o ld revo 1ut1onary.
.
a b out h 1s
the arrogance of

46

. 11y
His w1. f e resente d espec1a

Hal~. 47 Under these circumstances, the compliance of

Schrotter is surprising.

Perhaps his hands were tied by the communist

members of the Chicago group like the emigrant Arthur Necker.

Perhaps

he realized that only the cooperation between the New York leftists and
the Chicago activists could outmaneuver the German American and emigrant
centrists of New York.

The Volksecho praised him as "an old and well

known co-fighter of our cause".
activity of Schrotter.

48

, Hall soon rivaled the organizational

He spoke with Schrotter or without him at the

44
Volksfront, March 1937.
45
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rbid., 15 June 1937.
rbid., 15 January 1938.
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meetings of the DAKV and of its member organizations.

At one of them,

he confidently "predicted which forces in Germany will finally stop
Hitler1' .

49

He became co-editor of the Volksfront in January 1938 and

editor of an equal status on 22 April 1938.

-----

On that date, the Volks-

front finally appeared as a weekly, just a little over a month before

the national convention.

In a front page article, Hall daimed that

with this weekly appearance "the Midwest and the Far West of the United
States received an independent, progressive German language newspaper
that did not exist before 11 •

50

He reserved the front page to himself

for such occasions as the Munich Pact, a keynote address for the new
year, the German occupation of Czechoslovakia or the military and party
purges of 1938 in the Soviet Union.
The Volksfront soon voiced the policy 9f the Comintern.
dent Roosevelt finally became its hero, too.

Presi-

It defended his domestic

and foreign policy, "the perfection of inner democracy" and the defense
of international democracy.

It rejected the third party attempts of

Governor LaFollette of Wisconsin which it had previously favored.
LaFollette was inclined to limit assistance to unemployed workers in
favor of suffering farmers.

Only a third party promoted by the AFL and

the CIO would have met with its approva1.

51

When Cong~ess threatened

to cut $150 million from the Work Projects Administration emergency
budget in February 1939, the Volksfront called this a concentrated
49

Volksfront, March_ 1938.

SOibid., 2 April 1938.
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Ibid., 7 January 1939 and 11 February 1939.
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The meeting of the DAKV New York also discussed the Chicago proposal
for a new constitution of which the Volksfront plan was only one article.

According to the NVZ, the delegates received no advance copies of

the constitution.

The proposal was read to them only at the meeting so

·that they had little time for deliberation.

Also, the national executive

in New York failed to make an alternative proposal.

It was even suspect-

ed by the NVZ of conspiring to liquidate itself in favor of a new executive in Chicago.

The Volkszeitung finally charged the communist groups

of the DAKV with claiming double and paper representations for the
.

nat~ona

1

.

convent~on.
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This outside criticism by someone who could

have done better from within was not very effective with the secondary
labor organizations.
The leftist activist coalition reached its main objectives at
the national convention: the adoption of its constitution, the election
of its candidates to the national executive and the selection of Chicago
as the new executive seat.

As the result of nearly two years of prepar-

ation, it controlled a majority of delegates.

Most of the representa-

tive speakers of the nine DAKV city locals favored the coalition.

Eric

Sanger, the leader of the German American Club Astoria, and Karl Meyer,
the president of the Arbeitersgnger, spoke for New York; Arthur Necker,
the new president of the DAKV Chicago, for that local; Anton Jacobs, a
writer of the Volksfront, for the Detroit local, and
locals of Philadelphia and Baltimore.

volkszeitung, 21 May 1938.

for the

Arthur Hesse, the business mana-

ger of the Volksfront, represented San Francisco by
55

Sch~nstedt

pr~xy.

This conven-
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tion elected an almost all Chicago national executive.

Hall became

vice president after his co-nominees Schrotter and Necker declined in
his favor.

Schrotter was unanimously elected national secretary with

Necker as his deputy.

The positions of treasurer, protocal secretary

and legal consultant were also occupied by Chicagoans.

This was almost

necessary because of the controversial shift of the executive to
Chicago.

The liberal

Dr. Rudolf Brandl, a former editor of the Frank-

furter Zeitung and director of the Ullstein Publishing House archives
in Berlin, lost his prominence in the DAKV.

He was offered the low

position of secondary protocal secretary under the condition that he
move to Chicago.

But his main job was in New York as editor of the

.
56
German Jewish immigrant paper Aufbau.

ted president of the DAKV.
position.

Sattler was unanimously elec-

But this was not the strongest executive

Also, he lived in New York which further impaired his execu-

tive effectiveness.

Thomas Mann had sent a letter of commendation to

the national convention and then accepted a DAKV vice presidency for a
while.
There was a certain amount of opposition at the convention
which the leftist activist coalition had to conciliate in order to preserve a minimal harmony.

The reports of the two front papers emphasized

the unity and unanimity of the proceedings of the convention. 57

But in

its final report, the Volksfront was nevertheless satisfied that the
56

57

Volksfront, 15 January 1938.
rbid., 17 June 1938.
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conference could be held "despite all difficulties".

58

The coalition

leaders had to be very diplomatic in handling the delicate problem of
the role of Sattler and the Benefit Fund.

They allowed for a certain

measure of ideological diversity and passed by the opportunity of
giving policy speeches of their own.
controversial issues too far.

They also refrained from pushing

They had to outmaneuver Sattler and the

Benefit Fund without over-alienating them.
sable as "the heart of the DAKV".

The latter were indispen-

Hall took it upon himself to nominate

Sattler for the presidency and to deliver the official laudation:

"None

of us has acquired more merits for the progressive development in the
German American field or has contributed more to the general development
of the DAKV and none of us commands such great personal and moral authority as our friend Sattler."

59

Nobody at the convention criticized the

latter for reaffirming the non-partisan character of the DAKV.

He held

to the centrist illusion that it did not matter "whether someone is a
socialist, a communist or a democrat
.
~s

a

.
s~ncere

.
.
1
enemy
o f Nat~ona

The main thing is that he

60
soc~a
. 1 ~sm.
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But he conceded "the
II

relatively weak influence of the League of Culture in the German American field" and o·ffered the remedy of a greater 'emphasis on the German
background and on German and German American cultural values.
was not enough for the activists of Chicago.
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of the centrist DAKV, the Volksfront pointed out that the new constitution "liberated the DAKV from the narrowness of a small circle that was
more or 1 ess

.

restr~cte
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It

justified the transfer of the executive to Chicago with "the great passibilities for the development of the progressive German population in
the Midwest" and with the argument that the whole country could be
better propagandized from that central point.

The DAKV Chicago was

free to follow a more dynamic Popular Front policy.

For the New York

leftists, any further comment was redundant after their success at the
convention.
Schrotter himself still clung to some remnants of his independent Popular Front theory.

He still considered National Socialism as

part of a larger problem and believed tha-t "if we do not have any
higher general goals and concentrate exclusively on the Nazis in Germany
we cannot escape the reproach of anti-Germanism.

We oppose the Nazis

only within the context of the general fight against fascism and for
democracy."

He felt that the Popular Front had to deal with the rise

of American fascist organizations beyond the small German American Bund.
He was not as tolerant of the American political and economic system as
the leftist advocates of the Comintern policy.
overlapping fronts:

For him, there were two

"A freedom loving America is the last safe bulwark

against world fascism alone, Soviet Russia against world fascism and
.

cap~ta

1"~sm. 1163
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The Popular Front took only a temporary precedence over

Ibid.
rbid., 17 June 1938.

77

the ultimate goals of socialism.
The purpose of harmony was also served "by wisely giving up
resolutions of secondary importance".

On

the recommendations of

Sattler and Schonstedt, the committee on resolutions withdrew two motions which "might not find unanimous acceptance".

The first contained

an honorable citation of the Chicago group for the weekly publication
of the Volksfront.

The second resolution reminded the delegates of the

campaign for the Einheitszeitung by asking that all mutual recriminations between the two front papers and the NVZ be dropped.
coalition did a complete job at the national convention.

Thus, the

64

After the convention, the DAKV made creditable efforts in
further Popular Front organization with limited success.

The DAKV

Chicago pursued an inter-ethnic Popular Front in the Midwest and on
the West Coast.

For Schrotter this was a natural course.

Chicago

had sizable minorities of all the former ethnic components of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire which were then all threatened by Germany.
The DAKV Chicago participated in a mass meeting to commemorate Hitler's
assumption of power with such groups as the Czechoslovak National Alliance of America,. the Hungarian Democratic Federation, the Lithuanian
Progressive Organizations, and the Jewish People's Committee.

65

This

meeting resulted in the formation of a Joint Council of National Groups
of which the DAKV Chicago became a member.
64 rbid., 3 June 1938.
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rbid., 28 January 1939.
rbid., 4 February 1939.
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Thus, the latter gained

78
some liberal recognition by way of inter-ethnic associations.
The further expansion on the West

Coas~which

had hardly any

secondary labor organizations, was carried out by Hall in 1938 and 1939.
He was mainly interested in Los Angeles and Hollywood which had become
a center of German Jewish immigration and of American Jewish migration
after 1933.

It was a promising field for Popular Front antifascism.

Various antifascist organizations existed already which the DAKV could
potentially join.

There were also many German exile writers, drama-

tists, actors and other artists in the area.

Among the writers were

Thomas Mann, Heinrich Mann, Bertold Brecht, Lion Feuchtwanger, Bruno
Frank and Carl Zuckmayer.

Their reputations went beyond ethnic and

labor limits,and their very professions symbolized the antifascist
principle of free artistic expression for which they had been persecuted.

Their literary contributions to the front press and the front

press reports about their activities had an unlimited propagandistic
value.

But Hall's exploits were rather modest.

In September 1938, he

founded a DAKV local in Los Angeles that consisted of sixty members
from three organizations like the German American war veterans of California.

Bruno Frank, who was known for his protests against the atro-

cities of the First World War, promised his cooperation.

This embryonic

DAKV participated in the activities of the Council of Nations which
consisted of antifascist groups with Central European origins.

A mass

meeting was planned for October with an All Nations' Show directed by
.
Max Reinh ardt, t h e b est known t h eater d irector o f Repu bl ~can
Ber 1.~n. 67
67

Ibid., 24 September 1938; also Volksecho, 1 October 1938.
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In 1939, Hall went back to the West Coast.

The Volksfront serialized

his travel diary which he sent from Portland, Oregon.
The Eastern DAKV founded new locals in Rochester, New York and

.
. 68
Rea d ~ng,
Pennsy 1van~a.
Sange~

The DAKV New York, which was then headed by

of the communist German American Club, tried desperately to make

some Popular Front connections with non-labor groups.
campaigned continuously for this forward move.

69

The Volksecho

From dubious evidence,

it detected a change of mood in the non-labor organizations.

In

October 1938, it derived hope. from the fa-ct that only a bare third of
the ten thousand German Americans who gathered for the Deutsche Tag
(German Day) meeting in New York "raised their hands for the Hitler
salute".

There was "only one solitary and badly visible swastika" on

display.

The Volksecho discovered a "process of reorientation among

German Americans" which was supposedly based on a popular "rank and
file movement" within their organizations.
for a comprehensive Popular Front.

70

This warranted optimism

The German Day was organized by the

Vereinigte Deutsche Gesellschaften (Confederated German Societies) to
which belonged also the Steuben and the Karl Schurz societies.

71

The

Volksecho defined this federation as a center block with which the left
block of the DAKV was to effect a Popular Front as a matter of "historical mission".

68
69
70
71

This front would oppose the fascist block of the National

Volksfront, May 1939.
Volksecho, 28 May 1938.
rbid., 8 October 1938.
rbid., 7 January 1939.
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their efforts mainly on the Benefit Fund as the largest organization.
Seger defended the past Social Democratic approach of reserve and procrastination by conceding that "an organization like the Workmen's
Benefit Fund must, of course, not be jeopardized or even destroyed by
. . 1 d'~scuss~on
. 1175
po 1 ~t~ca
..

But political discussion was exactly what he

had in mind under the new circumstances.
tion of the Fund in New

Yor~,

For the quadrannual conven-

he admonished the delegates "that the

political activation of the masses of the AKStK should be a special
goal for the next four years".

He advised the leaders of the organi-

zation to reform their "bad conscience toward revolutionary socialism".
He saw the AKStK as the nucleus of a new labor party and recommended
"political pioneer work for the formation of an independent labor movement in the United States".
for a Popular Front.

Within such a movement, there was no room

76

But Seger commented only indirectly on the DAKV.

In his speech

to the AKStK delegates, he explained why the NVZ did not believe in
"cooperation with the adherents of the Soviet dictatorship".

In an

ensuing article, he expressed satisfaction with the eighth resolution
of the convention which objected to "any kind of dictatorship".

He

interpreted it as a refusal of "fighting the fascist dictatorships together with the advocates of a differently colored dictatorship 11 •

Then,

he exhorted the Benefit Fund that "the unity of the movement, the
uniformity of the fight, the strength of the organization and the purity
75
76

volkszeitung, 10 June 1939.
Ibid., 1 July 1939.
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of the political ideas require the rejection of the wrong allies".

77

Despite the decline of the Popular Front, the Social Democrats
did not make many inroads on the AKStK.

It is difficult to assess the

factional balance within the Benefit Fund, but it did not seem to have
shifted radically in 1939.

The previous year, the Group for the Repre-

sentation of the Proletarian Interests had asked the Progressive Group
in the AKStK to discuss a coalition of the two factions.

The Progres-

sive Group claimed that it had already absorbed all factions and that
the former consisted exclusively of communists.

It insisted that there

existed already "a unity of action in the fight against war and
fascism".

These Progressives were probably centrist rather than con-

·servative members of the Krankenkasse.

78

At the convention, Sattler

proclaimed that "we remain the arch enemies of Nazism and fp.scism and
remain so as editor of the journal [Solidarity].
1179
.
WL"11 b e no compromLse.

·r

In this respect, there

The resolutions of the convention demanded

the continued unity of the socialist workers and asked for financial
and political contributions to the work of the DAKV.

Another appeal

asked all branches of the Benefit Fund to join the DAKV.

Heym reported

in the Volksecho that "a reactionary mood" at the convention was overcome and that the organization remained fortunately "on the side of
the fighting proletariate".

The "reactionaries" had criticized fi-

nancial and moral aid to the Spanish Popular Front.
77

78
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Except for the

83
communists, the AKStK remained united on the issue of a potential war.
It demanded a referendum about American participation unless the United
States would be attacked directly.

80

After the conclusion of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the NVZ finally
asked the secondary labor organizations directly to repudiate the DAKV.
Seger publicized the refusal of the Volksecho and of the Volksfront to
condemn the pact and invited "the AKStK, the Federation of Workril.en's
Choirs, the labor athletic unions, in short, all German labor organizations of America [to] make a decision".

He considered anybody hopeless

"who has still not understood that you can't sit down at the same table
with communists".

There were "now only adherents of democracy and

adherents of dictatorship".

Seger asked those who agreed with the NVZ

to decline any further cooperation with the DAKV.

He admitted that

"the NVZ had shown extraordinary restraint towards the DAKV during the
past two years [and] had generally avoided to publicly confront organizations who cooperated with communists".

I~

had done so, according to

Seger, not because it considered cooperation with communists possible
but "for the sake of the fight against National Socialism".
categorically that "there is now an end to.this". 81

He stated

In December of 1939,

the NVZ ·called for a boycott of the German Day rally of the DAKV and,
for the first time, refused to report about this meeting of "a branch
of Stalinists".
80
81
82
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It defined itself as "the only German language news-

rbid., 11 February 1939.
volkszeitung, 2 September 1939.
rbid., 30 December 1939.
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paper in the United States that, in accordance with its socialist principles has continuously,fought against dictatorships of all shades."

83

The German American Popular Front nearly disappeared in the fall of
1939.

But the Social Democratic emigrants could claim no credit for

this fact.

They even failed to reap the benefits from it which they

had expected.
The German American Popular Front tried to adjust to the new
situation of the non-aggression treaty and the resulting war with little
success.

It did so at the second national convention in Cleveland

which had been postponed from June to early September for obscure reasons.

The best defense for the DAKV was another attempt at reaching

safe, middle class waters.
United Front.

The Popular Front was supposed to save the

According to Hall, "the needs of the day and the maturity

of the evolution make it necessary and possible to expand the KV beyond
t he

.
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Sattler agreed that it was most important "to make a consistent effort
of
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strategy required ideological changes.

II

• 85

In the new situation, this

In the resulting controversy

over the proper adjustments, the leftists imposed their unworkable appreach on the centrists.

At the convention, Sattler introduced a motion

to condemn the Hitler-Stalin Pact.
the latter.
83

But the leftists could not disown

The Volksecho blamed it on the isolation of the Soviet

Ibid., 9 September 1939.

84
Volksecho, 10 September 1939.
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volkszeitung, 9 September 1939.
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Union which needed more time to prepare for the onslaught of the German
armies. 86

The leftists referred the motion of Sattler to the committee

on resolutions.

There, they theorized that "the foreign policy of

Russia did not concern the work of the League directly".

The committee

submitted a counter-resolution against condemnation "because of the
unpredictable consequences
rapidly".

and because the situation could change

The thirty-five delegates from a dozen cities accepted the

second resolution "by all against four votes".

The Volksecho reported

this development only some ten days after the convention, in its last
issue.

87

As a result of this stand, the German American Popular Front

lost one of its main purposes, the defense of the Soviet Union by collective security.

But it could not benefit from this diplomatic change

which was, propagandistically, much worse than the concept of collective
security.
In this dilemma, the leftists resorted to substitute ways of
improving the image of the DAKV.

The delegation from Philadelphia felt

that the DAKV was "not only an anti-Nazi organization, but an auxiliary
organization for all German Americans".

Hall belatedly proposed to em-

phasize the transformation of the DAKV "from a purely negative antiNazi organization to a positive German American cultural organization".
He deplored the fact that the cultural work of the League was "still
its greatest weakness".

It was "sporadic and never systematic".

It

required "a serious, systematic educational program that familiarizes
86
87

Volksecho, 26 August 1939.
Ibid., 16 September 1939.

86

German Americans and Americans with German language, literature and
music".

It should extend to "the field of civilization", that is, it

should "pursue German American interests in the public school system,
II

the public h ousing system, etc • .

88

sis from foreign to domestic policy.

Thus, the DAKV switched its emphaIt stood "for a progressive

internal policy" with a "minimum program of democracy for all German
Americans 11 •
the WPA 11 •

89

That meant "no lowering of salaries, no elimination of

90

The leftists also paid attention to the nationality issue and
to ethnic protection.

The Volksecho deplored that many German Americans

denied their German origins.

This contributed to the misconception that

"Germandom and National Socialism are

identical~'. 91

Hall also suggested

that a strong DAKV could raise its voice after the war "when a new
Versailles must be prevented to ensure the renaissance of a free democratic Germany".
assistance.

The convention should lay the foundation for this

As a comprehensive purpose of a better Popular Front, the

leftists offered "the protection of the loyal German Americans in the
face of the war situation and of the danger of a rising anti-German
hatred in the United States".

92

With these ideological concessions, the DAKV hoped to qualify
88
89
90
91
92
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for cooperation with the conservative German American societies.

93

The president of the Wisconsin Zentralverband deutschstammiger Vereine
(Confederation of German Societies) accepted an invitation to the conference.

With him, the German American Turners, a non-labor organiza-

tion, and the Steuben Society were envisioned as members of a National
Cartel Organization of German

Amer~cans.

This middle class strategy

could not work for a DAKV that identified with the Hitler-Stalin Pact.
The Neue Volkszeitung correctly diagnosed it as a sign of decline.
Hall covered this bleak outlook up with a show of confidence.

Ignoring

the latest international developments, he called the period from mid1938 to the fall of 1939 "a year of progress".

In his speech to the

convention, he described the development of the DAKV "from a loose
federation of individual city locals .•• to a relatively solid national
.
.
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.
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He added that the latter

was of one mind and had never had any serious differences of opinion.
But with "the reorganization of the national executive" and other
measures, the Popular Front assumed a lower profile which was not conducive to a publicity oriented movement.
elected president.

Sattler was unanimously re-

Schrotter remained national secretary but Hall and

Necker did not retain their vice presidential posts.
tional organizer instead.

Hall became na-

In a time of reduced activity, this was more

a recognition of past services.

A national secretariate of five members

would reside in Chicago while the full executive of fifteen members
would meet every six months in a central location., The national con93
94

Ibid.
Ibid.

88

vention would be held only bi-annually unless half of the DAKV locals
demanded an earlier date.

The Volksecho and the Volksfront discon-

tinued publication shortly after the convention.
to issue a monthly DAKV bulletin for 1¢ apiece.
the German American Popular Front was over.
in obscurity.
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The latter planned
The first phase of

The DAKV survived only

The next two years of the German socialist emigration

belonged to the Social Democratic and the New Beginning groups.
95

rbid.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GERMAN EMIGRATION BEFORE
THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS OF THE
SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, THE UNIONISTS AND THE NEW BEGINNING GROUP
These three Social Democratic groups were not equally competent in their organizational efforts in this country.

The Sopade and

the emigrants of the Allgemeine Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (ADGB,
General German Trade Union Federation) had the best opportunities for
establishing branches in the United States and for consistently cultivating good relations with American labor groups.

But they were pre-

occupied with European events and did not make any long term plans.
They represented the Weimar labor establishment and did not" feel the
need for winning the recognition of an American labor movement whose
socialist sector was alien to them, disorganized and small.
was powerful but anti-socialist.

The AFL

At times of financial distress, the

unionist and SPD emigrants made' ill-conceived attempts at raising
instant American funds.
The unionist emigrants made Martin Plettl the American representative of their belated Gewerkschaftliche Auslandsvertretung Deutschlands (Geade, Exile Committee of the German Trade Unions).

But Plettl

lacked the proper attitude to the plans of his American sponsors and
remained too isolated.

The Sopade was equally shortsighted.

89

After

90
failing to establish an early representation on the basis of already
existing contacts, it sent a number of individual volunteer fundraisers to the United States at haphazard intervals:

Seger in 1934

and 1935, Sollmann in 1937, and Stampfer in 1939 and 1940.

At the

occasion of Stampfer's first trip to America, the Sopade finally established an American branch, the German Labor Delegation (GLD).

By

then, the latter had already been preceded by the Gruppe Neu Beginnen.
Unlike the other two groups, NB had no American contacts in
1933.

But its emigrant leader Frank seized the opportunity of Vladek's

visit to Europe in 1935.

Eager for a status which the Sopade tried to

deny the NB Group, Frank realized that political work in the United
States was important for a long term emigration.

Before the end of

his first visit to America in 1935, the NB Group had the nucleus of an
American sponsor organization in the American Friends of German Freedom (AFGF).

But the number of American sponsors was mainly limited to

the Jewish labor leaders and the progressive minority in the Socialist
Party.

Even as a latecomer, the German Labor Delegation was not will-

ing to share the vital support of the Jewish labor organizations with
NB.

It resented the American success of Frank and tried to dislodge

the New Beginning Group from its favorable position.

In this process,

antifascist unity was again sacrificed to emigrant rivalry.

This be-

havior of the German socialist emigration limited the extent of its
political work in the United States.

It disillusioned the American

sponsors and turned their antagonisms to the disadvantage of the
German socialist emigration.

In the Jewish Labor Committee, the pro-

NB and pro-GLD factions neutralized each other's initiatives for the

91
respective German emigrant groups.
Long range Social Democratic planning would have required the
establishment of an official branch of the Sopade in the United States
in 1933 or 1934, before the split of the SPA in 1936.

The Sopade was

then financially independent and could have been an equal partner of
American socialists.

In this way, the SPD executive and the later

Social Democratic emigrants in New York could have won the willing
cooperation of the unionist emigration instead of arrogating unionist
functions under the pressure of later circumstances.

Neither could

they have been challenged by New Beginning which was, instead, allowed
a headstart.
ing groups.

They would also have had to be more tolerant of dissentVladek would have insisted on moderation.

lacked the necessary vision.

But the Sopade

It was only in~erested in Europe and ex-

pected an early end to National Socialism.

By the time of its bank-

ruptcy, the Sopade was considered doomed so·that American socialists
and unionists were reluctant to waste money on it.

The opposing

socialist emigrant groups were only good for partisan American purposes.
Immediately after the National Socialist assumption of power,
Siegfried Lipschitz encouraged American socialists and unionists to
cooperate with the· Sopade.

He had run the Social Democratic press

service in New York since 1929.

1

Especially American Jewish socialists

1
Federal Republic of Germany, Political Archives of the Auswartiges Amt, Bonn, Ausburgerungen, 23. Liste, L-Z. Dr. Siegfried
Lipschitz: Preussische Gestapo to Reichsministerium des Innern, 15
November 1934. This document further elaborates that Lipschitz became
a journalist after serving in the German army and studying law and
economics in Berlin and Vienna. He represented various liberal German
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and unionists were interested in contacts with the Sopade and in extension of its work to the United States.
of mediation frustrating.

But Lipschitz found the task

Part of his problems with the Sopade were

his own ideas about antifascist work in the United States.

The execu-

tives disliked his patronizing criticism and activism and his insistence on socialist renewal and cooperation.

For a while, he had been

editor-in-chief of the old New York Volkszeitung which suggests that
he was too radical for the Sopade.

Lipschitz deplored that the Weimar

SPD had not responded to his exhortations of thoroughly informing
American public opinion about the dangers of a National Socialist
victory.

In 1933, he was convinced that antifascist publicity in

America by the SPD was more important than ever, and more important
than in Europe because of "the support which we may receive from all
sides of American public opinion for our fight against the Hitler
regime".

He. described how many "government agencies, organizations,

newspapers, etc." had asked him "to be kept up to date about the developments within the German socialist and labor movement and to be
informed regularly about all declarations, decisions, etc. of our movement".

Reciprocally, he hoped to contribute to the Neue Vorwarts and

to all other publications of the Sopade.

2

Beyond that, Lipschitz pro-

posed the formation of an official branch of the party in this country
newspapers in the Far East. Then,he spent four years in Mexico as the
head of the Social Democratic press service in that country before being
promoted to the same task in the United States.
2
Archiv der sozialen Demodratie, Bonn, Emi rations-Kores ondenz
(later referred to as EK), Lipschitz to Werte Genossen (Sopade , 21 June
1933, Mappe 72.

on the ground that a mere press service would not suffice for the
necessary work in the United States.

He considered his loyalty un-

questionable and made himself available to the emigrant executives
"at any time and in any way necessary in this fight against the reigning German tyranny".

3

He informed them that he planned to attend the

conference of the Socialist International in Paris in August 1933,

!

where he expected to discuss these American matters with them personally.

Stampfer represented the Sopade in Paris and seemed very inter-

r
~·

ested in the proposals of Lipschitz.
the full executive in Prague.

He promised to report them to

4

But the Sopade was not interested.

It was disappointed by

the criticism of the SPA delegation to the Paris conference.

Soon

after his return from Europe, Lipschitz questioned Stampfer about the
progress in the matter of an American Sopade branch and insisted again
on the necessity for an immediate decision.

He explained again that

his plans were not only supported by the SPA but also by the American
unions and by the leadership of the AFL.

He offered to be an honorary

Sopade representative and expected compensation only for the cost of
running an office.

The latter could in his opinion maintain close

contacts with the government agencies in Washington and extend its
work from a central point to the Latin American countries which were
especially vulnerable to National Socialist propaganda. 5
3

4

It can be

Ibid.

L·~psc h'~tz to Sopad e, 7 Ju 1y 1933 , EK

Mappe 72.

5
Lipschitz to Friedrich Stampfer, 27 September 1933, EK
Mappe 72.

r
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assumed that an SPD branch of long standing would not have been ignored by the American government.
Without the establishment of a Sopade branch, Lipschitz continued his work within the antifascist activities of the American
socialists.

He wrote the pamphlet "Swastika over Germany" which was

printed by the Rand School,
in the SPA.

6

th~

propaganda stronghold of the Old Guard

Shortly after his return from Europe in the fall of 1933,

"the Socialist Party and the antifascist unions" organized the Labor
Conference to Combat Hitlerism, a forerunner of the Labor League.
According to Lipschitz, the ACWA and the ILGWU belonged to the Conference together with other Jewish labor organizations like the Workmen's
Circle and "German party and labor groups". 7

The Labor Conference de-

cided to.:form locals throughout the United States and established an
office for publicity, the Transatlantic Information Service (TIS).

It

was run by Lipschitz who then had an American substitute for the defunct Social Democratic press service.

He expected the Sopade to

cooperate closely with the Labor Conference and with the TIS.

He

solicited a regular correspondence which was to include telegrams on
special occasions.

He emphasized that "these international contacts

are all the more necessary as we might at some unforeseen moment be
terribly dependent on them".
6
Political Archives AA, Bonn, Ausburgerungen, 23. Liste, L-Z,
Dr. Siegfried Lipschitz: Bericht der Deutschen Botschaft in Washington, 10 June 1933.
7Transatlantic Information Service, New York, Lipschitz to
Parteivorstand, Prag, 31 January 1934, EK Mappe 138.
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This was a reference to a potential revolutionary change in
Germany about which Lipschitz shared the general illusions.

In March

1934, he doubted whether the Sopade was prepared for such an eventuality and was afraid "that the approaching hour of destiny will find
us inhibited by unresolved questions".

8

He praised the Revolutionary

Manifesto of the Sopade as a necessary beginning but urged more revolutionary seriousness.

He believed that "the time has come to officially

shed the garb of the old Social Democracy and to unite under a new
banner, in name also".

In so doing, the Sopade could overcome the

general criticism of the Social Democratic performance before and
after January 1933.

Lipschitz urged this change out of loyalty to the

SPD which ought to defend itself against the charges from within and
without its ranks that its Revolutionary Manifesto was only "new wine
in old containers".

He expected the Sopade to assume the revolutionary

leadership against National Socialism and reintegrate the dissident

.
9
socialist groups into a common effort.

He also advocated more far-

reaching plans which would have "an electrifying appeal to youth and
to the world".

He considered it necessary to unite "the defeated

German and Austrian forces into a 'Grossdeutsche' socialist party"
which would pursue "the goal of a united socialist 'Grossdeutschland'
imbued with true Social Democratic spirit".

10

Such ideas could not go

8
Lipschitz to Stampfer, 2 March 1934, EK Mappe 138.
9

Ibid.

10

Ibid.
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over too well with the Sopade which viewed the internationally favored
and more radical Austrians with distrust.
The Sopade nearly ignored the Labor Conference and left Lipschitz to his own devices.

He had to remind the executives that

Vladek, the general manager of the Jewish Daily Forward, had asked
them for delivery of all Sopade publications including the issues of
the year old Neue VorWarts.

He told them without making much of an

impression that "comrade Vladek is easily the most active American
.

personality in the fight against the Nazis, here and over there".

11

In the absence of good overseas relations, Lipschitz vigorously pursued
the American goals of the TIS with the assistance of the Jewish Daily
Forward. He conducted "a systematic press and radio campaign" against
the Third Reich, the Nazi propaganda in the United States, and against
American antisemitism.
newspapers and

.

His

magaz~nes,

went to more than five hundred
.
.
. d.~v~. dua 1s. 12
to numerous organLzatLons
an d ~n
infor~tion

The German government was concerned about the activities of
Lipschitz because of its fear of anti-German feelings in the United
States.

The German embassy in Washington was upset about the circular

letters of the TIS to the American press and about the wide influence
of the Information Service which reached Chicago, St. Louis and Omaha.

13

The Prussian Gestapo complained that American public opinion was easily
impressed and that Lipschitz "inflicted substantial damage on National
Socialistic Germany and its economic relations with America", especially
11
12
13

Lipschitz to Stampfer, 30 April 1934, EK Mappe 138.
L·Lpsc h'~tz to Sopa d e, 31 J anuary 1934 , EK Ma ppe 138 •

Political Archives AA, Bonn, Ausburgerungen, 23. Liste,
Bericht der Deutschen Botschaft in Washington, 26 January 1934.
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through the proclamation of a boycott against German goods.

14

To for-

ward its information to German newspapers was considered as "the
ultimate impudence" of the TIS.

15

By March 1935, the German consulate

general in New York was satisfied to report that "the anti-German activities of Lipschitz have apparently subsided".

According to a special

agent, the TIS existed no longer and Lipschitz had accepted a position
with the AFL.

16

Despite "his limited circumstances", the German

embassy considered it advisable to postpone depriving Lipschitz of
his German citizenship which-would only bring him undeserved publicity!
The Gestapo waited until August 1937 before resubmitting a proposal for
the Ausburgerung (deprivation of citizenship) of Lipschitz to the Ministry of the Interior which had then no more objections.

18

. The disappearance of the TIS was due to an expansion of the
Labor Conference.

The latter was concerned that a strictly Jewish

fight against fascism would stimulate rather than contain antisemitism.
The Labor Conference was only precariously inter-ethnic with the mem14
Ibid., ~reussische Gestapo to Reichsministerium des .Innern,
. 15 November 1934.
15

Ibid., Bericht der Deutschen Botschaft in Washington, 26
January 1934.
16

Ibid., Bericht des Deutschen Generalkonsulats in New York,
6 March 1935.
17

Ibid., Bericht der Deutschen Botschaft in Washington, 18
January 1936.
18

Ibid., Preussische Gestapo to Reichministerium des Innern,
20 August 1937; also Reichsministerium des Innern - Preussische
Gestapo, 3 September 1937.

7

98
bership of such elements as "the German party and labor groups".
According to Lipschitz, these "German organizations of a socialist hue
have been active despite their weakness and have organized numerous
meetings".

But the Neue Volkszeitung did in his opinion "not fully

•
up to [ our J
1 ~ve

•

expectat~ons

11

• 19

Nevertheless, the Labor Conference

refused to associate with communist groups.

According to Lipschitz,

the German communist emigrant Willi MUnzenberg, a Popular Front theorizer and organizer in Paris, "thoroughly failed" in his purpose of
winning American Jewish union funds during his visit to the United
States in the summer of 1934.

20

Lipschitz also refused to mediate in

August 1934 between the American Committee against Fascist Oppression
in Germany and his "friends in the Socialist Party".

He did not recom-

mend the communist proposals for a United Front around "the solidarity
campaign for the political prisoners in Germany",
\

21

which were for-

warded to him by the American Munzenberg associate, Louis Gibarti.
Under these circumstances, the American Jewish labor groups wanted "to
conduct the fight on a strictly unionist basis" and tried to involve
the AFL.

They persuaded William Green to make boycott declarations
19

Lipschitz to Sopade, 31 January 1934, EK - Mappe 138.

20

Lipschitz to Stampfer, 21 August 1934, EK - Mappe 138. Mllnzenberg had his own convictions about the Popular Front which was
officially proclaimed by the Comintern a year later, in August 1935.
He was expelled from the KPD in 1939 for his independence of mind and
action and shortly thereafter died mysteriously· in a forest near
Grenoble, France.
21

Archiv des Bundesvorstandes des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes
(DGB), DUsseldorf, Emigrationsnachlass Martin Plettl: Louis Gibarti to
Lipschitz, 2 August 1934.
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against German goods and issue antifascist appeals.
Green and other AFL leaders presided over

a

In February 1934,

"Hands across the Seas

Dinner" which the Labor Conference organized in New York "as
of solidarity with the German labor movement".

a

symbol

Finally, the national

convention of the AFL in San Francisco, in the late summer of 1934, devoted a full day "to the discussion of fascist problems".

22

Then, it

established the Anti-Hitler Labor League and instituted a Labor Chest
for the Relief and Liberation of Workers in Europe.

Lipschitz kept

his public relations job in the League so that the general consulate in
New York had been correct in reporting his employment by the AFL.

In

October 1934, the Sopade finally responded to the entreaties of Lipschitz by sending Segar on a trip to the United States.

It will be

discussed after the following report on the relations between German
and American unionists.
The problems of Plettl in the American emigration were related
to the lost reputation of the ADGB leaders after their misguided attempt
at appeasing the Hitler government.

The union emigrants faced an un-

friendly European union movement which tried to take the organization
of underground work in Germany into its own hands.

This was all the

easier since the German union leaders were not prepared for such work
and took more than two years to establish an emigrant representation.
What hurt them most was this loss of international status in addition
to their defeat at home.

They were used to being the principals of the

European union movement.

They intended to rehabilitate themselves and

22

Lipschitz to Stampfer, 21 August 1934, Mappe 138 EK.

100
regain some of their former stature by assuming a belated control of
all underground work in Germany.
with the union internationals.

No German union was to deal directly
Thus continued an unhealthy antagonism.

The relationship between Plettl and the American Jewish union leaders
duplicated the European situation.

Plettl could help to raise funds

which were handed over to the union internationals.

He suffered from

this disregard which intensified his traumatic European experience.
He became obsessed with regaining European respectability for the
German union emigration but that development took too long.

It was

retarded in the view of Plettl by a conspiracy between New Beginning
and the union internationals against the ADGB emigration.

When Vladek

became also enamoured with NB the task of Plettl seemed hopeless.
With his union background, his visit to the United States had
not required much negotiation.

He had been president of the Deutsche

Bekleidungsarbeiter Verband (DBV), Union of the German Clothing Workers)
from 1920 to 1933, and also president of the Internationale Bekleidungsarbeiter Faderation (IBF, International Clothing Workers' Federation)
from 1924 to 1935.

In 1933,he was imprisoned for a while in Berlin and

fled to the IBF in Amsterdam after his release in May.

It was natural

for the American garment unions to sponsor Plettl for a six-month tour
of the Eastern and Midwestern United States in the fall of 1933 on behalf of the Labor Conference.
where he died in 1958.

23

He took it safe and stayed in America,

His emigrant activity was limited to the three

years from 1933 to 1936. It ended with the decline of the Labor League.
23

Lipschitz to Sopade, 31 January 1934, Mappe 138 EK.
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Plettl was absorbed by the developments of the German union
emigration in Europe.

In 1933, at the congress of the International

Federation of Trade Unions, the latter played only "the shameful role
of tolerated spectators", a discrimination that Plettl felt still
"burning on (his] forehead" three years later.

He felt like "a fugitive

from a defeated army" and was depressed over "the scorn for the German
loser".

24

In the two years before the organization of a German emigrant

representation, the IFTU and the IBS, the labor internationals, tried
to coordinate the unionist underground work in Germany.

They formed

the Coordination Committee for Illegal Activities among whose members
were Edo Fimmen of the International Transportworkers' Federation (ITF)
and T. von der Heeg, the secretary of Plettl's IBF.
dynamic underground work

comparabl~

They advocated

to the program of the New Beginning

Group with whom they had various connections inside and_ outside of
Germany.

The German unionist emigrants were afraid of an NB conspiracy

in the international organizations: "Miles - SI (Friedrich Adler),
Miles - IFTU (Walter Schevenels), Miles - ITF (Edo Fimmen)".

25

Plettl

and his fellow ADGB emigrants maintained the same liberal attitude as
the Sopade and called the Coordination Committee the "Soviet of Amsterdam"26 which allegedly rejected "out of hand ·an those whose names are
connected with the old German trade union movement; since [their]
'political' program is identical with political revolutionary romanti24

Plettl to Schliestedt, 11 May 1936, Nachlass Plettl.

25

schliestedt to F(ritz] Kummer, quoted in F[ritz Kummer] to
Marten Hendrick (Plettl), 17 May 1935, Nachlass Plettl.
26

schliestedt to Plettl, 5 February 1936, Nachlass Plettl.
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cism, it entails a priori the exclusion of the old trade unionists who
cannot go along with this line under any circumstances".

27

Plettl

failed to get a response from the secretary of his own IBF despite repeated requests for information.

Simultaneously, his presidency of the

IBF ended in 1935.
In his search for rehabilitation, Plettl was one of the most
emphatic organizers of an ADGB representation abroad.

He discussed his

plans by correspondence with his unionist colleagues in Czechoslovakia,
France, Holland and Denmark.

28

leaders and representatives of

They called a conference of emigrant
German underground groups to Reichen-

berg, Czechoslovakia, in the summer of 1935.

It decided

to~form

an

exile committee (Geade) and a Reichsleitung (national underground committee) in Germany.

Both were to guarantee the organizational indepen-

dence of the German trade union groups. in Germany and abroad.

29

Indi-

vidual union groups were no longer to deal directly with Amsterdam or
Brussels but with the national committee.

The Geade would mediate

between the latter and the labor internationals.

In September 1935,

the Geade was recognized by the IFTU in time for the AFL convention in
October.
Plettl pursued his European interests in 1936.

He made "far-

27

F[ritz Kummer] to Marten Hendrick (Plettl), 17 May 1935,
Nachlass Plettl.
28
29

schliestedt to Plettl, 17 May 1935, Nachlass Plettl.

Kreyssig, im Namen des Internationalen Gewerkschaftsbundes to
Internationale Berufssekretariate, 9 August 1935, Nachlass Plettl.
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reaching plans" for the Geade and proposed "to centralize and to win a
preponderant influence" in the IFTu.

30

He intended to travel to London

for the IFTU congress of 1936 and proposed a prior meeting of Geade
representatives in order to discuss the offensive strategy for the
congress •. He objected especially to the comprehensive representation
of the German speaking countries by an Austrian unionist, and insisted
on a direct representation of the Geade in the IFTU.

He also promoted

the idea of "an inevitable war" in order to persuade the IFTU into
considering the opposition against Hitler rather than against Franco
as the main issue of its future policy within which the Geade would
.

acqu~re

.
31
a centra 1 ~mportance.

"a concentric approach".

His European strategy was that of

He impressed on the other Geade representa-

tives the need for "hannnering" from all points of the German emigration
sphere at the reluctant union internationals for recognition.

Plett!

could not, however, take his trip to London for lack of money and for
fear of being refused reentry into the United States on his temporary
visitor's visa.

The Geade did not become what Plett! wanted it to be.

It could not catch up with the developments in the United States.
While waiting, Plett! had to defer to the reality of the American situation.

He necessarily agreed to' "the concentration of contri-

butions in the IFTU" and in the IBS.
30

32

The two internationals received

Plettl to Kreyssig, 16 May 1936, Nachlass Plett!.

31

Plettl to Schliestedt, 11 May 1936; also Schliestedt to
Plett!, 13 October 1936, Nachlass Plett!.
32

Plettl to Fritz Heinrich, 22 September 1937, Nachlass Plett!.

104
"several thousand dollars" in early 1934.

33

But the German unionists

continually complained to Plettl that Italian, Polish and Spanish concerns received preference.

He considered it, however, pointless to

pass on their direct financial requests to the Labor Chest.

34

Instead,

he told his fellow emigrants to refrain from overcriticizing the IFTU
when they would meet Vladek on his trip to Europe in the summer of
1935.

He advised them to tolerate the fixed idea of dealing exclusive-

ly with the internationals since "we will achieve our goals best by
letting [the American unionists] persist in their initiative and their
good faith in its fairness".

35

But Vladek ignored the German unionists

whom Plettl had recommended to him.

Besides some Sopade leaders, he

met some IBS secretaries, the secretary of the Socialist International
and Frank, who was favored by the Austrian Adler and thus benefitted
from the reputation of the Austrian socialists after their courageous
but unsuccessful stand against the Dollfuss government.

Vladek invited

Frank to visit the United States in the fall of 1935.
At that time, Plettl hoped to win a few points in prestige as
the American Geade representative in Atlantic City where the AFL convention took place.

He had not gone to the important convention in

San Francisco in 1934 where his new employer, the Labor League, was
formed.

Apparently, he did not want to ask the ILGWU for the train-

33
Plettl to Friedrich Adler, 15 March 1934; also Max Braun to
Plettl, 24 February 1935, Nachlass Plettl.
34
35

schliestedt to Plettl, 13 October 1936, Nachlass Plettl.

Plettl to Schliestedt, Hartig, Reissner, Kummer, 7 August
1935, Nachlass Plettl.
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fare to the West Coast.

For the convention in Atlantic City, he was

resolved to shed his modesty and to speak in the name of the German
union emigration.

It gave him a feeling of continuity since he had

been a member of the German study commission which had attended the
AFL convention of 1925 in the same city in order to sound out the possibility of an AFL membership

~n

the IFTU.

But by 1936, Plettl neared the end of his emigrant activity.
The American labor movement was disrupted by the split of the Socialist
Party and by the challenge of the CIO.

Since the main unions of the

Labor League spearheaded the movement for industrial organization, the
Labor League and the Labor Chest lost their organizational basis.
Plettl hoped that "the rift will not be permanent" so that "in the
interests of the European tasks, this welt-functioning institution [of
the Labor Chest] will be maintained and will not be reduced to our
original organizations", the Jewish unions.
pened.

The Labor League fell into abeyance.

That was exactly what hapPlettl retired to Florida

where he lived for the next twenty years.
A long term approach would have been better for the union emigration.

As Geade representative in New York, Plettl could have

continued working with the Jewish Labor Committee and with Lipschitz
with whom he had corresponded and met frequently.

He was also the

president of the Deutsche Freiheitsbund (League for German Freedom),
"a politically neutral organization opposed to the Friends of the New
Germany".

36

36
119.

In New York, he would have entered into contact with the

Gerhard Seger to Parteivorstand, 10 November 1934, EK Mappe
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later arriving Social Democratic emigrants.

In 1940 and 1941 he could

have persuaded the Jewish Labor Committee to rescue some of the unionist refugees from Southern France whom the German Labor Delegation
neglected.

Such reinforcements would have obviated the later conflict

between the GLD and a second union representation.
The fate of Plettl showed that the Labor League was more interested in politicians than in unionists.

The request of Lipschitz for

"a prominent party speaker" led finally to the first visit of Seger
from October 1934 to June 1935.
every~hing

37

Lipschitz promised that he would do

in his power to make the tour successful and hoped that

Seger would "not be too late" for an enthusiastic American reception.
He conceded that "public interest was momentarily concentrated on the
Austrians" in this year of their courageous resistance.

But he was

dissatisfied with the performance of the socialist mayor of Vienna
whose tour he had arranged.

The latter was already sixty-five years

old and "avoided any discussion of political and power questions"
which Lipschitz considered important "in the interests of the future
and of the necessary appeal to youth".

He confessed to Stampfer that

"the time has come when we have to brutally assume the initiative and
cannot afford the luxury of looking back to the past with nostalgia".
For these reasons, the choice of Seger seemed "fortunate" to him.

38

Seger had an ideal antifascist record for a speaking and fundraising tour.
37 L·

~psc

He had spent most of 1933 in the concentration camp of
h.~tz to p arte~vorstan
.
d , Prag, 31 January 1934 EK Mappe

138.
38

Lipschitz to Stampfer, 2 March 1934, EK Mappe 138.
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oranienburg from where he escaped in December 1933.

In retaliation,

his wife and two year old child were arrested and then released under
· pressure. 39
. h ecc 1 es~as
. t.~ca 1 , par 1"~amentary an d d.~p 1omat~c
Eng 1 ~s

He

described his ordeal in the report "Oranienburg" which sold eighty
thousand copies in Sweden alone within half a year.

But significantly,

he could not find a publisher in England or the United States.

40

His

recent loss of citizenship in the company of two German princes made
also promotive news.
Yet, the tour of Seger was not successful.
part of the rightwing establishment of the SPD.

He had not been

His good publicity

enabled him to pay his own way and gave him the opportunity to pursue
an independent emigrant career.

His recommendation by the Sopade re-

fleeted this ambiguity •. · It read that "comrade Seger supports the
political work of the party during his trip to the United States in
the name of the SPD

.

execut~ve

,.41
•

More crucially, Seger took sides with

the Old Guard in the factional disputes within the SPA.

The Militant

majority charged that the Old Guard exploited his tour for propaganda
benefits in the party struggle.
reception in

New York.

The factional problems began with his

He arrived together with the Austrian Julius

Deutsch who had led the socialist defense against the Heimwehr militia
(national guard) and who later became a general of the International
39

seger to Parteivorstand, 18 May 1934, EK Mappe 119; also
Radkau, Die deutsche Emigration in den USA, p. 146.
40
41
119.

Seger to Paul Hertz, 19 August 1934, EK Mappe 119.
Sopade recommendation for Seger, 16 October 1934, EK Mappe
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Brigades in the Spanish Civil War.

The two socialists were welcomed

at the pier by a large delegation from the Jewish unions, the Socialist
Party, the League for German Freedom, and other German American organizations together with "thousands of young socialists" with red flags.
They carried the Austrian German pair on their shoulders to the waiting
cars that brought them to the Socialist Party headquarters in a procession of music bands and thousands of marchers with hundreds of
. .
tore hb earers 1 ~n~ng
t h e streets. 42

According to Lipschitz, this wel-

come and its publicity in the American press caused "a disruption of
the Nazi propaganda in this country that could not be overestimated".
Yet, Seger- was not pleased.
majority of the Socialist Party.

43

He felt upstaged by the Militant

He believed that the latter misused

the reception and the tour of Deutsch for publicity purposes in the
contest over control of the New York party organizations.
with the minority.

44

He sided

In his view, only "the New York [City] and a few

other organizations correspond to the German party", that is the SPD.
He sarcastically compared the twenty-two thousand SPA members to the
one hundred twenty million people of the United States.

The Socialist

Party was only "a miniscule sect" which in turn consisted of "more
factions than members".

He declared the national executive in Chicago

"controlled by half-communists" and explained to the Sopade that "it is
better and more useful for the financial purposes if I do not appear
42
43
44

Lipschitz to Stampfer, 2 November 1934, EK Mappe 138.
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Seger to Crummenerl, 18 November 1934, EK Mappe 119.
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too often as a speaker of this party because of the relationship between the American unions and this insane sect".

According to Seger,

the SPA even mismanaged the tour of Deutsch because their "wild revolutionary determination ••. was inversely proportional to [their] ability
of organizing a simple speaking tour".
comrades were

11

Seger complained that certain

not very friendly" towards him.

According to hearsay,

the national secretary was "not interested in arranging the American
travels of German traitors".

Seger claimed however that the latter

and many others changed their views after listening to his presentation
of the Social Democratic case in the Weimar Republic.

Deutsch also

conciliated by asking Seger to continue his program because he was required to leave the United States prematurely.

45

Under these political

circumstances, Seger relied "on organizations quite different from the
Socialist Party".

46

Yet, his attitude towards the Socialist Party probably hurt
his work with the Labor League.

Vladek, who tried desperately to save

the SPA, was also the treasurer of the Labor League.

He continued his

practice of dealing financially only with the labor internationals
which had a joint European Committee for distributing American funds.
Seger received a set fee of $25 for every meeting of his speaking tour
for the Labor Chest
45
46
47

47

which lasted for two months beginning in January

Seger to Sopade, 10 November 1934, EK Mappe 119.
seger to Toni Sender, 29 November 1934, EK Mappe 119.
Seger to Vladek, 18 November 1934, EK Mappe 119.
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1935 and extended from New York to Los Angeles.

48

Vladek delivered

this money, some $1,056, personally to the Sopade during his trip to
Europe shortly after Seger's departure.

49

For other Labor Chest funds,

the Sopade depended on the European Committee.

Inevitably, controversy

arose over how much the Committee received and what was the proper
Sopade share.

At the farewell dinner for Seger, Vladek reportedly

mentioned that the Labor Chest had raised $28,000 for Europe up to
June 1935.

The European Committee received $5,000 from Vladek in No-

vember 1934.

In the spring of 1935, the president of the IFTU told the

Sopade that the Labor Chest had sent $15,000 up to then.

Later, he

claimed that the Seger tour had netted $2,500 of that sum, a figure
which made no sense to Seger.
request its due share.

The latter kept urging the Sopade to

Vladek had already told him in November 1934,

at the start of the tour, that the Sopade should "insist on a really
substantial portion that corresponds to the importance of Germany, of
our work and of my cooperation".

In this sense, Seger argued that

"nobody has worked as hard for the enlightenment about fascism in the
United States as I".
Vladek.

Then, he negotiated "long and repeatedly" with

But the latter referred him back to the European Committee

which alone decided about the deservingness of underground groups.
The IFTU had given most of the American funds to illegal groups in
Germany of whom Seger professed to have heard for the first time.
48

He

Seger to Sopade, 10 November 1934; also Seger to Crummenerl,
18 November 1934, EK Mappe 119.
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told the Sopade in disgust that he did not want to "further concern
himself with the issue especially since my experiences in the United
States were not very pleasant".

50

He also complained that "the part

of his speaking tour which was organized by the American Federation of
Labor was not very successful".

He considered the latter "unprepared

for the organization of a campaign of political meetings" since it had
"no cadres of functionaries or at least of employees who have organizational experience"

51

The other engagements of Seger were not very successful either.
They included "a mass meeting" of the League for German Freedom and a
meeting of the German branch of the New York Socialist Party.

Both of

them were relatively well attended with audiences of seven to nine
hundred people.

But Seger commented that "a German speaker is natur-

ally disappointed".

52

His Chicago appearances included speeches at the

Universities of Northwestern and Chicago and "two dinners with the
richest men in town", one of them at the house of the lawyer Levinson
who had drafted the Kellogg Pact.

From these wealthy Jewish business-

men, the Sopade received "a first installment" of $500. 53
reaction to his Chicago appearances was insignificant.

The press

According to

Seger, only opponents of President Roosevelt could get good publicity
50

Seger to Crummenerl, 18 November 1934, 19 June 1935; 18 July
1935, EK Mappe 119.
51

Seger to Crummenerl, 18 July 1935; also Seger to Sopade,
19 June 1935, EK Mappe 119.
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there.

His total record consisted of one hundred fifty-three speeches

and ninety-four interviews in fifty-five cities and twenty-one states
during an itinerary of over thirty thousand miles.

54

In the final

analysis, Seger considered his tour "politically successful, ••• much
less successful in the collection of funds for our illegal

activities'.~ 5

The Sopade was still used to spending large sums.
For his second time in the United States, Seger had a different
concept.

He thought he had enough experience and connections for es-

tablishing himself in the United States independently of the Labor
League.

But he wanted to involve the Sopade more in his plans.

At the

end of his first trip, he wrote the exile executives that "our antifascist propaganda is lacking a centralized systematic direction.
we would create one we could accomplish something".

If

He would be well

equipped to be the agent of such a Sopade effort in the United States,
especially with his prospect of joining the staff of the Neue Volkszeitung in August 1935.

Seger did not have the time to go to Prague.

The Sopade executive, Siegfried Crummenerl, met with him in St. Gallen,
Switzerland, in order to discuss the next American trip.

56

Seger told

the Sopade that he had already "so many speaking engagements for the
coming season" that he had decided to settle in America with his family.
He hoped to collect $8,000 to $10,000.

He emphasized, however, the

need "for a planned action covering all the states ••• instead of my
54
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Seger to Sopade, 19 June 1935, EK Mappe 119.
Seger to Crummenerl, 18 July 1935, EK Mappe 119.

Seger to Sopade, 19 June 1935; also Seger to Crummenerl,
19 June 1935, EK Mappe 119.
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more or less sporadic appearance".
American style".
tation.

He advocated a "real

1

drive 1 in the

This required the establishment of a party represen-

Seger intimated that his permanent position with the NVZ could

give "the political work in the United States the necessary stability
so that a solid center for our party work could be established".

He

volunteered for·such a project unless the Sopade had "other personnel
intentions".

In this context, he asked: "By the way, your permanent

representative here, is that Dr. Lipschitz?"

57

His ignorance of the

status of Lipschitz was indicative of the Sopade attitude towards him.
If the latter had planned to establish a party branch it would have sent
somebody else.
For his fundraising efforts, Seger wanted to address the liberal
middle class besides the labor groups.
of such an undertaking.

He was aware of the difficulties

According to him, collection for charity was

more popular than for political causes.

Especially Jewish groups pre-

£erred to contribute to emigrant aid societies rather than to socialist
and antifascist groups.

They were afraid of generating more antisemi-

tism by interfering in internal German affairs.

Criticism of the Social

Democratic role in the fall of the Weimar Republic was another obstacle
to fundraising.

This criticism was especially prevalent in liberal

middle class circles.

They had "a devastating conception of the 'fail-

ure' of German Social Democracy so that the communists and the enormously popular Miles Group [NB] have an easier access to funds even from
rightist groups".

57

Seger attributed the anti-Social Democratic attitude

Seger to Crummenerl, 6 November 1935, EK Mappe 119.
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of many intellectuals and liberals to the influence of the Nation and
the New Republic.

It meant that "this mood is based on a complete ig-

norance of the subject and can be overcome immediately by an authoritative presentation of the real state of affairs".
Seger did not raise much money for the Sopade.

Despite his confidence,
He did renounce his

speaker's fee in its favor since he had a permanent job with the

NVz. 58

But there was practically no correspondence between him and Prague after

1935.

He pursued his emigrant career independently of the Sopade as

editor of the NVZ, short time president of the DAKV and principal member of the Social Democratic Federation.

After the outbreak of the

Second World War, he had even more ambitious plans which will be discussed in the context of the German Labor Delegation.

He hoped for a

political career in the United States and did not return to Germany
after the war.
When a concerted Social Democratic effort was not forthcoming
Vladek looked for more contacts with the German exile and underground
movement.

During his trip to Europe in the summer of 1935, he also

explored the situation of the latter.

The general secretaries of the

Socialist International and of the International Federation of Trade
·unions recommended the NB Group and its exile leader, Frank, to him.
Such European socialists as Leon Blum, the organizer of the French
Popular Front, and Sir Stafford Cripps of the English Socialist League
also favored the NB Group.

Vladek was impressed with the exile and

underground work of the latter which in the beginning acted as a con58

Ibid.
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sultant to the .Sopade in this field.

59

NB provided many of the under-

ground reports for the Deutschlandberichte of the Sopade.

It coopera-

ted with Social Democratic underground groups like the Zehn Punkte
Gruppe (Ten Points Group) which repudiated the Sopade

60

and with the

remnants of the Sozialistische Arbeiter Jugend (Socialist Workers
Youth Organization) in Berlin.

1

Vladek knew that the leaders of the

latter had been expelled from the SPD in early 1933 for preparing an
underground cadre system when the party still believed in a legal existence.

Also, the salaries of NB leaders were considerably lower than

those of the Sopade executives and NB devoted a larger proportion of
its income to illegal work.

The latter resembled the activities of the

Bund in Czarist Russia which had shaped the political attitudes of
Vladek.

After the Sopade executives, the American Bundist also wanted

to meet Frank.

But he missed the NB leader in Prague who then followed

him to Brussels, his last European stop.

There, he invited Frank to

visit the United States and advised him to adopt the covername of Paul
61
. Amer~can
.
ac t•~v~•t•~es.
Hagen f or h ~s
of Frank in the United States.

That remained the emigrant name

As a well known mediator in the SPA,

Vladek was interested in a united German effort against National Socialism.

His interest in NB continued his previous solicitude for the

Sopade and the German unionists.

He also favored the NB policy of a

59
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socialist concentration.

Contrary to the assumptions of the Sopade,

it was not the identification of NB as a Social Democratic group which
endeared it to Vladek but the NB ideology and practice.

Neither was it

the end of Sopade subsidies which caused NB to look for American funds.
The financial success of NB in the United States only duplicated its
European fund raising efforts.

It had received 5,000 sfrs from the

Swiss Socialist Party and from the Swiss unions, 90,000 ffrs from the
French Section of the Socialist International under L~on Blum, 500
pounds from the Socialist League of Sir Stafford Cripps and 50,000
crowns from the Czech Social Democratic Party.

62

The Sopade could have

been as successful as NB in the United States if it had cooperated better with Vladek and adopted a more positive attitude towards other
socialist groups.
The first fund raising campaign of Frank lasted from the fall
of 1935 to early 1936 and nearly coincided with the second campaign of
Seger.

In 1935 already, Frank organized an NB center in the United

States, the American Friends of German Freedom (AFGF).

The latter

skillfully avoided a reference to socialism in favor of an appeal to
freedom.

It was more an American sponsor group than an overseas branch

of a German political group.

It was "a small, rather private organiza-

tion"63 until early 1939 when it expanded its activities and became !'a
more public organization".

According to Frank, its first supporters

were Jewish labor leaders which included besides Vladek, Julius
62
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Hochman and Max Zaritsky.

There were also Socialists like Reinhold

Niebuhr and Norman Thomas and the League for Industrial Democracy of
which Thomas was chairman,

Niebuh~

vice president, Mary Fox executive

secretary and Vladek a member of the board of directors.

During his

first American visit, Frank lived at the house of Thomas so that he
could not have gone far beyond the circles of the Labor League and of
the Socialist Party in New York.
American Friends of
$8,000.

64

With the help of Vladek and the

German Freedom, Frank raised about $7,000 or

This amount represented about one third of the total NB budget

of that year.

It was much more than Seger had been able to collect.

As could be expected, the Sopade became concerned about these
developments.

65

It had just terminated its subsidies to NB and hoped

to see that group decline.

Thus, the successful work of NB in the

United States rekindled Sopade antagonism and gave more urgency to further Sopade efforts in the United States.

In the latter, the SPD execu-

tive was encouraged by Cahan who hated Thomas and opposed the attempts
of Vladek to save the SPA.

In this process, the Sopade sat on the

wrong chair of American sponsorship.

Even though Cahan himself reported

to Wels that Frank collected only "a few thousand dollars with the help
of Vladek" during his first visit, the Social Democratic emigrants circulated rumours of much higher sums, usually $10,000.

According to

some statements, he raised $100,000 during his first tour.

Others
66
claimed that he received $10,000 from Chicago sources alone.
These
64
65
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exaggerated figures implied criticism of Frank's fund raising methods.
Cahan displayed more openly his political motivation.

After

the first visit of Frank, he changed his attitude towards the NB leader
whom he had first met in 1934 at the convention of the British Trade
Union Congress.

Adler had introduced his friend to the patriarch

socialist from America.

Admittedly, the conversation with Frank was

"clearheaded and realistic" and "he made a good impression on me".

But

in 1936, Cahan wanted to hear from his friend Wels "without delay,
what you think of Willi Muller [European covername of Frank]?"

67

He

told Wels that "as you know, we completely support the policy of the
PV (Parteivorstand (party executive)] and I want to prevent anything
that might further the interests of the NB Group in any way".
sented that Frank had stayed at the house of

He re-

Thomas and met "mainly

with the leftist Socialists who cause us so much trouble and do so
68
• h t h eLr
• cooperatLon
•
• h t h e communLsts
•
II .
muc h damage wLt
WLt

Actually,

the pacifist Thomas group was the first from which the AFGF disengaged
after the outbreak of the war.

Cahan's antagonism towards NB was kept

in check until 1938, that is "as long as Vladek was alive" who "protected our interests".
The long response from Prague opened a campaign for the character assassination of Frank in the United States.

The account of Wels

about the past of Frank opened with the two points that were most incriminating in the United States:
67
68

the NB leader was a former communist

cahan to Sollmann, 16 August 1936, EK Mappe 122.
cahan toWels, 21 May 1936, EK Mappe 58.
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and a kidnaper.
charge.

The account omitted the political context of the latter

Together with a fellow communist in Berlin, Frank had forcibly

prevented a representative of the Social Democratic Vorwarts who later
became a National Socialist from making a radio address in favor of
naval rearmament.
against it.

Instead of the Vorwarts speaker, a communist sp9ke

The SPD had just come out of the elections of 1928 as the

strongest party after an appeal for more food to the needy rather than
for new cruisers for the navy.

In the process of forming a coalition

government, the Social Democrats reversed themselves.

In his letter,

Wels continued the conspiracy theme by recalling that he had rejected
a 1932 offer by Frank of bringing a faction of the SAP back into the
SPD as the attempt of "a communist emissary" to infiltrate the party.
In order to excuse the later Sopade dealings with the NB Group in the
emigration, Wels made the Austrian socialists Adler and Bauer responsible for the survival of NB.

The 40,000 Mark of subsidies for the

latter came out of a total budget of more than three million Mark and
were expended "in order to synthesize what forces were still left in
Germany" after 1933.

This generosity was allegedly repaid with in-

gratitude when Frank "soon led all oppositional intriguing against
us II • 69
The rupture with NB came according to Wels when Frank bribed
Otto Schonfeld, the secretary of Wels, into surrendering secret Sopade
documents.

69

Actually, Schonfeld turned them over voluntarily.
Sopade to Cahan, 12 June 1936, EK Mappe 58.
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consisted of a report about NB at the time of its cooperation with the
Sopade and contained the names and addresses of friends of Frank and
Schonfeld in Germany.

It was accessible to everybody in the SPD office.

One of its secretaries was later discovered to be a Gestapo agent on
whose intelligence many illegal socialists went to concentration camps,
••
70
including Schonfeld's father.

.•
After this incident, Schonfeld con-

tinued as Sopade secretary and held other positions of trust.

The most

arrogant conspiratorial act was according to Wels the attempt by Frank
at winn,ing NB representation in the Socialist International.

In his

summary, the Sopade chairman characterized Frank as "a professional
conspirator" who was by 1936 only "a maverick with a few friends".
Only "his American visit has set him afloat again".

Wels explained

that the Sopade had "absolutely no relations with him".

71

Cahan re-

newed his continental friendships with a visit to Europe in 1936 despite
his seventy-seven years.

Then, he vigorously sponsored the plan of a

fund raising campaign of the Sopade member Wilhelm Sollmann.
The visit of Sollmann was another instance of how the Sopade
bungled its American relations.

Instead of working out a permanent

arrangement with its man on base, it added another failure to that of
Seger.

The main problem was that the Sopade was only interested in

raising funds instead of establishing a political base in the United
States.

The latter was a difficult goal to pursue as long as the exile

executive tried to circumvent the American labor movement instead of
70
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coming to grips with it.
better than the first.

The Sopade choice for a second envoy was no
Sollmann was not representative of the Sopade.

Even though the latter had subsidized his newspaper Die Deutsche Frei~ in Saarbrucken and then in Luxemburg with initially 10,000 ffrs a

month and had paid a salary of 1,200 ffrs a month to him and his associate,Sollmann maintained an ideological independence with his Volkssozialismus (Ethnic socialism).

His loyalty was more a matter of

personal relations with his equals and old friends, Wels and Crummenerl.
He did not recognize the Sopade as the official voice of the SPD and
reserved the right of speaking for himself.

Later, he resented Sopade

propaganda that identified too closely with the Allied war effort.

He

was also more interested in establishing himself personally in America.
With the help of his English Quaker friends, he eventually became a
lec~urer

at Swarthmore College near Philadelphia.

In the United States,

he soon detached himself from the Social Democratic executive and emigration.

In a probable reversal of his motives, he explained that he

wanted to be an American.
This reasoning did not apply to his conservative political
relations with the former German chancellor BrUning and with the leftist National Socialist Otto Strasser.

He was excited when Gottfried

Treviranus informed him that "Bruning has repeatedly asked about me
(sollmann]".

He expected that Bruning "will certainly find an oppor-

tunity for a discussion with me" in the United States.

There, he

visited the former chancellor several times and corresponded with him
throughout the war years.

He also used the influence of Bruning for

trying to get an American visa for Strasser.

He had met with the

122
latter occasionally and corresponded with him until_l942.

He assured

Wels in 1936 that he was only interested in "objective discussions" and
did not think of publicly cooperating with Strasser.

But he was unable

to "predict which alliances the future will force on us".
considered the antisemitism of Strasser as mild.

72

Sollmann

It would grant citi-

zenship to those Jews who could meet certain qualifications.

Not

accidentally, he was occasionally the recipient of antisemitic party
correspondence which complained about the prominence of Jewish Social
Democrats and their responsibility for the plight of the party.
ethnic socialist Sollmann

deplore~

The

himself, the persistence of the

Marxist ideology in the SPD and explained to Wels that "my national
affiliation with Germany emanates from my peasant blood".

73

This choice

of a representative exemplifies the ineptitude of the Sopade which hoped
to raise large funds from Jewish organizations in America.

It also

meant that the Sopade did not yet grasp the importance of the American
Jewish labor movement.
dated.

As a first generation teader, Cahan was out-

His maverick position depended on his old control of the Jewish

Daily Forward.
Seger did not grasp the situation either.

He prepared the visit

of Sollmann in the same way that he had organized his own speaking tours
as those of an emigrant doing individual business with his own selection
of disparate American organizations.
problem.

There was at first also a personal

The Sopade treasurer Crummenerl, who was a,personal friend of
72
73
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~

t
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~,.
Sollmann' d .;d not l.;ke h.;,.,.
L

L

Bu t So 11mann h a d a

·1·~atory conversa·

cone~

tion with Seger during the latter's interim return to Europe in the
summer of 1935.

75

In July and September 1936, the Sopade asked Seger

76
directly to support the plans of Sollmann
who eventually reported
.
77
that Seger "seems to promote me now vigorously".
The two of them
agreed that an American agent should plan the tour for a commission of

25a/~.

Af ter f•~ve

•

negat~ve

answers,

78 S
eger s t ~"11 f e 1 t t h a t So 11mann

should not even bother with "the political labor movement in America"
which included Vladek.

He argued that it was "very weak" and had also

suffered a split recently.

A close identification with it would jeop-

ardize arrangements with other American organizations.
with Seger.

Wels agreed

Despite the setbacks with an individual arrangement, he

was still determined "to do everything possible in order to bring off
.
t h e Amer~can

.

.

m~ss~on

" • 79

He still thought that one of the possible

things was to ignore Vladek who had made strenuous efforts for NB.
Sollmann was pulling opposite strings.

When Vladek was again

in Europe in the summer of 1936 at the same time as Cahan and planned
to visit Prague, Sollmann tentatively approached his dissenting Sopade
colleague and NB supporter, Hertz, with the request:
74
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mobilize your connections for my American trip with which I am somewhat
in love?"

80

But he also tried to exploit the connection with Cahan

while simultaneously excluding Cahan from a full preparation of his
trip.

He asked the Old Guard socialist to reconfirm the approval of

his .American plans.

The latter promised to "do everything in my power

to make the trip possible".

But he asked for a delay until the contra-

versies in the Socialist Party were resolved.

He conceded that "our

comrades in America - I mean the loyal Social Democrats - are somewhat
confused about the background of the socialist work in Germany".

But

he confirmed that "we remain loyal to the old executive and its comrades.

We are not interested in NB and all the other left wings"

81

He reiterated his resentment of Frank's residence in the house of
Thomas "who tried to oust Morris Hillquit and who collaborated with the
American Trotzkists and other 'unofficial communists'".

Thomas was

"a muddle-headed demagogue of the cheapest type but we, the 'Old Guard',
that is the loyal old Social Democracy, separated irrevocable from these
people and founded the Social Democratic Federation11 •

82

He explained

that the SDF retained the Jewish Daily Forward and the majority of the
party members including the Jewish and the German speaking branches and
"all loyal socialists of the American movement".

He remarked on the

Vladek group that "only a handful of our people are still trying to sit
80
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on two chairs.

One of them introduced W.

~uller

[Frank] to the Jewish

labor organizations •.. so that he received about $10,000.

Later, they

told me that, in their opinion, all this was done with my knowledge and
approval."
with NB.
to Wels.

83

Cahan was determined to foil the plans that Vladek had

He did not need the further prodding which Sollmann suggested
84
As Cahan used Sollmann, so the latter used the former.

A friend

of Cahan who was a correspondent for the New York Times wrote a laudatory article about Sollmann just before the arrival of the Sopade
representative in January 1937.

It called him "the greatest political

figure losing his citizenship at this time, .•• one of the outstanding
leaders of German Democracy, ••• an authorized representative of the
.
85
underground movement in Germany".

After this, Cahan's name was

omitted from the letterhead of the invitations which the Sollmann
Reception Committee sent out.

As its secretary, Seger in·cluded the

names of such dissenting emigrants as Sender and Rosenfeld.

He con-

sidered it especially important to use the names of protestants like
Niebuhr, Tillich and the executive secretary of the Christian Committee
for the Aid of German Refugess.

86

Because of this plan of approaching

American protestant organizations, Seger advised that Sollmann should
"not be branded right away as a party politician".
83
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many doors for him since "even well educated Americans unhesitatingly
interchange socialists, communists and anarchists which is all red to
tern.
h " 87

Actually, the non-socialist protestants were not all that

antifascist, certainly not pro-socialist and sometimes suspect of antisemitism.

Seger wanted to avoid the impression that the Sopade repre-

sentative was "engaged only by Jews".

This raises the suspicion that

Sollmann with his conservative and reactionary connections was deliberately chosen to appeal to American protestant and other organizations
and that the detachment from the American Jewish labor groups was calculated or, as it turned out, miscalculated.
would understand these tactics.

88

Sollmann hoped that Cahan

Later, he was incensed that the

American Jewish Congress refused to engage him.

The speaking tour of

Sollmann was as uncoorainated as it could possibly have been.
The Social Democratic expectations that had engendered the
quasi-businesslike concept of the Sollmann mission were completely out
of place.

Wels admitted that "after five years of Hitler dictatorship,

our accounts are substantially lower ••. and the time will come when
they-will be empty".

He projected that a monthly contribution of

$4,000 from the United States would allow the Sopade to carry on as
before.

He regarded American Jewish institutions as inexhaustible

suppliers of funds and could not believe that they would contribute to
Jewis h

.

em~grants
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sopade straight about his fund raising potential.
self "lucky if I could raise $4,000 only once".

He considered himHe thought that he was

doing a good job politically but conceded that the collection of funds
was more difficult than he had imagined.

90

By the end of 1937, he had

sent little money to Prague.
Sollmann had various explanations for this failure.

He claimed

that his fund raising was "only so difficult because the Sopade is
thoroughly despised except by a few people" like Cahan.

91

He was out-

raged by the favorable comments of Stampfer in the Neuer Vorwarts about
the Popular Front discussions of Breitscheid and other Social Democrats
in Paris.

He was desolate about the way in which "the heritage of the

greatest political movement the world had ever known [the SPD] was
squandered by little souls".

He then explicitly denied the Sopade "the

future right to issue authoritative political judgements".

With simi-.

lar escapades, they were jeopardizing his future cooperation.

This was

ungrateful since he was the only productive executive in 1937 "in contrast to all of you".

92

Sollmann also believed that in their effort

"to starve out [the Sopade] financially", the NB Group had denounced
him as antisemitic with American Jewish organizations.

An article

about his ethnic socialism by an.NB member had appeared in the Sozialistische Aktion which Hertz edited for the Sopade.
90
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It was apparent-
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ly translated into English and distributed to American Jewish organizations.

But, according to Hertz, the Neue Volkszeitung itself had pub-

Jished an interview with Sollmann in which the latter frankly discussed
his relations with Strasser.

Hertz admitted that he had sent "some of

my American friends" copies of his correspondence with Sollmann from

the years 1935 and 1936 about the notions of this ethnic socialist on
nationalism and the

~ewish

question.

He wanted to "avoid the impres-

sion that the underground movement endorsed these ideas".

94

This was

probably the source of the charge that Frank had sent letters to Thomas
and to the president of the American Jewish Congress.
later admitted that he had no direct proof for this.

95

Sollmann

He talked to

Thomas and the AJC president but could not overcome the shame of having
to defend himself publicly against a charge of antisemitism.

Neither

could he regain "full trust in any of the 'comrades' who believed such
unfounded rumours".
ist emigration.

96

It helped him to find his way out of the

His attitude towards the Jews was peculiar.

socia~-

He prob-

ably took some of the prejudices against them for facts which did not,
however, justify any unequal treatment.

In his own mind, therefore, he

was not antisemitic.
Despite the above explanations, Sollmann found out the cause of
94
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his failure.

He realized that without contributions from the Jewish

unions he could not get very far.

He told the Sopade about Vladek that

"I do not believe that anything can be accomplished without him".
Cahan was "the only loyal American friend ••• we have here".
latter was limited.

97

But the

If he were "ten or twenty years younger everything

would be much easier but the younger Vladek has overtaken him long
ago".

98

Instead of blaming himself and the Sopade for the bad relations

with the Jewish labor leaders, Sollmann scored the thirst for "radicalism" and "the complete lack of political instincts" of the NB contributors.

The concession he suggested was only palliative.

He asked the

Sopade to "please, think about whether you can not come up with something like a Social Democratic United Front".

He had the Rote Stoss-

trupp. (Red Avant-Garde) in mind "or whatever the little group is called
that rejoined you recently".

99

The Sopade and Sollmann had not yet

overcome their sense of superiority over the American and American Jewish labor movement which derived from their prominence before the defeat
by National Socialism.
The results of the following visits of Frank contrasted even
more with the Social Democratic failure than the first one.
visit lasted from April to June 1937 and netted $12,000.

During this

stay, he married .Anna Caples and became an American citizen.
visit lasted from December 1938 to the spring of 1939.
97
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His second

His third

At that time,

Sollmann to Crummenerl, 3 December 1937, EK Mappe 122.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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the AFGF was expanded and started publishing its Inside Germany Reports.
With the

~inence

of war, Frank decided to stay in the United States.

He returned once more to Europe in June 1939 in order to transfer the
NB exile committee from Paris to London in anticipation of a French
defeat.

In a response to an inquiry by the Office of Strategic Ser-

vices, he estimated the total sum of American contributions to NB
between 1935 and 1942 at $90,000 to $100,000.

Until 1935, the Sopade

treasurer Crummenerl overlooked the NB funds.

In 1936, Hertz became

the trustee of NB finances at the suggestions of the SI secretary,
Adler, the NB exile committee and several underground organizers.
Hertz handled the NB funds through a committee of three that included
himself and Frank.
New York.

The American funds passed through a committee in

It transferred them to Sir Stafford Cripps in England who

.
100
h an d e d t h em over to t h e Hertz commLttee.
Despite these arrangements, Frank had to face all kinds of
Social Democratic accusations.

His visits became occasions for an es-

calation of Social Democratic recriminations.

In this process, the

relations between the two groups deteriorated beyond the mediation
attempts by some Jewish labor leaders.

The tables turned for the two

groups when Vladek died at the early age of fifty-two in October
1938. 101

The death of this influential NB sponsor gave free reins to

100Paul Hertz, Erklarung im Falle Paul Hagen; also Autobiographical data and OSS Inquiry, 15 May 1942, box 5, folder Neubeginnen;
also Paul Hertz to Dear Comrade, 19 June 1940, box 7, folder 4, Frank
Papers.
101Frank, Autobiographical data, p. 9, document received from
Mrs. Frank.
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the antagonism of Cahan.

By this accident, the Social Democrats re-

covered some of the ground they had lost through their lack of imaginative planning.

But they abused it to the detriment of the whole German

socialist emigration in the United States.

After 1938, it was difficult

to stem the tide of Social Democratic recriminations.

On hearsay infor-

mation, Seger charged among other things, that Frank had embezzled NB
funds.

102

He promised to retract these accusations publicly but failed

to do so after the death of Vladek.

It turned out that Frank had not

led a luxurious life in an Austrian spa but merely spent some days with
\

his daughter of his previous marriage before returning to the United
States for good.
In the fall of 1937, the general secretary of the Workmen's
Circle,

Jos~ph

Baskin, who was also a member of the JLC, tried unsuc-

cessfully to bring about a friendly agreement between the Sopade and
NB.

During his tour of Poland, he made a detour to Prague and offered

his "mediation in case of serious intentions for an understanding".

He

had an interview with Stampfer in order to sound out the attitude of
the Sopade.

Stampfer reacted positively as always but he discussed

the interview only with Wels, Vogel and Crummenerl rather than with
the full Sopade so that Hertz was excluded.

As the outcome of this

meeting, Stampfer informed Baskin that the Sopade was not interested
in discussions with other groups.
did not return to Prague.

Under these circumstances, Baskin

He regretted that the Sopade people were

102
Paul Levy to Hertz, 7 February 1938; 14 February 1938; 5
September 1938; 18 September 1938; also Hertz to Levy; 2 September
1938; also Hertz to Hagen, 16 July 1940, film reel 14, Nachlass Hertz.
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"blind, stubborn and live in the past".

103

The Sopade and the Social

Democrats in New York did not want to co-exist with NB.

They hoped to

supplant the latter in the favors of the Jewish Labor Committee.
They made their first serious organizational effort in the
spring of 1939, not because they were concerned with the political
situation in case of war but because they were bankrupt.
~ad

The Sopade

to discontinue two of its three publications, the Zeitschrift fur

...

Sozialismus in 1936 and the Sozialistische Aktion in 1938 after the
expulsion of Hertz.

It could not publish the Neuer Vorwarts much

longer without American help.

If it stopped publishing the Vorwarts

prematurely it could expect no assistance at all.

In this emergency,

the Sopade decided to approach the Jewish Labor Committee and the AFL
and to establish a permanent representation in the United States for
these purposes.
gation.

104

The latter was logically called German Labor Dele-

The Sop.ade finally discarded the salesman's concept of soli-

citing donations for antifascist speeches in favor of negotiating with
fellow labor groups.

In order to initiate these plans, it sent the

Jewish executive Stampfer to the United States.

He was the one Sopade

member best known and regarded by the American Jewish labor leaders.
He was also the best public relations man of the exile executive.

He

was a party professional who had edited the national party daily
Vorwarts since 1916.

As an ethical rather than a Marxist socialist,

he represented well the right wing Sopade.
103

Hertz to Baskin, 9 September 1937, film reel 14, Nachlass

Hertz.
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Matthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Einleitung, p. 35.
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By the time of Stampfer's first visit in January and February
1939, the friends of Cahan had a majority in the JLC.

The latter

promised large sums on the scale of the contributions to NB.

But their

passage through the Committee took beyond the time of Stampfer's visit.
The latter also met with the president of the AFL.

With his right wing

Social Democratic ideology, he thought that the Sopade had to choose
the democratic AFL over the pro-communist CIO.

He expected much from

this national union federation without realizing that it was worlds
apart from the socialist unions of the Weimar Republic.

Stampfer told

Green that the Sopade funds for the fight against Hitler were nearly
exhausted and that the executive needed $50,000 annually for continuing
its work.

For the current year, $25,000 would be enough.

105

According

to plan, Stampfer and the Social Democratic emigrants in New York
formed the German Labor Delegation which was to pursue the relations
with the JLC and the AFL.
secretary of the GLD.

The rather obscure Rudolf Katz became the

He had come directly to the United States in

the mid-thirties and had not been in contact with the SPD executives
either during the Weimar Republic or during the emigration.

In New

York, he became a member of the editorial staff of the Neue Volkszeitung and the secretary of the German language branch of the Social
Democratic Federation.

He was ready to do the political work of the

GLD for which he had few competitors among a Social Democratic emigrant group that had grown larger during the late thirties.
ed

Aufhause~

105

It includ-

Max Brauer, the former mayor of Altona, Grzesinsky and

stampfer to William Green, 23 February 1939, Matthias and
Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 49, p. 381.
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Hans Staudinger, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce in the Prussian
government and later professor at the New School for Social Research in
New York.
After the departure of Stampfer, the GLD could not lead the
negotiations which he had opened to a very good conclusion.
promised

The JLC

~irst $15,000 and then $10,000 f~r 1939. 106 Katz and Stau-

dinger pleaded continually for an early partial payment and were
finally granted $4,000 in May 1939 and a smaller sum later. The rest
.
107
of the $10,000 remained outstanding.
In order to further its relations with the JLC, the GLD invited Dubinsky, Zaritsky and Baskin to
join its American sponsor committee.

Seger addressed the AFL conven-

tion in Cincinnati in October 1939 but no contributions were forthcoming from the giant union federation.

In the field of the non-labor

Jewish organizations, the GLD made no progress either.

It contacted

the two main conservative organizations, the American Jewish Committee
and the order of Bne Brith which spent large sums on the fight against
antisemitism.

The AJC represented the Jewish business community which

had Central European ethnic origins.

It was reluctant to support revol-

utionary activities in Germany and was afraid of an antisemitic reaction
in the isolationist United States.
reservations.

The Order of Bne Brith shared these

Besides antisemitism, it combated communism and did not

take the German Social Democrats for what they said they were.

A
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Katz to Stampfer, 11 March 1939, Matthias and Link, Mit dem
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 51, pp. 383-387.
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Katz to Stampfer, 22 May 1939, Matthias and Link, Nr. 62,
pp. 400, 401; also Stampfer to Sopade, 7 February 1940, Matthias and
Link, Nr. 86, pp. 440, 441.
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delegation under Katz met with the director of the American Jewish
Committee and told him that the Sopade needed about $75,000 for 1939.
The latter offered only to convene an informal meeting with a few individual AJC members to whom the GLD would have to report again.

108

The wealthy labor lawyer, George Backer, who had recently bought the
New York Post represented some potential AJC contributors and also made
some offers of his own.

He held out the prospect of $25,000 which

would become speedily available in case of major developments like a
But he procrastinated interminably so that Katz and Staudinger

war.

gave up on him after innumerable calls.

109

In the meantime, the GLD tried to bolster its labor image.

It

asked the labor international and the president of the exile committee
of the German labor unions for endorsements.

110

The latter reacted

with a letter to Green which stressed the independence of the unionist
resistance and emigration.

He agreed with the Sopade on the communist

question and on the repudiation of the splinter groups, that is mainly
NB.

But he asked Green directly for support "for our inner-German

union

activit~s". 111

The GLD'could also intercede with the AFL for
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Fritz Tarnow to William Green, 8 May 1939, Matthias and
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contributions to the unionist emigration.

The labor internationals did

not endorse the GLD as a union representation.
The main cause for the problems of the GLD was the antagonism
towards NB which was supposed to alleviate them.

The GLD was indignant

about the official formation of the American Friends or German Freedom
in May 1939 and about the sponsorship of the AFGF by some Jewish labor
leaders.

Adolph Held, the chairman of the JLC and the president of the

Amalgamated Bank of the Jewish unions, accepted the job of overseeing
the AFGF finances.

Since the Social Democrats had not yet publicized

their own cormnittee they felt upstaged by the "Konkurrenzfirma" [rival
company].

They decided to publish their material immediately so that

"we will still make it an hour ahead of them" .ll

2

In the fall of 1939,

the GLD became upset again over "the problem New Beginning and the
tivity of Dr. Hertz".

ac~

The AFGF celebrated the arrival of the latter in

New York with a well organizedcfund raising dinner.

Its financial re-

sults were so good that Hertz felt they could not be equalled by any
other organization.

Simultaneously, the AFGF published Nr. 48 of the

Sozialdemokratische Informationsbriefe of the NB exile cormnittee, in
New York.

The GLD was incensed about this usurption of its identity

and about "Dr. Hertz running to our American comrades [of the JLC] and
presenting himself as a Social Democratic leader, an underground worker
and a future Social Democratic restorer".

113

It decided on a
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staudinger to Stampfer, 23 May 1939, Matthias and Link,
Nr. 63, pp. 401, 402.
113

Katz to Stampfer, 14 November 1939, Matthias and Lin, Nr. 79,
pp. 427, 428.
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general campaign of enlightenment which was directed at "all American
organizations and unions", especially at the JLC.
the GLD could

11

Katz realized that

on the other hand not become vicious in public because

the Americans must not be bothered with internal differences".ll

4

Yet,

one of the GLD counter-measures was an article in the NVZ which claimed
that "every dollar contributed to this purpose [NB] will be a dollar
thrown out the window".

115

tive article in the JDF.

Cahan followed with an even more vituperaIt accused the NB organization of both

viciously attacking the Social Democrats "as a type of counter-revolutionary reactionaries" and illegitimately appropriating the Social
Democratic name for its own purposes.

The latter offense was according

to the JDF editor in step "with old communist tradition" while the
former could only be committed by a "Connnu-Nazist agent or a totally
blind fanatic 11 •

With little consideration for reality, Cahan claimed

that "all German Social Democrats .•. support the exiled party executive" and that the NB Group had "never held any practical influence in
Germany".

Any contributions to this group were wasted and only the

GLD deserved American support.

116

Katz suggested that the Sopade ex-

press special thanks to Cahan, "the great old man", for this article.
With these methods, Katz expected a GLD victory in the fight
for the favors of the JLC.
114
115
116

The publicity against the Hertz dinner

Ibid.
Neue Volkszeitung, 18 November 1939.

Artikel von Cahan, "Eine Warnung an alle Freunde der.• Deutschen Freiheitsbewegung", Jewish Daily Forward, 19 November 1939, Ubersetzung als Anlage zu Matthias and Link, Nr. 80, pp. 428-431.
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caused "a small internal storm" or, in hi.l) phrase of two weeks later,
"a great storm inside the JLC".
attempt at keeping three people
and Held.

The article by Cahan was "an energetic
away from NB",

117

Baskin, Zatitsky

Katz was confident that "the overwhelming majority [of the

JLC] under the leadership of Cahan is on our side".
not dominate the JLC.

118

But Cahan could

Each of its members relied on his individual

authority as the leader of a labor organization which made voluntary
contributions to the JLC.

In response to the Cahan article, the minor-

ity prevailed on the JLC to request information about Hertz and NB from
the general secretary of

the~ocialist

International.

the grade from Adler for NB was "A-plus".

As anticipated,

He described the Croup as a

movement for the restoration of German socialism.

Stampfer considered

this response as an interference by the SI secretary who was "preparing
a new split for the sake of his private enjoyment".

119

The JLC minor-

ity could block appropriations to the GLD so that neither of the two
German emigrant groups received anything.

Held told Staudinger that

his position as treasurer of the AFGF had "no special significance"
and that he supported "all movements which seem capable of fighting the

. " • 120 Then, he reproached Katz and Stampfer for leaving him igNaz~s
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Katz to Stampfer, 3 December 1939, Matthias and Link, Nr. 81,
pp. 431-433; also Sitzung der German Labor Delegation, 13 December 1939,
Matthias and Link, Nr. 82, pp. 433, 434; also Nachlass Stampfer, group
I, section 9, Nr. 429.
118
119

12

Ibid.
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°Katz, Notiz; 22 May 1939, group I, section 9, Nr. 399,
Nachlass Stampfer.
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norant of the deep dissensions between Hertz and the Sopade and for not
sparing him the "bitter fights with his friends".
w~th

Katz thought that

this statement, Held only wanted to cover his tactical retreat.

Actually, Held told Katz that "personally, he stood behind us, not
behind NB 11 •

He claimed to have directed the rejection of an appropria-

tion to NB because "he opposed divisiveness and considered the PV as
the competent institution".

But Held continually postponed a decision

about a GLD appropriation for 1940.

All the Social Democrats received

was the rest of the appropriation of 1939.
The latter development took place during the second visit of
Stampfer from January to May 1940 which was supposed to overcome the
stagnation in the GLD negotiations, and was inspired by the successful
AFGF dinner for Hertz.

.,

The GLD wanted to similarly celebrate Stampfer

with a dinner with AFL executives or a meeting that featured Bruning,
Thomas Mann and Hermann Rauschning, the former mayor of Danzig who had
repudiated the National Socialists in his emigration with his bestselling

~'Revolution

of Nihilism".

These plans annoyed Stampfer.

did not consider his presence in America indispensable.

He

He suspected

that the GLD had not followed up his initiatives of 1939 vigorously
enough.

After. his arrival in New York, he sought the solution therefore

in a reorganization of the GLD.
organizer; he was only "a good

121

In his opinion, Katz was not a good

assistant, no more".

He also was too

busy making a living and could not efficiently conduct the affairs of
the GLD on a part time basis for $30 a month.
121

Stampfer thought that

Stampfer to Sopade, 15 February 1940, Matthias and Link,
Nr. 88, p. 444.
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the Sopade could rid itself of financial worries "if we had the courage
of instituting a full-fledged bureau here".

122

The executive Rinner

replied from Paris that he had been the first one to make this proposal
while others hesitated to affront Katz.

•
too dest~tute

II

to assume

•
cont~nuous

But by 1940, the Sopade was

•
respons~

b ~•1 ~t~es
• •
• k ~n
• dlf • 123
o f t h ~s

There was also no suitable substitute for Katz.
reaction, Stampfer temporized on the issue.

After this Sopade

By the time of his final

return to the United States in the fall of 1940, it was too late to
dislodge Katz.
Stampfer soon conceded that he had held illusions about the
potential results of his first visit, both regarding the JLC and the
AFL.

In 1940, he became even more pessimistic than the GLD members,

and told the Sopade at o·ne time that he was "loaded with skepticism up
to my neck".

124

At the end of January he addressed the meeting of the

Executive Committee of the AFL in Miami.

The latter promised to sup-

port the GLD and the Sopade in all. respects possible.

But Dubinsky,

one of the AFL vice presidents, warned Stampfer that the support of
the AFL Executive Committee was of purely political significance.
Stampfer repeated to the Sopade that he considered the decision of
Miami "as a gesture of sympathy without practical consequences".

This

was in his opinion still "a moral success ••• [that] improved our
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prestige substantially".

The Sopade and the GLD were recognized "as

an important political factor" by an AFL that played an important role
in American politics and whose president was a personal friend of
Roosevelt.

125

The warning of Dubinsky came true.
union locals for financial contributions.

The AFL depended on the
Green encouraged all nation-

al and international unions, state federations and central unions of
the AFL to give financial assistance to the GLD who represented "the
old German Labor Movement ••• whose free, democratic, independent
unions ••• were similar to our own American Federation of Labor
unions 11 •

126

Stampfer visited

ma~y national union offices in Washington

as well as the New York Federation of Labor.

He realized that the

task of contacting local unions was unlimited since there were about
forty thousand of them.

He tried to organize a special committee of

AFL unionists under the direction of Matthew Woll to keep up the AFL
fund raising campaign after his departure.

But Woll was not to be

pressed into the service of a socialist emigrant.

He promised to raise

money for the GLD and the Sopade within his AFL Labor League for Human
Rights which predictably came to nothing.

Green made a_personal con-

tribution of $250 which some Jewish labor leaders considered prejudicial.

It prevented the New York union of musicians from contributing

$1,000 since they did not want to go beyond matching Green's sum.

The
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union of the hat and capmakers of Zaritsky donated $500.

It was symp-

tomatic of the fund raising difficulties of Stampfer that he pursued
the hopeless task of eliciting aid from Backer.

The latter rejected

the idea of a $15,000 loan against the credit of the future German
labor movement.
The negotiations with the JLC netted $3,000, that is the rest
of the appropriation of 1939.

It saved the Neue Vorwarts for a few

more months until the German invasion of France.

The JLC deferred

interminably a decision over an appropriation of $10,000 for 1940.

It

\

was held up by a pending appropriation of $2,000 to Hertz.

The

millionaire socialist Alfred Baker Lewis from Boston, who was also one
of the GLD sponsors, tried to mediate between the two German emigrant
groups.

After corresponding with Seger, Hertz, Frank, and others, he

suggested that "the· connnunist issue be dead" in reference to NB.

The

latter had refused any involvement in the Popular Front negotiations
in Paris in which several Social Democratic emigrants had participated,
including the later GLD chairmen Aufhauser and Grzesinsky.

Nor did

the Boston socialist consider the GLD qualified to criticize the underground record of NB.

He told Seger that it would in his opinion be

"relatively easy to get together with them [NB] if an effort were made
to do so".

In reference to the cooperation in the German socialist

underground, he thought "it would be reasonable and statesmanlike to
try to do the same thing among the emigres Germa~s.
ful and not harmful as far as I can see."

127

It would be help-

But the GLD was bent on

127 Alfred Baker Lewis to Seger, 16 March 1940; also Fred Sanderson to Lewis, 31 March 1940, film reel 14, Nachlass Hertz.
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disposing of the NB Group.

When the JLC asked Stampfer for advice,

the Sopade executive answered that the Labor Committee should know
itself what to do with its money; that the $2,000 would, however, be
used "to fight us".

128

Held kept reassuring Stampfer about another

$10,000 for the Sopade saying that it was only a matter of a few days
before they would be approved.

Actually, he postponed a final decision

because he feared "a blow-up over the questionable $2,000" for NB.

By

the time of Stampfer's departure in May 1940, the JLC had not yet
reached a decision.

Stampfer considered this

11

a truly grotesque

situation ••• [in which]NB is obstructive against us and a divisive
agent in the JLC".
a decision.

129

'

The events in France relieved the JLC of making

After the Fall of France, all JLC contributions were

reserved for the rescue of the refugees.
Thus, the Sopade became serious about its American relations
at an inopportune time and in the wrong way.
cially and politically.

It was bankrupt finan-

With the outbreak of the Second World War,

the hope for an inner-German solution to National Socialism faded away.
A military confrontation intensified Western nationalism which did not
help the Sopade and the GLD either.
undesirable applicant for asylum.

The former sank to the role of an
With its intolerance, the latter

destroyed the rest of its credibility after the loss of its political
128
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usefulness.

With their own background, most of the Jewish labor

leaders found a plurality of German socialist emigrant groups natural.
But they could not abide the degree of antagonism between the latter,
especially not during the refugee crisis of 1940 and 1941.

I

CHAPTER V
THE POLITICS OF RESCUE
The outbreak of the Second World War confronted the German
socialist emigrant groups in the United States with the practical task
of rescuing their comrades from Southern France.

This required cooper-

ation and offered the chance of disregarding ideological differences in
a common endeavor.

But more consistently with their past antagonisms,

the political aspirations of these groups interfered with the humanitarian task of rescue.

This resulted in a limited performance in the

service of their comrades.

In the pursuit of its political ambitions,

the German Labor Delegation obstructed not only some of the efforts of
its New Beginning competitors, it also neglected its own Social Democratic and unionist refugees in Southern France.

It made sure that the

Sopade executives did not come to New York where they would have
eclipsed the GLD.

Eventually, it ignored the limited number of Social

Democratic refugees whom it had helped to escape to America.
In their rescue work, the socialist groups had to labor against
the negative refugee policies of the French and the American govern/

ments.

With its anti-semitic and anti-socialist attitude, the French

government of Petain and Laval made life for the German and European
refugees difficult and prohibited their escape.

In the United States,

the Roosevelt administration was sympathetic towards Jewish and anti-
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fascist refugees.

But it could not do much for them because of the anti-

alien mood of the country during and after the Depression.

The policies

of the French and the American governments explain sufficiently why a
large number of socialist and other refugees were left stranded in
Vichy France.

In this context, it is difficult to judge the rescue

work of the German socialist emigrant groups for their comrades in
Southern France.

Some of the emigrant groups in New York did their

best for the refugees with limited success.

But regardless of the gen-

eral circumstances, the German Labor Delegation often neglected its
duties towards its fellow Social Democrats and unionists.
After the outbreak of the Second World War, the refugees were
no longer safe in France.
aliens.

The French government treated them as enemy

It· subjected all male Germans between the ages of seventeen

and sixty-five to internment in sixty so-called centres de rassemblements (gathering centers).

Simultaneously, they were liable to military

service or to work in labor battalions or formations de prestataires.
The last of the internees were released by mid-January 1940.

Nine

thousand of them joined the regiments de marche, the foreign volunteer
units of the French army, and five thousand the prestataires formations.

After the attack on France in May 1940, the French government

ordered a second internment of all German men and women.

With the

approach of the German armies, their situation became precarious.

They

were moved from camp to camp or released, according to the individual
judgement of the camp commanders.

They mingled with the stream of the

l
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French refugees trying to escape to Southwestern France.

1

The new French government in Vichy was much harder on the refugees than its predecessor.
German demands.

Its own inclinations were in tune with

It was obliged by article 19 of the armistice to

"surrender upon demand all Germans named by the German government".

2

Delegations of the German and Italian armistice commissions were stationed in the major cities of the free zone.

A new policy of intern-

ment established concentration camps and labor camps for the refugees.
The conditions and the treatment in these camps were often appalling.
Epidemics were rampant.

The suicide and death rates were high.

In the

camp of Gurs, one thousand and fifty-five out of thirteen thousand five
hundred refugees died.

In mid-November 1940, the concentration camps

were transformed into regular camps under civil authority.

The poor

and the specially suspect refugees were retained; those with independent means were released and assigned to forced residency mostly in
provincial small towns and villages where they could not initiate their
1
Kurt R. Grossmann, Emigration: Die Geschichte der HitlerFluchtlinge, 1933-1945 (Frankfurt: 1969), pp. 12, 58, 59. See also
Arthur Kastler, The scum of the earth (London~ 1949), p. 186, and
Lucien Steinberg, "The scum of the earth, ein Beitrag zur Situation
der deutschsprachigen Emigration in Frankreich zu Beginn des Zweiten
Weltkt±eges", Widerstand, Verfolgung und Emigration, Studien und
Berichte aus dem Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
c·n.d. ), pp. 104-117.
2
varian Fry, Surrender on Demand, the dramatic story of the
underground organization set up by Americans in France to rescue antiNazis from the Gestapo (New York: Random House, Inc., 1945), Foreword
p. X.
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emigration.

.

The conditions in the transformed camps did not improve

.f.~can tl y. 3

s~gn~

During this emergency, the refugees received aid from twentysix mostly American relief organizations.

Many of these also gave

assistance in emigration even during the months when emigration was
illegal.

They became very important in the evacuation of the socialist

refugees.

Among them were the American Friends Service Committee of

the Quakers, the Unitarian Service Committee, the Jewish Comite
d'Assistance aux Refugies with thirteen subcommittees in the unoccupied
zone, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the Emigration
Association of the Hebrew Immigration and Aid Society, the Emergency
Rescue Committee and the International Relief Association.

The French

headquarters of these organizations were mostly in Marseille.
The grace period for evacuation was circumstantial.
could predict its duration.
spring of 1941.

4
Nobody

Its end was expected for as early as the

In early 1942, Laval promised the German government

the extradition of ten thousand German refugees in order to stave off
occupation.

He ordered the provincial prefects to supply the lists and

the refugees.
rest of France.

In November 1942, the German armies finally occupied the
From the Vichy camps, the German government deported

3
Friedrich Heine to German Labor Delegation, 25 December 1940,
EK Mappe 51. See also: Heine to Nielsson Thorsten, 30 M~y 1941, EK
Mappe 51, and Grossmann, Emigration, pp. 205, 208.

4G rossmann,

.

.

p. 206. See also: Heine, list of
twenty-six relief committees in unoccupied France, 1 March 1941, EK
Mappe 51; and Korrespondenz Max Diamant, Teil 3, list of American
relief agencies, AsD.
Em~grat~on,
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almost two hundred thousand refugees to its extermination camps in
Central Europe.
refugees.

Among the deportees were a number of socialist

5

Despite these dangers to the refugees, the Vichy government
made escape from France almost impossible.
without an exit visa.

It was illegal to leave

Until July 1940, the Bureau de Circulation

Militaire and the provincial prefectures had the authority to issue
exit visas.

But then, the Ministry of the Interior monopolized this

authority and refused to issue exit visas to German refugees for the
rest of 1940.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sold them unofficially

to rich refugees for 25,000 ffrs or about $625 apiece.

6

In January

1941, the Ministry of the Interior unexpectedly reversed itself.

The

refugees could then embark on French ships in Marseille for Martinique
from where they could continue their voyage.

Foreign lines could not

operate in Marseille because of the war.
The French visa policy complicated the task of evacuation.
During the time of illegal exit, the rescue committees had to cover up
their major activity with social work for the refugees.

They were sub-

jected to periodical police raids and were pressured to close down
their offices.

It was very difficult for them to negotiate the release

from camp of refugees for whom they had acquired an American visa.
Sometimes, they bribed the guards or the camp commander.

Sometimes, the

5
Grossmann, Emigration, pp. 209, 210.
6
vladimer Vochoc, Memorandum of the Emergency Bureau for the
Rescue of German Anti-Nazi Refugees in London to the French Ministry
of the Interior, May 1945, pp. 1-6, AsD.
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refugees managed to escape by themselves.

Marseille was the only place

where the refugees could acquire the necessary emigration papers from
the foreign consulates.

But for traveling there, they needed a permit

for safe conduct which had usually a time limit that was too short for
the bureaucratic delays at the consulates.

Also, a refugee in Marseille

was automatically _suspected of pursuing illegal exit.
quent police raids in the hotels and in the streets.
proper papers, a refugee could

There were freWith or without

be arrested, sent back to forced

residence or to a camp in the provinces.

For a short while in the

summer of 1940, the American consulate general in Marseille did not
hand over an American visa without presentation of an exit visa,which
was unobtainable.

When a representative of the Emergency Rescue Com-

mittee complained to Eleanor Roosevelt the State Department changed
that practice.
During the time of illegal exit, Lisbon was the only continental port where the refugees could embark for overseas.

The French

police and the Italian armistice authorities easily controlled the
harbor of Marseille.

The only way to Lisbon was the landroute to the

Pyrenees and through Spain and Portugal.

This required Spanish and

Portuguese transit visas which were not always easy to get.
to, and crossing, the French Spanish border was illegal.

Traveling

Sympathetic

French border officials at Cerbere often let the refugees pass on tpe
train to Spain.

Others arrested them and returned them to the camps

or to forced residency.
problems.

Suicide was not an unusual solution to these

A number of refugees left on carefully reconnoitered foot-

paths over the hills that circumvented the border guards.

The Spanish

l
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border officials usually accepted them and put an entrada stamp on
their transit visas.

Refugees without entrada stamps were later ar-

rested and sent back to the border for a proper repetition of entry.
The acquisition of Spanish and Portuguese transit visas was
subject to varying conditions.

Until October 1940, the Portuguese con-

sulates issued a transit visa for 200 ffrs or about $5.00 to any holder
of an acceptable passport and of a visa of final destination.

The

possession of a Portuguese transit visa qualified for a Spanish transit
visa.

But the large stream of refugees made the Portuguese government

uneasy.
Lisbon.

Between 1940 and 1942, forty thousand refugees passed through
7

Most of them waited there for weeks and months for a place on

a ship or even for an overseas visa.

They became often welfare cases

that were tended precariously by American relief organizations like
the Unitarian Service Committee.

Eventually, the Portuguese authorities

limited the transit stay in Lisbon to a number of weeks and arrested
those refugees that could not comply.

Also, the Portuguese consulates

were instructed to issue a transit visa only on presentation of a paid
ship ticket.

The Spanish government also caused problems.

On 25 Sep-

tember 1940, it instructed the Spanish consulates to submit all visa
requests to Madrid where they could be better screened.

After a visit

in Madrid by Heinrich Rimmler, the chief of the Gestapo, the Spanish
border opened and closed intermittently for arbitrary periods of time.
Later, Spanish transit visas became contingent on French exit visas.
With the spring of 1941, the Spanish government refused transit visas
7
oscar Handlin, A Continuing Task. The American Jewish Joint
Distribution Committee, 1914-1964 (1964), p. 87.
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to male refugees of military age.

This necessitated illegal entry into

Spain and the use of counterfeit visas and entrade stamps.

Few refugees

succeeded in crossing Spain under these conditions.
The dispensation of transoceanic tickets in Lisbon was organized by the HICEM, the

Emigr~tion

Association of the Hebrew Sheltering

and Immigration Aid Society (HIAS) and of the older Jewish Colonization
Agency (ICA) that dated back to 1881.

According to an agreement with

the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee which conducted rescue
operations in Germany and German occupied countries, the HICEM covered
Vichy France and related evacuation countries, including Portugal.
usually bought bulk space from various ocean passenger lines.

It

For the

places that remained after the accommodation of its own clients, it
accepted the applications of other rescue committees such as the Emergency Rescue Committee, the German Labor Delegation and the International Relief Association.

It waited for the cables of these committees

from New York confirming payment or guarantee of payment for the passages.

Sometimes, the HICEM granted subsidies to individual clients of

the socialist rescue committees.
The shipowners usually exploited individual refugees.

Under

the conditions of war, only a few Greek, Portuguese and American passenger lines could operate out of Lisbon.

Shipspace was limited so that

there were always many more refugees than the lines could accommodate.
This made evacuation a lucrative business.
the black market at inflated prices.
$100 to $150.

Individual tickets sold on

A $185 ticket cost an additional

Better tickets were traded for $200 to $1,000 more than
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pr~ces.

8

The ships were often in deplorable condition.

Sanitary facilities were insufficient for an overcrowd of exhausted or
ill refugees.

Many died during an interminable voyage of weeks and

sometimes months.

A ship might dock at one or more Caribbean or Mexi-

can ports before sailing on to New York.

The HICEM and the Portuguese

government sometimes succeeded in imposing improvements of the ships on
the reluctant shipowners.
The evacuation of refugees from Vichy France was difficult but
not impossible.

The rescue organizations had to coordinate their oper-

ations in France, Spain, Portugal and America under constantly changing
conditions in each country.
their clients.

They could only evacuate a minority of

The American visa policy made their task more difficult

and contributed to the partial failure of the work of .rescue.
The Roosevelt administration left the quota immigration system
untouched because the president could not do without the support of a
group of anti-alien Democratic Congressmen from the South.
Department was in tune with the latter.

The State

Its visa administration had

the result that the German quota was not even fully used during the
refugee crisis.

From July 1940 to June 1941, during the main rescue

year, the German quota use was only 47.7%.

By the summer of 1941, new

legislation practically stopped further immigration with its relative
and LPC clauses.

Refugees with relatives left in Germany were consi-

dered vulnerable to extortion of intelligence services and refugees who
8

Curt Geyer to Ollenhauer, Vogel, 13 March 1941, EK Mappe 44.
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were likely to become public charges were also unwelcome.

9

Unlike immigrant visas, visitor visas were open to executive
regulation.

In their administration, the government had some leeway

which it used to pacify such political supporters as the Jewish labor
unions.

It created the emergency visa which suspended the six months

tUne limit of the visitor visa but obligated its holder to leave the
United States as soon as possible and start preparing for departure immediately after arrival.

The processing of special visa applications

fell to the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees (PAC).
But the American consuls in Europe soon complained about this curtailment of their visa authority.

The State Department made good use of

their complaints in persuading the president in mid-September 1940 to
sanction severe restrictions of the emergency visa program.
Thus, the benefits of this program for the German socialist
refugees were modest.

The Jewish Labor Committee had compiled a list

of European labor leaders and intellectuals which a delegation under
AFL president William Green handed over to the State Department on

2 July 1940.

About four hundred of the refugees on the JLC or AFL list

or, as it was occasionally called, the Dubinsky
visas.

lis~

received emergency

A number of clients of the Emergency Rescue Committee also ob-

tained such visas during the operative phase of the-program in the
9
on the immigration policy of the Roosevelt administration, see
Henry L. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, the Roosevelt Administration
and the Holocaust, 1938-1945 (New Brunswick, New Jersey; Rutgers University Press, 1970); SaulS. Friedman, No Haven for the Opp~essed,
United States Policy toward Jewish Refugees, 1938-1945 (Wayne State
University Press: 1973); and DavidS. Wyman, Paper Walls, America and
the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941 (Amherst University Press: 1968).
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summer of 1940.

Later, special visas were very difficult to get.

10

The testimony of the refugee committees confirmed these problems.

A representative of the Emergency Rescue Committee told Eleanor

Roosevelt in November 1940 that since mid-September no new emergency
visas had been granted to political refugees.

On October 17, Frank

wrote to Ruth Fischer in Lisbon about how "the consular service •••
paralyzed the original good will of part of the administration and reduced the results which seemed at first possible.

The people in the

administration ••• have more and more slowed down; even the active rest
is split".

He el.aborated that "for the last four or five weeks, perma-

nent committees have been meeting weekly.

Each time, they say the issue

has been salvaged once more but each time the counter current turned
out to be stronger."

Frank was also pessimistic about further sponsor-

ship.f<;>t; tJ:le rescue committees.
'has dropped to zero".

He felt that "organizable good will •••

This applied also to the unions who "after push-

ing through their first list of about three hundred refugees which contained at least one third Mensheviks and Bundists .•• have neither the
10
Besides the discussions by Feingold, Friedmann and Wyman on
the emergency visa program, see also: Dokumentation zur Emigration,
Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Bericht von Hilde Walters: She
mentions a summary affidavit by William Green for about two hundred
refugees on the JLC-AFL list. See also: William Green to Stampfer,
27 August 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland,
Nr. 103, p. 467; Jewish Labor Committee, Memorandum to the British Labor
Party and to the Trade Union Congress, July 1941, EK Mappe 196; Hagen to
Elfriede Eisler (Ruth Rischer), 17 October 1940, Frank Papers, box 8,
folder E: Frank estimated that the first JLC-AFL list contained the
names of about three hundred refugees in Southern France. See also:
Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, I, EK Mappe 51; Katz to Stampfer,
21 September 1940, Stampfer Nachlass, section I, group 9, Nr. 431;
Ibid., Nr. 444; Rudolf Katz, Die exilierte deutsche demokratische Linke
in USA, 1955, p. 9; Hagen to Hertz, 12 July 1940, Nachlass Hertz,
reel 15.
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chance nor the desire to force through a second listrr.

The difficul-

ties for gaining approval of the first AFL list had been rrgigantic".
Frank was exaggerating to a refugee whom he did not favor.

11

But his

assessment of the problems with the special visa program was correct.
The French and the American visa policy limited the work of
the German socialist rescue committees.

The bureaucratic visa pro-

cedures required the unceasing efforts of these committees without allowing them to accomplish much.
a frustrating job.

Raising the necessary funds was also

But as former refugees, the German socialist emi-

grants in the United States could be expected to do their best against
any odds.
Unfortunately, they did not always live up to the demands of
the refugee crisis.

Not even for this humanitarian task could they

muster the necessary antifascist solidarity.

They continued fighting

each other rather than their common enemy.

Their antifascist perform-

ance fel·l short of their antifascist claim.

Sometimes they were ab-

sorbed in political rather than humanitarian ambitions.

The former

interfered with the latter especially in the neglect of undesirable
refugees.

Their lack of foresight was already an indication of this

attitude.

They organized rescue committees only in the extremity of

the French defeat.

A more timely and systematic job would have achieved

better results.
It is not surprising that after the war some former emigrants
covered up the partial failure of their rescue work.
11

They did this in

Hagen to Elfriede Eisler, 17 October 1940, Frank Papers,
box 8, folder E.
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the context of the domestic and international situation of postwar
Germany.

A record of good work in America and of successful relations

with Americans could help their political image in the era of the Cold
war when their conservative opponents tried to brand them as communists.
In his postwar memoir, Stampfer claims: "The fact is that most of the·

emigrants succeeded with the help of the United States to leave France
before the extradition began."

12

In his short memoir of 1955, Katz

reflects on his achievements as one of the main rescue organizers by
using the phrase of "the miracle of the rescue".

13

The introduction

to the documentation from the Stampfer Papers repeats this uncritical
view when it gives the grade of "highest merits" to the German Labor
Delegation for its organization of the rescue effort in 1940 and 1941.
The selection of documents does not substantiate "this great achievement".

14

These postwar reports also covered up the politics that in-

fluenced the rescue work of the emigrants.
Against these later claims, it is important to establish the
record of the emigrant rescue work.

The second part of this chapter

will therefore deal with the two main socialist rescue efforts, those
of the American Friends of German Freedom and their Emergency Rescue
Conunittee (ERC) and of the

German Labor Delegation.

It will discuss

how much money these groups raised for their rescue work and how many
1

~atthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, p.

118.

13

Rudolf Katz, Die exilierte deutsche demokratische Linke in
USA, p. 30, Nachlass Stampfer, section I, group 9, Nr. 444.
14
Matthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, p. 35.
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refugees they were able to evacuate.

The description of these tasks

will exemplify the political conditions of the rescue work.

The rela-

tionship between the two socialist committees will further elucidate
their politics of rescue.
The American Friends of German Freedom had a hard time getting
their rescue work under way.
of political obstacles.
Rescue Committee.

Their first two attempts failed because

As a third attempt, they founded the Emergency

The first rescue committee started in the spring of

1940 before the French defeat.

It had an initial fund of $3,000.

Hertz was to come from Los Angeles to New York to support the committee
with his independent status as an elected member of the Sopade.

A

friend in Washington probed the possibility of emergency visas. 15

But

the committee failed because Frank as its main organizer became the
victim of the character assassination of the German Labor Delegation.

In the spring of 1940, he asked for an investigation of the charges
against him.

A socialist arbitration committee chaired by an American

convened shortly before the German invasion of France.

But the GLD

representatives protracted the sessions into the spring of 1941 and
intrigued against Frank as a politician under investigation.
In order to neutralize this handicap, the AFGF tried to organize an international committee which included Austrian and Russian
emigrants.
15
16

They invited Thomas Mann to represent its German section.
Hagen to Hertz, 17 June 1940, Nachlass Hertz, reel 15.
Hagen to Hertz, 2 July 1940, Nachlass Hertz, reel 15.
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They also hoped for the membership of the GLD which
longer sabotage their efforts.
tial benefits.

then no

co~ld

The GLD tended to cooperate for poten-

But it continued its policy of monopolizing the support

of the Jewish Labor Committee, especially in the matter of the emergency visas.

It opposed any share of the international committee in

the several hundred blanco visas of the first list which the JLC and
t he AFL h a d

.

acqu~re

d

. h a summary a ff.~ dav~t
. b y AFL

w~t

. d ent Green. 17

pres~

It persuaded the JLC chairman, Minkof, to drop the NB-clients from the
"Dubinsky list" with the argument that their names had been submitted
by a politically unreliable person.

Hertz thought that "it was unbe-

lievably mean of the Sopade people (the GLD] to secure the elimination
of our people from the list, no matter what explanation they might
offer".

18

success.

Frank worked strenuously for their reinstatement, with partial
Buttinger, who had made large contributions that had also

benefitted the GLD, backed him.

Together, they appealed to Julius

Hochman, who was one of the JLC members friendly towards the AFGF.

The

latter called a partial JLC meeting in which he objected to the methods
of Minkof,and secured the reinstatement of six NB clients. 19

Frank

mentioned, however, specifically more than six from the two groups of
NB applicants, of which the second group contained "our own most endangered people", while the first group included refugees like Konrad
17
18

19

Ibid., Hagen to Hertz, 12 July 1940.
Ibid., Hertz to Hagen, 16 July 1940.
rbid., Hagen to Hertz, 17 July 1940.

160
'd en. 20

All other eighteen NB applicants were rejected.

He~

After this

squabble over blanco visas, the AFGF initiated the Emergency Rescue
Committee.
For several reasons, the ERG was a committee that was able to
go about its business.
was settled.

Mainly, the issue over the easy blanco visas

The GLD was satisfied that the AFGF had to acquire any

further visas on its own.

Also, the structure of the ERC covered up

its main connection with the AFGF.

This was especially important for

the isolated refugee work that the ERG had to do.

The American sponsor

organization of NB appeared as only one of several members in this
third committee.

But the representatives of the other member groups

were mostly former friends of Frank like Buttinger of the Austrian
socialist emigrants, Walcher and Frolich of the SAP, members of the
Gruppe Neuer Weg, a former SAP faction, and members of the ISK.
dynamic force behind the ERG was the AFGF and Frank.
AFGF national committee was chairman of the ERC;
its second secretary.

1

The

Kingdon of the

Anna Frank-Caples

With some modification, the ERG was a continua-

tion of the abovementioned international committee.

Even the GLD was

still represented by Katz who liked to treat the Emergency Rescue Committee as a non-political, philanthropic group of bourgeois benefactors.
The ERG succeeded in portraying a non-political image by its
work for the refugee journalists, writers and artists.

20

This could pass

Vogel to Emergency Rescue Committee, 26 April 1941, EK Mappe

139.
21

Katz to Stampfer, 21 September 1940; Matthias and Link, Mit
dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 105, p. 472.

r

161

as a culturally antifascist endeavor in terms of freedom of opinion
and expression.

Many of the writers and journalists were, however,

leftists to the point that they considered the Social Democrats as
conservative.

It was natural for the AFGF to practice socialist soli-

clarity towards these refugees.
aid.

But the ERC was not selective in its

It helped all antifascist literary refugees.

Temporarily, a

group of non-socialist writers became even preponderant in the ERC.
Frank claimed that in mid-August 1940, the conunittee had "completely
fallen under the influence of German bourgeois writers who had very
different ideas from ours on the merits of particular refugee cases".
In this situation, the AFGF beat a tactical retreat that demonstrated

its importance.

According to Frank, "we pulled back and limited our-

selves more or less to our own closest party members.
improved though, lately."

Things have

22

The AFGF also mobilized most of the financial sources of the
ERC.

Buttinger was able to be one of the individual contributors be-

cause of his American marriage.

Ingrid Warburg,of the Warburg banking

family, took a friendly interest in the AFGF and in the ERC.

According

to Varian M. Fry, who directed the ERC operations in Marseille, she
"made [the rescue work] possible".

The firm of Harold Oram in New York

conducted publicity and fund raising campaigns for the AFGF that also
benefitted the ERC.

It generally served liberal groups.

Caples worked there since 1939 or before.

Anna Frank-

According to Hertz, one

fund raising dinner in particular could not be equalled in financial
.22

Hagen to Elfriede Eisler, 17 October 1940, Frank Papers,
box 8, folder E.
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success by other political groups.
financial problems.

Nevertheless, the ERC had early

They were exemplified by the hope that Hertz, in

faraway Los Angeles, could raise "a large sum".

23

The ERC was energetic in its quest for refugee visas.

Frank

and Buttinger had reasonable hopes for the independent acquisition of
blanco visas after a conversation with Eleanor Roosevelt.

But she

could apparently not persuade the president into taking this kind of
risk a few months before the elections.

Katz noted with satisfaction

that the ERC lacked the important protection of the AFL and was also
suspected by Washington of pro-communism.

He insisted that the ERC

sponsored communists and fellow travelers whom the Smith Act excluded
from the United States.

24

Actually, the ERC was reluctant to jeopardize

its precarious reputation but refused to abandon its ex-communist refugee clients.

After this failure, the ERC had to submit visa applica-

tions to the PAC for the full bureaucratic process.
It succeeded in acquiring a good number of regular emergency
visas.

The statistics of the AFGF give an indication of the work of

the ERC.

By August 1940, the NB sponsor organization had provided one

hundred twenty affidavits which Frank considered "a Herculean achieve25
ment".
Among others, these affidavits were for two or three friends
23

Hertz to Hagen, 23 August 1940, Nachlass Hertz, reel 15.

24
Katz to Stampfer, 21 September 1940, Matthias and Link Mit
dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 105, p. 472. The Smith Act of,l940,
catered largely to the fifth columnist hysteria. It required all aliens
over the age of fourteen to register and to be fingerprinted. It also
expanded grounds for deportation by adding membership or former membership in a subversive organization such as .a communist party.
25
Hagen to Hertz, 23 August 1940,Nachlass Hertz, reel 15.
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of Gurland, a former leftist Social Democrat who was then working in
the ERC, for "the major members of the SAP", for some members of the
Gruppe Neuer Weg, for some Brandlerites and for about twelve additional
members "of our own group".

These affidavits had by August resulted in

visas for only forty refugees with prospects for twenty more visas.
Six of the visas were for SAP refugees and one for an ISK refugee.

26

By October 9, the AFGF was engaged in the collection of affidavits for
"about forty or fifty organization members left for our considerat

,

~on

11

. 27
Not all of these cases were brought to a good conclusion.

By

October 1940, the AFGF had succeeded in evacuating only "about twenty
of our people".
trouble.

28

By that time, the emergency visa program was in

But the financial situation of the AFGF seemed also hopeless.

It had only $25 left after the expenditure of "horrendous sums".

Frank

explained that the refugees in Southern France and in Lisbon were misinformed in assuming that the AFGF had any special influence in visa
cases.

Its initial success was due to the fact that it had been the

first organization "to realize the danger of the situation".

Frank

added that 've mobilized all our connections in this country and managed to just get by with our funds".

But the support of the rescue

26

Hagen to Hertz, 26 August 1940, Nachlass Hertz, reel 15. The
Brandlerites were the followers of the co-founder of the German Communist Party Opposition.
27

Hagen to Elfriede Eisler, 17 October 1940, Frank Papers, box
8, folder E; Hagen to Hertz, 17 July 1940, Nachlass Hertz, reel 15;
and Ibid., Hagen to Hertz, 25 July 1940.
28
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of the AFGF had "meanwhile been reduced to zero". 29
Fry conducted the rescue work for the ERC in Marseille.

For

this purpose, he established the Centre Americain de Secours (CAS)
which was sponsored by Andre Gide and Henri Matisse, among other celebrities.

Two of Fry's assistants were Social Democratic refugees.

CAS and Fry employed all imaginable tricks in their rescue work.

The
~Vhen

necessary, they gave their clients Panamanian, Brasilian, Chinese,
Siamese or Belgian Congo visas for a pretended destination, and
Czechoslovakian, Polish, or counterfeit Danish and Dutch passports.

30

They also provided special problem clients with French demobilization
orders for Algeria and Morocco which they bought from a French officer
at $5 apiece.

For a better prospect of success, they sent their Lisbon

bound clients to the

Pyre~ees

in small convoys accompanied by an Ameri-

can staff member or an experienced refugee.

Fry, himself, and his

assistant convoyed Franz'Werfel and his wife, Heinrich Mann and his
wife, and Golo Mann, the son of Thomas Mann, into Spai?·
forced to leave France in October 1941.
ate until 1942.

But the CAS continued to oper-

It was suspended on 2 June 1942 and closed down on

15 September of the same year.
29

Fry was

Hagen to
8, folder E.

Elfried~

31

Eisler, 17 October 1940, Frank Papers, box

30

Fry, Surrender on demand, pp. 44, 82, 219. One of the main
purveyors of passports was the Czechoslovak consul Vladimir Vochoc. He
was engaged in evacuating the "Czechoslovak freedom fighters" who had
fought on the French side. He was in contact with the Unitarian Service
Committee through Donald Lowrie, who was also a representative of the
YMCA and of the American Friends of Czechoslovakia. He put Fry into
contact with Vochoc.
31

Hirschberg to Heine, 6 September 1942, EK Mappe 51.
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Under the impression of his initial success before September
1940, Fry lost sight of
opinion of Frank.

th~

possibilities of further rescue, in the

The NB leader thought that Fry should "know better

from the absence of an echo to his persistent calls for help.

He is

sincere and active ••• but he fails to understand that aid cannot be
given in proportion to need, but only in proportion to the support we
are able to muster".

32

Nevertheless, the statistics which Fry offers

in his report are impressive if somewhat generous and imprecise.

33

Out

of fifteen thousand applicants, the CAS decided to consider one thousand eight hundred cases which involved four thousand refugees as
"genuine cases of intellectual or political refugees with a good chance
of emigrating soon".

It payed weekly allowances to five hundred sixty

refugees and refugee families in order to keep them out of

~amp.

34

The

Fry committee guided more than a hundred people into Spain on the clandestine "F-route" over the Mediterranean foothills of the Pyrenees.
During 1940, it sent "nearly three hundred fifty human beings" out, of
France, mostly without exit visas.

During the period of legal exit in

1941, "we ••• sent people out of France legally in wholesale lots and
illegally in retail".

By May 1941, the number of CAS evacuees had risen

to more than one thousand.

Nearly three hundred more people were

res-~

32Hagen to E. Eisler, 17 October 1940, Frank Papers, box 8,
folder E.
33The records of the Emergency Rescue Committee in the Deutsche
Bibliothek in Frankfurt, West Germany, were pillaged of most important
documents as souvenirs of Thomas Mann, Lion Feuchtwanger and others.
34

Fry, Surrender on demand, pp. 189, 236.
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cued between the departure of Fry in October 1941 and June 1942. 35
The CAS gave special consideration to "the friends of Paul
Hagen [Frank]".

Fry wrote in his report that, "fortunately for me, the

first of the refugees to come to [the CAS] in response to my summons
were Paul Hagen's German socialist friends and some of the younger Austrian socialists".

36

He also offered more than the usual assistance to

"four friends of Paul Hagen's in the camp at Vernet [whom] he had asked
me particularly to help, and I didn't want to go until I had gotten
them out of France".
AFGF in the ERC.
coordinated.

37

This emphasized again the significance of the

In general, the rescue effort of the AFGF was well

It had better organizers on both sides of the Atlantic

than the Social Democrats.

The communication between them was very

good.
The Social Democratic effort was hampered in all three rescue
periods by serious financial, organizational and personal problems.

In

the first period, which lasted until the fall of 1940, the Social
Democratic committee in Marseille exhausted its own funds and did not
get much help from Frank Bohn, the representative of the GLD, the Jewish Labor Committee and, indirectly, of the AFL.

In the second period

of the rest of 1940 and in the third period of the winter and spring of
1941, the GLD failed to raise any funds beyond the limited contributions
35

Ibid., pp. 124, 170, 188, 206, 236.

36Ib ~"d ., p. 14.
37

Ibid., pp. 86, 87-92.
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from the Jewish Labor Committee and to communicate properly with the
Social Democratic refugees in Lisbon and with the Social Democratic
committee in Marseille.

The Social Democratic rescue effort failed

except for the limited number of refugees whose evacuation was paid by
the Jewish Labor Committee.
The Social Democratic committee was organized by the Sopade.
The SPD executives came to Marseille in the summer of 1940, mostly from
the camp of Castres.

They stayed long enough to organize their own

evacuation to Lisbon with the $10,000 they had left after the seizure
. b an k account at t h e
o f t h e~r

cre'd.~t commerc~a
. 1e

.

~n

p ar~s.
. 38

Ollenhauer left with their families at the end of August.
ally went to England.

Vogel and

They eventu-

Stampfer and Rinner left with their families in

early September and went on immediately to New York.
split 9f the Sopade will be discussed later.

This geographical

The Sopade left Friedrich

Heine behind in charge of the Social Democratic committee.

39

Here-

mained until early 1941 when the chances for further evacuation became
negligible.

He had been coopted as a member of the Sopade in the early

emigration and had the confidence of both the executives and the other
refugees.

To whatever the Social Democratic rescue effort amounted, be-

sides the contribution from the Jewish Labor Committee, was,mainly his
work.
38 K
.
d eutsch e d emo k rat~sc
. h e L~n
. k e·~n
. USA , p. 9 ,
atz, D.~e ex~. 1 ~erte
Nachlass Stampfer, section I, group 9, Nr. 444.
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vogel to William Gillies, 8 March 1941, EK Mappe 139. From
1930-1933, Heine had run the SPD propaganda center in Berlin. He had
been with the Sopade since 1933, throughout the Prague and Paris exiles,
and was coopted into the executive. In Prague and Paris, he was managing editor of the Neuer Vorwarts, the successor of the Weimar Vorwarts.
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He had to cope mainly with lack of funds and visas.
initial $10,000,

11

Of the

significant sums" went for "travel expenses beginning

with [the Sopade executives] to the last friends 11 •

The Sopade leaders

left him "theoretically ••• 60 Mille", that is 60,000 ffrs or about
$1,500, but "practically only about 45" Mille or $1,125.

Of these, the

Sopade leaders agreed with Heine before their departure to spend $625
on the remaining Sopade associates in the camp of Castres, among them
·curt Geyer and Gustav Ferl.

The remaining $475, Heine spent on assist-

ance to Social Democratic refugees in Marseille and the Southern
provinces.

By September, the Sopade funds were gone.

40

In the absence

of any other financial assistance, Heine persuaded Toni Wels, the widow
of the former chairman of the Sopade, to give him a-loan of 77,000 ffrs.
or about $1,925.·

It enabled him to evacuate ten more refugees, in-

eluding the coopted Sopade member, Curt Geyer, Herbert Weichmann and
Ernst Hamburger with their families.
the United States.
money of Toni Wels.

Eight of these refugees went to

The Sopade leaders reprimanded Heine for using the
She never got it back and later lived a precarious

life in New York until her death in March 1942.

Heine was distressed

to hear that his promises to Mrs. Wels were worthless.
that he had acted in the higher interests of
gees.

the~lives

But he insisted
of ten refu-

41
From then on, Heine depended on the GLD and on Bohn.

Since

both of these received their money from the Jewish Labor Committee, it
40
41
Mappe 51.

Heine to Sopade, Lisbon, 15 October 1940, EK Mappe 51.
Ibid.

See also: Heine to Ollenhauer, 27 September 1940, EK
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is not clear to which funds the GLD referred in its explanations to
Heine.

In September 1940, Katz complained that "our financial situa-

tion is deplorable considering the great task of the rescue".

The GLD

had paid the ten transatlantic tickets for the Sopade executives and
their families.

Five of these tickets it. held only in reserve as a

safety for the Vogels and Ollenhauers in case they
English visas.

sho~ld

not get

When the GLD nearly had to make good on this polite

offer it let the two executives know that they were not welcome in New
York.

This political incident will be further discussed later.

After

these expenditures, the GLD had only $2,000 left, earmarked for the

.
next transat 1ant~c

. k ets. 42

t~c

It refused to use part of this money

for subsistence payments to the Sopade leaders in Lisbon.
With Bohn, Heine argued about visas and subsidies.

Bohn

c~me

to Marseille in July 1940 With the AFL list of emergency visa clients
and the insufficient amount of $10,000.

43

He was responsible for

several national refugee groups: the Polish Bundists and Russian emigrants who had not taken the Siberian route to Japan and California,
the Italian socialists, a group of German literary refugees and the
Austrian socialists and German Social Democrats.

About one-third of

the four hundred thirteen emergency visas under the AFL list was
naturally reserved for the direct clients of the Jewish Labor Committee
42

Katz to Stampfer, 21 September 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit
dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 105, p. 473.
43

Frank Bohn was the brother of William Bohn, a socialist editor and writer.
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and the Polish Jewish Bund in New York.

44

Heine complained that rrthe

Russians [received] the lion's share of the visas".

He claimed that.

"this jeopardized the whole [German] operation and had the effect that
our really endangered friends fall under the table 11 •
same opinion but he followed his instructions.

Bohn was of the

45

Heine was also dissatisfied with the way Bohn spent and handled
his limited funds.

The latter had received "2-1/2

Mille [or $1,000]

for each of the participating groups for initial activitiesn.
Germans and the Austrians were in the same group.

46

The

But this money and

the rest of the $10,000 was mostly tied up in difficult exchange arrangements and in a ludicrous rescue scheme.

Heine could only get

reimbursed by Bohn for some of his expenses.

This was the best he

could do after "the unproportionate expenditures in the first four
weeks of [Bohn's] inexperience".
ordinary efforts 11 •

47

Even for this, he had to make "extra-

According to the Bohn accounts, Heine received a

direct contribution of $1,000.

48

This amount is the only subsidy from

Bohn that figures in the dollar accounts of Heine of early 1941.

49

The

Sopade also received a reimbursement of $1,000 from Bohn and kept it.
44

Hagen to E. Eisler, 17 October 1940, Frank Papers, box 8,
folder E; and Heine to Ollenhauer, 27 September 1940, EK Mappe 51.
45

Ibid.
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Heine to liebe Freunde (Sopade, Lisbon), 16 September 1940,
EK Mappe 51.
47
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Heine to Ollenhauer, 27 October 1940, EK Mappe 51.
Heine to Erich Rinner, 29 October 1940, EK Mappe 51.
Heine, Abrechnung, Dollarkonto, spring 1941, EK Mappe 51.
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Actually, these $2,000 were about the legitimate German share of the
$10,000 Bohn fund.
In addition, Heine managed to recover na small amountrr of the

squandered boat

mone~ which he shared with the Italian socialists. 5°

Bohn disliked the land evacuation route over the Pyrenees which traversed three

co~ntries.

He thought that his clients were either too old

for this ordeal or too endangered in fascist Spain.

He invested $4,412,

or nearly half of his fund, in renting and provisioning a seaworthy
fishing boat for direct evacuation from the harbor of Marseille.

51

Among its prospective passengers were a number of prestigious German
writers and Social Democrats like Franz Werfel, Franz Mehring, Lion
Feuchtwanger, Rudolf Breitscheid and Rudolf Hilferding.
to this scheme.

It was an open secret for the

Fr~ch

Heine objected

police.

The boat

was seized by officials of the Italian armistice commission the day be·.
fore it was due to sail. Heine referred to it later as the Flying
Dutchman, the legendary ghostship of the Atlantic Ocean.
The boat money also revealed the incorrect accounting of Katz
for the Bohn fund.

His compilation dates from June 1941 when the res-

cue operation was over.

According to his defensive explanation, $8,700

of the Bohn fund were spent by June 1941.
sorbed 306,000 ffrs, or about $7,650.

Of these, the boat money ab-

An additional 50,000 ffrs, or

about $1,250 went for contributions to Stampfer, Breitscheid, Hilferding
and Erika Biermann, a Sopade secretary.
50
51

Even with the incorrect figure

Heine to liebe Freunde (GLD), 25 December 1940, EK Mappe 51.

Heine to liebe Freunde (Sopade, Lisbon), 16 September 1940,
EK Mappe 51.
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of the boat money, Katz did not account for about $1,300 of the Bohn
fund.

He also claimed that 105,000 ffrs, or about $2,625, of the boat

money were recovered, a surprisingly large amount even it it was shared
with some Italian socialists.

The incorrectness in the Katz account

was a coverup which shows that something was wrong with the rescue
work of the GLD.

52

Another example was the way the GLD dealt with the German literary refugees.

A certain number of them was on the AFL list so that

Bohn was responsible for them.

He made subsistence payments to some of

them including Leopold Schwarzschild, the former editor of the Weltb·~hne.

11

More than once", the CAS wanted to take over a client from

Bo h n wh o f o11owe d , h owever, hi s

.

.

~nstruct~ons.

53

Katz disliked this use

of the Bohn fund, but it took him until September before he cabled to
Heine: "positively no payment to others but strictly labor peoplen.

54

Heine defended himself later against the criticism by Katz by arguing
that even this late telegram was "not clear enough to give us firm
guidelinesn.

55

Most of the writers were leftist and therefore poten-

tially labor people.

Katz tried to regulate the payment of transatlan-

tic tickets more explicitly_.

He demanded that "for the members of the

literary, journalistic and artistic group who are not members of the
52

Ibid., and Heine to Erich Rinner, 29 October 1940, EK Mappe
51; Katz, account-of the funds of Frank Bohn, 29 June 1941, EK Mappe 61.
53

Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, I, EK Mappe 51.
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Telegram from Katz, 27 August 1940, quoted in Heine to Sopade,
16 .September 1940, EK Mappe 51.
55

Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, I, 'EK Mappe 51.
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party we pay under no circumstances, even though they were on our
list".

56

Eventually, the Jewish Labor Committee paid the transatlantic

fare for nineteen German and Austrian writers, including Hermann Budzislawski, Alfred rbblin, Georg Bernhard, Konrad Heiden, Leopold
Schwarzxchild.

Of these, Heiden and Bernhard were reinstated on the

AFL list after the protest by Frank.

Katz explained the evacuation of

the non-Social Democratic writers with the excuse that

11

unfortunately,

the (ERC] was founded four weeks after the start of our own rescue
operation.

Had ... we anticipated this we would possibly have limited

our visa list .•. to exponents of the labor movement".

57

Despite his attitude towards the literary refugees, Katz objected to the publicity of the ERC which used the names of "two dozen
writers •.. whom we [the GLD] rescued with our list and not they"-.

But

in his negotiations, Jne offered to let the ERC organizers have "this
credit and its financial exploitation" if they agreed to his idea of
11

ticket sharing".

It stipulated that the ERC pay 50% of the transat-

lantic fare for "our party members", the Social Democratic refugees.
Katz conceded to Heine that this method might seem "quite American but
it is practical politics".

This attitude was typical of Katz.

58

This dependence of Katz on the Emergency Rescue Committee,with
which he was on bad terms,

~hawed

Democratic rescue effort.

Its first period ended with the exhaustion

56

the precariousness of the Social

Katz to Stampfer, 21 September 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit
dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 105, p. 471.
57
58
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of the Sopade funds, the departure of the unfortunate Bohn from France,
and the curtailment of the emergency visa program.

As a result of

these negative developments, all of the regular German Social Democratic
and unionist refugees were still in Southern France.

According to

Heine, there were "about two hundred forty party and union members in
the unoccupied zone of France with whom we had contact; with their families, they numbered about six hundred".

59

The GLD, the JLC and Heine

initiated the evacuation of a number of refugees.
until 1941 before they could leave France.

But they had to wait

By the fall of 1940, the

Sopade executives were out of France with the exception of Heine.
these, only Stampfer and Rinner went to New York.
they numbered five refugees.

Of

With their families,

The JLC had paid for their tickets.

Heine and the Sopade had each receiv-ed $1,000 from the Bohn fund.
was the amount of the American contribution.

This

It is not even clear

whether the first $1,000 were separate from the German share of the
boat money.

Heine claimed that "I would not have had a penny from you

[the GLD] if i t had not been for the small amountrr of the recovered
money.

60

Ten more Social Democratic refugees had left Vichy France,

eight of them for New York, with the help of the loan from Toni Wels.
In the second period, no

German Social Democratic refugee made

it to the United States with the help of the GLD.

The Sopade leaders

waited in vain for some money from New York that would at least keep
the refugees alive while they were waiting for evacuation.

Ollenhauer

59

Heine to Thorsten Nielsson, 30 May 1941; and Heine to London,
30 May 1941, EK Mappe 51.
60

51.

Heine to German Labor Delegation, 25 December 1940, EK Mappe
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and Vogel could not go on to England before December 1940.

The corre-

spondence between the GLD and the Sopade executives in Marseille and
Lisbon was one-sided and unpleasant.

The contradictory statements of

Katz about how much money they had already received from New York and
how little was available in the last months of 1940, insulted them.
Katz was the only Social Democrat whom they addressed with the formal
"Sie".

He was alien to them since he was unknown in the Weimar Repub-

lie and had not shared the first and second emigration in Prague and
Marseille with them.
this relationship.

The "Ems Dispatch" of December of 1940 symptomized
It told Vogel and Ollenhauer that they were unwel-

come in New York.
The

eff~rts

of Heine, Vogel, and Ollenhauer during the second

period were completely wasted.

In October 1940, Heine had already com-

plained that "I really don't know how things are supposed to go on if
everybody is going to keep sitting on my tail 11 •

He did not know,

either, how to come up "with something like 70,000 ffrs [$1, 750 J for
the transportation of twenty people".

61

He remained helpless.

In one

of his rare letters, Katz answered in December 1940 that he could provide

11

new visas, if at all, only very slowly and with great difficulty.

money we can't send him (Heine] at all.
. ·
· fl uence an d o f our
t h e 1 ~~ts
o f our ~n

we

want you to realize

62
"b ~·1·~t~es.
·
rc

poss~

The financial

situation was thus,according to Katz,"absolutely terrible".

63

61

Heine to liebe Freunde (Sopade, Lisbon), 15 October 1940,
EK Mappe 51.
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Katz to Curt Geyer, 8 December 1940, EK Mappe 61.

German Labor Delegation to Ollenhauer, 25 December 1940,
EK Mappe 61.
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The secretary of the GLD excused himself with the unresponsiveness of the Jewish Labor Committee, for which he was largely responsible, himself.

He could not secure the transatlantic ticket for Robert

Groetzsch, an associate of the Sopade, who then received it from the
HICEM.

Nor could he get any assurance from the JLC on the six tickets

for Friedrich Wilhelm Wagner, Rudolf Leeb and Georg Fuchs with their
families.

64

He warned against optimism about their later acquisition

since the JLC, "our financial mainstay", was nwithout any means".
This prediction was too pessimistic.
New York in early 1941.

65

All of these refugees came to

On December 20, Katz reiterated that the JLC,

which he condescendingly called "our men in the background" seemed to
be "totally fund],ess".

The Labor Committee itself had termed "any

expectations for further appropriations as hoepless".

66

It did not

even disburse the $5,000 it had promised the GLD earlier.
JLC left the GLD

11

Thus, the

completely in the lurch", according to Katz.

was a perfect alibi.for the GLD.

This

Its secretary concluded that "the

German Social Democrats and democrats 11 in the United States, that is,
the GLD, could "not do more than they already have".

67

Another alibi

was the AFL with "its curious structure and its insufficient education
in political solidarity for foreign movements".

Katz was pessimistic

about a prospective meeting with Green in Washington at the end of
January 1941.
64
65
66
67

Another appeal by the latter to the state, district and

Ibid.
Katz to Curt Ge:t:er, 9 December 1940, EK Mappe 61.

Katz to StamEfer, 20 December 1940, EK Mappe 61.
Katz to Ollenhauer, 5 January 1941, EK Mappe 61.
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local union organizations would accomplish little. -The GLD secretary
also pointed to the American "lethargy towards the great refugee drama".
It was in his words "a typically American phenomenon that such waves
[of sympathy for the refugees] rise and fall like a new fashionrr.
Yet, the JLC was not as devoid of funds as Katz portrayed it to
be.

It had large funds at its disposal during the 1930's and 1940's.

It had contributed $224,021 to the European underground movement up to
1941.

68

In 1939, the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, one

of the main members of the JLC, raised $250,000 for a special refugee
fund.

With the contributions of the employers, its total rose to

$425,000.

During the war years, the ILGWU collected over $7 million

for re!ief funds, community chests and social service agencies, mostly
from voluntary half-day and full-day pay contributions of its members.
In 1942, it donated $75,000 to the purchase and the furnishing of the
British Merchant Navy Club in London.

69

The JLC would have been capable

of doing more for the GLD during the second rescue period.
It was mainly the fault of the GLD if the JLC remained aloof
during this period.

The GLD attacks against Frank nearly deadlocked

the Labor Committee on the issue of appropriations for German socialist
refugees.

Sometimes, it allocated a specific amount but put off its

payment.

Under these circumstances, the GLD insistence of relying ex-

elusively on the JLC made no sense.

Besides, the latter resented the

68

Jewish Labor Committee, Memorandum to the British Labor Party
and to the Trade Union Congress, July 1941, EK Mappe 196.
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Max Danish, The world of David Dubinsky (New York: 1957),
pp. 104, 103.
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laziness of the GLD.

Estrin, who administered the JLC rescue effort,

ndid not take well to K. [Katz] 11 •

He explained that

11

yes, i f the GLD

would come to us and say we need a total of thirty tickets, we will
come up with ten of them; please, give us the money for the rest, this
would then stand as a word".

He felt that with the proper approach, it

was possible to raise large amounts of money in the United States for
a good cause.
rescue effort.

But the GLD had "never made any contribution" to the
70

In the first rescue period, it had made an unsuccess-

ful attempt at exploiting the Quaker connections of Sollmann.

Seger

and Grzesinsky negotiated for a sum of $10,000 with the American Friends
Service Committee in Philadelphia.

71

But thereafter, the GLD failed to

cultivate relations with the major American relief organizations.
the case of

th~

In

Emergency Rescue Committee, it expected to win funds by

being antagonistic.

It limited itself to the JLC which it alienated by

its political behavior.

This approach demonstrated both ineptitude and

disinterest in the rescue work.
The Sopade executives in Lisbon and Marseille could only guess
about what was going on in New York.

Vogel and Ollenhauer were upset

that they did not even receive some money for their sustenance.

72

Vogel protested that "we ·could have starved to death" i f it had not
been for some financial aid from William Gillies, the head of the international department of the British Labor Party.
70

He sent the airfare

Maria Rinner to Heine, EK Mappe 102.
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Sollmann to Stampfer, 4 September 1940, Nachlass Stampfer,
section I, group 13, Nr. 642.
72

Vogel to Lenk, International Federation of White Collar Workers, 11 January 1941, EK Mappe 139.
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for nine tickets to London of which three were not used so that there
was a reserve for food.

73

Ollenhauer protested to Katz that "your

attitude of not doing a thing for Lisbon in two months is absolutely
untenable".

74

Vogel was "seized by horror" when he thought of the

Social Democratic refugees who might follow him to Lisbon.

He still

thought in terms of "the rescue effort for a larger group of peoplerr in
the future.

The two Sopade leaders could not see the point of evacua-

ting the refugees to Lisbon "if they don't even have the minimum for
livelihood here".

75

They did not realize yet, that they would not have

all that many successors in Lisbon.
"I am sick and tired.

Heine also let the GLD know that

Today is the first day of Christmas and I fer-

vently wish that you may all go to hell."

He told them that the Ameri-

can consulate in Marseille received "half a dozen and more visas every
day -- for othersn.

Almost the entire ISK group had received visas.

Heine stated that "so far you have not contributed one centime in
direct money.

I would not have had a penny from you if it had not been

for the small amount" that was recovered Ufrom the lightly squandered
[boat] money".

He found this absence of funds

If

all the more deplorable"

since the Austrian refugees received substantial sums in November and
December, 70,000 ffrs, or about $1,750, on December 23.

He told the

GLD that "you are responsible when things are not working out:.here the
way they should •••• you are partly to blame when our friends ••• don't
73
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know on what to live ... when our friends in the provincial towns and
camps starve to death. 11

He contrasted their indifference with the

prospect that "the political situation could turn into a disaster any
day and ruin our entire work".

76

This was what nearly happened in 1941.

The response of Katz to these complaints was unbelievable.

He

stated somewhat cynically that nwe don't expect any thanks nor are we
sensitive about serious reproaches for what you call a bad job".

77

Yet,

he claimed that "so far, none of our group failed because of lack of
the necessary tickets".

78

because of lack of visas.

This implied that all of the refugees failed
He boasted of $10,000 which

11

we invested in

the rescue of the friends in Southern France, including you".

In a

letter of January 7, 1941, he claimed that the total investment of the
GLD in 1940 was $15,000.

79

He elaborated later that "it is a miracle

that we were able to collect the large amounts for the rescue

wor~

that

have been spent" . . But he complained that ''the expectations of all the
comrades in Europe seem to have been raised by irresponsible generators of hope to such a degree that they find it difficult now to grasp
completely the sad seriousness of the lack of any financial means"
Katz usually spoke in the name of the JLC rather than the GLD.

80

His

statistics served his purposes.
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What poisoned the relationship with the Sopade leaders most was
the lack of any sympathy of the GLD for the situation of the refugees.
Katz termed their necessary evacuation condescendingly nthis philanthropic rescue operation 11 •

He answered the letters of Vogel, Ollen-

hauer and Heine only rarely, and then in a symptomatically arrogant
tone.

Vogel objected to "the general behavior of comrade Katz towards

usn.

The Sopade leaders in Lisbon ndirected a stream of letters and

reports at him and SOS calls about our own situationn.

The response of

Katz was "one single letter and, to our SOS calls, the advice that we
should exhause the Portuguese resources", that is, the American relief
.

organ~zat

i ons ~n
. L.~s b on. 81

The background to this bitter relationship

was the GLD policy of keeping Vogel and Ollenhauer out of the United
States.

Before its letter of unwelcome of November 1940, the GLD did

not want to encourage the two Sopade leaders.

After their remonstrances

about this kind of treatment, Katz let them feel his anger.
plained to the GLD that

11

Heine com-

you play silence in all major and minor musical

keys ..•. You treat me, your representative for more than four hundred
friends, in a quite shameful manner."

He had sent them rrprobably more

than a dozen telegrams and certainly more than a hundred letters 11 •
received one letter in October and another one on November 20.

This

prompted him to ask the GLD: "Do you think I am here for fun?"

He

He

thought that advice and information was the least that he could expect
of them and wondered whether they realized

11

at all how our friends feel

when I have to tell them again and again that there has been no mail
81 Vogel to Stampfer, 5 December 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit dem
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 107, p. 476.

r

r.
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from America for the last four weeks 11 •

82

This relationship did not improve during the third rescue
period of the winter and spring of 1941.

Heine complained in February

1941 that Katz did not answer 1% of his questions.

To a total of a

hundred-fifty letters, he had received five answers,and to thirty telegrams, three responses.
impossible11 •

83

He told Stampfer that "this makes cooperation

He ended his "extremely one-sided correspondence with

Katz" with letter NR. 155 when he left Lisbon in March 1941.
successor Ernst Hirschberg did not fare any better.

84

His

He received one

nabso1ute1y insignificant" letter from Katz in his first month.
tone of these Katz letters remained also the same.
"patriarchal and pedagogicn,

85

The

Sometimes it was

sometimes "so terribly haughty and over-

·
th a t .;t
. · f y~ng
· tt . 86
b ear~ng
• .;s
• h orr~

Katz related to Heine like to an

ignorant "aborigine" in American union matters.

Yet, the latter had

first hand knowledge of that field from conversations with Cahan and
Stampfer.

87
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Heine concluded that "our American friends [the GLD] are

Heine to German Labor Delegation, 25 December 1940, EK Mappe

51.
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Heine to Stampfer, 23 February 1941, Nachlass Stampfer,
section II, group 17, Nr. 45; and Heine to Lisbon, 17 January 1941,
EK Mappe 51.
84
85

Heine to Freunde (Sopade, London), 19 March 1941, EK Mappe 51.
Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, II, EK Mappe 51.
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Heine to Stampfer, 23 February 1941, Nachlass Stampfer,
section II, group 17, Nr. 45.
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Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, II, EK Mappe 51.

183
really a cruxtr. 88

He felt nhelpless and hopeless 11 •

While in Lisbon,

he did not dare to go out into the countryside for a day because he was
"apprehensive of reflection".

He was afraid to think about !!what may

become of the movementn and wondered whether

11

we - the divided and de-

·
·
d ec~s~ve
· · rr . 89
. d em i grat~on
mora l ~ze
t h at we are - can rea 11y d o anyt h ~ng
Nevertheless, the third rescue period was the only successful
one.

But the credit for its achievement belongs to Heine and the JLC

rather than to the GLD.

They prepared most cases of this period in

1940 already on the basis of the emergency visa list of the JLC.

The

opportunity for their evacuation came in January 1941 when the Vichy
government began issuing exit visas for obscure reasons.

Refugees

with visas could then either go to Lisbon or embark directly in Mar-

.

seille for the French Caribbean island of Martinique, for Cuba or
Mexico.

From these countries, they could try to get to the United

States.

The French government stopped the Martinique voyages after

British naval vessels seized a refugee ship in May 1941.

Thereafter,

it was very difficult to leave France.
The JLC evacuated a sizable group of German refugees in early
1941, starting in February.

Its evacuation list, which includes the

five evacuees of 1940, mentions fifty-three single or married German
socialist refugees of whom thirty-seven were Social Democrats, eight NB
members, six SAP members and two ISK members.
88

With their families,

Heine to Freunde (Sopade, London), 28 April 1941, EK Mappe 51.
89 .
Heine to Stampfer, 30 May 1941, Nachlass Stampfer, section II,
group 17, Nr. 47.

184
they numbered ninety-five German refugees.

90

The cost of transporta-

tion between Marseille and New York consisted of possibly $75 for the
train ride to Lisbon and of $175 for a transatlantic ticket, together
$250.

For ninety-five refugees, these expenses came to $23,750.

The

HICEM usually granted a discount:of $37.50 per transatlantic ticket,
which may or may not have been included in the amount.of $175.

Some of

the refugees on the JLC evacuation list received their fare from other
sources or had their own means.

According to a laudatory memorandum of

July 1941 to the British Labor Party and to the Trade Union Congress,
the JLC rescued eight hundred European labor leaders at a cost of
$300,000.

91

Of these, the proportional share of the fifty-three German

labor leaders would be about $20,000.

The JLC also sent two amounts of

$500 to Lisbon, the first one in mid-March 1941.

But of these,

Marseille received only $313 while the Sopade retained $587 and the SAP
and ISK refugees received $50 each.

92

Disregarding the expenses for

the sixteen splinter group socialists on the JLC list, the evacuation
of the GLD refugees cost about $20,000.

That was much less than the

amount claimed by Katz.
In his German postwar memoir, he gave the total JLC figures a
90

rnstitut f~r Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Sammlung Karl Frank,
Varia, 1933-1951, Jewish Labor Committee, list of the German and Austrian evacuees, compiled by Estrin.
91

Jewish Labor Committee, Memorandum to the British Labor
Party and to the Trade Union Congress, July 1941, EK Mappe 196.
92

Heine, Abrechnung, Dollarkonto Einnahmen, spring 1941, EK
Mappe 51; Curt Geyer to Stampfer, 20 March 1941, Nachlass Stampfer,
section II, group 17, Nr. 38; and Heine to London, 23 March 1941, EK
Mappe 51.
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German context and created the impression that his number of a hundred
sixty families or about eight hundred refugees evacuated in 1940 and
1941 were all German.

Besides, they are described as the families of

"well known democratic personalities" rather than of mostly socialist
refugees.

93

In another instance, Katz claimed that the GLD and the JLC

rescued about a hundred German families at a cost of $100,000, that is
about five times the actual amount.

94

His attempt of presenting the

rescue as a family operation is curious.
in the number of refugees.

It allowed for more tolerance

$1,000 for the transportation cost of one

family is a high amount considering that many married refugees had no
children with them in exile and that many refugees were single.

So far,

the misleading figures of Katz determined the contemporary view of the
GLD rescue work.

Stampfer gave them credence when he claimed that most

German socialist refugees escaped Southern France before the German
occupation in 1942.
As shown above, most of the two hundred forty Social Democrats
and unionists who were listed with the Heine committee were left behind
in France.

The actual number of the refugees was higher than two hun-

dred forty because Heine was "not in direct contact with all of themu.

95

He resisted the pressure of the Sopade for his departure until mid-March.
He had to remind the Sopade of nour many friends in the provinces and in
the camps" and argued that "your appointment of me as your representa93

Katz, Die exilierte deutsche demokratische Linke in den USA,
p. 26, Nachlass Stampfer, section I, group 9, Nr. 444.

.

94Th ~"d ' pp. 29' 30.
95
Heine to Thorsten Nielsson, 30 May 1941; and Heine to London,
30 May 1941, EK Mappe 51.
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tive prohibits the brusque termination of the previous activity".

He

found it "difficult to agree with you that 'all the others can really
help themselves more or less'".

96

To his knowledge, there were still

two hundred six single or married Social Democratic and unionist refugees in Vichy France in early 1941.

97

But he restricted himself to

preparing the visa cases of "fifty or sixty of our most important
friends".
a

98

'~undred

By the time of his departure in mid-March, there were still
fifty-eight union members and Social Democrats with their

. t he unoccup1e
. d zone " •·99
f am1. 1'1es 1n

Significantly, by this time, the

order was reversed to union members and Social Democrats.
Heine's successor, Hirschberg, was even more pessimistic about
further evacuations.

He planned to leave Marseille in early June 1941

since he was convinced that "by then, not the least bit could be any
longer accomplished".

He considered eleven or twelve cases as mandatory

and could not "seriously believe that it would be impossible to find a
solution for [them]".

Actually, seven more single or married Sopade

clients left .in April and May 1941.

There were then still a hundred

fifty married or single Sopade refugees in France, or about four hundred persons including the children.

100

About himself, Hirschberg

96 Heine to Lisbon, 17 January 1941, EK Mappe 51.
97 Heine to Stampfer, 18 March 1941, Nachlass Stampfer, section
II, group 17, Nr. 46.
98Heine to Lisbon, 17 January 1941, EK Mappe 51.
99 Heine to Thorsten Nielsson, 30 May 1941; and Heine to London,
30 May 1941, EK Mappe 51.
100

Ibid.
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remarked sarcastically that he received an American visa "despite all
the efforts of our friends".

101

But he did not manage to escape, pos-

sibly because his wife was pregnant at that time.
Those refugees who could not leave Southern France did not fare
as badly as Hirschberg predicted.

When the French started to surrender

hundreds of refugees in the summer of 1942, he was afraid that "very
few of us will manage to survive the war".

102

pation, he los.t contact with the refugees.
deported to Germany.

After the German occu-

A number of them were

But the majority of them went into hiding and

joined the French resistance.

They re-emerged after the war, among

them fifty-two Social Democrats and unionists in Southern and Central
. t he
F ranee and f ~' f ty ~n

reg~on
0

.
103
o f p ar~s.

The size of the Social Democratic evacuation and the preference
given to one group over another reveal the politics that influenced the
Social Democratic rescue work.

The basic motive behind these politics

was the ambition of the GLD which expressed itself in competition with
the Sopade and in antagonism towards NB.

The GLD was formed as a finan-

cial subsidiary of the Sopade which conferred on it a recognition of
some value in its dealings with the American labor movement and government.

But politically, the GLD wanted to continue the conservative

policy of the previous period.
101
102
103

The refugee crisis of 1940 and 1941

Heine to Freunde (Sopade, London), 18 May 1941, EK Mappe 51.
Hirschberg to Heine, 28 August 1942, EK Mappe 51.

tiste der Mitglieder in der Provinz; Liste der Mitglieder in
der Pariser Region (German socialist emigrants in France after the
liberation], EK Mappe 124.
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offered good opportunities for asserting this political independence.
It nearly caused the demise of the Sopade.

Its leaders lost their

financial accounts in Paris and ended up in the internment camps of
the Vichy government.
evacuation.

After that, they depended on the GLD for their

The GLD took advantage of this situation.

It welcomed,

and contributed to, the geographical split of the Sopade which completed the decline of the SPD executive to a group of three members of
whom only two were elected by the Weimar party.
In this context, the GLD was not keen on evacuating the small
group of Sopade associates about whom the SPD executive was most concerned.

They could only go to the United States since they were not

admitted to England.

The GLD was satisfied that these emigrants would

be isolated ·in America where it ignored them.
clientele among the German labor groups.

The GLD had no preferred

It was not interested in the

unionist refugees either even though as the German Labor Delegation it
claimed to represent the German unions.

This conflict of rescue inter-

ests was intensified by a new difference in ideological outlook between
the GLD and the Sopade.

The GLD planned to continue the policy of the

great coalition with liberal American and emigrant groups.

The Sopade

of Vogel and Ollenhauer rio longer attributed much significance to the
so-called liberal emigration.

They could not understand why the GLD

rescued Center Party emigrants like Werner Thormann while most Social
Democratic refugees were still in Southern France.

In a further step,

the GLD wanted to involve BrUning into its coalition activities by promising to help the Social Democratic friends of the former chancellor:
Braun, Hilferding and Breitscheid.

A marginal Social Democrat like

190
ties to groups which it antagonized politically.

It expected them to

rise above the political intransigence of the GLD which subordinated
its rescue work to its politics.
In the preference for their associates, the concern of the
Sopade for the average Social Democratic or unionist refugee left much
to be desired.

There was talk of

11

active" and

11

passive" party members.

Most of the evacuees on the JLC list belonged to the small circle of
refugees who had been close to the Sopade during the first and second
emigration.

Those beyond this narrow group, Ollenhauer thought, could

help themselves.

Another characteristic of the Social Democratic res-

cue work was the neglect of the unionist refugees unless they were
primarily party officials.
was no unionist

emigrat~on

few individuals.

Nearly all of them were left behind.

There

in the United States to speak of besides a

Until nearly the end of the war, the GLD did not have

to contest its self-assured role of union spokesman.
The unionist refugees were.aware of their situation.

In Janu-

ary 1941, they protested against their nclassification as inferior
party members because we are unionists".

They thought that this had

happened "in the visa affair ... when SAP-ists, NB and ISK people were
preferred to us".

They vowed that ''we will not tolerate it any more".

104

They were not aware of the _fact that the NB, SAP and ISK refugees in
question were clients of the American Friends of German Freedom rather
than of the GLD.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that

the unionist refugees were foremost in opposing a premature departure
104Bruno Suss
..
.
to He1ne,
13 January 19 4 1, EK Mappe 51.
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of Heine.

The union leader Bruno Suss wrote Heine that

disappear like thatrr.

11

you cannot

Suss was corresponding with seventy-six ltADG

people 11 , that is officials of the former General German Trade Union
Federation.

They insisted that Heine appoint a successor before leav-

ing and suggested the formation of a committee of three with one member
for the refugee correspondence in France, a second for the correspondence with the Sopade and the GLD and a third for contacts with the
Marseille refugee committees and with the American consulate.

But these

.
. 105
e ff orts were 1n va1n.
The geographical split of the Sopade was a mysterious affair.
The SPD executive came to no conclusion in its debate on whether to
emigrate to the United States or to England.
they pleased.
country.

Its members then did as

To Vogel, the United States was a remote and strange

He thought that England would play the decisive role in a de-

feat of Germany.

Rinner held the opposite opinion.

But in the crisis

of November 1940, Vogel and Ollenhauer thought that they would have to
join Stampfer and Rinner in New York.

In that situation, the GLD un-

necessarily told them that they would be of no use in the United States.
Fortunately, they still received visas for England.
Sopade came about naturally.
its policy.

The split of the

But the GLD superfluously stated it as

The Sopade complained bitterly about this treatment.

Thereafter, the Sopade leader Geyer smelled'"a light odor of boycott
in the air 11 to which he attributed the ensuing neglect of the Lisbon
106
refugees by the GLD.
lOS Ibid.
106

Geyer to Ollenhauer, 6 February 1941, Mappe 44.
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This confrontation continued with the Thormann affair.
Center Party emigrant was "totally unknown" to Geyer.

107

This

Heine remem-

bered that "Mr. Thormann and his clique attacked us for years in the
Zukunft" during the Weimar Republic and fought the Social Democrats in
the emigration.

He asked the GLD:

11

Why the hell do you bother with

Mr. Thormann? ·Why do you even bend a finger for such people?n

The

Labor Delegation knew that there were "still a hundred families of
people who are close to us 11 on Southern France.

There were friends

"who have devoted thirty to forty years to the movement ... two dozen
and more underground workers who will be shot if they fall into the
hands of the Nazis".

108

In further pursuit of its policy of

11

the Great Coalition", the

GLD tried to involve Bruning in its activities by exploiting his interest in the evacuation of Hilferding and Braun.

The GLD was slow in

giving Bruning information about Hilferding and Breitscheid, the two
inseparable Rudolf's.

But Katz "abused the two conversations which I

had with him", according to

.. .

Brun~ng.

109

. ••
Sollmann told Bruning more

bluntly that ni can't imagine what all these people want to do here".
He thought that Hilferding and Breitscheid would adjust badly to the
United States and assumed that Hilferding did not speak English, some107 Ibid.
108
109

Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, II, EK Mappe 51.

Jane Addams Peace Collection, Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania, William Sollmann Papers, Heinrich Bruning to Wilhelm Sollmann,
4 February 1941.
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thing that Sollmann had learned only during the emigratLon.
The case of Otto Braun, the former prime minister of Prussia,
held more promise for the politics of the GLD.

Brt7ning "wished nothing

more" than to have Braun in the United States "even if it was only for
his safety".

But he intended to go further.

He hoped that together

with Sollmann, Braun would become "a representative figure for the former Social Democrats in this country".

In that case, Bruning was "quite

willing to discuss the possibility of a collaboration between the two
11

·

,

,

groups , that is, between the GLD and the Center Party emLgratLon.
Katz was eager to go along with Bruning.
figure in this plan, had other ideas.
could "help a lot here".

111

But Sollmann, a principal

He could not imagine that Braun

He objected that Braun was too old, that his

health had always been unstable, and that he did not speak a word of
. h , 112
Eng 1LS

Sollmann had more conservative plans.

He did not want to share

his access to Bruning with other Social Democrats.

He thought that Otto

Strasser was a better candidate for an exile triumvirate.

He had vi-

sions of a Volkssozialismus (ethnic socialism) as a blend of christian
socialism, catholicism and nationalism.

Strasser might fit into this

scheme as one of the founders of the National Socialist Party who had
110
Nachlass Heinrich BrUning, in care of Claire Nix, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, Sollmann to BrUning, 5 October 1940. This paper uses
copies of the documents from this collection which Dr. Thomas A. Knapp
was allowed to make on the basis of a private arrangement with Claire
Nix.
111
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BrunLng
to Sol 1mann, 4 February 1 94 1, So 11mann Papers.
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sollmann to Bruning, 3 August 1941, Nachlass Bruning.
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broken away from Hitler and founded the Schwarze Front (Black Front) as
a fascist opposition to Hitler.

Sollmann was interested in the activi-

ties and projects of Strasser in the emigration: the Freie Deutschland
Bewegung (Free Germany Movement) and an exile government in the form of
a Nationalrat (National Council) in which BrUning and Sollmann were
expected to participate.
Iffor d emocracy

. th

w~

. de
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Sollmann presented Strasser as an advocate
. d t he
. 1 ~mp
. 1.~ca t.~ons I I• 113 He emp h as~ze

soc~a

Catholic views of Strasser "whose social ideas are closely related to
those of the pope".

He also minimized the antisemitism of

Strasser

who proposed full citizenship for German Jews under certain conditions
at a time when they were persecuted by the German government.

Sollmann

conceded that he disagreed with Strasser "on the Jewish question11 but
he thought that "from every Jewish standpoint ... it could only be useful to rescue Strasser11 •

He advised Strasser's agent in the United

States to convince influential Jewish circles such as the Jewish Labor.
.
t h at
Comm~ttee

s trasser

was not

.

. .

ant~sem~t~c.
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Personally, he thought

that Strasser "may still go far in his political development and we are
unable today to predict which alliances the future will force on us".ll

6

In this state of mind, Sollmann used all his pe'rsuasion to enlist the
full aid of BrUning for Strasser,

Bruning was not optimistic but he

complied with the wishes of Sollmann.

Eventually, Strasser was admit-

113 rnstitut fi.ir Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Otto Strasser Papers,
vol. 5, Sollmann to Kurt Singer, 5 October 1940.
114 sollmann to Singer, 5 October 1940, Strasser Papers, vol. 16.
ll 5 Ibid.
116 sollmann toWels, 31 December 1935, EK Mappe 122.
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ted to Canada but not to the United States.

117

In a further step, Sollmann tried to get Bruning to sponsor
five members of the Black Front in Marseille.

He said "I rack my brain

about how I could help them" and resented the fact that "the emigration
of the Left refuses to have anything to do with them".
consolate about Bruning's refusal.

118

He was dis-

He asked for confirmation of

Bruning's explanation that one of the five refugees was "an evil character" who had bee:t;J. a double agent for the Czech military police and
for the Gestapo and had tried to hand Strasser over to the Gestapo.
Members of the Black Front were so hard to come by in the emigration
that Sollmann could not easily let go of these prospects.

119

The relationship of the GLD with the Emergency Rescue Committee
exemplifies its politics of rescue towards the German socialist splinter groups.

The ERC and the CAS wished nothing more than cooperation

with the Social Democratic committees.

In Marseille and Lisbon, such

a positive relationship materialized.

In the fall of 1940, Heine asked

Fry to take over the affairs of the four groups for whom Bohn had been
responsible including the German Social Democrats.

He joined the CAS

117

Briining to So11mann, 29 August 1940; and Bruning to So11mann,
20 September 1940, Sollmann Papers. See also: Sollmann to BrUning
5 October 1940; and Sollmann to Bruning, 10 October 1940, Nachlass
Bruning; and George N. Shuster, recommendation, 23 January 1941,
Strasser Papers, vol. 5.
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as honorary political consultant and participated in its twice daily
meetings.

120

The CAS had case files of many Heine clients and inter-

vened for them with the French authorities and the consulates.
corresponded with them and paid support to some of them.

It

An ISK emi-

grant, who represented the ERC in Lisbon, included all Social Democratic refugees there in the assistance·program of the ERC.

The latter

went especially out of its way for Hilferding and Breitscheid whom it
offered various escape arrangements.

121

conducted his affairs without the CAS.
operations with the closure of the CAS.

Hirschberg also could not have
He expected to terminate his
Heine and Hirschberg expected

an equally close cooperation at the other side of the Atlantic Ocean
between the GLD and the ERC.
This put Katz into a dilemma which he tried to solve in his
usual uncanny way.

First, he had to justify the demands which he made

on the ERC without giving away too much of the political background.
For this purpose, he described the ERC as a politically neutral hourgeois organization as though bourgeois organizations were politically
neutral, especially when it came to socialists.

Then, he had to ex-

plain to Heine why the ERC did not deliver, without taking the blame
himself.

Instead, he put it on Frank.

dieted himself.

But in this process, he contra-

If Frank played such a dominant role in the ERC the

120

Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, I; and Heine to New York,
[n.d.], EK Mappe 51.
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Fry, Surrender on demand, pp. 18, 93, 167, 189. See also:
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uber die Sitzung des Parteivorstandes der Sopade, 21 May 1935, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Federal Republic of Germany.
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latter could not have been an unpolitical committee.

In his dealings

with the ERC, Katz did not bother with such subtleties.
ber of the ERC as the representative of the GLD.

He was a mem-

But instead of con-

tributing his share of funds and efforts to a cooperative venture he
tried to extort from the ERC the deal of the abovementioned Fahrkartenteilungsabkommen (ticket sharing ageeement).

This kind of boldness was

out of tune with the fact that the GLD would have had "serious financial problems"without substantial help from the ERC.

122

To Heine, Katz did not admit the political background of his
relationship with the ERC.

He told him that "over there you have ap-

parently not quite grasped the context.
partisan foundation."

123

The ERC ... is a private non-

He claimed that the GLD cooperated "friendly'

with the ERC since the latter had "far-reaching connections and extensive means".

124

In so doing, Katz played skillfully on a typically

socialist misconception of Heine.

The latter agreed with Katz that

the rescue of refugees was the responsibility of "the big American
relief organizations".

He did not want to see "the financial means of

the labor movement applied to relief tasks which •.. ought to be met by
• or o th er pr1vate
•
•
•
II 125
b ourgeo1s
we lf are organ1zat1ons
.

Without realiz-

ing it too well, Katz contradicted himself in his above description of
the ERC by adding in parentheses that Mrs. Paul Hagen, that is Anna
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Katz to Stampfer, 21 September 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit
dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 105, p. 471.
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Ibid.
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125 Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, II, EK Mappe 51.
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Frank-Caples of the AFGF, was the second secretary of the ERC and
Frank, himself, "one of the most active associates there".

126

Later,

he admitted that the GLD was "on very bad terms with the ERC whose
office is dominated by Hagen and his people".

He rationalized for

Geyer that the ERC was "supposed to be a non-partisan, American office.
(But] we realize that this committee grossly disfavors our people".

127

Heine reacted equivocally to the problem of the relationship
between the GLD and the ERC.

He was confused but he was not completely

ignorant since Katz had found it necessary to set the views of the
Sopade leader about the American context straight.
confidential terms with Fry.

Also, Heine was on

Without being fully aware of the politi-

cal implications of the problem, he thought that both the ERC and the
GLD should improve their

way~.

In the fall of 1940, he made an ill-.

advised attempt at settling the issue directly with the ERC.

He com-

plained that the ERC had given to the members of the SAP, NB and the
Richter [Buttinger] group assistance of three to five times their
contributions as though he knew what these contributions were.

He urged

the CAS to ask the ERC to "reclaim the money ... from these three organizations".

The CAS sent "at least four or five telegrams of this

tendency to the central office" in New York, suggesting that the ERC
stop further payments to these groups until reimbursement.

It seemed·

to him that Frank and the NB emigrant Heinrich Ehrmann tried to seize
control of the ERC.

The latter responded with a cable which stated

126Katz to Stampfer, 21 September 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit
dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 105.
127 Geyer to Sopade, 16 April 1941, quoting Katz, EK Mappe 44 .
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that "the SAP, NB and Richter help us more than any other group".
Heine noted with resignation that "it will hardly be possible to
effect a stop of aid from here".

128

Even though he came to know something about the nature of the
ERC and about "its practice and guidelines" his feelings about the ERC
remained ambivalent.

He knew that Fry was "instructed to take care of

the members of those groups who gave him their mandate in America:
primarily the SAP, the Richter group, NB, Neuer Weg, and the ISK, as
well as all the people in whom the International Refugee Association
takes an interest".

But he could not properly understand this situa-

tidn and was frustrated about its results.

It meant that "our friends

had a priori no chance" of being accepted onto the visa list of the

CA.s. 129 He resented the fact that "in the ERC,there are only Miles
people" and that Frank "reigned exclusively".

130

This did not keep Heine from charging Katz with ineffectiveness
in the dealings with the ERC.

He knew that sometimes the latter had to

contact the CAS for information about Social Democratic refugees which
Katz had fully at his disposal.

131

He urged Katz to emphasize that "we

are not only the beneficiaries but also the benefactors [of the CAS]
and that I contribute,more than a number of employees (of the CAS]".
128Heine to New York, [fall of 1940], EK Mappe 51.
129 Heine to New York, 6 February 1941, I, EK Mappe 51.
130
Heine to London, 15 May 1941, EK Mappe 51.
131Hirschberg to Katz, 8 April 1941, EK Mappe 51.
132

Heine to New York, [n.d.], EK Mappe 51.
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Hirschberg asked Katz to point out that the SPD committee had not been
"ungenerous" and that it had cared for members of the smaller socialist
groups and especially for refugees who stood in between those groups.
He thought that "these efforts could increase the confidence [of the
ERG] in us which could only be beneficial".

In that case, there might

"arise an atmosphere there [in New York] which uproots the worst abuses
of group egoism".

He also suggested that Katz submit to the ERC a list

of GLD clients with the necessary data.
The charge of ineffectiveness was substantiated by more neutral
observers.

According to the SAP emigrant who represented the ERC in

Lisbon, the latter did not take up a refugee case on its own initiative.
It waited until a sponsor group provided the affidavits before it approached the question of the passage money.

133

An ISK emigrant in the

ERC in New York complained to Heine that "unfortunately, Katz does
nothing in the provision of affidavits.
anything in this respect.
lot if they tried harder."

He claims they could not do

It seems to me, though, that they could do a
Also, if not all the Social Democratic

refugees in Lisbon were included in the ERC assistance program, "the
fault lay with Katz who was not effective in New York". 134

With regard

to the position of Frank in the ERC, the same ISK emigrant explained to
Heine that the NB leader was "inseparable from the work of the committee.

Besides, he has really performed extraordinarily and not only for
133

rheodora Benedite to Max Diamant, 10 November 1941, Max
Diamant Correspondence, vol. 2.
134

·
(
d e, Lon d on ) , 18 May . 1 94 1, quoting
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Lewinsky, EK Mappe 51.
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his own people."

135

This information should have further clarified the

conception of Heine of the problems in New York.
At the end of the last rescue period, he heard more about the
contradictory approach of Katz.

The latter more openly conceded his

knowledge of the connection between the ERC and the NB organization.
He explained that "we have assumed a negative inheritance here with the
Hagen complex.

We are convinced that we will have to conduct many

uncompromising fights against this adventurer".

But the GLD wanted to

postpone "the great confrontation which is inevitable".

It did so

"mainly because of the consideration for those who are still in France
and Portugal".

It still hoped "to get a few tickets and some assis-

tance out of [the ERC]".
. 1 approac h • 136
1.11 og1ca

Katz still had the same illusions about his
But Heine should have understood a little

better why the ERC did not comply with the wishes of the GLD.
In general, the rescue period was a frustrating episode in the
history of the German socialist emigration in the United States.

In

Europe, the refugee crisis became a time of rapprochement between the
various socialist emigrant groups.

In the United States, this oppor-

tunity was lost mainly because of the attitude of the GLD.

Its basic

political approach required a continuation of the old intra-socialist
antagonisms.

Under this condition, it tried to square the circle by

conducting its rescue work separate from, and parallel to, its political
135
136

Ibid.
Geyer to Sopade,l6 April 1941, quoting Katz, EK Mappe 44.
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aspirations.

This senseless strategy was bound to fail.

not claim credit for the rescue work of the JLC.

The GLD can-

The latter made its

contribution despite of the GLD rather than because of it.

In the end,

the rescue period intensified the antagonisms between the German social137
ist emigrant groups in the United States.
137
About the Emergency Rescue Connnittee, see also John M.
Spalek and Joseph Strelka, eds. Deutsche Exilliteratur seit 1933,
Band I: Kalifornien, Teil 1 (Munchen: Francke Verlag, 1976),
pp. 214-219: Wolfgang Elfe, "Das Emergency Rescue Connni ttee". This
article reluctantly mentions the possibility that the ERC was mainly
sponsored by NB and its ideological friends. This ambiguity is curious
since all the evidence of this dissertation on the German socialist
emigration in the United States was made available to the editors of
Deutsche Exilliteratur and to Elfe upon request after conversations
with them in the spring of 1972 in Chicago. The article by Elfe also
fails to politically identify the International Relief Association (IRA).
The latter was also a socialist connnittee of an ideological orientation to the left of the ERC.

CHAPTER VI
THE GLD AS AN AMERICAN COMMITTEE:

ITS AMERICAN POLITICS

IN INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOPADE
The decline of the Sopade inspired the search for GLD independence.

With the internment of most of its executives, the Sopade

ceased to exist for a while after the German attack on France.
the French defeat, it had to leave the continent.

After

For this operation

and for the rescue of the Social Democratic and unionist emigrants, it
had to depend on the GLD.

Thus, the latter gained the upper hand in

its dealings with the exile executive and maintained an independent
position from then on.

This importance which the GLD assumed after the

Fall of France energized some of its members in the way that "the signal for the attack affects an old battle horse". 1

The Gld held a

meeting on 12 December 1940 about its future activities.

It made plans

for radio propaganda from England to the continent, for an emigrant
coalition in the line of .the Great Coalition and for the Social Democratic equivalent of an ehtnic Popular Front.

The emigrant coalition

was called tne· Association of Free Germans (AFG), the ethnic coalition
the German American Congress for Democracy (GACD) which tried to replace the DAKV.
1

Anna Geyer to Sopade, 17 February 1941, EK Mappe 44.
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With the AFG, the GLD tried to occupy the international emigrant limelight.
politics.

With the GACD, it hoped to intervene in American

Seger, especially, expected the rise of a majority labor

party in the United States as the revival of a crossbreed between soctalism and progressivism.

In this context, he hoped for a progressive

union movement which would result from a unification of the AFL and the
CIO.

He also saw signs of a cooperative movement in America comparable

to the Social Democratic equivalent of Weimar Germany.

In this scheme

of things, a German American progressive front could play a role.

The

plan for radio propaganda from England ignored the Sopade in its own
country of exile.

It symptomized the new attitude of the GLD towards

a nearly insignificant Sopade.
The GLD had tried to contribute to this state of affairs with
its rescue policy.

It had unnecessarily shown its eagerness to keep

the Sopade away from New York and to split it geographically.

These

developments resulted naturally from disunity within the Sopade.

In

trying to force them, the GLD had betrayed its political intentions.
Two o f t h e

2

.

act~ve

sopa d e

memb ers,

s tamp f er

2
an d Ri nner, went to t h e

Empfehlung fur Erich Rinner, 9 March 1941, EK Mappe 102. With
a doctorate in economics, Rinner had been scientific consultant to the
office of the Social Democratic Reichstagsfraktion from 1927 to 1933.
He was also personal secretary to Hilferding while the latter was
finance minister. He specialized in national and communal budgetary
and tax policies. In 1933, he became a member of the SPD executive
and then of the exile executive. After his detachment from the GLD,
he worked on a government research project about German economic development after 1933. Then, he was employed by the Office of War Information. In 1945, he became financial consultant of a Wall Street firm
and stayed in the United States.
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United States where four dissident Sopade members already resided.
other four active executives eventually went to England.
soon dropped out because of ideological differences.

The

One of them

Heine had been

co-opted during the early emigration so that Vogel and Ollenhauer were
the only two elected members of the rump Sopade in London.

In the

debate over its next destination, Rinner had insisted that the Sopade
could do better in the United States.

He believed that America would,

before long, join the anti-Hitler coalition and would become the predominant ally because of its inexhaustible economic and technological
resources.

He also anticipated the future world role of the United

States and expected Americans to look upon European affairs in an objective way.

American nationalism would play a small role in an even-

tual peace settlement since Americans had ethnic ties with all European
countries including Germany.

American participation would guarantee an

equitable and constructive postwar settlement unlike the Versailles
treaty which England did not have the strength to resist. 3
Despite these good arguments in favor of a move to America,
Vogel and Ollenhauer decided to go to London.

Unlike the United States,

England had a strong socialist labor movement whose leaders they knew.
Vogel's conception of the Second World War was European.

He considered

Britain as the major ally of any anti-Hitler coalition even if the
United States should eventually join it.

He remembered the belated

American entry into the First World War which was followed by a relapse
into isolationism.
3

He did not understand very well the complexities of

Rinner to Sopade, 22 March 1942, EK Mappe 102.
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American political attitudes and confessed that America was strange to
him.

He preferred the English closeness to the continent and counted

on the historical tradition of English European interests which would
also be influenced by the familiar internationalism of the British
Labor Party.

4 Actually, the British labor movement proved more nation-

alistic than Vogel had expected.

Nevertheless, Rinner later conceded

that the decision of going to England had been correct.

He became dis-

illusione4 with an increasing American susceptibility to demands for a
Carthaginian solution to the German problem. 5
In the late fall of 1940, it seemed that Vogel and Ollenhauer
would not be admitted to England.

Geyer had preceded them to Lisbon.

A delay in his immigration procedures gave rise to fears that later
proved unfounded.

In this uncertainty, they telegraphed Stampfer and

Rinner in care of Katz.

They were ready to reconsider their earlier

decision even if the visa situation improved because of possible political discrimination in England.

Without referring the telegram to its

addressees, the GLD decided to tell the Sopade leaders that they had no
possibilities for political work in the United States, at a time when
it developed its grand political design.

It took the position that the

party executives should be as close to Europe as possible.

It also

told the executives that, in all fairness to other needy refugees, it
should no longer hold on to the blanco visas which it had reserved for

4

ollenhauer to Reinhold, 30 March 1941, EK Mappe 80; also: 01lenhauer to Heine, 29 March 1941, EK Mappe 80; Vogel to Stampfer, 5-December 1940; Matthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland,
PP· 475-477.
.

5

Rinner to Sopade, 8 December 1945, EK Mappe 102.
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them as a matter of politeness.

Privately, the GLD members prided them-

selves about having forced the hand of the Sopade leaders.

Especially

Grzesinsky seemed to be convinced that "he had decisively shaped the
history of the next hundred years with this telegram".

The executives

assumed that this response expressed the opinion of Stampfer and Rinner
so that the decision for England would have been unanimous.

When ·in-

formed of the actual circumstances, they considered the telegram from
Katz "as a direct message of unwelcome" which was added to his failure
of communicating with them during their uncertain stay in Lisbon.

With

one exception, he had left their numerous letters, reports and telegrams from Lisbon unanswered.
still
alln.

11

By the beginning of December, there was

a fifty to fifty probability that we have to go to America after
The executives decided to take "the next best ship to the USArr

if they were not admitted into England by the end of December.

6

British Labor Party finally relieved them of their predicament.

The
But

the tone was set for the future relations between the executive and the
GLD.

Vogel reprimanded the latter severely for what he called, in a

reference to Bismarck, another "Ems Dispatchn.
_The next half year.of GLD - Sopade relations confirmed the previous trend.

The exile executive in London could not supervise or in-

fluence the GLD by its two active executives in New York.

Stampfer

soon repudiated the Sopade in favor of the GLD of which he could not,
otherwise, have become a member.

In the case of the ''Ems Dispatch11 , he

6
vogel to Katz, 25 November 1940, Matthias and Link, Mit dem
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 106, p. 474; also: Vogel to Wilhelm
Hagner, 29 March 1941, EK Mappe 139.
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resented what he called the awkward, bureaucratic tone of the Sopade
letter which he considered
that it was

11

11

absolutely nonsensicaln.

7

He told Rinner

completely out of the question that we operate within the

GLD as representatives of the party executive.
to be ridiculed for such a Don Quixotery".

He [Stampfer] refused

To Rinner's question

"whether he would silently stand by while the party executive was being
pushed against the wall by the GLD", he answered that there was nothing
left of the Sopade that could be pushed against any wall.

He told the

Sopade that "to cooperate permanently with Rinner as an organized part
of our committee is technically impossible".
Rinner faced an impossible task.
GLD its duties towards the Sopade.

8

He tried to impress upon the

He rebuked the American committee

for pretending to represent the Weimar labor movement directly rather
than the exile party executive.
11

9

He attempted repeatedly to clarify

the basic question of the relationship between the Sopade and the

GLD".

He insisted that the issues of a coalition committee and of

radio propaganda from England could only be approached in
with the Sopade.

cooperat~on

The latter had discussed the feasibility of radio

propaganda with the International Secretary of the Labor Party after the
German invasion of France.

But both projects were impractical while the

English government hesitated to define its war aims and was reluctant to
7

Rinner to Sopade, 16 December 1940, EK Mappe 102.

8

Stampfer to Sopade, January 1941, Matthias and Link, Mit dem
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 108, p. 478.
9

Rinner to Sopade, 16 December 1940, EK Mappe 102.
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. h any em1grants.
.
10
deal w1t
functions.

Rinner conceded to the GLD only auxiliary

It should,for the present, take advantage of the unlimited

availability of information in the most important news center of the
world and keep the Social Democratic emigrants elsewhere up to date.
For the future, it should deliberate about a program for Germany and
Europe after the war, in close contact with the Sopade.
~ontribute

The GLD should

materially and ideally, that is with financial support and

political loyalty, to "a purpose oriented cooperation and a useful division of labor within the party executive".
The GLD members unanimously rejected Rinner's appeals.

Auf-

hauser proposed even that the remaining three executives in London stop
calling themselves a party executive and act, instead, as a Social Democratic Auslandszentrale (exile center).

The GLD felt relieved of a

further obligation to communicate with the Sopade.

That was,in its

opinion, the function of Rinner, who was, nevertheless, excluded from
the main deliberations of the GLD.
at their discretion.

He was only a guest to be invited

Katz at first reimbursed Rinner for small Sopade

expenses if they were conscientiously listed, down to the last postage
item.

Special permission was 'necessary for telegrams.

Then Rinner was

to conduct his correspondence through the office of Katz who finally
told him that nin principlerr, the GLD was not liable to assume any
Sopade expenses.

11

The GLD rejected unanimously its original purpose as

10

vogel to Rinner, 10 March 1941, EK Mappe 139; also: Vogel to
Stampfer, 10 March 1941, Matthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutsc~
land, Nr. 111, p. 488; Ollenhauer to Emil Stahl, 1 August 1941, EK
Mappe 80.
11

Rinner to Sopade, 16 December 1940, EK Mappe 102.
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a fund raising subsidiary of the Sopade.

It gradually neutralized

Rinner who gave up his attempts at mediating between the Sopade and the
GLD in July 1941.

12

Vogel and Ollenhauer had encouraged him to stay on.

They accepted the behavior of the GLD with equanimity and patience
rather than with useless protests.

They were not afraid that the Amer-

ican committee would outperform them since they had settled down to a
more realistic and somewhat pessimistic appraisal of their political
possibilities and those of the Social Democratic emigration in general.
But they considered "the maintenance of a close contact between you
[ Rinner] and us as the only practical possibility of the moment 1r as far
as their American relations were concerned.

They were interested in

that "not all connections are severed between you as our confidant and
the GLD" and wanted "to maintain close contact with our comrades in the
United States 11 , including the numerous Social Democratic emigrants outside the GLD.

In the meantime, they hoped that the aspirations of the

GLD would "eventually return to a sensible level(( . 13

Without fully

understanding the attitude of the GLD, they believed that the difficulties between Rinner and the American committee were of a personal
nature.

Rinner was the special persona non grata of the GLD.

realized correctly that the latter was

11

But he

now by all means bent on estab-

lishing a political position for itself in this country.

It considers

itself the true representative of the party and uses Stampfer to assist
12
13

Rinner to Sopade, 12 July 1941, EK Mappe 102.

ollenhauer to Rinner, 26 January 1941, EK Mappe 79.
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it in this role with his name."

14

In this scheme, the Social Democratic emigrants had no place.
.
15
The GLD dealt with them accordingly.

It coopted only a few late emi-

grants for reasons of prestige like Stampfer and Aufhauser.

It was a

committee of only about ten permanent members that pretended to represent the German labor movement of the Weimar Republic.
subdivided twice more.

Dnportant matters were prepared in an unofficial

subcommittee of less than five members.
monopolized by Katz.

The GLD was

Financial matters were nearly

If the Social Democratic emigrants had any policy

making voice they could have forced the GLD into a different direction.
If ignored completely, they could have started an organization of their
own.

Already in July 1939, the GLD decided that the formation of a

special group of Social.Democratic emigrants was "not recommendableu.
It designated the German branch of the SDF of which Katz. was the secretary as the proper organization for accommodating Social Democratic
emigrants.

They could come to its meetings and discuss its lectures.

But their opinions did not count.

They soon lost interest.

For the personal and legal needs of the refugees, the NVZ held
a weekly Sprechstunde (office hours) which treated them as clients.
the recommendation of the GLD, the NVZ also registered the emigrants.
They were potential subscribers to the NVZ.

15
16

16

Stampfer and a few others

were welcomed at the pier for publicity reasons.
14

On

For the rest, Mrs.

Rinner to Sopade, 25 February 1941, EK Mappe 102.
Robert Grotzsch to Vogel, 27 January 1942, EK Mappe 46.

sitzung der GLD, 14 July 1939, Matthias and Link, Mit dem
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 67, p. 408.
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Rinner often waited alone for hours in the cold of mid-winter for a boat
that might be several hours late.

17

The Sopade received almost unani-

mously negative reports about the GLD.

But Katz disappointed the hopes

of the executives that he would not be completely indifferent to the
reputation of the GLD abroad.

18

A self-help organization could have

used all the available talent for handling and referring special emigrant needs.

The JLC and other American relief committees took care

of the material needs o'f the emigrants of whom many received room and
board in the fraternal Kongresshaus of the JLC.

Others received the

going welfare rate of $7 a week.
The Sopade tried to do its best for the neglected American
comrades.

Several of them had belonged to "the inner circle", that is,

the former Sopade bureau, for whom the GLD had especially little use.
They had been reluctant to go to New York, especially after hearing of
the bad ways of the GLD.

The Sopade executives asked the Rinners to

concern themselves with the refugees.

They asked Mrs. Rinner to "report

about each of them individually, how they are making out", specifically
?lso about the whereabouts "of our other friends".

19

. The Rinners held

weekly get-togethers in their house and kept in contact with as many
emigrants as possible.
17

20

The Sopade also left Rinner with $300 to

Maria Rinner to Sopade, 26 February 1941, EK Mappe 102.

18
vogel to Wilhelm Hagner, 29 March 1941, EK Mappe 139; also:
Grotzsch to Vogel, 27 January 1942, EK Mappe 46; Ollenhauer to Katz,
1 August 1941, EK Mappe 80; Ollenhauer to Reinbold, 30 March 1941,
EK Mappe 80.
19
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Rinner to Sopade, 12 July 1941, EK Mappe 102.
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administer in small sums to needy emigrants while doubting whether it
was nin principle right 11 to support the friends in America with party
funds.

Vogel and Ollenhauer wrote as many personal letters as possible

in order to give the Social Democratic emigrants in America the feeling
of belonging to the party and its emigration.
But the Sopade failed in its attempt of-forming a Social Democratic organization in the United States.
11

At first, it asked Rinner

whether it is not possible and advisable to organize our comrades in

USA in some way ... so that they may feel to continue belonging to the
party 11 •
that

11

They left the idea up to Rinner's judgement but they thought

we could not leave these people completely to themselves 11 •

They

proposed that their former associates,Gustav Ferland Rudolf Leeb,
.
.
.
. 1y. 21
assLst
RLnner
a d minLstratLve

ject.

But the latter balked at this pro-

He was tired of emigrant affairs and did not want to confront

the GLD with it.

A few months later, the Sopade approached Leeb, whom

Friedrich Wilhelm Wagner and Hans Gaspari were to assist.

The three

emigrants planned a fraternal organization of all German Social Democrats but they could not come to terms with each other.

22

They rejec-

ted the Sopade idea of registering the Social Democratic emigrants and
collecting a membership fee.

Rinner made the substitute proposal of

creating "a better, informal bond 11 by improving and distributing the
Sozialistische Mitteilungen of the Sopade for a subscription fee.

His

main objection to the membership fee was that "more than anywhere else,
21
22

ollenhauer to Rinner, 1 August 1941, EK Mappe 80.
Rinner to Sopade, 11 October 1941, EK Mappe 102.
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the emigration in this country consists almost exclusively of officers
of the movement if not of leaders".

It lacked almost completely "the

simple party soldiers",and the officers have "very little understanding
for membership fees".

In the absence of a general Social Democratic

organization, the GLD remained in total control.
The England project was to be the launching event for the political plans of the GLD.

As an emigrant organization, it needed a

significant activity relating to Germany to its credit in order to gain
recognition in the United States, especially from the government.

It

could no longer claim to have any contacts with a German underground
movement whose extent was unknown.
only alternative.

Shortwave radio propaganda was the

But the United States still had its neutrality

legislation so that England, the exile territory of the Sopade, was to
be the base of these GLD operations.

The problem of the latter was

that they depended on outside help for facilities and funds.

But the

relevant agencies could and wanted to conduct this propaganda better
themselves in their own ideological terms rather than those of a suspect emigrant organization.

For these reasons, the GLD did not succeed

in its first objective.
At first, it intended to send two representatives to Canada or
England.

In a less ambitious scheme, Staudinger proposed to send

propaganda records to England for broadcasts from there.

Stampfer and

Katz discussed these plans with Citrine and Schevenels, the two top
officials of the International Federation of Trade Unions, who attended
the annual convention of the AFL in New Orleans in November 1940.

As

an English labor leader, Citrine was to recommend the GLD proposals to

r
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the proper English authorities, that is, the Labor Party, the Trade
Union Congress, the government and the British Broadcasting Corporation.
Instead of a second meeting, there was only a telephone conversation
with Citrine who was not enthusiastic about the plan in view of an
increasing nationalism of the English labor movement, which he probably
shared. 23

The State Department and the English ambassador also refused

to promote the plan.

Vogel and Ollenhauer dissuaded the GLD by reiter-

ating the probable uselessness of the venture.

In the face of GLD

persistence, they welcomed the visit by GLD representatives for internal
reasons, that is for promoting better relations between the two committees through personal discussions.

There was so little coordination

that Ollenhauer stated in August 1941 that
·
a b ou t wh a t ~s

·

go~ng

on th ere an d

1
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have no longer any idea

· th wh a t purposes ;n
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· d" . 24
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In February 1941, the project revived in a luncheon meeting of
Katz and Stampfer with Held and Minkof of the JLC.

According to the

report of the two GLD leaders, Held spontaneously proposed to Stampfer
a trip to London together with other American and emigrant representatives.

The JLC executives offered to pay the expenses and to get AFL

sponsorship from Green.

Held argued that the repeated attempts of the

GLD for some recognition from the American government had only elicited
a non-committal response.

He explained that

to Washington leads through London".

11

the road from New York

The GLD representatives should

try to win in London "some kind of recognition of your activity and
23
24
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16 Decemb er 1940 , EK Mappe 102 .

Ollenhauer to Ferl, 19 August 1941, EK Mappe 80.
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posit·ion here".

Held was sure that out of 10% of it "we would make

100% here in America".

25

He apparently meant that the JLC could then

successfully intervene for the GLD with Washington.

Somewhat incon-

sistently with his own feelings, Stampfer called the proposal by Held
"a romantic idea".
GLD meeting.

It was, however, generally approved by the ensuing

Aufhauser welcomed impatiently this "attempt of the GLD

at becoming politically active" and proposed to benefit from its
impetus by issuing a Social Democratic Correspondence equal to the
Germany Reports of the American Friends of German Freedom and superior
to the Sopade Informations from London.
after the England journey.

This idea was postponed until

Grzesinsky offered "the stupendous plan" of

making the England mission the launching event for "an executive committee", that is, for an .emigrant coalition in the form of a government
in exile of which he was the most impatient advocate.

Stampfer ob-

jected to sharing the benefits of his England trip with Grzesinsky so
that the latter had to wait until the summer of 1941.

26

In June 1941,

the England project of the GLD took the form of a potential visit by
two AFL representatives, possibly Green and treasurer George Meany,
and Stampfer.

This visit would have returned the courtesy of Citrine

and Schevenels who had attended the'last AFL convention.

But the

secretary of the International Department of the Labor Party anticipated "serious difficulties" and telegraphically suggested that Green
25
26

Rinner to Sopade, 25 February 1941, EK Mappe 102.
Rinner to Sopade, 11 March 1941, EK Mappe 102.
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purposeIt o f t h e . Journey.

The English labor leaders wanted to see representatives of both American union federations which did not appeal to the AFL.

They were also

concerned about the direct sponsorship by the AFL of the GLD plans for
their country.

As a result, the AFL leaders stayed at home.

Stampfer left for London on 12 September 1941.

But

The JLC financed his

trip with $1,800.
Stampfer was not as pessimistic about his mission as he had
sometimes pretended.

While waiting in Baltimore for the departure of

the plane, he was "very happy that I am not sitting around as a superfluous man

that I am not a forgotten man . . . . The worst thing in

these times is to be left out".

28

In a memorandum to Clement R.

.Attlee, the leader of the Labor Party and the deputy prime minister,
he laid out a grandoise program that lacked credibility.

He thought

that radio propaganda could "organize the spiritual forces of antiHitler Germany in a common effortH and prepare "revolutionary events 11
there.

According to Stampfer, this propaganda task was the common

responsibility of British, American and German emigrant labor.

He

proceeded to speak in the name of the "American Labor Movement" and of
other American organizations.

He pretended that all '.'the anti-Nazi

organizations of America are planning a vast and well directed propaganda offensive to be carried into Germany".

This "new movement" was

27

Stampfer to Vogel, 10 June 1941, Matthias and Link, Mit dem
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 115, p. 507.
28

Stampfer an seine Frau and Tochter, 12 September 1941,
Matthias and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 119, p. 516.
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supposedly sanctioned by the American government which was still
partially neutral.

Also, for a common appeal to German labor, the AFL

and the CIO would have had to cooperate.

Green contented himself with

participating in an appeal by the English labor movement to the German
people.

Part of the American movement was the growing German American

movement against Nazism.

Stampfer defined it as a combination of the

Social Democratic organizations of the GLD leaving out other emigrant
organizations of which Attlee was, nevertheless, aware.

29

As predicted

by the Sopade, Stampfer accomplished nothing during his four months
stay in England and returned to New York in frustration.

Many of the

British socialists and unionists favored the attitude towards Germany
which was symbolized by Lord Vansittart and came to be called Vansittartism.

As one of the main foreign policy makers in the Foreign

Office before rising to the House of Lords.in 1941, Vansittart believed
that National Socialism thrived on the old traditions of German nationalism and militarism so that it was difficult to distinguish between
the Nazis and a victimized German people.

A minority of German social-

ist and Social Democratic emigrants in England also favored the Vansittart theory and inevitably engaged in ideological disputes with the
other emigrants.

The visit of Stampfer intensified these antagonisms.

He was a right wing Social Democrat who believed in a liberal Germany
which could be revolutionized against Hitler.

The German Vansittartists

discredited the former editor of the Vorwarts with public references to
29

Memorandum Stampfer to Attlee, 20 October 1941, Matthias and
Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 120, pp. 517-519.
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his patriotic and conservative attitudes during the First World War and
the Weimar Republic.

An article in the London Times also took up his

past record and branded him as a nationalist.

Under these circumstances,

Stampfer could not even get to the first base of a labor recommendation
to the English government.

30

Nevertheless, the GLD kept emphasizing the need for psychological warfare.

Participation in the latter was the only way it could

get accepted by the American government.

Shortly after the return of

Stampfer from England, the NVZ proposed the establishment of a longwave
radio station in England which would be exclusively reserved for antiGerman propaganda twenty-four hours a day in order "to attain Hitler
significantly in his own country".

It wanted "a capable American,

German speaking team" sent to England under American supervision.
But the American government was not interested in GLD schemes.

31

Soon

after the American entry into the war, it created the Office of War
Information (OWl) which envisioned emigrant cooperation but more on the
ethnic homefront than in Europe.

The Overseas Branch of the OWl em-

played only individual socialist emigrants.

Their selection caused

bitter recriminations between the two main emigrant groups.
suspected the OWI of preference for NB people.

The GLD

It did not lend itself

30
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to much cooperation with the OWI because the latter intended to involve
other groups which the GLD opposed.

But it could not get the separate

governmental recognition it wanted.

Partly, also, the GLD members were

afraid of becoming identified with American postwar plans that would
compromise them in Germany.

This predicament will be further discussed

later.
Thus, the timing for the formation of an emigrant coalition
was influenced by many factors.
conflicted

~ith

At first, a German exile coalition

American neutrality.

Later, the American government

had plans of its own for emigrant organization.

Also, because of the

jealousy among the GLD members, their plans were not integrated and
did not start simultaneously.

Stampfer pursued the England project and

did not want to share its credit with Grzesinsky who pressed for an
exile coalition.

Seger pushed for an ethnic coalition in accordance

with his ideas about an American political career after the war.

Then,

the period of rescue from the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1941 had
a retarding effect.

Also, several coalition antecedents influenced

the project of the Association for Free Germans.
In July and August 1939, there had been an "information conference" of the German American Popular Front, New Beginning, the SAP, and
the GLD.

The GLD delegate was not Katz because he had several years

before been a candidate for the chairmanship of the German American
Popular Front organization and had sharply attacked its members after
his defeat.

The conference was to nominate an emigrant representation

which was especially important in the event of war.

The GLD proposed

to form a triumvirate as a nucleus for this representation.

It was to
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include Grzesinsky, Seger, and, as a third emigrant acceptable to the
left wing, Aufhauser, Tillich or Hertz.

This rump committee should

complement itself by coopting "with priority, the political Right,
Democrats, Center Party people and Volkspartei (People's Party) members".

But the GLD opposed Rosenfeld as emigrant representative because

of his collaboration with communists.

The other groups rejected this

proposal so that the GLD felt then "free to act independently 11 •

32

The

GLD had already decided to intensify its talks with bourgeois emigrants
like Bruning.

But the latter did not respond.

Apparently, he wanted

to maintain his reserve until the outcome of the war was decided.

The

GLD then wanted to proceed without Bruning but did not make much progress.

33
It participated for a while in the Council for European Peace,

which consisted of two components, an organizing effort by the Social
Democratic Kurt Grossmann and an initiative by some catholic emigrants
under Erwin Kraft.

34

Grossmann discussed his project with his friends

in New York including Seger.

He planned to involve everybody including

such socialists as Rosenfeld, Hertz, Toni Sender, Arthur Rosenberg and
32
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and Tillich.

35

He wanted a representation of "the entire German opposi-

tion or of its largest part" which included not only the party political
but also "the Kultur-political groups" as "art attraction even for the
United States".

36

At the end of December 1939, the Grossmann circle

and the Kraft circle agreed to join their efforts.

37

Their program

called for a federated Europe to which the individual countries would
delegate most of their sovereignty.
not necessarily Russia.

38

It should include England but.

The catholic Kraft was for an inclusion of the

latter, the Social Democrat Grossmann against it.
nimity on the benefits for Germany.
. h se~n
. h e~t
. ( nat~ona
.
1
Re~c

.

un~ty

There was more una-

The Council wanted to save the

) and oppose d

.

. 1 d.~smemb erment. 39

terr~tor~a

It also opposed "a super-Versailles" in the form of "an educational
government" imposed on Germany.

40

The GLD participated in the connnit-

. 35

Sammlung Kurt Grossmann, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Munich,
Komitee fUr einen gerechten Frieden, ein demokratisches Deutschland
und ein foderatives Europa, New York, 1939-1942, Rundbrief, 3 November
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36
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tees of the Council with Brauer and Katz but soon dropped out.

41

The

Council lasted until 1942.
Other Social Democratic efforts were those by Sollmann and
Katz.

Sollmann had refused to join the Council of European Peace be-

cause o f

.

~ts

. ..

compos~t~on.

42

He considered the idea of the United

States of Europe his own and formed the German Council for Liberty and
Federation in December 1940 together with bourgeois emigrants

43

like

Ernst Meyer, a former German diplomat in America, and Gotz Briefs, an
economist who had favored the Center Party and was then a professor at
the Catholic University of America.

Sollmann could not interest

Bruning in the project despite his close relations with the former
chancellor.

In February 1941, during the refugee crisis, Katz tried

again to involve Bruning in his schemes.
the GLD on behalf of Hilferding.
two conversations I had with himtt.

The latter corresponded with

He complained that Katz "misused the
But Bruning was not always as un-

equivocally opposed to participating in emigrant activity as he often
claimed.

44

He had several times expressed his wish of bringing together

the various groups of the German opposition without, however, acting
upon it.

Katz asked him specifically whether he would welcome Otto
41

sitzung der GLD, 10 November 1939, Matthias and Link, Mit dem
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Braun, the former prime minister of Prussia, in America who was relatively safe in Switzerland.

Bruning thought that Braun might, together

with Sollmann, become "a representative figure for the former Social
Democrats in this country".

In that case, he was "quite willing to

discuss the possibility of a collaboration between the two groups",
. 1 Democrat~c
. an d t h e Center p arty
.
b etween t h e Soc~a
t h at ~s,

·

·

45

em~grat~on.

Apparently, he would have liked to engage in emigrant politics with his
choice of associates.

His strenuous efforts for Hilferding are signifi-

cant in this context.

In the case of Braun, he met with the resistance

of Sollmann who questioned "the advisability" of bringing the former
prime minister of Prussia to New York.

46

Under these circumstances,

the GLD had to do without the prestige of Bruning.

In July 1941, it

formed the German American Council for the Liberation of_Germany from
Nazism.

In the fall of 1941, this council was registered with the State

Department as the Association of Free Germans.

47

The AFG stated defensively that it was not a government in
exile.

Such a claim would have been impossible without the participa-

tion of a prominent non-socialist former Weimar politician.
also have brought

c~arges

against· the former office holders that they

wanted their positions back after the war.
45
46

It would

48

As little more than a

BrUning to Sollmann, 4 February 1941, Sollmann Papers.
Sollmann to Bruning, 3 August 1941, Nachlass Bruning.
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Social Democratic committee, the AFG was a pretentious coalition.
There was only one Center Party emigrant in its self-appointed administrative board, first the GLD client Thormann and then Karl Misch, a
former political editor of the Vossische Zeitung in Berlin.

49

The AFG

did not even have .the full support of the GLD, some of whose members
referred to it as "the new club of Grzesinsky".

Stampfer noted criti-

cally in his postwar memoirs that the AFG did not develop a sustained
activity.
In conflict with this background, the Association made claims
and plans that approximated those of an executive group.

In its search

for status, it spoke for the democratic forces of the Weimar Republic
in order to justify a similar claim for the postwar period.
alleled the idea of trusteeship with which
caretaker role for the SPD.

This par-

the Sopade justified its

As a government-like body, the AFG did not

confine its role to the United States.

It intended to

11

organize free

Germans in the United States and in other parts of the world".
hauer considered this ambition as "propaganda".

Ollen-

Otherwise, it would

engender ''tensions since we do not think that such an activity will
further our cause".

50

Another executive idea was the project of

Grzesinsky to organize a volunteer emigrant army.

Somewhat embarassing-

ly, the AFG also made a promise as from one government to another to
"cherish, maintain and extend the institutions of American freedom".
49
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In preparations for postwar negotiations, it planned to ''study and to
draft plans in collaboration with representatives of other nations for
the purpose of reconstructing a free democratic Germany and a peaceful
Europe".
In the absence of government recognition, the AFG hoped to lift
up its status by cooperation with the newly established United Nations,
also, as another detour to American support.

In.the opinion of the

NVZ, the Declaration of the United Nations of January 1942 offered a
basic program for "a promising moral campaign into Germany".

51

For

this, the United States would hopefully take the initiative so that
the AFG and the GLD could participate in the psychological warfare of
the Allies.

A step in the direction of official recognition was to be

an AFG cosignature of the Declaration, something that the State Department had suggested for free movements even if they did not constitute
.
governments ~n

.1 e. 52

ex~

After the signatures by a Danish and an

Estonian committee, the AFG telegraphed Secretary of State Cordell Hull
that the Washington Declaration would not be complete without a German
signature.

But in its opinion, it could only be rendered by emigrants

who were legitimized by their Weimar past.

Emigrant comp.etitors of the

AFG who had not "a priori opposed any totalitarian dictatorship" as well
as socialist dissenters would not be qualified.

The AFG would not

claim to represent the leadership of the second German republic, but it
would be "the voice of the free, non-National Socialist Germany in
America 11 •
51
52

Its foundation and its signature of the UN Declaration were,
Neue Volkszeitung, 10 January 1942.
Ibid.
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therefore, "a political necessity".

Otherwise, those who claimed the

identity between Germany and National Socialism would be correct.

53

But, as an enemy alien committee, the AFG did not have the confidence
of the State Department.
In October 1942, the AFG attempted to strengthen its role by
publishing "a sketch of a second German republic which ... will eliminate the weaknesses that permitted the rise of Hitler 11 •

This was

presented "to the statesmen of the United Nations and to the people of
the Allied countries'r.
11

In its context, the AFG felt it could play

an effective part both during the war and in the period immediately

following it".

Its members were ready "to cooperate with all of the

agencies of the United States government".

This statement was signed

by the twenty-eight members of the AFG,of whom about two thirds were
Social Democrats and the rest Weimar coalition party members of local
importance who were patronized by the Social Democrats.

54

In this sketch "for the free Germany of tomorrow", the AFG
spoke in the name of the second German republic as the representative
of the first.

It vowed that

11

the German people will build a free

Republic 11 after "the complete victory" of the United Nations.

Grzesin-

sky was confident that the German people would back the forces of the
Weimar Republic.

Without having to take into account their defeat,

the latter would root out National Socialism, disarm and demilitarize
53Ib. d
~

54
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Programmatische Richtlinien der AFG, October 1942, Matthias
and Link, Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 135, pp. 567-570; also
Sammlung Glaser, Band I, pp. 42, 43.
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the country and establish an economic democracy that would permanently
deprive rrpan-German militarism and imperialism" of their economic
. 55
b as~s.

The critical social element of postwar Germany would be the
young people whom the old generation would have to reeducate.
sky was sometimes pessimistic about this prospect.
they could

11

Grzesin-

He thought that

not be converted to democracy" after their training in

National Socialist ideology.

This put the fortunes of the second repub-

lie back into the hands of '!their fathers and their mothers who have
known a better Germany (and] will build the new Reich".
tation of the Weimar generation was selfserving.

This rehabili-

Yet, Grzesinsky 1 s own

democratic attitudes were tinged by enlightened authoritarianism which
reflected his former position of police chief of Berlin and Prussia.
He promised that the new "state shall serve the interests of the
peopl~r.

It would "provide for the people ... freedom of speech and

worship and freedom from want and fear 11 •

Grzesinsky complemented the

program with the assurance that future attempts of overthrowing the
democratic form of government would be checked "by adequate agencies
to be established by the government", presumably·police agencies.
This was to be another improvement on the performance of Weimar.

56
But

this program could not validate the claim of the AFG for representing
the democratic forces of the German past and future.
This Social Democratic vision of a second republic would be
55
56
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possible if the Allies learned the lesson of the wrong treatment of
Germany after the First World War.

After their prospective victory and

a total German defeat, they were to apply enlightened benevolence rather than interference in postwar German affairs.

This would be a safe

policy because National Socialism which had brought down the first republic would be over.

This time, the Social Democrats would be correct

in considering communism the real danger to a German republic.

The

latter circumstance would tie the hands of the Western Allies.

Any

dismemberment of Germany would cause "a Bolshevist Revolution 11 that
would spread irresistibly to France, England and the United States.

57

The Social Democratic emigrants of the GLD anticipated a confrontation
between East and West in which Germany would play a crucial role on the
Western side.

They considered East Prussia as an Eastern cultural

front of Western civilization.

Its cession would constitute the open-

ing appeasement of a Soviet Union bent on world conquest.

58

The Social Democrats of the GLD thought that the communist
threat should determine the policy and the strategy of the Western
Allies during the war.

They would have preferred a continuation of

the Hitler-Stalin Pact, and deplored the East-West alliance of the
United Nations.

Under the latter circumstances, Stampfer clatmed that

"the consequence of a Hitler defeat (would be] the victory of world
bolshevism".

It was immaterial "whether Soviet Russia does or does not

fight or whether it fights on this or on that side".
57

58

Ibid.
Neue Volkszeitung, 28 June 1941.

It remained al-
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ways the same and its present democratic stand was only ncamouflage".

59

Seger vowed that "we will continue to consider this war as a war of
democracy against dictatorship regardless of the circumstance that
Russia ... is today on the side of democracy.
in common with the democracies".

Russia has not the least

Katz recommended to the American

government to pursue the second of three possible outcomes of the war
between Germany and Russia.

A total defeat of Russia was probable but

undesirable; the possibility of a Russian victory over Hitler was
nimperceptibly small" so that the United States should opt for rra half
defeat [of Russia] with a stable Eastern front".

60

Seger specified

that the Allies should keep military help to Russia to a minimum so
that this war could end "with the triumph of the democracies and with
the defeat of the principle of totalitarian dictatorship".

Otherwise,

trthe devil Hitler would be replaced with the Beelzebub Stalin".

The

end of the Hitler-Stalin Pact was the occasion to let National Socialist Germany exhaust itself in a defeat of Soviet Russia.

The Social

Democrats could then rebuild the republic without the handicap of
another Versailles.

This was the only working solution to the German

problem so that the GLD and the AFG deserved the exclusive attention of
"the British and American labor movements 1r.
The GLD attitude towards the Soviet Union also influenced its
ethnic politics.

After the conclusion of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, it

hoped to monopolize the ethnic field and take over from the defunct
59

60
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Popular Front.

In June 1940, it formed the German American Congress

for Democracy (GACD) in order to benefit from the activation of public
opinion during that presidential election year.
ethnic Great Coalition.

The GACD was to be an

But its first interest was that of replacing

the Popular Front in access to the secondary labor organizations.

Its

method was that of denouncing the left-wing leaders of the latter.
this context, Stampfer was satisfied over nthe

In

anamorphosis of pseudo-

Social Democrats into communists who take their place next to their
intellectual kin, the Nazisn.

Once properly identified, they stood

out as people as dangerous as their predecessors in the Weimar Republic "which perished because of communist crimes"
Columnists

62

61

They were Fifth

for whose containment the GACD was a "dire necessity".

It

could "help our German American people to success-fully withstand and
repel the onslaught of totalitarian propaganda in this country 11 •

63

What these ncomm.unists, fascists, pacifists, defeatists and other
queers" achieved in Europe they could repeat in the United States.

64

The NVZ thought that rrthe AKStK and the German speaking unions are
naturally deeply interested in all these things 11 like the fight against
Fifth Columnists, that in that respect
61
62

11

they would not leave the least
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doubt about their loyalty to American democracy'r.

65

Sometimes, the NVZ tried to apply pressure on the left-wing
leaders and members by hinting at potential governmental reprisals
for disloyalty.

In an appeal of October 1940 to the secondary labor

organizations, it emphasized that most of them faced "a very uncertain
faterr and advised "political purity: out with the Nazis and connnunists
of our ranks.

An end to the Fifth Columnn.

The NVZ established that

"only he who is ready to defend the bourgeois, the political democracy
of a capitalist country has the right of occupying a function in a
labor organization since it is the capitalist, the bourgeois, the
political democracy which makes our existence possible".

66

Another

criterion was according to the NVZ the attitude towards the ongoing
"war for freedom or ·for servitude".

In a reference to the Hitler-

Stalin Pact, the NVZ identified the opponents of the war with the
opponents of democracy.

It implored the

German American labor organ-

izations to defend their property, their camps and the funds of the
AKStK by showing their true color and by forcing all their false friends
to cast off the mask: "All men on board . . . . Group yourselves around
the NVZ ••. ·• That is the best way of fighting for the defense and the
expansion of democracy."

In 1941, the NVZ defined the convention of

the Federation of Workmen's Choirs in May and June of that year as rta
conference of a political character",and expressed happiness about a
meeting of "the friends of the NVZ among the Workmen's Choirs in the
65
66
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whole country".

Beyond that, the former left-wing Social Democrat,

Toni Sender, addressed the ASB convention in the name of the GACD.
The NVZ invited the conventioneers to a Fruhschoppen (Sunday morning
beer), and distributed leaflets telling them that they belonged "into
the ranks of the GACDu.

67

The latter, however, did not gain much ground in the secondary
labor organizations.

The former followers of the Popular Front did not

go over to the GACD.

They rejected the policy of the Great Coalition

with liberals and conservatives.

Many members of these organizations

preferred a neutralist discretion on the war issue that derived often
from a tradition of socialist pacifism and also saved them from turning
against their country of birth.

The DAKV faction of the AKStK resented

the fact that the Fifth Column issue was used against them.

In Septem-

ber 1940, the New York group of the Nature Friends dropped further
support of the NVZ because of the incitement of "worker against worker",
that ·is, for fomenting Hthe Fifth Column hysteria" and for supporting
the war.

The NVZ disqualified this criticism by countering that nthe

Nature Friends belonged to those German American labor organizations
which are abused by

a small clique of communist party functionaries".

It censured the national convention of the Nature Friends for "whipping
through a resolution against Nazism and fascism [and] leaving out communism as an enemy of freedom...

It skillfully pointed out that the

Nature Friends were in danger of losing their New York camp because of
their communist activities and expected to score points with Nature
67
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Friends members for denouncing this deliberate jeopardy of valuable
labor property.

The NVZ hoped that "the doubtlessly non-communist

majority of the Nature Friends •.. would make their stand [about the
NVZ] clear to the clique

Cof their] leadersrr. 68

With the end of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the GACD faced a new
situation with the resurgence of the Popular Front, which will be discussed in a

sep~rate

chapter.

But it did not like the end of the golden

times during which the communists and the Popular Front had been in
limbo.

It kept refusing to differentiate between National Socialists

and communists and held on to the convenience of putting them both into
the same category of Fifth Columnists.

Even moderates like Siegfried

Marek in Chicago, who had favored the first Popular Front, described
an anticipated second front as an alliance of communist convenience.
With his predilection for abstract formulations that were not always
original, he claimed "the identity of Hitlerism and Stalinism under the
common denominator of ... nihilism".
second Popular Front were justified.

69

The fears of the GACD about a
The latter was an uncomfortable

period for the liberal ethnic coalition.

At the annual convention of

the Workmen's. Choirs of New York state, the delegates considered themselves "as enlightened people [who] could not remain indifferent towards this fight 11 between Russia and Germany.

A resolution expressed

satisfaction with "the heroic resistance of the Russian people and its
Red Armies, also with the honest will to fight of the English people",
68
69
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in this order.
.

restr~cte

d

It considered "their fight our fighter and asked for un-

70
'd to Eng 1an d an d to t h e Sov~et
'
Un~on.
·

a~

Besides the membership of local branches of the secondary labor
organizations, the composition of the GACD is unclear.

Most of its

organizers were GLD-Social Democrats like Brauer, Katz and Seger.

71

It was founded "by about one dozen groups of all circleslf which the NVZ
described generally as conservative, liberal and Social Democratic, in
that order.

72

In early 1941, the delegates to the first national con-

vention of the GACD represented seventy-eight German American organizations with a combined membership of two hundred thousand.

73

These were

probably various locals of a limited number of mostly secondary labor
organizations.

No conservative society was mentioned by name and only

two liberal organizations to justify the claim of a Great Coalition;
the German American Democratic Society or Rolandbund and the Central
European Society.

The latter was founded in July 1939 by the Austrian

Rudolf von Hahn, a former publisher in Berlin who had come to the
United States several years before.

Among other things, it called the

attention of the public to disloyal German Americans.

The former was

founded in 1930 as an antifascist and, according to Seger, as an anticommunist organization.

Its president was Erwin H. Klaus, an immigrant.

In May 1940, it decided to expand, and made Frank Bohn the chairman of

.

70Ib ~'d ' 15 November 1941.
71

72
73

Anna Geyer to Sopade, 17 February 1941, EK Mappe 44.
Neue Volkszeitung, 22 June 1940.
Ibid., 8 March 1941.
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its national organization committee.

This provided a link with the GLD.

Seger negotiated with the Rolandbund in the spring of 1940, before the
formation of the GACD.

He had to save both Klaus and Bohn from the

communists, which was not an unusual undertaking for a Social Democrat.
These two participated in protest organizations against the new alien
legislation which Seger described as front organizations.

The latter

included the DAKV and the Workmen's Choirs., As members of the GACD,
Bohn and Klaus had to be prominently displayed.

Bohn became the c-hair-

man of the GACD and Klaus the vice chairman and national organizer·.
The office of the Democratic Society served also the GACD.

Hahn became

the chairman of the arrangements committee for the first national convention of the GACD.

74

Ironically, Klaus and Hahn, as the leaders of

an organization that combated Fifth

Co~umnism,

were, themselves, sus-

pected of such activities in connection with the abovementioned protest
organizations.

Klaus appeared on a list which the Secretary to the

President referred to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.75

Hahn was arrested and detained with his wife at Ellis Island

for possible deportation.
.

~h

They had apparently overstayed their term

. d States. 76
t h e Unite
The GACD tried hard to win over conservative societies and con-

servative German Americans.
74

Its first membership meeting criticized

Ibid., 9 March 1940; 16 March 1940 and 4 May 1940.

75

watson, Secretary to the President - Federal Bureau of Investigation, State Department, 7 June 1940, National Archives, Washington,
State Department Central Files, Socialism.
76

Ibid., Division of Press Intelligence, an article about Hahn
in the Sunday New York Times, 21 March 1942.
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the Steuben Society for allocating funds to fight British propaganda.
But it could not save that conservative organization from its cooperation with the DAKV.

The GACD addressed itself especially to rrthe

freedom loving and democratically oriented German Americans 11 •
endeavor, it indulged in some contradictions.
German Americans constituted a majority.

In this

It thought that those

It was, in the opinion of the

GACD "an often made and often repeated error, but very definitely an
error 11 to believe that "our entire German American population is infested with an un-American Nazi doctrine 11 •

The number of the disloyal did

"not amount to more than a handful of Americans of German stockrr while
"the huge masses •.• despise and abhor Hitlerism as well as Stalinism'r.77

Yet, the GACD admitted that German America was neutral.

vowed to fight .for its soul.

It

It talked about "that considerable part

of the ideologically wavering German Americans", those 90% of the nearly
seven million German Americans who still hesitated in the middle be.
.
78
t ween f asc1sm
an d ant1' fasc1sm.

In an attempt at their conversion,

the GACD conducted a national rreducational campaign for enlightenment"
which concentrated on exposing the living and working conditions in the
Third Reich.

It made records for radio stations and for "liberal and

progressive 11 local groups about such topics as the daily life of an
average family under the Nazi regime.

It tried to pressure the German

Americans into patriotism by fomenting fears of undemocratic reprisals.
An indifferent German American would be considered a half Nazi.
77

Ibid., press conference of the GACD in New York, 26 February

1941.
78

Anti-

Neue Volkszeitung, 4 June 1941.
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loyalty in radio and in the press.

He would have liked to carry out

his supervising and loyalty testing of German American newspapers as an
OWI official.

But his employment was limited to an appearance with a

Midwestern newspaper chain.

The OWI imposed him as editor on a reluc-

tant owner who sabotaged him as best he could.

In almost daily communi-

cation with Alan Cranston, the head of the Foreign Language Division,
Seger brought the newspaper chain into line with the government view
of the war.

But he did not want to repeat this exhausting experience

and returned to New York.

In December 1941, after the United States

entered the war, the Social Democratic weekly had to issue 'tan urgent
appeal to our readers to remain loyal to the NVZ".
with

11

It was concerned

overtimid readersn who did not want to "burden themselves now

with a German newspaper".

83

The bourgeois German Americans were in-

tractable to Social Democratic berating.
Under these circumstances, the GACD did not become a Great
Coalition.

The wife of the former Sopade member, Geyer, predicted

already in the summer of 1940 that this ethnic coalition did tcnot have
•
•
a c h ance f or b ecom~ng
a b ~g

•

•

organ~zat~on

gradually gathered a limited momentum.

II

. 84

It had a slow start and

The first public meeting took

place in mid-July 1940; the first membership meeting in mid-September
1940 and the first national conference in early March 1941.

85

The

latter could not celebrate an expansion either in the secondary labor
83
84
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rbid., 24 June 1939 and 1 July 1939.
Anna Geyer to Sopade, 17 February 1941, EK Mappe 44.

Neue Volkszeitung, 20 July 1940 and 21 September 1940.
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or the conservative fields even though it took a long time to prepare.
But the conference decided to establish local chapters throughout the
United States.

The GACD would concentrate on the six states that com-

prised 60% of the seven million German Americans:
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Ohio and New Jersey.

New York, Illinois,

~en,

it would deal with

the 13% of German Americans in thirteen other states of secondary concentration before a full expansion into all other states of the Union. 86
This plan was realized halfway with some locals in second stage cities
like Los Angeles and San Francisco.

But except for New York and Chi-

cago, the GACD locals carried on a limited number of activities.

In

many places, the late coming GACD could not dislodge the entrenched
DAKV even during the good times of the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

In Cleveland

specifically, the DAKV local, which comprised the strong leftist factions of the German American labor organizations, hampered the establistment of a GACD loca1.

87

The Congress for Democracy also issued the

Air News which was sent to German radio commentators and to two hundred
daily and weekly newspapers.

88

Thomas Mann became a member of the GACD

but "the half-witted Germans in America who are even less respectaBle
than the Bundists (the American Nazis)" did not join. 89
The American government was critical of such mixed organiza86

German American Congress for Democracy, press conference,
26 February 1941, National Archives, Washington State Department
Central Files, Socialism.
87
88
89

Neue Volkszeitung, 12 July 1941.
Neue Volkszeitung, 23 May 1942 and 6 June 1942.
Ibid., 14 June 1941.
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tions as the GACD.

Hahn and Klaus asked for a message from the presi-

dent to the first national conference.

But a memorandum of the State

Department advised against this request in terms of the general prewar
attitude towards antifascist organizations.

The Department believed

that encouragement should be limited strictly to American organizations
'which represent themselves to be acting as Americans in the furtherance of our national aspirations in contrast to organizations which
either in their title, membership or otherwise imply a combination of
Americanism with some other national affiliation".

It objected thus

to the designation German American Congress which "at once suggests a
division in loyalty whereas the goal to be sought is unqualified unity
as Americans, and Americans only".

The State Department recommended

"a certain reserve in the degree of support extended to such groups".

90

For this reason, it felt.that a message from the president to the GACD,
"presumably to be read at the Conference, would be inappropriate".
Hahn received only a letter from the Secretary to the President who
assured him that the president desired to encourage "any group of
American citizens organized with the objective to promote national
unity in this country as well as the freedom of peoples throughout the
world".

But rrthe heavy pressure of official duties" prevented the

president from preparing a message to the conference.

91

Secretary of

Labor, Frances Perkins, was supposed to address the convention.
90

The

state Department memorandum, 1 March 1941, National Archives,
Washington State Department Central Files, Socialism.
91

rbid., White House, Secretary to the President to Hahn.
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Assistant Attorney General substituted for Attorney General Robert H.
Jackson.

The general attitude of the American government towards emi-

grant and ethnic organizations will be discussed in the chapter on the
second German American Popular Front.

It changed considerably after

the American entrance into the war.
Outside the field of German American politics, the concept of
a Great Coalition did not apply.

In American politics, the GLD-Social

Democrats and especially Seger had visions of an independent labor
party that could rival the Republican and Democratic Parties and equal
the role which the SPD had played in the Weimar Republic.

Seger con-

tributed to this theme in his regular Leitartikel, "The American Scene",
in the NVZ.

A significant GACD could have given him more stature.

But

the organizational tool with which he had to work in the field of Third
Party politics was the German Branch of the Social Democratic Federa- .
tion.

As the watchdog of independent labor politics, the SDF tried to

keep the American Labor Party in line, which was to be the nucleus of
the movement.

The SDF had been a member of the ALP since 1936 and had

agreed to support all ALP candidates in local, state and national
elections under the condition that the ALP remain politically independent of the two major parties.

Seger rejoiced in June 1939 that the

ALP executive committee had decided against election deals and proposed
a campaign "against the reactionary Republican Party and against a
Democratic Party devoid of all political principles". 92

The main com-

mon deviation from this independent line was the support of the Roosevelt administration and the vote for the reelections of the president.
92

Neue Volkszeitung, 24 June 1939 and 1 July 1939.
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A meeting of the nationai executive of the SDF declared in January 1940
that "the progressive, humane and democratic principles of the Roosevelt administration in domestic and foreign policy must be maintained
and expanded".

But in non-presidential elections, the SDF was willing

"to-collaborate on the formation of a third party with non-communist
progressive labor and farmer groups".

A plan was developed for setting

up local progressive groups in industrial centers which would send
delegates to the national convention of the SDF.

93

This strategy would

also keep the ALP in the line of independent labor party politics.

The

SDF was deeply concerned about the defense of the ALP against its communist faction.

It supported the Liberal Labor Committee to safeguard

the ALP against the efforts of the communist Committee to Rebuild the
ALP.

Seger was disappointed when the ALP disintegrated and the SDF

made little progress.

94

In the design of Seger, the role of the American unions was to
be that of supporting an independent labor party in the way the General
German Trade Union Federation used to support the Weimar SPD.

He ad-

mitted that "the American unions have absolutely nothing in common with
even a mildly socialist or Social Democratic economic concept". 95

But

he hoped that they would eventually go for a de-ideologized progressive
party.

In their polarized state with the two national federations of

the AFL and the CIO, they would not meet on this middle ground.
93
94
95

Ibid., 20 January 1940.
Ibid., 2 March 1940 and 30 March 1940.
rbid., 10 February 1940.

Seger
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was therefore very interested in the unification of the CIO and the
AFL and deplored the fact that the latter denounced the former as
communist.

His attitude was not always evenhanded.

liked a CIO without its president John L. Lewis.

He would have

In the discussions

for unification in early 1939, he criticized the plan of Lewis for a
united American Congress of Labor by comparing it to the German communist tactics of the Revolutionare Gewerkschafts-Organisation (Revolutionary Trade Union Organization).

He thought, however, that the

principle of industrial organization which was still anathema to the
AFL should be conceded.

96

With the split of the auto workers from the

CIO, he felt that the latter had not fulfilled ·the hopes of 1936.

But

he remained mildly critical of the AFL and objected to "ultra reactionary and sometimes corrupt leaders of the AFL".

He criticized especially

the opposition by ten members of the AFL executive committee to the
economic policies of the New Dea1.

97

After 1939, Seger was dissatis-

fied with both AFL isolationism and CIO ambivalence towards the HitlerStalin Pact.

98

Even after the formation of the GLD which had opted for

AFL sponsorship, he castigated mainly Lewis rather than the CIO.

He

branded Lewis as the Judas Iscariot of the American labor movement for
supporting Wendel Willkie in the presidential election campaign of
1940.

99

He also held Lewis responsible for undemocratic methods in
96
97
98
99

rbid., 11 March 1939 and 18 March 1939.
rbid., 10 February 1940.
Ibid., 4 May 1940.
Neue Volkszeitung, 2 November 1940.
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the CIO.

But the changes in the American union movement for which

Seger hoped did not take place.

The CIO remained too radical and the

AFL too conservative for the GLD.

The two federations did not unite

until long after the war.
The American cooperative movement had also a place in Seger's
design.

He wrote more than ten articles about it in 1940.

was too small to nourish his hopes.

No incident

The cooperatives acquired nearly

the importance of a panacea and constituted something like extenuating
circumstances for American capitalism.

They became "the basis of a

new world", constituted "practical democracy 11 and were the answer to
the necessary preservation of democracy by promoting economic equality.
Seger celebrated incidents like the opening of the first cooperative
gas station of the United States in Washington D.C. and of the first
cooperative oil refinery in the world in Kansas.

He was impressed with

the Cooperative League of America and with the number of over one
million of cooperatively organized Americans.

For him, the United

States was not only the most capitalistic country in the world, but
also the leader in the cooperative field so that it was already well
advanced on the road to economic democracy.

Seger would have liked to

see the cooperative movement grow to the importance of the Gewerkschaftliche Einkaufsgenossenschaften(GEG, Trade Union Wholesale and
Retail Cooperatives) and its Konsum chain stores in Weimar Germany.
100

100

rbid., 6 April 1940, 13 April 1940, 4 May 1940, 15 June 1940,
13 July 1940, 27 July 1940, 10 August 1940, 7 September 1940, 21 September 1940, 9 November 1940, 30 November 1940, 7 December 1940, 28 December 1940, 18 January 1941.
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This was another unrealistic expectation that failed to materialize.
None of the political initiatives of the GLD during the first
war years carried very far.

They were typical emigrant undertakings.

Based on Weimar precedents, they lacked realism and a sense of American
categories and proportions.

These great designs also fostered another

Social Democratic legacy of the Weimar years, the intolerance towards
other socialist groups, especially towards NB.

The frustration of

these great ideas intensified the antagonism towards the NB organization.

A certain jealousy was justified since the American Friends of

German Freedom did creditable political work which will be discussed
in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VII
THE AMERICAN FRIENDS OF GERMAN FREEDOM AND ITS GERMAN SECTION
AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
The AFGF was a unique organization because of the fusion of its
American and emigrant elements.

This structure was aptly designed to

facilitate its political tasks and avoid the handicap of the enemy
alien stigma.
personal ties.
leader.

The American members were a leadership group with many
The German members considered Frank their indispensable

The American ex-socialists and the German democratic social-

ists were also compatible ideologically.

The former held a rationalism

for which democracy was the manifest destiny of the postwar world of
which Germany was the pivotal case.

The NB emigrants with their scien-

tific socialism liked this sober functional approach.
would escape a second Versailles.

Defeated Germany

A new united democratic socialist

movement could take over the work of reconstruction.

The NB emigrants

considered themselves as the exile part of the avant-garde of this
movement.

Its home section was the underground movement with which NB

claimed to· have ·special ties.

Thus, in all respects, the AFGF was a

homogeneous organization that functioned smoothly throughout the war.
The methods of the AFGF changed with the outbreak of the war
and the American entrance into it.

Before 1939, American public opinion
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had been antifascist rather than anti-German.

The AFGF had only to

rally American support for the German underground which might succeed
in overthrowing the National Socialist regime.

After 1939, and es-

pecially after December 1941, military defeat became the alternative
to a German revolution,and nationalism the corresponding American
attitude.

Against the latter, the AFGF wanted to assert its rational

approach to the German problem.

For this purpose it planned to expand

the organization nationally and emphasize propaganda in the United
States.

Since a second republic within a European federation was also

in the interests of the victim nations of National Socialism and fascism, the AFGF tried to promote its program by international cooperation.

In 1941, it started the International Coordination Council (ICC)

which was to convey on the German emigrants the status of the exile
groups of the victim nations.

This rehabilitative effect was to keep

alive the idea of "the other Germanyn, that is, the democratic Germany,
in American public opinion so that the AFGF could continue its work.
In 1942, when the military tide of the war started to turn,
the AFGF made plans for recontacting underground groups in Germany.
Frank submitted his ambitious formula to the Office of Strategic Services and to the War Department.

This plan wanted to organize the

underground groups into an underground government ready to take over
the reconstruction of the country after the demise of National Socialism.

The Frank initiative derived from the avant-garde theory of NB.

The latter did not share the liberal illusions of the Social Democrats
about potential mass resistance in Germany.
abroad was not a feasible approach.

Radio propaganda from
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All these plans hinged to a large extent on some token of
unity within the German socialist emigration.

The latter was a pre-

condition of them but, under the circumstances, it became one of their
goals.

In the process of executing its plans, the AFGF hoped to rally

or to neutralize the GLD.

The Free World Association supplanted the

ICC as another international committee but one that had a chance of
including the GLD.

The Frank formula for an underground government

also tried to enlist the GLD.

When the OSS failed to support that

plan, the AFGF relied on the War Relief Board of the CIO and the AFL
for financial support of its contact work.

This Board wanted to form

a council of European emigrants with a German section that included NB
and the GLD as well as the Popular Front group.

But the identity of

the GLD was incompatible with the position of a rearguard of a defunct
Weimar Social Democracy.

The Labor Delegation lent itself to no con-

centration with the NB emigrants.

It continued a confrontation with-

out compromise which contributed to the failure of the AFGF plans.
The attitude of various government departments and agencies was especially influenced by a GLD campaign against an alleged domination of
the German section of the Office of War Information by Frank and his
presumed friends.

Thus, the AFGF initiatives of the first half of the

war were unique and well conceived, but failed.

For the second half,

the AFGF concentrated on plans for reconstruction which the second part
of this paper will discuss.
As its name implied; the AFGF was. more
friends than a coalition of political groups.

a committee of political
AFGF personalities were

generally co-leaders of several American groups.

Norman Thomas was

,....-.
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also chairman of the League for Industrial Democracy of which Niebuhr
was vice president and Vladek had been a member of the board of directors.

The executive secretary of the LID, Mary Fox, was also the

secretary of the AFGF while her husband, the former socialist John
Herling, was a member of the executive committee of the AFGF.

Anna

Caples was also connected with both organizations; in the AFGF, she was
the executive secretary.

The former president of the LID, Harry W.

Laidler, was a member of the national committee of the AFGF.
was doubly involved with NB.

Tillich

Some circles of German Christian Social-

ists in Berlin cooperated with NB underground groups there while he was
a close theological and political associate of Niebuhr, one of the
leaders of American Christian Socialism.

Niebuhr, one of the founders

of the Union for Democratic Action, was the chairman of the AFGF.

Other

UDA progressives like James Loeb and Roger Baldwin were also closely
associated with the AFGF.

The latter benefitted from the numerous poli-

tical acquaintances of its direct members.

With this degree of estab-

lishment, it was beyond the reach of the GLD which had to center its
attacks on Frank.
But the AFGF was not the organization of Frank.
elaborate structure.

It had an

It was directed by an executive committee of

twenty-five members to which belonged Held, Fry, Alfred Baker Lewis,
Paul Kellogg, James Loeb, and Zaritsky.

The committee elected the

officers of the organization, among them Frank as research director.
The latter had few constitutional rights even though he was one of the
driving forces of the AFGF.

The executive committee met monthly and

supervised, also, the disbursement of funds.

It appointed a finance
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committee which had to authorize expenditures over $100.
to be double-signed and the financial books
certified public accountant.

w~re

All checks had

audited annually by a

The AFGF also had a national committee of

liberal personalities like Christian Gauss of Princeton University,
Frank Kingdon, Laidler of the LID, Max Lerner of The Nation, David F.
Seiferheld, Tillich, Franz Hollering and others.
the AFGF was small.

The German section of

Frank gave its numbers at twenty emigrants.

They

included,probably, some sympathizers like Marie Juchacz and Emil Kirschman~

also, both of whom had cooperated with NB before the war from

their border station in Mulhouse, Alsace Lorraine.
Frank and Niebuhr had commensurate political ambitions.

The

nee-liberals around Niebuhr hoped to establish a third, progressive
party, possibly towards the end or shortly after the war.

In this way,

they expected to influence postwar reconstruction in a rational way.
In defining the destiny of Germany, the AFGF emphasized the liberal

tradition of Germany from the controversial revolution of 1848 to the
equally controversial revolution of 1918 and the ensuing Weimar Republic.
ment.

The Third Reich was an interruption of German democratic developIts end must serve the continuation of this development.

This

doctrine was necessarily out of tune with the nationalist attitudes of
the Allied countries in their effort of total warfare against the
National Socialist challenge.

But the AFGF wanted to win at least a

few thousand Americans over to its idealist concept.

While Germany fit

into the world plan of the American liberals, the antifascist and
eventually victorious Soviet Union did not.
Cold War attitude towards Russia.

This presaged their later
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The AFGF emphasis of the German liberal tradition abetted the
emigrant concept of "the other Germany" and was to some extent a substitute for it.

The "other Germany" consisted of various elements like

the emigration, the underground movement, the martyrs in the concentration camps,and the unorganized antifascist element of the population.
Frank admitted that even in this combination it was as small as the
National Socialist Germany, so that the majority of the German people
placed themselves somewhere in between.

But it had to do.

Hertz, who

generally considered the judgement of Frank as sober, had "the impression that he overestimates somewhat the degree of opposition and discontent in Germany 11 •

1

Thus, the AFGF had two complementary driving

forces, the ambitions and ideologies of its American and German members.
Before the outbreak of the war, the concept of "the other Germany" was not challenged:

trAnti-Nazi sentiment at that time was in the

main progressive, democratic and anti-totalitarian", not anti-German.
The AFGF intended to be the "transformer to exploit the anti-Nazi
energy ..• and drive the greatest international force to the mill of a
democratic revolution in Germany".

It had, therefore, "a very clear

task" in encouraging and supporting the underground movement in Germany.
It would have liked to implement "far-reaching plans to expand the
work" if both, underground and AFGF, had been stronger.
1
2

2

Paul Hertz to Georg Frey, 14 June 1942, Hachlass Hertz, reel 31.

Plan for action of the American Friends of German Freedom, summer 1940, Frank Papers, Hoover Institute; also ibid.: Paul Hagen,
Frage I: Warum kein Verhandlungsfriede ausser mit einer demokratischen
Vertretung in Deutschland. Frage II: Was unterscheidet die heiden
Deutschland? 17 October 1941, 21 pages.
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After 1939 and especially after December 1941, the American
attitude towards Germany changed and, with it,
AFGF.

the approach of the

The war broke almost all contacts with the underground movement.

In this situation, the AFGF set itself three tasks:
propaganda, and international cooperation.

national expansion,

It wanted to find new

strength among Americans, German Americans, and exiled Germans.

It

wanted to upgrade its contacts outside New York into systematically
working groups of American Friends and eventually into a national organization.

The active support of a· few thousand progressive Americans

was considered as "an extraordinarily important factor against European
fascism today".

It would not be the big transformer of American anti-

Nazism but it would amount to "a protection for democratic and progressive movements in Europe tomorrow".
for a coming democratic revolution".

It would be "the only bridge ...
The AFGF intended also to "reach

important German labor and democratic elements in this country and in
the Western hemisphere, professors, other intellectuals, scientists".
But its plans for cooperation with German exiles and German Americans
only circumscribed the difficulties with the GLD and with the German
American organizations.

The AFGF had no access to groups like the

Worlanen's Benefit Fund.

It considered, nevertheless, "a certain acti-

vity among German Americans".

3

Frank envisioned a potential merger of

the AFGF with the German American Council for Democracy and with the
Loyal Americans of German Descent under George N. Shuster.

These plans

were not feasible.· But the AFGF established some locals as,for example,
3

.

Private statement of policy, 11 June 1941, I: Winning the
war; II: Winning the peace; Frank Papers, Hoover Institute.
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in Pittsburg.
The war made it necessary to "interpret the struggle of the
democratic elements of Germany to the people of this country" so that
anti-German feelings would not interfere with the proper solution of
the German problem.

The AFGF had to publicize its "conviction that

only a German democratic revolution will finally solve the international crisis of our time".

4

It made remarkable efforts in the fields of

publication and documentation.
Inside Germany Reports.

Since May 1940, it issued the monthly

They intended to inform the American public of

the conditions inside Germany and stressed the difficulties and the
declining popular appeal of the National Socialist government.

Frank's

book, ''Will Germany crack?", sununarized the speculation about "the
other Germany".

In order to substitute for the lbss of original re-

ports, the AFGF established an archive for the systematic collection
of secondary

in~ation.

In conjunction with this effort, the Research

and Information Service of the AFGF issued the monthly "In Re: Germany"
under the editorship of the emigrant Henry Ehrmann.

It was a critical

bibliography of books and articles on Germany with some ten subheadings.
The AFGF also arranged seminars, political discussion groups and public
forums.
The critical question was the content of antifascist propaganda.
The discrepancy between AFGF philosophy and American foreign policy
presented a problem.

According to Frank, propaganda had to deal with

"progressive war aims" that described the new world whose construction
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was to follow the war.

For this purpose, he termed the Eight Points of

the Atlantic Charter as insufficient.

They fell below the standards of

the Ten Points of Wilson and represented a compromise that offered
neither a democratic solution of the national question nor contained
even a discussion of the social question.

They reminded Frank of ideas

about a dictated peace and contributed little to the reinforcement of
the democratic revolutionary elements in Germany.

In order to improve

these war aims propagandistically, he proposed a "method of positive
interpretation of the Eight Points" together with demands for Allied
promises of,postwar assistance and the use of representatives of the
defeated nations.

The absence of positive war aims beyond the Eight

Points was a permanent threat to the emigrant ideology of

11

the other

Germany".

Th~JFGF

conceded the weakness of the German democratic forces

but did not accept it as an excuse for any other German solution than
its own.

It realized that "the conscious nucleus" of the potential

democratic forces was a minority almost exclusively found in "the producing layers" of German society.
affairs were somewhat weak.

The explanations for this state of

One of them was the alleged dilemma in

which the opponents of the National Socialist regime were trapped.
They felt called upon to defend the national interests of Germany,
especially in their support of the war.

The AFGF plans also detected

"a passive mass resistance on the homefront'·', which was to be encouraged
by radio propaganda so that millions of slow working Germans would become important allies behind the military front.

Finally, there was

"the so-called layer of the recalcitrant malcontents" who represented
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"

the older generation "in varying degrees of a negation of the Nazi
system".

5

In this situation, the AFGF could not deny that an Allied

military victory was necessary.

But in order to reconcile the latter

with the need for a German revolution, Frank invented the formula of
"the dependent revolution".

Only the Allied armies could defeat the

military might of the Third Reich.

With this outside help, the minor-

ity of democratic forces in Germany could organize for a political
change.

In this scheme. the underground movement could become "an ally

inside Germany".
The formula of Frank hinged a lot on a recurrence of the situation of 1918 when the Allied Armies did not enter Germany.

The mili-

tary developments of the last war years necessitated readjustments of
the AFGF solution for the German problem.

But for the time being,the

principle of "a dependent revolution" avoided the potential pitfalls of
the NVZ prophets of a German revolution.

The NVZ propagandists were

eventually caught in their own rhetoric and could be dismissed on
their own terms.

According to the logic of their propaganda, a German

people that did not revolt against Hitler deserved little postwar consideration.
In the field of international cooperation, the AFGF tried to
make "the closest contacts with ... European democratic elements",
especially with those in the American exile.
5

It intended to cooperate

Paul Hagen, Was underscheidet die beiden Deutschland? 17 October 1941, Frank Papers; also ibid. Radio broadcast, 21 May 1942, a discussion between Alfred Baker Lewis and Paul Hagen about the American
Friends of German Freedom.
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with the national committees of Belgian, Czechoslovakian, Danish,
Dutch, French, Italian, Norwegian and Polish exiles, especially with
those of the respective labor movements.

The idea was to build an

American European Forum and an organization of American Friends of
European Freedom.

In the summer of 1941, the AFGF sponsored the forma-

tion of the International Coordination Council (ICC).
with

E~eanor

In an interview

Roosevelt about the refugee crisis of June 1940, Frank

added that "I also want to talk to you about the setting up of a representative delegation of exiled organizations and movements from the
part of Europe occupied by the Nazis, a kind of European Congress in
exile".

6
The AFGF never emphasized directly the benefits it hoped to

derive from the ICC.

It described the latter always as an organization

that existed for its own sake.

Siegfried Jeremias, a young NB immigrant,

knew that the European exile committees "naturally need us less than we
do them".

But his definition of the ICC covered up this circumstance.

He explained that "the ICC was really conceived by Willy [Muller, i.e.,
Frank] as an organization which would offer to the European refugees ...
a framework for common political activity under the benevolent sponsorship of Americans, similarly to the arrangement of the AFGF".

7

Accord-

ing to its monthly Voice of Freedom, the ICC was "a common enterprise
with a common goal".

It was "an organization of those who must help one

6
Karl Frank to Eleanor Roosevelt, 15 June 1940, Frank Papers,
box 6, Immigration.
7

siegfried Jeremias to Paul Hertz, 23 July 1942, Nachlass
Hertz, reel 32.
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another".

It represented a coalition of various national groups with

"a particular technique" for aiding and coordinating the various underground wars in Europe.

The Allies should recognize these enemies of

Hitler, "however humble, as friends in a cormnon aim".

The ICC and the

corresponding national underground movements had established a Victory
Front against Hitler and anticipated the United Nations as the proper
approach to the Second World War.

Accordingly, the ICC should also be

recognized as a kind of general staff of the European underground war.

8

According to Frank, it was "an early forerunner of the idea of an antifascist United Nations group".

9

Thus, the International Coordination Council had to offer European and American benefits to the government in Washington.

In the

exposition of "the motivating forces behind such a Council"," an ICC
memorandum attractively emphasized the "gigantic ... as yet untapped
reservoirs of national resentment" against German occupation.

It of-

ferred the organization of these forces as one "of the most important
weapons for the ultimate victory".

With the additional influence over

the American foreign language groups, the ICC would have "power in
Europe and influence in the United States".

With this double recommen-

dation, the ICC was to be worthy of governmental consideration.

With

its ethnic extension, it acquired "a healthy character of true Americanism".

The memorandum invited "at least the tacit approval of the
8

voice of Freedom, published by the International Coordination
Council, Volume I, Nr. 3, December 1941, Frank Papers.
9
Answers to accusations by Gunther Reinhardt against Paul Hagen,
Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2; also Ibid., Autobiographical material,
box 6.
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United States government 1r.

It also explained that New York was prefer-

able to London as a center for the international cooperation of exiles.
London was the capital of a belligerent nation.

The Interallied Center

there harbored a number of official exile governments.

But they depen-

ded for their status on the British government and shared in the British
wartime animosity towards all Germans, including Social Democrats and
socialists.

Moreover, like the Polish group, they were not all demo-

. 1"~ne d . 10
y ~nc

. 11
crat~ca

The ultimate purpose of the ICC was a liberal solution of the
European problem.

The

Counci~

was interested in nthe discussion and

clarification of mutual war and peace aims".

Very simply, "the basic

fact of this war ..• in kindergarten terms" was the realization that a
lasting peace could only be found "through the active cooperation of
the submerged and conquered peoples of Europe".

The war years were

"the strategic time for an aggressive effort to revitalize faith in
democracy in all countries".

The ICC anticipated "a world order based

on liberty" from which defeated Germany could not be left out.

11

The

mutual contacts of the ICC members served as "the preparation for the
great cooperative effort of building the new united and democratic
Europe that must emerge from this war".
problem was somewhat futuristic.

12

This solution of the European

The consequences of the war p9stponed

10

Memorandum on an International Coordination Council in the
United States, Frank Papers.
11

12

.
Vo~ce

o f Free d om, Vo 1 . I, Nr. 3 , Decemb er 1941 , Fran k Papers.

Memorandum on an ICC, Frank Papers.
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its viability.

Also, a victorious Russia would not agree to a European

federation from the Atlantic to the borders of the Soviet Union.

The

attempt of graduating "the other Germany" to Allied status by way of
cooperation with the victims of National Socialism was problematical.
Also, the chances for a united postwar German socialist movement were
not very good.

The ICC wanted to

11

reach the creative forces of the

future; it should organize itself from among Americans and Europeans
chosen less according to title and standing than according to capacity
and promise. 11

It should initially at least be

and progressive people 11 • 13

11

limited ... to qualified

This attitude of the ICC was less one of

free choice than of lacking alternative.

The official Social Democrats

of the GLD were not going to cooperate with the unofficial Social
Democrats of NB.

After 1945, the Western Allies relied on the conser-

vative forces of German post-Nazi society.
The composition of the ICC reflected the influence of the AFGF.
'

One of the ICC antecedents was the Emergency Rescue Committ~e which had
also been sponsored mainly by the AFGF.
ERC, was also the chairman of the ICC.

Frank Kingdon, who headed the
The treasurer of the ICC was

David T. Seiferheld who held the same position in the successor of the
AFGF and in the later Council for a Democratic Germany.

Nearly half of

the American Friends of European Freedom were American Friends of
German Freedom.

The European members of the executive committee of the

ICC were often close associates of AFGF leaders.

The ICC included "one

person from England, France, Italy and Germany, and a certain number of
13

Ibid.
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representatives of smaller nations 11 •
with four emigrants:

The German group was the largest

Frank, Carl Zuckmayer, Hans Simons and Ingrid

Warburg, who was actually an American citizen.

The Austrians Buttinger

and Franz Hollering, who had been a leftist editor in Berlin, favored
the German cause in the form of a Grossdeutschland (Greater Germany)
that included Austria.

Of the two British supporters, Isiah Berlin and

John Wheeler-Bennett, the latter was an acquaintance of Frank and NB.
He was in the service of the British Ministry of Information which also
employed some NB members.

14

In 1939, David Astor of the British Minis-

try of Information was to visit the British Ambassador in Washington,
Lord Lothian, in order to discuss the proficiency of British leaflet
propaganda in Germany with a group of American and German antifascists.
Astor sent, however, "a friend of his whom he thought ideally fitted
for the purpose", that is, Frank.

Edward C. Carter, the later vice

. d ent o f t h e ICC , was one o f t h ~s
· group o f

pres~

15
· f asc~sts.
·

ant~

The remaining nationality groups were listed with only one or
two representatives.

Some of them belonged to labor parties who had

supported NB before the war in Europe as, for example, the Norwegian
I

Labor Party, whose parliamentary secretary was a member of the ICC.
In general, these were the labor parties whose delegations to the
Paris Congress of August 1933 constituted the militant minority in the
debate over the response of the Socialist International to the rise of
14
Autobiographical material, Frank Papers, box 6.
15

Edward C. Carter to Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant
to the President, 25 April 1942, Frank Papers, box 6, Immigration.
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National Socialism.

They criticized the German Social Democratic fail-

ure of making a stand against the Nazis.

They were more sensitive about

this because their countries were smaller and more vulnerable to fascist
aggression.

Among the ICC nationality groups were the American Friends

of Czechoslovakia, the American Friends 'of Polish Democracy and the
Mazzini Society.

The Czechoslovakian group and its Czechoslovakian

American Relief Committee had assisted the Emergency Rescue Committee
in its task of evacuation.
The work of the ICC remained limited.
reorganizing European underground contacts.

It did not get far in
It did some domestic prop-

aganda as for example with its Voice of Freedom, which lasted for less
than a year.

That monthly was to give "an authentic record of the

struggle for freedom as it unfolds behind Hitler's lines'r.
formed committees for such tasks as

o~erseas

16

The ICC

radio propaganda and post-

~/

war planning.

The radio committee was its best going, and, eventually,

most controversial concern.

It analyzed German and Axis radio propa-

ganda and devised antifascist responses.

Eventually, it survived the

ICC and became an independent committee, the Shortwave Research Inc.
When the American government entered the war and the business of war
information, it relied on emigrant antecedents like Shortwave Research.
It entered into work contracts with the latter and hired a part of its
staff after its dissolution.
Shortwave Research, as a post-ICC committee, was organized by
the legal assistant of Colonel Donovan, the later director of the Office
16

voice of Freedom, Vol. I, Nr. 1, September 1941, Frank Papers.
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of Strategic Services, who approved of this non-profit organization._
This was done at the suggestion of James P. Warburg, the head of the
Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information.

According to Warburg,

Shortwave Research "enabled the government to try out writers, translators and announcers".

If they were suitable for permanent employment

they were investigated by the Civil Service Commission before hiring.

17

Within the general attacks on the government information agencies,
especially in Congress, Shortwave Research was singled out as a committee of Frank that wasted government funds for leftist purposes.

The

GLD was also instrumental in this, and tried to gain political capital
from distortions of simple facts.

But Frank had no influence in the

shortwave committee after the end of the ICC.
not 'the spirit of Shortwave Research' 11 •

He stated that HI was

It was run by AFGF people:

Marya Blow as president, Bertram F. Willcox as one of two vice presidents, Carter as secretary, and Seiferheld as treasurer.

The committee

was apparently well endowed for the standards of antifascist work.
After its dissolution, it had a surplus of "possibly $35,000" which
probably came from private contributors like the Warburgs.

This fund

was distributed by the board of Shortwave Research among antifascist
organizations like the liberal Italian Justitia e Liberta group in New
York.
$1,500.

The AFGF received, according to Frank's recollection, $1,000 or
18
17

James P. Warburg to David Seiferheld, 7 June 1944, Frank

Papers.
18Answers to accusat~ons
.
.
1 Hagen by Gunther
.•
aga~nst Pau
Reinhardt,
Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2; also ibid., Memorandum on the statements
about Paul Hagen in the Gunther Reinhardt report.
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The cooperation a£ the European nationality groups in the ICC
·was somewhat reluctant.

In the summer of 1942, Jeremias received the

task of unifying them for a common effort.

19

He worked for the CIO

Committee for American and Allied War Relief in New York as its shortwave radio director for broadcasts to Europe in cooperation with the
Office of the Coordinator of Information, one of the predecessors of
the Office of War Information.

By 7 July 1942, the CIO was accorded

fifteen minutes daily by the Coordinator, for labor propaganda to Germany, France and Italy.

Jeremias was also supposed to direct the short-

wave program of the AFL.

The government would have liked to promote a.

rapprochement between the two union federations but Philip Murray, the
chairman of the CIO, told Jeremias that a cooperation between the CIO
and the AFL was not even possible in the field of antifascist work.
The latter had also to familiarize the CIO member unions with this
antifascist work.

He spoke to such union bodies as the executive board

of the United Auto Workers and a plenary staff meeting of the steel.

war k ers un1.on.

20

Frank thought that these CIO connections should benefit the ICC.
Kingdon, the chairman of the ICC was also convinced that cooperation
with the CIO could go much further than-,_pievious ly expected.

He hoped

to develop these relations on his own but the deliberate reserve of
Jeremias taught him the indispensability of the CIO shortwave director~!
19
20

Paul Hagen to Paul Hertz, 5 June 1942, Nachlass Hertz, reel 31.

siegfried Jeremias to Paul Hertz, 13 August 1942, Nachlass
Hertz, reel 32.
21
siegfried Jeremias to Paul Hertz, 23 July 1942, Nachlass
Hertz, reel 32.
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The latter, at first reluctantly and then more enthusiastically, agreed
to the project of Frank.

He wanted to expand his connections and "es-

tablish good and solid relations ... with all union leaders of America,
CIO or AFL" for the benefit of the ICC.

Leading CIO officials suggested

to him, Frank and the ICC to arrange a promotive banquet in which the
most important union leaders from across the country would participate.
Murray was willing to make "a fundamental declaration" about the CIO
concepts of solving postwar problems and about CIO sponsorship of ICC
programs.

Eventually, the ICC formed a special labor group of which

Jeremias became the secretary.

Besides Frank, it consisted of two Nor-

wegian, two Polish, and one Czechoslovakian exile, among them the
representatives of the Polish and
United States.

the Czechoslovakian unions in the

Other exiles abstained for fear of creating the impres-

sion that this tabor group was meant as a rival of the unionist inter.

nat~ona

1 . 22

In the opinion of Jeremias, the ICC had to be solidified and
its new labor group more firmly established before a drive for CIO
sponsorship.
thei~

them".

He realized that the European labor exiles neglected

ties with the ICC because they

'~aturally

need us less than we do

Nevertheless, he considered a better coordination of these

European laborites as "one of our essential tasks".
nator was difficult.

The job of coordi-

Jeremias felt that he was too young and not diplo-

matic or flexible enough for it.

He had already differences of opinion

with Frank who wanted to load the labor group with German socialist ex22

Jeremias to Hertz, (July 1942), Nachlass Hertz, reel 32.
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ponents 1 i k e Wa 1c h er an d Lew~ns
thought that it would be

11

He also was pessimistic and

useless to continue offering our cooperation

to the other groups if they do not really want to cooperate".

On the

other hand, he believed that the presitigious Hertz was capable of edueating them into cooperative allies.

Their reluctance was supposedly

based on lack of political understanding which Hertz would have the
stature to clear up in hours of talks with each individual exile.

They

would have to adhere to the liberal ICC philosophy according to which
the only alternative to involving the German labor movement in the reconstruction of Europe was "the fascist

suppress~on

of Germany".

24

Without a preliminary solidification of the ICC, Jeremias considered
his task of winning CIO sponsorship impossible.

Hertz was invited to

return to. New York from Los Angeles in order to "pull together more
actively and responsively the various national groups and committees
t h at h ave b een

•

cooperat~ng

• h us II 25

w~t

Jeremias thought that the re-

form work of Hertz would take six months after which he would be "personally optimistic about the possibilities of the ICC 11 •

He hoped for

"great political influence within the American labor scene" together
with financial agreements that would keep the ICC afloat for the duration of the war.

23

26

These hopes did not materialize.

Frank discouraged

Frank Kingdon to Paul Hertz, 12 August 1942, Nachlass Hertz,

reel 32.

24
25
26

Kingdon to Hertz, 23 July 1942, Nachlass Hertz, reel 32.
Kingdon to Hertz, 12 August 1942, Nachlass Hertz, reel 32.

Jeremias to Hertz, 27 July 1942, Nachlass Hertz, reel 32.
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Hertz from coming to New York on the basis of a salary guaranty of only
three months which Jeremias considered sufficient.

The ICC was termin-

ated the same year under unclear circumstances.
Frank claimed that the end of the ICC coincided with the appearance of government agencies after December 1941 that absorbed some of
the functions of the ICC.

This would, however, have been the time for

an intensified activity in order to assist these agencies and win some
government recognition.

A better reason for an end to the ICC was the

formation of the United Nations in early 1942.

The European antifascist

groups joined their respective UN delegations.

But, more credibly, the

ICC was "liquidated ... partJy because another International Committee ...
running more on a pro-Russian line at the time, attracted more interest
.

and got more official support".

27

This was the Free World Association,

an emigrant coalition of various national and political participation
in which some militant socialists like Julius Deutsch were instrumental.
The latter was a hero of the fight against the Austrian Heimwehren
(national guard) and of the Spanish Civil War in which he had been a
general of the International Brigades.

He was well acquainted with

Spaniards like Del Vayo who was one of the main organizers of the Association.
But it was not the usual style of Frank to cede to competition.
There was a chance that the Free World Association would realize a concentration of German socialist groups.

It planned the formation of an

International Labor Propaganda Committee under the direction of Deutsch.
27

Answers to accusations against Paul Hagen by GUnther Reinhardt, Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2.
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Del Vayo had repeatedly approached Frank in this context before Deutsch
wanted to discuss directly with the latter "the ... political questions" of such a group in November 1942.
promised their cooperation.

Some German groups had

Deutsch wanted to engage "the three main

groups (Grzesinsky, Rosenfeld, Hagen)'', that is the GLD, the Popular
Front and NB.

He considered it "more practical" to discuss the impli-

cations of this plan with Frank

alone before a joint meeting.

28

Jeremias called the Association an organization engaged in "Luftgeschafte"
(ghost activities).

He was upset over Frank's preference of the Associ-

ation to the ICC.
Another reason for the end of the ICC was its failure to promote the AFGF plan for "contact work" in Germany.
much of "mere propaganda from a distance".

29

Frank did not think

He had definite plans for

reactivizing contacts "with the real underground movement over there".
For this purpose, he got in touch with the NB groups in England and
. h NB f rLen
. d s Ln
. 1·LS b on. 30
Swe d en an d wLt

The American government was ex-

pected to "give us facilities" for this project while respecting the
political independence of the emigrants.

31

It seemed reasonable to ex-

pect some friendly consideration from the intelligence and propaganda
..

agencies of the government.

They cons is ted of the Office of the Coordi--

28

Julius Deutsch to Paul Hagen, 30 November 1942, Frank Papers,
box 5, Neubeginnen.

29

..
Richard Lowenthal to Paul Hagen, 28 October 1942, Frank Papers,
box 5, Neubeginnen.
3
°Karl Frank to Max Hoffmann, 25 June 1943, Frank Papers, box 5,
Neubeginnen.
31

Paul Hagen to Paul Hertz, 4 May 1942, Nachlass Hertz, reel 31,
also ibid., Hagen to Hertz, 5 June 1942.
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nator of Information and of the Office of Facts and Figures.

These were

reorganized into the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the CIA.

The AFGF had good relations

with the first Coordinator, Arthur J. Goldberg, who had a similar background as the liberals or ex-socialists of the UDA.

A Chicago friend

of Goldberg and Frank arranged a meeting between these two in New York
in May 1942.

He believed that "you [Frank] will see in it an opportuni-

ty to further some of the ends which you and the AFGF have been seeking".

He recommended "your being completely frank with Mr. Goldberg ...

a good and trusted friend of mine".

32

Two NB emigrants, Georg Eliasberg

and Bernhard Taurer, were already employed in the Office of the Coordinator. In the War Department was an isolated NB emigrant, Henry Ehrmann.
Later, the AFGF had a friend there in Lieutenant Colonel Julius Klein,
a graduate of the first class of the School for Military Government in
Charlotteville, Virginia.

His nephew and former assistant, Joseph Roos,

was close to Hertz and Frank.

He was the director of the News Research

Service in Los Angeles which analyzed the foreign language press.
For these agencies, Frank prepared first an outline and then a
full fifty page "Plan to make contact with the German underground", in
the summer of 1942.

The outline was presented to the Coordinator in

April and then to the OSS where Goldberg ended up after the termination
of his former office, in June 1942.

Frank had the opportunity of ex-

plaining the plan personally to Colonel Donovan, the chief of the OSS.
He also negotiated with Donald Downes of the OSS and, through him, with
32 Richard A. Meyer to Paul Hagen, 24 April 1942, Frank Papers,
box 9, letter M.
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John Foster Dulles "whose agent in this matter I understand you to be".
Several conversations took place with Allan Dulles about the details of
the plan.

In one of them, Anna Frank-Caples participated as a prospec-

tive member of a liaison team in Switzerland.

But "a difference of

opinion among members of the staff" of the OSS held up the proposals of
Frank.

33

It referred to a number of discriminating reports about Frank

by Grzesinsky of the GLD who was then employed by the OSS.

After this

initial failure, Lt. Colonel Klein endorsed the full "Hagen formula"
and recommended it to section G-2 of the General Staff with the offer of
serving as the commanding officer of the project.

The Office of the

Chief of Staff believed, however, that the project fell under the jurisdiction of the OSS to which it was returned in September 1942.

It was

submitted there'to the Planning Committee of Psychological Warfare and
was given "the fullest consideration", without any positive results.

34

In October, Elmer Davis, the head of the OWI, also checked over the
project of Frank.

He thought it looked good but was "outside the field

of my activity" so that his opinion would be of little value.

Under the

auspices of a united German emigration or even without the interference
by the GLD, the plan might have met with a more positive fate.
The Hagen formula was an ambitious project that aimed at the two
major objectives of the NB emigration:

the preparation of a German

revolution and the concentration of the various socialist exile groups.
33

James P. Murphy, OSS to Lt. Colonel Julius Klein, War Department, School of Military Government, 25 September 1942, Frank Papers,
box 6, Immigration.
34

Ibid.
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The initial outline of April 1942 was more limited but,with the endorse-

f~ll

ment of Klein, a

elaboration seemed in order.

35

The Lt. Colonel

would have liked to continue his intelligence career with the execution
of this plan.

He had started out with an investigation of the German

American Bund in 1933 and 1934.

In his explanation preceding the under-

ground plan, he championed Frank and the German section of the AFGF beyond their own good.

His evaluation reflected one-sided information

which was useful to his purpose.

According to Klein, the German emi-

grants represented "either only themselves individually or only remnants
of former parties whose historical mistakes mean that they will never
return to.

a place

of prominence or even a position of trust in Germany".

After this disqualification of the GLD, he described NB as an underground group "made up mostly of younger members of the former Social
Democratic Party".

It had developed "adequate techniques, a system of

intelligence and information ... and a personnel of staff members" at
the ready disposal of the War Department.

Frank would be "one of the

most suitable persons to be used for such activities" as contact work
with underground groups.

36

The plan of Frank was so elaborate that its general objective
"may never be reached before the end of the war".

It promoted the ob-

jective of a dependent revolution which would follow a National Socialist collapse. 37

Part IV, "The Decision" dealt with "an offensive on the

35

Paul Hagen, How to prepare collaboration with the anti-Nazi
underground movement, 10 April 1942, Frank Papers, box 7.
36E xp l anat~on
.
by Lt. Colonel Klein of the Hagen Plan, Frank
Papers, box 7.
37

Paul Hagen, A plan to make contact with the German underground,
Frank Papers, box 7.
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German home front".

It would be "the chief task of the United States

Army to make liaison with the nucleus of opposition, to strengthen,
help and encourage its development, to attempt a possible coordination
in an underground national organization with the aim of a democratic
revolt against the Nazis".

A special section responsible to the General

Staff would direct these activities.

But the implications of the

"Hagen formula" went beyond the domain of the War Department or any
other department.

It concerned the general American postwar policy

towards Germany and Europe, a policy that had to be negotiated with the
other Allies.
The Special Section in charge of executing the plan of Frank
would have consisted of a chief of the rank of a higher intelligence
officer like

~lein,

and of a staff of the commanding officers of eight.

subsections for political intelligence, liaison, field operation, propaganda, research, special activities like sabotage and terror, and
defense, that is, self-defense or counterintelligence.

This apparatus

resembled the structure of a government and could eventually have assumed many governmental functions in postwar Germany.

In fact, the

ultimate goal of the plan was the establishment of a government-like
underground representation in Germany and abroad.

First, the Liaison

Section had to develop "special staffs for liaison with existing nuclei
of opposition" in Germany.

They would consist of "labor contact staffs"

for the trade unions, the Social Democratic Party, the socialist youth
groups, the Communist Party, and the labor emigration in all exile
countries.

They would further include separate staffs to contact the

religious opposition, the army opposition, war prisoners and foreign
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labor in Germany, underground groups of exile governments, youth, soldiers and women.

These liaison staffs would have been employed by the

Field Operative Section.

The initial task of that section was to es-

tablish and coordinate borderland sections in Switzerland, Sweden,
Portugal, Turkey, Vichy France, Spain and Persia.

The borderland sec-

tions had to set up "contact points" on the respective borders including
those "in occupied Eastern Territories and in the Balkan area"; then
"in the five most important German centers" of Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne,
Munich and Vienna; later in twenty more important centers.

The border-

land sections and contact points would be directed by Field Operators
who would supervise and protect the various liaison staffs in communicating with the various German oppositional forces.
The German forces should then be coordinated according to political or social origin and encouraged to build up representative committees abroad so that there would be foreign delegations of the trade
union movement, the Social Democratic and all other groups.

Eventually,

a concentration of inside and outside representative committees would
result in a national underground organization and in "a united delegation abroad (Vereinigtes Auslandsbtlro)".

This ambitious scheme would

practically comprise a secret inland government in addition to an exile
government.

According to the theory of a dependent revolution, it could

still not have deprived the National Socialist regime of its power but
it could have contributed to the defeat of this regime and assumed control thereafter.
The plan of Frank would have overtaxed the human resources of
the German emigration.

As recruits, the Special Section needed
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"reliable emigrants, volunteers among war prisoners, and specially qualified American and Allied citizens".

The liaison staff members and

field operators should be ''perfectly qualified ... by knowledge of
language, knowledge of territory and population, and by political experience".

Among other duties, the Research Section had to assume the

task of establishing "a careful card index" of personnel.

It was to

set up "an official research institute for German affairs which will
register and mobilize the available intelligentsia in the German emigration in the United States and England ... and which should have a
subsection for political research in German American societies and
clubs and among other foreign German settlements in South America".
In awareness of the p,roblem of human resources, the plan considered
the whole German emigration inside and outside·the United States as
the proper recruiting ground for its needs.

In the United States, it

considered as "the largest and most important ... the Jewish emigration" with the American Jewish Committee, the German Jewish Aufbau and
the JLC.

Then followed "the academic emigration, professors, some

elements of the former Republican administration [of Germany] and a
large group of writers, artists, etc." with the special mention of the
New School for Social Research in New York.
collection of

antif~cist

This somewhat uncohesive

forces was complemented with the recommenda-

tion of emigrant groups in London, the center of the Communist emigration in Mexico, "leftist connections 11 in the United States around
Rosenfeld and the

German American Emergency Conference of the second

Popular Front, and cultural groups around Thomas Mann.
tion omitted the GLn. 38

This enumera-

275
But the plan did approach the problem of emigrant cooperation in
general rather than of a socialist concentration in particular.

Only a

united emigration could claim the necessary mandate for the plan of
Frank which would otherwise represent a partisan approach.

Frank pro-

posed that "an attempt should be made to arrive at a political coordination of the now split emigrant forces so that they might become a sort
of a representation abroad".

This regrouped German emigration could

"prepare special statements of policy and produce worthwhile anti-Nazi
literature in the German language".

Thereby, it could also coordinate

highly qualified individuals who were isolated "because of the lack of
an emigration center".
function.

This. all-party coalition would have a subsidiary·

It would be neutralized within-the proposed system·o"f "the

other Germany".

The plan specified that this emigration center should

be kept separate from the Special Section as well as from the underground
representation abroad.
problematic GLD.

The proposal of Frank could not deal with the

39

Parallel to the Hagen formula, John Foster Dulles promoted an
OSS scheme.

It tried to enlist German emigrants in a Commission that

would advise the American government on "political strategy directed at
German

.

quest~ons

" . 40

unresponsiveness.

Frank did not want to alienate the OSS planners by

By qualifying his interest, he demonstrated his pre-

ference for his own plan.
38
39
40
folder 5.

The Commission was to comprise all activist

Ibid.
rbid.
Paul Hagen to D. Downes, 16 May 1942, Frank Papers, box 10,
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groups including that of Otto Strasser while omitting most socialists.
For the future chief Cold Warrier of the United States, that was not an
unusual arrangement.

But Frank might be compromised in such company so

that he objected especially to the composition of the projected emigrant
center.

Without Strasser, there was in it "already a bunch of right

wing connections", including the former Center politician Karl Spiecker.
Frank was afraid that "among them, I look like a lonely birch on the
other hill".
doubt".

About the future Germany, he had "of course hardly any

He believed that the impending change or revolt would be "a

turn to the left by a hundred eighty degrees" which would call for "a
streamlined modern bomber" like the Special Section rather than for
"the old post chaise" of the OSS Commission.

Frank recommended a more

proportionate representation· of emigrant groups and advised Downes, the
representative of Dulles, with some awkwardness, that the "old Social
Democrats ... would be of some value ... in an all-round center.
so, German Communists or the Thomas Mann crowd".

41

More

The agents of Dulles

might have been aware of the danger of a left turn in postwar Germany.
Possibly, their Commission was designed to obstruct such a potential
development.
In his tactical response, Frank accepted the·offer of the OSS
"wholeheartedly" but insisted on retaining full independence of the
other members of the Commission.

He wanted to be responsible to nobody

but the officials of the United.States Government and claimed the privilege of withdrawing from the emigrant center whenever it seemed neces41
folder 7.
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sary to him.
political.

He did not concede to Downes that his objections were only
The independence of each group required the retention of all

authority by the

ass,

in his opinion.

In inconsistency with his own

formula, he also raised the additional obstacle that authority could not
be delegated "from one nation to another".

Reliance on. "borrowed au-

thority"would make "puppets" out of the emigrants who would lose the
confidence of German underground groups.

Within the

ass

formula, Frank

would have been an isolated participant with little control over decisions.

His criticisms promoted his own scheme.

latter avoided all the drawbacks of the

ass

He emphasized that the

plan.

It "always only asked

for facilities for the time of our [the German] interregnum".

42

Hagen formula would also have depended on borrowed authority.

The
But its

ultimate objectives would have repaired that initial handicap with a
national German underground organization and its united delegation
abroad.

The response of Frank amounted to a refusal.

was not implemented but neither was the Hagen formula.

ass,

The

ass

formula

For the nascent

the latter was a good case study in counterintelligence.
Simultaneously with the plan of Dulles, Goldberg requested in

August 1943 a list of thirty to forty people willing to go to North
Africa for his office.

He told Ehrmann that they should be "all of

German origin, whether American citizens or not".
clear information about their prospective task.

Ehrmann received no
They would serve the

same purpose as "the Italians we sent over" in the course of the North
African campaign and the Allied landing in Sicily.
42

Ibid.

The group of German
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emigrants would be under the authority of the OSS and would probably
wear uniforms.

In time, they would be "shifted to suitable places

nearer to the fortress", that is, Germany.

After a visit to North

43
.
Go ldb erg wou ld rna k e more d e f ~n~te
· ·
d ec~s~ons.
· ·
Af r~ca,

Apparently,

nothing became of this project.
After the failure of the ICC and of the Special Section, the
AFGF relied on union help for rebuilding its European connections.

44

In a letter to NB emigrants in England, Frank mentioned a council of
European emigrants that was formed in connection with the War Relief
Board of the CIO and the AFL.

The members of the council were asked to

present their budgets for. their. work in occupied and fascist. countries.
The AFGF intended to "strengthen liaison work from Sweden, Switzerland,
and Lisbon" and to reorganize the former NB
and Palestine.
of NB.

45

~ontacts

in Turkey, Africa

It also hoped to get $300 a month for the London bureau

In June 1943, Frank wrote to Max Hoffmann in Lisbon that "we

have made preparations here for an extensive support which would reactivize some of our former activities in which you and Emil [Kirschmann]
were participating from M"ulhausen [ Alsace]".

Frank wanted to know

whether Hoffmann could get "direct contacts into occupied territory in
France" and send a courier to a designated address in Switzerland,
probably Illner.
43

The latter was recontacted and "has started to work".

Henry Ehrmann to Paul Hagen, 2 August 1943, Frank Papers.

44

Paul Hagen to Paul Hacke, Hans Martens and friends, (1945)
Frank Papers, box 8, letter H.
45
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Frank to Schottle, Lowenthal, 29 June 1943, Frank Papers,
box 5, Neubeginnen.
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He reported that "word from comrades apparently scattered all over
Germany is hopeful".

The NB leaders SchO"ttle and Krioringen in London,

who had operated border stations in Switzerland before the war, were
asked to "help us with Swiss contacts for Illner".
an effort to recontact NB members in Sweden.

46

Frank also made

He wrote them that "we

are against pointless activity but we believe that the time has come
to take up old contacts and build new ones".

Frank made "persistent

efforts to get to Sweden or Switzerland" in person.

In case of rapid

developments on the military front and in Germany, the AFGF wanted to be
able to deal with ''the problems we have been preparing for all these
years".

47

It testifies to the frustration of exile work that these

attempts by the AFGF at reactivating its underground contacts were unsuccessful, partly because of emigrant disunity and partly because of
Allied unresponsiveness.
The attitude of the GLD towards the AFGF remained consistently
negative throughout the war years.

The Social Democratic committee

avoided the cooperation for which the AFGF was hoping, first in the
International Labor Propaganda Committee of the Free World Association
and then in the European Council of the AFL-CIO War Relief Board.
idea for this Council had come from the Jewish Labor Committee.

The
Of the

German groups, it included the GLD, the AFGF, the ISK, and the SAP.

For

Frank, "the great progress in this council is that the GLD, the SAP and
we are considered on parity.
46

For the first time, the fictitious mandate

Karl Frank to Max Hoffmann, 25 June 1943, Frank Papers, box 5,
Neubeginnen.
47

Ibid.

280
of the GLD has been restricted to a representation of itself and not of

48

the whole movement."

But the GLD cons ide red the Council not as a

political arrangement, only as a conglomerate of "subsidy recipients".
It was "an expedient" for getting money for
movements".

the so-called underground

The GLD refused to sit on the same table with Frank so that

49
for h;m.
•
•
Hertz had to Subst ;tute
AFGF.
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I t was b en t on neu t ra 1'~z~ng
·
th e

For this purpose, it accepted the journalistic assistance of

Cahan in the Jewish Daily Forward, of the emigrant Hans Gaidies in Gegen
den Strom, of the German immigrant Gunther Reinhardt in his reports to
various government agencies and of the emigrant Ruth Fischer whose Networ k

.

p0~nte

d out Re d

.

.

consp~rac~es.

50

At the beginning of the war, Frank

hoped that a bipartisan investigative committee would put an end to the
rumours about him.
vantage.

But the GLD manipulated the committee to his disad-

It also raised a public controversy over the alleged influence

of Frank in the Office of War Information which had a negative effect on
the general reputation of the German socialist emigration in the United
States.
With the return of Frank to the United States in January 1940,
the JDF and the NVZ had continued the editorial campaign against NB
which they had started in 1939.

An article of 9 February 1940 by Cahan

48

Frank to Schottle, Lowenthal, 29 June 1943, Frank Papers,
box 5, Neubeginnen.

49

Katz to Ollenhauer, 29 May 1943, Matthias and Link, Mit dem
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 145, pp. 595, 596.

50

chronologische Tafel des Auftauchens von Verleumdungen, Geruchten etc. uoer Paul Haaen, Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2; Karl Frank,
Memorandum uber die Anti-Hagen Kampagne, l February 1945, Frank Papers,
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was reprinted in the NVZ of February 24.

It emphasized the importance

of German Social Democracy in the fight against Hitler and described the
NB Group as an obstacle in the antifascist work of the Sopade and of the
GLD.

It reprimanded the Social Democrats for being too indulgent with

their NB detractors for the sake of socialist harmony, and insisted that
the interests of the antifascist cause required an end to this moderation.

Cahan justified his attitude with the argument that Frank had

allied himself during the split of the SPA with the enemies of Cahan
who "inclined like [Frank] more towards the communists".

51

A month later, the socialist emigrant Hans Gaidies repeated the
NVZ and JDF arguments with an article in the journal Gegen den Strom.
In the Czechoslovakian emigration, he had aroused the suspicion of Frank
with militant proposals.

He offered large sums from supposedly Czecho-

slovakian sources for such terrorist acts as the planting of a bomb in
the Berlin public library.

Frank warned the Sopade against Gaidies, who

later joined the GLD campaign against NB in the United States.

Gaidies

claimed that Frank forfeited the Sopade readiness for cooperation with
NB in 1934 with conspiratorial activities against the exile executive.
According to him, Frank had arrogated the name of New Beginning for his
group from the original movement which he had succeeded in splitting in
1935.

Besides this charge of political imposition, the article discre-

dited Frank by repeating the previous imputations of embezzlement, kidnapping, bribery and sexual improprieties and warned the American labor
51

Neue Volkszeitung, 24 February 1940.
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organizations against throwing their "money into the ocean" with contributions to NB.

52

These polemics were reprinted in the JDF of May 1940.

Simultaneously, rumours spread in New York labor circles that Frank was
a spy, presumably either a communist or a National Socialist spy accord-

ing to preference.
accusation. 53

Even Staudinger repeated this potentially harmful

Katz and Stampfer visited Pittsburgh where both the GLD

and the AFGF had local supporters and repeated the list of accusations
against Frank there.
Under these circumstances, Frank applied for a bipartisan socialist committee to investigate the charges against him and to issue a
binding statement.

But this attempt at clearing his political and per.-

sonal record coincided almost with the German invasion of France, with
the French defeat and the resulting refugee crisis.

The GLD dragged out

the negotiations for constituting the committee until the beginning of
October 1940.

Then, five meetings took place between October 2 and

November 6 at the faculty club of Columbia University.

Besides the

chairman, the committee was equally divided between the adherents of the
two sides.

Katz, Brauer, and the Jewish labor lawyer, Karlin, appeared

for the GLD; Buttinger, the German emigrant lawyer
the socialist

Max Hirschberg, and

John Herling, the husband of Mary Fox, for the AFGF.

As

witnesses appeared Frank, Mary Fox, Hertz and Ehrmann for the AFGF, and
Gaidies and David Shub, a JDF writer, for the GLD.
52
53

Seger and Stampfer

Gegen den Strom, March 1940, pp. 8-13.

Notes, Staudinger Komplex, 10 September 1943, Frank Papers,
box 7, folder 2.
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refused to testify.

While Brauer was relatively moderate, the task of

prosecution fell mainly to Katz.

54

The general attitude of the latter was somewhat curious for a
lawyer.
Frank.

He pretended that the AFGF had to disprove the charges against
The membership of Frank in the SPD was positively established.

55

Katz maintained that Frank could still have retained his membership in
the KPD so that he would be a double agent.

In order to escape the po-

litical complications of the investigation, the first chairman,who was
a GLD sponsor, resigned from the committee.

The second chairman reques-

ted an expansion of the committee in order to be relieved of his embarrassing position of sole arbitrator.

That would have dragged out the

investigation even further beginning with the negotiations about additional members and continuing with a repetition of the previously introduced evidence.

The length of the investigation alone would have re-

fleeted negatively on Frank while even an expanded committee could not
guarantee a fair outcome.

Eventually, the representatives of Frank

proposed that the investigation be terminated with an indirectly exonerating statement, especially since the chairman intimated plans for a
trip abroad.

After further procrastination during the rescue period,

the NVZ responded with an article of 26 May 1941 entitled "A leader unmasks himself".

It implied that the investigation was terminated be-

cause Frank feared it would substantiate the GLD charges.

The NVZ re-
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ceived a series of counter-declarations from Buttinger, Hertz, Adler and
others, but refused to print any of them, including the reply by the
former secretary of the Socialist International.

56

The NVZ article ap-

peared when the rescue period was over for the GLD so that the latter
no longer needed to exercise any reluctant restraint.

It is interesting

to note that after the war Katz became eventually the president of the
second chamber of the German constitutional court, the equivalent of the
United States Supreme Court.
The attack on an individual rather than a rival group was an
effective tactic in the emigration where a political leader could not be
replaced.

Katz practiced it to perfection.

He wrote to Ollenhauer that

Frank "is nothing else than an adventurer without conviction or conscience.

In old communist fashion, he is intent on building a personal

organization and apparatus for himself".

In America, it was "not too

difficult" to raise money for somebody who was "skillful and unscrupulous" enough to "fabricate the stories that Americans like to hear".
Katz believed that Frank "pursued with undaunted determination the disruption of the old exiled movement in order to build his own apparatus
all the larger from the pieces".

The GLD was "more than ever determined

to make an end to the fraudulent enterprise that centers around his person".

If the GLD followed the wishes of the Sopade for moderation, Katz

reasoned, it would only help the latter in "digging your own grave 11 • 57
But the AFGF only wanted the same kind of cooperation with the official
56

neclaration on the case of Paul Hagen by Dr. Paul Hertz, 9
pages, received from Mrs. Anna Frank, March 1973.
57

Katz to Ollenhauer, 1 September 1941, EK Mappe 44.
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Social Democrats that existed in England.

It did.not engage in recrim-

ination against the GLD even after the abandonment of minimal restraint
by the Labor Delegation in the summer of 1941.
had his own interpretation:

For this attitude, Katz

"[Frank's] new tactic consists in not at-

tacking us but rather in pleading for good weather.

He implores us

through middle men of all kinds to desist from our 'fractricidal' attacks.

This is naturally only a new trick of his."

58

During the time of the rescue already, Katz had vowed that "we
have to break Hagen before it will be too late".

59

1941, he was afraid that it was already too late.

By the summer of
He had "the feeling

that we all made a big mistake in the past in dealing with this case •
..• We should have moved against him much earlier and much more energetically.

He would then probably not have become as influential and

financially as strong as it is now, unfortunately, the case."

60

Con-

trary to the imagination of Katz, the AFGF was then already very limited
in its resources and relied mainly on the liberal constituency of its
own organization.

In taking on the AFGF, the GLD confronted a part of

the neo-progressive American establishment which it was incapable of
discrediting or of dissociating from the NB emigrants.

The anti-NB cam-

paign reflected also on the GLD and limited its chances of cooperating
with government agencies as much as it did those of the AFGF.
58

The

rbid.

59

Memorandum uber die Anti-Hagen Kampagne, 1 February 1945,
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result was a general neutralization of the German socialist emigration
in the United States.
When the period of rescue was over, the GLD intervened with the
ICC and the OSS.

Katz, Grzesinsky and Brauer complained to the Norwe-

gian ambassador in Washington about his sponsorship of the AFGF pamphlet
"Norway does not yield".

They described the AFGF as a semi-communist

organization led by the notorious communist, Frank.

The ambassador in-

formed the Norwegian members of the ICC about this GLD intervention.
Held similarly attacked the AFGF at the farewell dinner for Stampfer
before the trip to England.

Hedwig Wachenheim, a member of the GLD,

considered this as one of the latest attempts to eliminate the NB
Group.

61

The GLD also sent a number of anti-NB reports to the Office of

the Coordinator of Information.

Goldberg inquired back to Frank about

the charges of kidnapping and of disputed illegal trips into National
Socialist Germany, of which the latest had taken place in December 1938.
Frank sent him a list of available witnesses but Goldberg took his distance from the ICC for fear of getting involved in interemigrant rivalries.
Simultaneously, the GLD provided newspapers and journals that
published Frank articles with derogatory information.

Stampfer attacked

Kingdon for defending the record of Frank during the Weimar Republic.
He ridi.culed him for discovering "the KPD as an academy for democracy".
Adler thought that he had never read a "more repulsive" article by

61

Memorandum uber die Anti-Hagen Kampagne, 1 February 1945,
Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2.
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Neue Volkszeitung, 15 August 1942.

62

287

Stampfer.

He deplored that the latter ttpartook personally in the des-

picable personal campaign of denunciation which the NVZ has unwittingly
made one of its chief tasks".

Considering Stampfer's renegade attitude

towards socialism, he objected to his exclusive thinking in bourgeois
democratic categories .and to reevaluating the time of socialist promise
in the 1920's in these belated terms. 63

In connection with the same

incident, Adler told Seger that he considered it "hopeless to discuss
with you the behaviour of the NVZ in the case of Paul Hagen".

He had

"always hoped that you redeemed enough of your better past to dissociate
yourself from the methods of your editorial colleague [Katz]".

64

In

frustration over his setbacks, Frank discussed with Hertz the possibility
of going to Canada, possibly on a lecture tour, before returning to New
York for a new start in emigrant politics.
The GLD continued its anti-NB efforts with the American war infurmation and intelligence agencies in 1942 and 1943.

The initiative

by Grzesinsky while he was an expert on the German emigration on the
Foreign Nationalities Board of the OSS has already been discussed.

One

of his reports on Frank was given to the Jewish Labor Committee as a
government report.
against the AFGF.

65

66

Staudinger also warned the OSS official Dorn
The OSS eventually ordered an investigation of
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Frank and several of his associates.

The inquiries to which they were

subjected dealt with the standard GLD accusations about the use of
pseudonyms by Frank, his supposed double membership in the SPD and the
KPD and the conspiratorial nature of the NB Group.
The most irrational diatribe of the GLD was directed against the
alleged influence of Frank in the Office of War Information.

The Social

Democratic committee derived its fears from a few harmless circumstances.
Elmer Davis had written the preface to Frank's book "Germany after Hitler" before becoming director of the OWI.
actually ineligible for an OWI job.

This association made Frank

Eliasberg and Taurer had been

transferred from the prewar_COI to the OWI.

James Warburg, the cousin

of Ingrid Warburg, became the head of the Overseas Branch of the OWI in
New York.

His association with Shortwave Research Inc. was interpreted

as a partiality for NB.

Actually, the extreme antagonism between the

GLD and NB and the bad political behaviour of the Social Democratic
committee were reasons enough to exclude their members from the intelligence agencies.

Eliasberg and Taurer were special cases.

They were

needed as specialists in intelligence work because they had spent several years in German underground work and in German prisons before their
emigration.

The OWI commissioned a study of the underground movement

from them which appeared in 1943 as "The silent War" with a foreword by
Reinhold Niebuhr.

Several Social Democratic refugees who had been asso-

ciated with the Sopade but not with the GLD got low paying clerical OWI
jobs.

Seger failed to get an important job with the OWI.

He was disap-

pointed when he was sidetracked to Minnesota in a curious mission
against a chain of unpatriotic German American newspapers.

He inter-

289
vened repeatedly with Davis and prided himself in March 1943 in Pittsburgh with his latest intervention with the OWI director.

He had ener-

getically demanded a stop to any collaboration with the friends of
Frank.
In order to counteract this alleged relationship, the GLD enlisted especially the services of Gunther Reinhardt.

By then, the

latter was already an experienced informer.

He was from Heidelberg

where he spent his youth and college years.

He left Germany before the

takeover by Hitler and eventually came to the United States to rejoin
his Jewish mother.

From 1934 to 1935, he was an investigator for the

Dickstein-McCormick Committee, that is, for the House Un-American Affairs Committee.

Then, he was employed for a while by the American

Jewish Committee which fired him for sending reports about AJC officials
to government agencies.
FBI from 1935 to 1936.

According to himself, Reinhardt worked for the
During his two years with the New York Daily

News from 1939 to 1940, he prided himself about having a dossier about
every German emigrant in New York.

The Daily News fired him for passing

on information to Walter Winchell of the Daily Mirror.

During the war

years, Reinhardt worked occasionally for the Alien Department of the New
York police and became an investigator for the Dies Committee, the successor of the Dickstein-McCormick Committee.

He specialized in reports

about the German emigration in Mexico which was predominantly communist,
about ''communist" Jewish organizations in the United States, and especially about emigrant organizations like the AFGF.

Among his one hundred

sixty-seven reports were several about the OWl and Frank.
Reinhardt telephoned almost daily with Katz in New York. 67

Apparently,

290
In March 1943, Reinhardt finished his long report about the
number of leftist European emigrants and the alleged influence of Frank
in the OWI.

He forewarded it to seven government agencies like the FBI,

the OSS, and the Civil Service Commission.

The report to the OSS was

accompanied by a letter from Grzesinsky which termed Reinhardt as a
"neutral" source.

In the tabulation of the latter, ten out of sixteen

radio script writers of the OWI had past communist or radical affiliations.

The same percentage of "key people ... owe their job and alle-

giance to an alien ex-communist and exconvict", that is, Frank.

Suppes-

edly, the head of the German Department, Franz Hollering, rejected all
applications by "politically reliable and professionally competent
German Americans" and depended on the approval of Frank and his OWI
friends.

Reinhardt also claimed that seven of the nineteen stenogra-

phers and typists in the German Department were placed there through the
influence of Frank.

According to him, fifty-six out of sixty-four per-

sons employed in the German Department were aliens.
Frank "practically controls the personnel and the
the German Department".

He concluded that

~..rriting

policies of

68
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Reinhardt claimed that Warburg, the head of the Overseas Branch
of the OWT, colluded with Frank in hiring European refugees through
Shortwave, Inc.

He received help from the Department of Patriotic In-

telligence of the Constitutional Educational League in New York which
claimed in its Factogram of September 1943 that Shortwave Research
ttapproved and recommended hundreds of European refugees for appointment
to the government payroll" and that three hundred sixty of them were
given jobs with the OWI.

69

Roos thought that "Reinhardt and his SP

[ SPD] friends want to get a criminal angle on him [Frank] to convict
, II 70
h ll!l •

According to Rosenfeld, Seger was also determined to get Frank

into prison.

Economizing Southern Democrats and right wing Republicans

in Congress used the available reports on the OWI and on Frank as arguments in the discussion over the OWI budget.

71

A number of newspapers

like the Hearst chain printed excerpts from the Congressional Record
about Frank, Davis, Warburg, and others.

As a result of his work, Rein-

hardt claimed that Frank topped the secret deportation list of Senator
Dies.
The accusations by Reinhardt had little factual basis.

The

Civil Service Commission called the main report slanderous and refused
to reinvestigate the OWI employees in question, even though the FBI re69
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opened its investigation.

The implicated OWI employees credibly refuted

the charges against them.

Hollering assumed that the government took

the accusations not very seriously since all the officials in question
were still employed.
GLD people.

He obviously was not interested in hiring any

But he did not need Frank for his establishment in the

United States.

He had been able to emigrate early to America because

of his work as a foreign correspondent in New York for the Ullstein
Publishing House of Berlin.

He was not hired by Warburg but by another

official of the COI for his distinguished record as a journalist and
editor of antifascist papers.

These had not been communist papers.

Hollering stated that he had never been a member of the KPD.

He had re-

signed his editorship of the Arbeiter Illustrierte Zeitung, which he
described as a working class Life Magazine, in 1928 when the KPD acquired an interest in the paper that threatened his editorial independence.

He defined the Berliner Zeitung am Mittag, of which he had been

the editor in chief, as a popular democratic paper.

He founded the

Prager Mittag as the first antifascist daily of the German emigration.
He served as its editor in chief until June 1934 when he left for the
United States.

This daily was owned by politically independent busi-

nessmen and subsidized by the President of Czechoslovakia, Thomas G.
Mazaryk.

Hollering rejected categorically the idea that Frank had any-

thing to do with his selection of OWI employees.

His participation in

the ICC had not been based on personal relations with Frank.
people who did not know Frank or were hostile to him.

He hired

He discussed the

professional qualifications of all the OWI employees he had hired.
None of them was an NB emigrant.

Eliasberg and Taurer preceded
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him at the Office of the Coordinator and at the OWI.
them before.

He had never met
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Warburg maintained that he had personally nothing to do with
selecting the staff of the German section of the OWI.

He had not been

directly involved in Shortwave Research, Inc. from where some OWI employees were recruited.

He had met Frank only once before entering

government service and once during his work with the COI in early 1942.
At that time, Frank had suggested that the Office of the COI allow his
organization to broadcast to Germany.

Warburg had declined this request

as contrary to COI policy which did not accord radio time "to any of
.
.
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th e varLous
groups o f expatrLates

A fair number of refugees were employed in the German section of
the OWI.

The latter could not help employing them since a full command

of German was indispensable for radio propaganda into Germany.
identifiable German socialist emigrants appear on the OWI list.
them were women, some of them wives of socialist emigrants.
mostly clerical jobs for $1,440 to $2,000 a year.

Eleven
Most of

They held

Most of them had been

affiliated with the Sopade, one with the ISK, one with the KPO and one
of them was the daughter of a NB sympathizer.

The NB members Eliasberg,

Taurer, and Friedrich Schmidt were script writers at $3,800 a year.
notion of socialist emigrant influence in the OWI is incorrect.

The

It can

not be used to disspell the notion of a generally insignificant social72

••

Franz Hollering to David F. Seiferheld, 12 June 1944, Frank
Papers, box 7, folder 2.
73

James P. Warburg to David F. Seiferheld, 7 June 1944, Frank
Papers, box 7, folder 2.
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ist emigration in the United States.
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The idea that a single emigrant leader like Frank could have
controlled the propaganda of the German section of the OWI from the
outside was crazy.

The various sections of the OWI were subject to a

strict system of broadcast control.

As deputy director for propaganda

policy, Warburg was responsible for drafting all policy directives.
Then, they had to be approved by the director of the OWI and by representatives of the State Department and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
All scripts were checked by the Broadcast Control Division before being
issued to the radio announcers.

Also, the latter were monitored so that

75
.
t h ey cou ld no t d epart f rom t h e prepare d scr1pts.
The legend of vast NB influence in the OWI was in ludicrous contrast to the difficulties, frustrations and failures of the AFGF.

The

latter made well organized antifascist efforts which fell victim to
emigrant obstruction and government insensitivity.
stances prevailed during the second half of the war.

The same circumIn this period,

from 1943 to 1945, the three major German socialist emigrant groups,
the second German American Popular Front, the GLD, and the AFGF made
intensive plans for

German postwar reconstruction.

74

Memorandum on the statement about Paul Hagen in the Gunther
Reinhardt report, 26 June 1944, Frank Papers, box 7, folder 2.
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folder 2.

Warburg to Seiferheld, 7 June 1944, Frank Papers, box 7,

CHAPTER VIII
THE SECOND GERMAN AMERICAN POPULAR FRONT, 1942 TO 1945
The German attack on Russia gave rise to the second Popular
Front with its German American component.

Since this attack was unex-

pected it took some time to revive the Popular Front and to overcome
the disillusionment over the Russian diplomacy of 1939.

The military

emergency of Russia made her defense a legitimate concern even for nonsocialists.

As a member of the United Nations, the Soviet Union was in

alliance with the West.

The propaganda of the second Popular Front fit

even into the context of American foreign policy.

German American sup-

port of the war became a serious concern of the American government
which did not mind the efforts of the Popular Front to achieve it.
For the German American front, the cultural approach was outdated but
that did not make it easier to achieve the desired ethnic and emigrant
unity.

This second movement was of an even more composite nature than

the first.

The German American Emergency Conference (GAEC) was cen-

tered in New York, the German American Anti-Axis League (GAAAL) in
Chicago.

The German American trade unionists in New York,and some of

their leaders, had ambitions of their own.

They formed the independent

Victory Committee of the German American Trade Unions (VC-GATU).

The

paper of the GAEC was the German American which granted separate space
to the other two organizations.

The DAKV still existed and was asso295
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ciated with the GAEC but it remained in the background.
The second Popular Front cooperated eagerly with the government.

The Office of War Information wanted to unite all German Ameri-

can organizations, including the Popular Front, in the United Americans
of German Descent (UAGD).

After the government lost interest and the

GLD dropped out, the Popular Front and the conservatives remained the
uneasy partners of the UAGD that could not even agree on staging a
national convention.

One of the reasons for this failure was the

change in purpose of the Popular Front.

With Russian victory all but

certain, the latter became concerned with winning the peace.

It could

not gain conservative support for its plans of postwar reconstruction
so that the UAGD became a liability.

In this situation, Gustav Faber,

the main leader of the trade unionists, tried to circumvent the UAGD
with a new organization.

The Independent National Committee of German

Americans for the Re-election of FDR (INC) appeared to have only a temporary function.

But after the elections, it continued as the German

American National Committee.

As with the other socialist groups,

reorganization served the purpose of planning for reconstruction,
This planning was difficult even among various Popular Front
elements.

Their national and international concerns had to be often

adjusted.

The Popular Front tried hard to harmonize its German and

Russian loyalties, especially towards the end of the war.

Its main

hope was that the Soviet Union as a member of a peacetime United Nations would follow its international socialist conscience and work for
a positive treatment of Germany.

In this frame of mind, the Popular

Front supported the decisions of the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and
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When German interests suffered, it had recourse to the argu-

Potsdam.

ment that the German people had forfeited Allied consideration.

It had

always maintained that a revolution against Hitler was crucial for the
postwar fate of Germany.

If it occurred, German and Russian postwar

interests could harmonize within an internationalist approach.

Other-

wise, German interests would have to concede precedence to Russian
interests.

The GAAAL nearly fell victim to these conflicting national-

ist and internationalist tendencies.

But its pro-German wing prevailed.

The Popular Front could not solve the problem of emigrant unity.
The UAGD nearly brought all emigrants together.

But anti-communism was

the main reason for the GLD eventually to drop out of the government
sponsored coalition.

After that, some GLD members considered momentar-

ily a socialist concentration .. But the Labor Delegation pursued its own
isolationist re-organization which determined and limited its plans for
reconstruction as the next chapter will discuss.
The GAEC was formed on March 1st, 1942.
inaugurated two months later.

1

Its monthly paper was

For membership, the Emergency Conference

turned to the constituent organizations of the DAKV, the secondary labor
organizations, which were then doubly represented in the Popular Front.
The GAEC eventually built up a semblance of a national organization with
branches in San Francisco since April 1943, in Cleveland since June 1943,
in New Jersey since July 1943 and in Philadelphia since December 1943.
1
New York Public Library, The German American, New York, 1 May
1942 to date, sponsored by the German American Emergency Conference,
edited by Rudolf Kohler and Kurt Rosenfeld, July 1942, p. 1.
2
The German American, April 1943, p. 12; June 1943, p. 3; July
1943, p. 12; December 1943, p. 12.

2
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The GLD was naturally hostile to the purpose of the GAEC.

Katz con-

sidered Russia at first as a secondary theater of war and hoped that
American assistance to the Soviet Union would be kept at a minimum.
Competition for the fraternal organizations between the Popular Front
and the Social Democrats continued as before during the first Popular
Front.

They both usually sent speakers to the national conventions of

the fraternal organizations, especially the Workmen's Benefit Fund.
The leader of the GAEC was the centrist emigrant, Rosenfeld.

Heym had

enlisted in the American army and Hall had vanished from the scene.
The latter probably was too compromised from his first Popular Front
activities.

After the death of Rosenfeld in October 1943, the native

centrist Sattler became more prominent again.

The communist emigrants

did not seek the limelight as in the first Popular Front.
The GAAAL grew out of the Workmen's Benefit Fund.

This circum-

scribed the initiative of Kruse who was a functionary of the AKStK in
Chicago.

He and his group used the editorials in the AKStK journal

Solidarity for ideological discussions in the Chicago branches in order
to confront the "social pacifist and other prejudices 11 in the secondary
labor organizations.
followed soon after".

According to Kruse, ''the organizational forms
3

On February 1st, the AKStK called a loyalty

rally in the Social Turner Hall on Belmont Avenue, to which it invited
representatives of the fraternal organizations.

A continuation commit-

tee organized similar gatherings in other parts of the city which
3

rbid., May 1943, p. 2.
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eventually led to a comprehensive delegate conference on June 28.

4

In

between, the League organizers tried to benefit from a conference for
ethnic unity to which Mayor Kelly invited representatives of all German
American organizations on February 13.

5

But the non-labor societies

were ·not interested in the Popular Front so that the GAAAL was formed
without them. Rosenfeld attended the constitutional conference of June

28.

Its main organizers were Kruse, Jaeger and Schrotter, the organi-

zer of the first Chicago Popular Front.

It consisted of thirty-three

delegates from "labor, fraternal, cultural, sports, musical and other
organizations" representing in Popular Front perspective approximately
one hundred thirty thousand German Americans.

Besides the AKStK, the

Native Friends and the Workmen's Choirs, a number of CIO locals were
represented by their German American members.

T~ey

included the

Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and
the United Electrical, Radio Workers' and Machinists' Union.

This

rather leftist membership was complete with German American members of
the International Workers Order and of the German American Workers'
Club (Arbeiterklub) of Milwaukee.
Jaeger chairman of the GAAAL.

Kruse was elected secretary and

Schrotter remained more in the back-

ground with maintaining contacts with community groups like the Office
of Civilian Defense and the YMCA. 6
4

chicago Historical Society, "Where do you stand?'', pamphlet
published by the German American Anti-Axis League, (summer 1942); also
German American, June 1942, p. 2; July 1942, p. 8.
5

6

German American, January 1943, p. 3.
German American Anti-Axis League, "Where do you stand?".
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Unlike the first Chicago Popular Front, the GAAAL remained of
local importance.

Its activities were reported in the German American

under the regular section of "News and Views from Chicago".

It tried

to win local acceptance by participating in war related community and
ethnic programs.
German Americans.

Thereby, it hoped to win the support of non-labor
At the United Nations Parade for the demonstration

of ethnic unity, the GAAAL was the only German American group to participate with a float, despite the sponsorship of the event by City
Hall. 7

The League was also the only German organization to commemorate

publicly the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor.

This was done in a

Catholic high school where a group from the Veterans of Foreign Wars
presented the colours.

8

The GAAAL also participated in the North Side

Win 'the War Committee which was co-sponsored by the OCD and the YMCA.
Kruse functioned as program chairman.

9

But these activities did not impress the conservative German
Americans.

An issue that involved the latter more directly was the

yearly German Day celebration.

By 1943, the GAAAL claimed to have made

some progress in the way the latter was organized. At its insistence,
government speakers were invited and the League was also allowed to help
stage a patriotic rally.

10

In December, the GAAAL participated in the

German American Committee for an Allied Nations victory.
7

8

9

The latter

German American, January 1943, p. 3; 1 May 1943, p. 2.
Ibid., December 1942, P· 12.
Ibid., November 1942, p. 13.

lOib;d.,
1 J une 1943 , p. 2 .
..
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consisted of a group of progressive German American intellectuals, professors and supposedly businessmen.
Reich.

It included the author Hans Leo

Schrotter represented the GAAAL in the Committee.

11

The GLD and its ethnic arm, the GACD, soon challenged the GAAAL,
despite the circumspection of the latter.

AKStK representatives sub-

stituted for the League in sponsoring a mass meeting for pro-administration candidates in the mid-term state elections of 1942 which the
Republican Party won.
pendent Voters' League.

The other sponsors were the GACD and the IndeIn the view of Kruse, this joint sponsorship

successfully demonstrated German American unity.

But guest speaker

Seger,. :from the GLD, gave an interview to the Chicago Daily Sun in which
he called Kruse a communist and the GAAAL a communist affair.
this way, the

12

In

GLD reaffirmed Social Democratic interest in the AKStK

and the other secondary labor organizations.
The Victory Committee of the German American trade unionists
was organized by immigrants like Faber and Emil Romberg.

As a sixteen

year old, Faber had joined the youth group of the Deutsche Metallarbeiter Verband (German Metalworkers' Union).
tionary of that union.

Later, he became a func-

As a mechanic in shipbuilding, he worked in the

dockyards of Wilhemshaven, Kiel and Hamburg where the uprisings of 1918
started.

In 1924, he immigrated to the United States where he co-foun-

ded the transport workers union.
11
12

He became the treasurer of this union

Ibid., January 1944, p. 12.
Ibid., December 1942, p. 12.
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which had one hundred fifty thousand members in the 1940's.
was born in 1901 in the Ruhr area.

13

Romberg

As a labor functionary, he was

president of the Jungsozialisten (Young Socialists) in Northern and
Western Germany and the secretary of the free metalworkers' union of
the Rhineland.

In 1927, he went to the United States where he joined

the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.

Besides the

VC-GATU, he also represented the Victory Committees of the German
American Divisions of the Red Cross and of the National War Fund.
The VC-GATU was a very active Popular Front element.

14

A section

of each issue of the German American was reserved for it under the heading "Union Spotlight".
those of the GAAAL.

Its labor conferences were synchronized with

Together, they advocated a greater war effort in

productivity, exposing fascist agents and saboteurs and the protection
of "loyal German Americans" against discrimination from often German
American employers.

The first Labor Conference of Greater New York

took place in January 1943.

15

The simultaneous GAAAL conference of

trade union delegates in Chicago hoped "to secure the maximum mobilization of tens of thousands of German American workers".

The support of

the German underground movement also served as a psychological rallying
point as did the emphasis on the anti-labor policies of the Third Reich.
In appeals to the German workers, the conference felt a "great responsibility to assure a people's victory ... the world over".
l3Ib1.'d .. , J u 1y 1944 ' p. 3 .
14
Ibid., December 1944.
15

Ibid., December 1942, p. 12; January 1943, p. 1.

The trade
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unionists also wanted to promote socialism at home.

R. J. Thomas, the

president of the United Autoworkers,which was then part of the CIO,
sent a letter of support to the New York Labor Conference.

The secre-

tary of the Greater New York Industrial Council of the CIO addressed the
conference.

The latter was attended by union delegates so that it is

difficult to assess the numerical strength of the VC-GATU.
The first New York Labor Conference adopted a new structure for
the VC-GATU and a plan for expansion.
the Committee.

Faber became the secretary of

Specific victory committees were to be established in

each union local, branch, shop or office that employed a sufficient
number of German Americans.

Each VC member was to receive a contribu-

tion card and pay monthly dues of 25¢.

Of the six thousand members of

Local 1 of the Bakers' Union, for example, two thousand were German
American.

But only fifty of these joined the VC of this local which

was established with the consent of its officials.

The VC of Local 1

did not let a meeting of the local pass without an appeal for the Popular Front.

16

In the German American neighborhood of Yorkville on the

East side of Central Park, the trade unionists established the United
Yorkville for Victory Committee, together with some merchants of 86th
Street.

Its activities in that basically conservative area were repor-

ted in the German American under the heading "It happened in Yorkville"~?
The second New York Labor Conference followed in March 1943.
According to the German American, representatives from eighteen CIO
16
17

Ibid., May 1943, p. 3.
Ibid., November 1942, p. 12.
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and sixteen AFL affiliated union locals were present.
ence took place in December 1943.

The third confer-

It was welcomed by letters from

Wendell Willkie, Mayor LaGuardia and Victor F. Ridder, the conservative
publisher of the New York Staatszeitung who was also involved in forming a national organization of German Americans.

It restated the goal

of establishing victory committees in all locals with a large German
American membership and considered it important to circulate the German
American "as a means of mobilizing" all German American workers.

Faber

recommended the formation of an interethnic council of victory committees.

In this context, the Greek American Labor Conference and a

.
1
Nat~ona

Counc~"1 o f Hungar~an
.
T ra d e Un~on~sts
·
.
were

·
d
ment~one

. lS

These conferences and the activities of the GAEC were timed to
influence the preparation of a national convention of the United Americans of German Descent.

The latter was promoted by the Foreign Language

Division of the OWI whose head was Alan Cranston, the later Democratic
Senator from California.

The job of the Foreign Language Division was

to improve, maintain or establish unity among the various ethnic groups
in order to insure their full support of the war.

The Division had a

Press Section and a Radio Section to supply war information to the
ethnic media.

It could also impose its information by pressure, for

example, by threatening to recommend revocation of the second class
postage status of a specific newspaper.

In general, its methods were

more discrete, if not always successful.

In the field of the ethnic

organizations, the Foreign Language Division liked the device of uniting
18

Ibid., December 1943, p. 3; January 1944, p. 9.
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all those within a certain ethnic group which,in the German American
case, was almost impossible.

The Popular Front rejoiced over such an

idea but its single-minded enthusiasm eventually embarrassed the OWI
which was already a favorite target of conservative and isolationist
Congressmen.

The Social Democrats would have liked to associate with

conservative organizations but they had a hard time accommodating themselves to leftist groups which they considered communist.
valuable groups were the conservative societies.

The most

They represented the

majority of the German Americans and were not a potential hazard to the
image of the OWI.
The attitude of the American government towards the emigrants
had changed considerably after December 1941.

The government knew that

it could not clearly distinguish between emigrant and ethnic
since several of the latter were led by socialist emigrants.

g~oups

Before

Pearl Harbor, the State Department resented the opposition to its official policy of neutrality by socialist and Social Democratic emigrants.
Its policy statement of 10 December 1941 regarding "free movements in
the United States" was still ambiguous.

It explained that "in general,

the government of the United States does not favor 'free movements' ...
which carry on activities contrary to the established policies, domestic
or foreign".

This referred to interventionism as well as socialism.

The statement elaborated that the State Department "has taken cognizance
of the existence of a number of committees ... but has not extended any
form of recognition to them, formal or informal".

It was mainly con-

cerned with the potential division of "allegiance of any group of
American residents between the United States and foreign governments, in
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existence or in prospect", that is, exile governments.

It preferred

that "the governing committees of such [free] movements be composed of
citizens of the foreign country".

It disapproved of ••any attempt to

enlist the support of American citizens of like racial background 11 •
The State Department conceded, however, that

11

in harmony with the basic

principles of liberty, the people of the United States do have a sympathetic interest in movements by aliens in this country who desire to
liberate their countries from Axis domination 11 •

It would have preferred

that most German emigrants were not socialists, but American sponsorship
of their groups had always been tolerated.

19

After Pearl Harbor, the government came to view antifascist,
socialist emigrants as helpful in rallying ethnic support for the American war effort.

A memorandum of June 1942 from the White House to the

Foreign Language Division of the OWI contained an interesting initiative.
It was written by Gabriel Lorenz of the Office of Emergency Management.
An accompanying questionnaire was designed ••to explore, for the first

time -- and fully -- the significance of Free movements, their place in
the prosecution of the war and the molding of the peace 11 •

The

memo~n-

dum proposed that the government intervene in the organization of the
Free movements and streamline them into efficient factors of the morale
front.

The questionnaire was to establish ••rating for recognition 11 •
19

Institut f~r Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Deutschsprachige Presse
in den USA, 1941-1945, collected by the author from the State Department
Central Files in the National Archives in Washington, and from the files
of the Office of War Information at the National Records Center in
Suitland, Maryland, pp. 1, 2: Department of State, Policy regarding
11
Free Movements•• in the United States, 10 December 1941.
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Lorenz was aware of "the mushroom growth" of organizations for "nationalism, socialism or just propaganda purposes".

There were "many

duplications ... and organizations within organizations" which required
understanding of inter-group antagonisms and intricate front arrangements.

The questionnaire wanted to take stock and find out "who is

.
f or government LnterventLon.
.
.
20
wh o.? " as a b asLS

Lorenz thought that "taken collectively, these movements are as
yet an untapped reservoir of energy and resources which should, and
can, be harnessed to the war effort".

It was important to achieve

"UNITY ... in one conunon effort for victory".

He believed that their

"potentialities [are] enormous" for the homefront, the Victory-front,
that is, the continental underground front, and for the front of corresponding language groups in other countries, mainly Latin America.
The role of these Free movements in "building up the morale on the
home front, its influence on the production line among the millions of
workers which these organizations represent" seemed obvious.

But

Lorenz considered "the repercussions on the V-front in Europe and
Asia ... even more important".

The main reason for this attitude was

that nobody conceived yet of an Allied invasion of the continent and
of the total occupation of the Axis countries.
In this context, the emigration was to be used to activize the

underground movement.

By consolidating the free movements in the

United States, the underground groups could be united abroad.

Lorenz

20 rbid., pp. 3-5, Executive Office of the President, Office for
Emergency Management, Gabriel Lorenz to Alan Cranston, 30 June 1942,
Rating for Recognition, questionnaire form for Free Movements.

308

did not realize that this had already partially happened in the catharsis of underground existence.

In a more negative view, the illegal

groups had to be saved from the ideological differences in the Free
movements in America.

It was "obvious that unity here would beget a

united front abroad and thus eliminate the hazard which may come to
the underground movement from that disunity

w~ich

has so effectively

played into the Nazi divide-and-conquer tactics".

For the sake of the

underground movement, the government should bring harmony to the Free
movements in the United States since "every united front we create
here in the ranks of the Free movements is a victory scored on the
morale front in Europe".

The V-front was "a real second front and,

unlike a military front which can be defeated and dispersed, it remains
a permanent stronghold which grows stronger with every

s~tback

every execution, and grows wiser with every mistake".

It would "grow

and

bigger in size and scope with every message of unity from the new
world".

If a similar strategy could be applied to the ethnic commun-

ities of Latin America it would result in "unlimited horizons of
support for our war effort".
have an enormous impact:

A combination of all three fronts would

"by good organization and a keen sense of

international strategy, we have in our Free movements a potential for
converting mass Fifth Columns into mass Columns for Democracy."
In this sense, the memorandum was "not only probative but
creative".

The government should enter this "strange magnetic field

of freedom" and attract the Free movements to it so that they "emancipate themselves from their limited objectives to the limitless horizons
with which we must look upon the present struggle".

In an atomic way,
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Lorenz viewed the Free movements and their underground and ethnic tandems as pieces of a global world structure.

He believed that

sooner or later, we will have to separate once and for all time the
New Free World from the Nazi New World Order in a political fission
which is final and irrevocable . . . . this division must be made so
that when the broken world is pieced together again it will not be
of different pieces but all of one piece, victory for Freedom.21
The abstract enthusiasm of this memorandum did not lead very far.

The

policy of unconditional surrender changed this assessment of the Free
movements.

From then on, the American government was only interested

in ethnic unity at home.
A unification of the German American organizations in favor of
the war was a priority of the Foreign Language Division of the OWI.
The latter knew that the ethnic organizations under German emigrant
leadership had already the proper attitude.

The question was whether

they would cooperate in bringing the conservative organizations into
the same fold.

The Division was not fully aware of the potential dif-

ficulties of an association between leftist and conserva'tive German
Americans.

It believed that the patriotic issue of the war should

override whatever alienations there could be.

Under the circumstances,

it considered it best to initiate the project with George N. Shuster,
the president of Hunter College in New York City and the close friend
of Bruning whose patriotism did not let him speak out against the Third
Reich during wartime.

Shortly after the establishment of the OWI in

the summer of 1942, a representative of the Foreign Language Division
discussed "the entire German American situation" with Shuster.
21

Ibid.

The
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latter agreed to draft a German American manifesto which could be used
as an appeal to German American organizations for joining in a national
federation and demonstrating their loyalty in a national conference in
the fall of 1942.

22

The favorite name of German American Congress for

Democracy was already preempted by the Social Democrats so that the
prospective federation was named the United Americans of German
Descent (UAGD).

This was a derivation of the Loyal Americans of German

Descent, a group organized by Shuster.
The initial recruitment went smoothly.

Shuster was to contact

a group of original signers of the manifesto which included the organization leaders with whom Rutz, the chief of the German Desk of the
Foreign Language Division, corresponded, himself, in September 1942.
There was first the trio of the

Popula~-

Front:

Sattler as the national

secretary of the AKStK, Bonnheim as the secretary of the GAEC, and
Rosenfeld as the chairman of the DAKV.

The Social Democrats had fewer

organizations from which to send representatives.
as a leader of the GACD.

Seger participated

Manfred George as the editor of the Aufbau

represented the German Jewish immigration.

All of these representatives

agreed to a preliminary meeting which would also be joined by delegates
of a few other groups:

the VC-GATU and the Workmen's Choirs as Popular

Front groups, the Neue Volkszeitung as a Social Democratic newspaper,
the conservative Staatszeitung of Ridder, the conservative Vereinigte
Deutsche Gesellschaften (United German Societies) of Greater New York,
the Karl Schurz Turnerbund and "possibly" the Steuben Society if a top
22

rbid., p. 31, David Karr to Alan Cranston, 12 August 1942,
re: Dr. Shuster.
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leader was available who had not been "too pro-Nazi in the past".

This

preliminary meeting would decide what other organizations should be
invited to join the UAGD and to help prepare the national convention.
According to Rutz, "all persons contacted expressed a desire to get
going and promised to forget their past differences".

23

The difficulties of the preliminary UAGD committee soon became
apparent.

The conservative groups held back so that the two left

factions were over-represented.

The proceedings were slow and the

second meeting was only held on November 17 at Hunter College.
formed three committees:

It

a convention committee was to set the place

and date of the convention and formulate an agenda, an organization
committee was to prepare "a list of a thousand or more organizations"
which would be invited to send delegates, and a third committee was to
take care of the financial aspects of the convention.

Among the three

members of the convention committee were Seger, as chairman, and Rosenfeld.

To the four members of the organization committee belonged Katz

and two representatives of the VC-GATU, one of whom was also an editor
of the German American.

In the three member financial committee, the

Popular Front was represented by a DAKV leader.

As a result, the Social

Democrats were unhappy with "the Rosenfeld group" which had four delegates in the three committees and introduced another two members who
had not been invited, one from the VC-GATU and one from the DAKV.

But

Rutz was more troubled by the general predominance of "the two left
23

Ibid., pp. 34-35, Henry Rutz to Alan Cranston, 17 September
1942, re: New York situation.
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factions", especially since "the six or seven groups representing the
conservative societies" did not attend the second meeting.

He was

still optimistic about getting them to the third meeting and about the
UAGD convention in general.

With some contradiction, he described the

meeting as "a very harmonious affair with the different factions
patting each other on the back and all factions giving the government
a big hand for the work it has done to date in getting the groups
together".
1943.

But the date of the convention was postponed to mid-January

24
The strength of the Popular Front in the preliminary committees

and the enthusiastic Popular Front campaign for the UAGD convention
bothered the OWl and the GLD.

The GAEC had prepared for a national

all-German American conference of its own.
favor of the more promising OWl plan.

25

Then it dropped its own in

In September 1942 the German

American had already spoken out in favor of the UAGD and exhorted all
the factions to exercise mutual restraint.

Certain labor groups were

reprimanded for their reservations about sitting down at the same table
with formerly pro-Hitler groups whose "loyal members" must be helped
"to clean their house".

26

The Labor Conference of the VC-GATU and the

Midwest Labor Conference of January 1943,sponsored by the GAAAL, discussed "the issues to be raised at the convention of the UAGD".

Rutz

became concerned with this identification of the UAGD with the GAAAL.
24

Ibid., pp. 39, 40, Henry Rutz to Alan Cranston, 25 November
1942, re: New York Conference.
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rbid., September 1942, pp. 1, 12.
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He had "hoped to rally some of the working class groups which have been
'taken in' by the Anti-Axis League" to a prospective Midwestern convention of the UAGD.

But he felt that the GAAAL conference was "not going

to make it easier for us to attract the large German American organizations in Chicago to our proposed conference".

He was equally concerned

about the pro-UAGD propaganda of the New York Labor Conference and the
German American.

11

If this publicity goes out into the general German

American press", Rutz feared "additional arguments" at the next meeting
with conservative German American leaders on 20 January 1943.

27

It was a quarrel between the conservatives and the Social Democrats which eventually caused the failure of the UAGD convention and
the withdrawal of the OWI and the GLD.

It led to a temporary resigna-

tion from the UAGD by Ridder in December 1942.

According to Rutz,

"things had been going smoothly" when this episode occurred.

A repre-

sentative of the OWl was assigned to attend all the committee and
subcommittee meetings of the UAGD.
office for her daily paperwork.
for the convention.

Ridder provided the space in his

He had also promised to raise $3,000

Its detailed program was to be approved at the

next meeting of the preliminary committee.

At this point, Ridder was

attacked by the administrative chairman of the New York Anti-Nazi
Labor League, of whose executive board Seger was a member.
probably the AFL sponsored Anti-Nazi Labor League.
27

It was

The latter

Institut !ur Zeitgeschichte, Deutschsprachige Presse in den
USA, 1941-1945, pp. 44-46, Rutz to Cranston, 9 January 1943, re: German
organizations in Chicago; also, Rutz to Cranston, 9 January 1943,
re: German American Trade Union Victory Conference in New York.
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threatened to expose the alleged Nazi domination of an annual bazaar
for the benefit of poor German American families in New York, of
which Ridder was the chairman.

Unless the latter asked for the resig-

nation of the objectionable officials, the League would send an open
letter to the press.

Shuster and Rutz tried to mediate between the

League and Ridder but they could not prevent the threatened publicity.
After that, conservative leaders like Theobald Dengler, the head of the
Treasury Bond Drive among German Americans and the chairman of the
German American USO Committee in New York, agreed that Ridder should
take no further risks by enlisting conservative leaders for the UAGD.
Rutz met for six hours with Seger, Shuster, and Sattler before the
scheduled UAGD meeting, without succeeding to patch up these differences.

The UAGD meeting discussed the Ridder affair and wondered

whether German American unity was still possible instead of considering
and ratifying the convention program of the UAGD subcommittees.
thing was postponed until after another appeasement trial.

Every-

Rutz was

asked to stay in New York and either induce Ridder to reconsider or
persuade the conservative leaders to cooperate without Ridder.
resigned from the executive board of the Anti-Nazi League.

Seger

Despite

this concession, Shuster and Dengler also threatened to drop out of
the UAGD.
convention.

Under these circumstances, the OWI lost interest in the UAGD
28

Rosenfeld still tried to salvage the convention.
that there were no differences of political opinion.
28

He emphasized

There was only a

rbid., pp. 41-42, Rutz to Cranston, 15 December 1942, re:
Ridder's resignation from German American Conference.
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distrust of intentions, that is, a deeper seated issue of which the
Ridder affair was only a symptom.

He asserted that there would be an

equitable distribution of delegates and speaker assignments at the
convention and that only unanimous decisions would be valid.

29

But

with the withdrawal of the OWI, the UAGD lost its attraction for a
GLD that would not be caught associating freely with Popular Front
groups.

The latter and some of the conservatives, including Ridder,

stayed on and tried to make the UAGD function.
The relationship between the Popular Front and the conservatives
was complex.

It is not clear what the latter expected to gain from

their membership in the UAGD.

For Ridder and his publishing enter-

prise, it meant welcome government protection instead of harassment.
The absence of the GLD was also a plus because the latter was less
tolerant towards German American media than the Popular Front.

Shuster

was genuinely antifascist, but the few conservative leaders were careful not to cooperate too closely with the Popular Front.

They consen-

ted only to projects that centered around government programs.

The

Popular Front exploited the latter for its own purposes as best it
could.

It tried desperately to make the conservatives comfortable and

commit them to a national convention which was the main cause of their
discomfort.

In one of the conservative initiatives, the Loyal Ameri-

cans of German Descent tried to rally the German Americans in a protest
meeting against the National Socialist persecution of the European
Jews, without much response from either the German Americans or the
29G erman Amer~can,
.
March 1943.
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German Jewish refugees.

Ridder organized_a dinner meeting of old UAGD

officials and a number of new leaders from somewhat unpolitical singing,
sports, and dialect groups.

.
f or a
lai d t h e f oun d at~on

w~.

For the German American, this modest event

d er

.

rang~ng

30
German Amer~can
.
· ·
coa 1 ~t~on.

In July 1943, the Committee of the United German Organizations of New
York became interested in more ·cohesion among its member .organizations
and in a more patriotic program.

The GAEC urged the UAGD to use the

opportunity for tying this conservative group closer to the United
.
Amer~cans.

31

The third Labor Conference of the VC-GATU in December 1943 was
again timed to generate momentum for a prospective national convention
in January 1944.

A timely front-page editorial of the German American

appealed for overcoming mutual prejudices.

It claimed that the wall of

alienation between progressive and bourgeois German Americans had been
skillfully erected by National Socialist propaganda.

A national con-

vention would therefore be a defeat for National Socialism.

The

progressive groups should not thoughtlessly suspect the conservatives
of National Socialist sympathies and the bourgeois groups should shed
their prejudices against the laborites "as dangerous radicals".

32

In

order to facilitate better harmony, the German American portrayed the
Popular Front as the work of the centrist Rosenfeld.

Even after his

death, the latter was still of symbolic memorial value in the convention

30Th ~'d . ' June 1943, p. 2.
31Th.~ d . ' July 1943,
P· 12.
32
Ibid., January 1944, pp. 1' 3.
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publicity of the Popular Front.

This approach was helpful.

Even Ridder

stated that "America could use mapy more Kurt Rosenfelds", which did
not necessarily apply to the Popular Front.

33

None of the communist

leaders of the Popular Front stepped into Rosenfeld's shoes.

Instead,

the centrist Sattler joined in a triumvirate of prominent togetherness
with Ridder and Shuster.
But the conservatives in the UAGD were only ready for a War
Bond rally in February 1944 in cooperation with the German American War
Bond Committee of the Treasury Department whose chairman was also a
UAGD leader.

The German American defined

th~

stone in the history of the German Americans".

rally as "a stepping
Purchases of $6 million

in War Bonds were made, which was only possible if some of the fraternal
organizations invested part of their insurance funds.

The UAGD had

been "a loosely knit central body of organizations" 'ivhose unity was
"hindered ... by politics·, economic vie';vs or religious convictions".
After the rally, the UAGD 'tvas to become "a permanent organization''.
The GAEC thanked the UAGD which had made it possible "for the first
time in this war

to unify the various German American groups by

eliminating the overemphasis of divisive issues".

The Popular Front

paper was confident that "the movement of unification of the Americans
of German Descent will irresistably march on".

The VC-GATU planned

another Labor Conference in preparation for a national convention.
The conservatives were more cautious and warned the Popular
33
34

rbid., 1 October 1944, p. 5.
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Front against too far-reaching goals.
can

~.Jar

The chairman of the German Ameri-

Bond Conunittee and UAGD leader, Dengler, described the rally

as "an occasion where the various parties put aside their differences
as to politics, their opinions as to economics and their beliefs as to
religion".
Bonds.

This was a tribute to the collection of $6 million of War

In a subsequent GAEC meeting, Dengler suggested getting together

on "similar patriotic and conununity endeavors" like a Red Cross drive
or a USO campaign.

But he disagreed "with some of my friends that such

unity as I speak of should be strongly pressed and hurriedly urged".
He thought that "it should come by itself" and that it must "necessarily
be slow".

He did "most certainly ... not want any single individual

dictating to us" but he hoped that agreement on the above community
programs would "create that intimate connection and exchange of opinions
which will foster greater harmony and a spirit of appreciating each
other's viewpoint".

He opposed attempts "to inject controversial sub-

. t s " Ln
. t o th e wor k o f unL. f LcatLon.
.
. - 35
Jec
convention.

The UAGD never held a national

Before the next target date of January 1945, the re-

election of President Roosevelt intervened as a divisive issue between
laborite and conservative German Americans.

Then, the impending end of

the war took the patriotic pressure off the conservatives while the
Popular Front could no longer disregard the issues of postwar reconstruction.
To the Popular Front it became obvious that the UAGD would
never settle down enough for a discussion of postwar policies which had
35

Ib;d.,
AprL'1 1944·, p. 3 .
....
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been delayed by the organizational problems of the United Americans.
Even the Aufbau had been optimistic.

It had considered the War Bond

rally as "a cultural and political activation

... which will exert

its influence over the questions of the German future".

36

But if the

conservatives could not be lured to a national convention they could
even less be talked into support of Popular Front postwar policies.
In this situation, Faber tried to circumvent the UAGD.
the secretary of both the VC-GATU and the UAGD.

He was by then

Yet, he chose to form

a new German American coalition around the issue of presidential reelection.
Roosevelt.

As former isolationists, the conservatives did not like
It was patriotically possible for them to oppose a presi-

dent who wanted an unprecedented fourth term.

But the Popular Front

had always staked all its American hopes on Roosevelt.

Faber formed,

therefore, the Independent National Committee of German Americans for
the Reelection of FDR (INC).
new committee.

The American Turners participated in the

Their national chairman, a German American judge and

former congressman from Detroit, became the chairman of the INC.
served as secretary-treasurer.

Faber

After the reelection of Roosevelt, the

INC continued as a general German American National Committee and put
its "energy into the further service of German American-dom". 37

The

German American supported this strategy editorially so that the INC
replaced the UAGD in Popular Front publicity.

Faber entitled a front

36

Aufbau, 1934 to date, published by the German Jewish Club
in New York, 18 February 1944.
37G erman Amer~can,
.
1 October 1944, p. 1; 15 December 1944, p. 3;
15 February 1945, p. 1.
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page editorial:

'~at

we German Americans need".

His answer to this

rhetorical question was "a national leadership and a national representation".

Besides discussions with UAGD officials like Ridder in New

York, talks began in December 1944 in New York, Chicago, Detroit and
Milwaukee with other German American public figures like Judge Joseph
Gutknecht of Chicago, the chairman of the German American War Bond
Committee there.

Faber conceded that there was "little need for a new

individual organization". But he professed his intention of winning
thousands of existing German American organizations for the program of
the INc.

38
During its association with the UAGD, the Popular Front made

numerous appeals for German American and German emigrant unity.

These

were meant as propaganda for the UAGD or any other possible coalition.
They also played a role in the ongoing arguments about the necessary
war and postwar treatment of Germany which will be discussed in the
last part of this chapter.

One of these appeals was made in January

1943 at the occasion of the Rhineland Conference in Germany.

The latter

was a Popular Front coalition of the German underground movement to
which the German American devoted its entire issue of February 1943.
The information about it carne from the New York daily press rather than
through any direct channels.

This conference was attended by a Catholic

priest, a Reichswehr captain rather than a Wehrmacht captain, a member
of the former Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National People's
Party), representatives of the SPD and of the KPD, railroad and metal
38

rbid., 1 February 1945, p. 1.
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industry unionists, rural representatives and even a member of a
National Socialist opposition group.
Popular Front requirements.

Its composition fulfilled all

The conference had issued a manifesto

with a ten-point program that was broadcast over the illegal station of
the Deutsche Volkssender (German People's Station).

It demanded an

immediate end to German military operations, advocated the overthrow
of the Hitler regime and the formation of "a national democratic
government for peace".

It appealed to Germans of all social classes,

religions, and parties,but gave little advice beyond the advocacy of
sabotage.

In keeping with a proper Popular Front program, it was

economically vague promising nothing more than work, just pay and an
eight hour day.

Applying the principle of the tip of the iceberg,

Rosenfeld saw in the conference the makings of "a great national German
peace movement" and considered its manifesto as "a historic document".
The Rhineland Conference called in his opinion especially for the unification of the German Americans and for a national conference that
would pledge its support to "justice for the German people".

Finally,

it should be the occasion for a conference of the German emigration
"from the bourgeoisie to the communists", in the United States and
abroad.

The manifesto represented in his view "a vivid platform for

the unification of the political German emigration".

39

In the opinion

of the novelist Carl Zuckmayer, the conference called for "the common
front of freedom" of all emigrants and Germans in other countries
39

Ibid., February 1943, pp. 5, 6.
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especially as a pressure group for positive Allied war aims.

40

Another potential catalyst for the unfication of German Americans and German emigrants was the formation of the National-Komitee
Freies Deutschland (NKFD, National Committee for a Free Germany) in
Moscow in the summer of 1943.

The latter was a Popular Front committee

of literary and political emigrants and of German war prisoners,
especially officers.

Their ideologically generous manifesto could

appeal even to disaffected National Socialists.

It aimed at the dis-

integration and possibly the overthrow of the Hitler regime as an
alternative to Allied occupation, especially from the West, and to
unconditional surrender.

The German American considered the National

Committee as "a visible center" of the German anti-Hitler movement and
its formation as "a step that benefits all peoples".

It hoped that

this committee would have a revolutionary effect on the German anti.
f asc~st

. .
oppos~t~on.

41

Alf re d Nor d en, one of the writers of the German

American, wished that "the German emigration in the United States [and]
the German Americans put aside the old party barriers". 42

Zuckmayer

thought that the Moscow manifesto presented an opportunity and offered
the basis on which to unite "here, too, the divided German emigration
for

C

• • t ~at~ves
• .
11 43
ammon Stat emen t s an d common ~n~
.

When Committees of

Free Germans were formed in England, Mexico, and France, only the
40
41
42
43
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German Americans and the German emigrants in the United States fell
behind this international movement, in the opinion of the German
American.

The Free German movement was "gaining ground everywhere"

and ought to be extended into the United States.
special issue of the Solidarity to the NKFD.

Sattler devoted a

Another AKStK official,

who was also the assistant secretary of the GAEC, considered the decisions of the Benefit Fund convention of October 1943 as "a minimum
program that can be submitted to all German American groups, a program
that will lead to unity".

44

In this mood, the German American Popular Front tried to keep
all doors open, even those which were already closed.

It assumed a

conciliatory attitude towards the Social Democratic Landeskonferenz
(National Convention)_ of June 1943 in New York City.

The latter was

a reorganization effort that disdained even a socialist concentration
without communists.

Nevertheless, the German American approved the pro-

gram of the National Convention as barely distinctive from "the program of various left oriented Social Democratic or communist emigrant
groups".

45

One of the Popular Front motives for this moderation was

the desire to tone down the reaction of the GLD to the NKFD and the
Free Germany movement.
latter.

But the GLD lost no time in rejecting the

In an article of the New York Tribune, Katz ridiculed the

intimation "between the lines" of the manifesto that the German people
"have nothing to fear from Russia" and considered it as an invitation
44
45
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to go "over to (the Russian] side".

46

He insisted that the Soviet

Union wanted to make a deal with the Reichs>vehr.

In a letter to the

editor, Rosenfeld objected to this "speculative and dangerous interpretation of the manifesto". 47

Sattler was unhappy because the GLD called

the manifesto a communist document only because it had been elaborated
in Moscow.

But the rejection by Hedwig Wachenheim at the October con-

vention of the AKStK was even more polemical.
NKFD promises everything to everybody".
especially to a second front.

She thought that "the

In this context, she objected

It would facilitate the plans which the

Soviet Union promoted by their sponsorship of the NKFD.

The armies of

the Reichswehr were to be maintained and relieved on the Eastern front
by a separate peace so that they could fight with better concentration
"against the Anglo-Saxon Allies".
this opportunity.

The latter should not give them

The German American called Wachenheim's speech "an

abuse of the AKStK".

As health insurance, the latter ought to have

spared its members the stench of "the living corpses" of outdated
anti-Russian propaganda.

48

-While the UAGD was dragging its feet, the abovementioned Free
World Association offered an opportunity 'for unification.

The German

American supported its preparation of "a big rally of the German emigration and of the German Americans" in October 1943.

But no more was

heard of it and no Free Germany Committee was formed in the United
46
47
48
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States.

In the spring of 1944, the Popular Front emigrants were able

to participate in an emigrant coalition organized by the American
Friends of German Freedom.

This was the Council for a Democratic

Germany which will be discussed in the last chapter.

Besides this

CDG and the precarious INC, there were eventually only the original
Popular Front constituents, that is, the GAEC, the VC-GATU, the GAAAL,
and the German American, to promote leftist plans for postwar recon.

struct~on.

49

The Popular Front had an internationalist approach to reconstruction.

It wanted peace at home and abroad and did not separate

domestic from foreign issues.

A peaceful postwar world depended on

the coexistence between socialism and capitalism with the necessary
compromises in disputed areas like central Europe.
Nations was its diplomatic cornerstone.

A peacetime United

In this design, the positions

of Russia and Germany were ambivalent which benefitted the former and
hurt the latter.

In the socialist context, Russia was the only hope

for the future and deserved support.

During the war, the Popular Front

advocated, therefore, Allied aid to Russia and a second front in the
West.

In this same context,

German~

stronghold, was a fallen member.

which had once been a socialist

It was in need of rehabilitation

optimally by an antifascist revolution and in need of reeducation, but
also deserved the protection of the Soviet Union.

In this unequal rela-

tionship, Germany could lose when it deserved punishment for insufficient regeneration and when the concerns of the Russian protector took
49
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precedence over those of her protege.

In the pragmatic context, all

diplomatic deals were acceptable for what they were worth to Russia.
Thus, the new Eastern border could be rationalized in several ways.
In general, the Popular Front was pro-German as far as possible.
case of conflict, its pro-Russianism usually won out.

In

But some German

American Popular Front members had a harder time dealing with their
German nationalism.
The second front was first necessary to relieve the Soviet
Union of military pressure and then to make her victory as good as
possible.

The German American started campaigning for a second front

in June 1942.
warfare.

Schreiner was its specialist in military and political

He resented the explanation of the German disaster in

Stalingrad by a miracle rather than by the high morale of the Russian
armies and the Russian people.

But the second front was still neces-

sary to keep the German armies from regrouping.
lost.

The war could still be

Its outcome should not be jeopardized by the postponement of a

Western front.

At times, he was so optimistic that he thought with

such a front Hitler could be defeated in 1943.
an Allied landing in Western France.
were "not the real second front".

North Africa, Sicily and Italy

They were, at best, good prelimin-

aries for an attack across the Channel.
twoards the "air warfare extremists".
lead to fast results.

He was emphatic about

He took the same attitude
Bombing campaigns would not

In the meantime, the Soviet Union would have to

keep sacrificing its soldiers and carry the main burden of the war.
To Schreiner, the second front was the test of sincerity of the alliance.

When it finally materialized in June 1944, it did so for the

327
wrong reasons of which the major one was the advance of the Russian
armies.

50

But the GAEC, the GAAAL and the VC-GATU welcomed it with a

joint D-Day declaration.
.

German Am er~can
W~th

.

un~ty.

It was still expected to serve the cause of

51

the progress of the war, the emigrant question "What is

to become of Germany?" became central.

With a victorious Russia and a

superior West, nothing could save Germany from an unprecedented annihilation except drastic changes at home.

The communist emigrants of

the Popular Front understood the realities of rehabilitation which only
a German revolution could achieve.

They were more uninhibited in their

views because they were not afraid of a strong Russian influence in
Germany.

The centrists were more realistic about the probability of a

German revolution.

With somewhat more nationalistic concern than their

partners, they hoped that "the other Germany" would find Allied consideration even it if did not pass the ultimate test.

Because of

these divergencies in their views, the political line of the German
American, the GAEC and the other Popular Front groups was often ambivalent.

The GAEC had its first forum on "the future of Germany',' in

late November 1942. Bonheim established the junctim

between the right

of the Germans to "decide their own destiny" and the overthrow of'
Hitler.

Johann R. Becher, the later composer of the East German nation-

al anthem, emphasized the urgency of the German situation in a poem
50
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entitled "Noch eine Stunde".
make up their minds.
Allies.

That was all the German people had to

But Rosenfeld still expected changes from the

He belabored a theme that was designed to impress them when

he stated that "we cannot win the war, and it will be more difficult to
win the peace without our ally inside Germany".

He recommended Stalin

who had said that "the Hitlers are coming and going but the German
people will remain".

Rosenfeld argued that "if Joseph Stalin ... can

make such a statement then it must be certain that there exists a
Germany which will help to defeat Hitler and bring about a revolution".
But it needed Allied encouragement.

Alfred Kantorowicz established

"the other Germany" by a different deduction.

He based it on the num-

ber of National Socialist executions and encampments implying that
they reached only a percentage of the German opposition.

He did not

consider the alternative that especially a National Socialist dictatorship would indulge in overkill.

52

Rosenfeld felt encouraged at the occasion of the Rhineland
Conference.

The communists used the latter more as a stimulus for

Popular Front unity in America.

But Rosenfeld felt also on more solid

ground "from the standpoint of shaping the postwar world and of answering the much discussed question:

What is to become of Germany?"

He

expected the Allies to express their solidarity with the Rhineland
peace manifesto by guaranteeing "the national existence and independence of Germany".
52
53

53

Feuchtwanger and Tillich also believed in the

rbid., December 1942, p. 3.
rbid., February 1943, pp. 5, 6.

p
329
importance of the German underground movement.

To Zuckmayer, the

Rhineland Conference proved the existence of "a determined opposition
in Germany . . . . All hopes for a future, free and really democratic
Germany rest on this opposition".

He did not mention the unconditional

need for a stronger manifestation of this opposition.

According to a

German American fraternal leader, the conference was a good opportunity
for reminding German Americans of their duty to oppose "the Reaction"
whose plans for postwar Germany had just surfaced in an article of
April 1943 by Kingsbury Smith in the American Mercury.

It alleged

State Department plans for the decentralization of Germany.

Even

Walter Winchell discussed the manifesto of the conference extensively
in a radio commentary of March 21.

The German American mass-distribu-

ted a special leaflet about the conference entitled "The signs of
awakening".

54

When the National Committee for a Free Germany was formed in
Moscow, Bonheim was especially interested in its revolutionary effect
on the German underground.·

In his speech at the American Soviet

Friendship Congress in November 1943 in New York, he insisted that
"only by participating in the final struggle against the Nazis, will
[the German people] win the right to decide upon their own fate.

This

is the only way of saving the very existence ... of the German nation
... to avoid the dismemberment of Germany [and the] destruction of her
. d ustr1.es
.
11 55
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.
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At a later stage in the war, the same differences between the
communist and centrist Popular Front members surfaced in the debate
over the issue of unconditional surrender.

Rosenfeld thought that the

latter should not preclude an Allied interest in the German underground, the German emigration and political warfare.

Unconditional

surrender should be expected only of the National Socialist establishment in which his "five points" included those groups who served as
the economic and social basis of National Socialism in traditional
socialist theory.

The German masses, however, should be convinced

"that the United Nations are their friends" who do not plan the dismemberment of Germany.

This commitment to political warfare would

speed up the war considerably,in his opinion.

To Rosenfeld, UN cooper-

ation "with the enormous democratic forces ·within Germany" would prove
that the Allies were engaged in "a war against National Socialism and
not against the democratic development of the German people" which
alone could guarantee German pacifism.

In the unqualified sense, he

opposed unconditional surrender as well as "the continuous bombing of
the Reich",which Katz kept applauding in the NVz. 56
Especially towards the end of the war, the German American
tended to support the policy of unconditional surrender.

In January

1945, it severely reprimanded Dorothy Thompson, the pro-German comrnentator, for claiming that the cause of Allied military problems was the
policy of unconditional surrender.

Her series of articles in the New

York Post under the heading "Why Germany can not surrender" was counter-

56

Ib1.' d., J u 1y 1943 ' p. 13 .
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productive in the view of her critics.

It "strengthened all Nazis and

pro-Nazis in this and in other countries . . . . The demise of the
formula ... would be a moral victory of the first order for the Hitler
regime.

According to the German American, it was erroneous to believe

that her polemics against the policy of Casablance could shorten the
war.

57

Kruse, the leader of the GAAAL, came, however, to the defense

of Dorothy Thompson in the next issue of the German American.

In his

opinion, she had only urged an explanation of the policy of unconditional surrender by the Allies who should "particularize their policy
toward the various categories of Germans".

The Popular Front did not

concede that this Allied policy implied a punitive treatment of Germany.
It only meant that "nobody will negotiate with the Nazi regime"
Popular Front relied on the United Nations.

58

The

Whatever that alliance in

which a victorious Russia would have a strong voice would present as a
policy towards Germany would be acceptable to it.
But Popular Front propaganda experienced more and more problems
with United Nations policy.

It knew, however, how to handle them.

There were still safe issues on which any Popular Front member could
speak out without prejudicing actual developments.
reeducation of Germans and German war prisoners.
procrastinating issue.

One of them was
This was also a

It centered on the proper German state of mind

which could still be judged insufficient if necessary.

The INC had

ambitiously proclaimed its interest in "What is to be done with
57
58

Ibid., 1 January 1945, p. 2; 15 February 1943, p. 3.
Ibid., 1 March 1945, p. 11.
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Germany?".

Yet, it did little more than center on reeducation.

Its

chairman advocated the dispatch of "a special commission to Germany
to educate the people into the practical workings of a free democracy
[sic] ".

Faber headed an INC delegation to Washington for discussions

with several government departments.

He proposed to Secretary of

State Stettinius a German American delegation "to inspect Germany".
He also applied to the War Department and to General Eisenhower.

In

order to substantiate his request, he made the exorbitant claim that
the nearly six million German Americans in this country were "in one
way or another attached to organizations affiliated with our council 11 •

59

The GAAAL and the VC-GATU paid special attention to the reeducation of German war prisoners.

The GAAAL arranged forums for the dis-

cussion and the publicity of the POW question.
"American way of handling German war prisoners".

Kruse proposed an
He objected to

allowing National Socialist prisoners to terrorize antifascist POW's.
Some cases of torture and even of executions were reported.

Kruse

recommended to keep the common soldiers separate and to organize them
according to municipal and regional origins in the form of discussion
groups in order to develop nuclei of democratic regeneration.

One of

the GAAAL forums was held at the International Relations Center on
East Randolph Street.

It attracted representatives from the army, the

OCD, and the Chicago Civil Liberties Union.
was one of the main GAAAL participants.
59

Besides Kruse, Schrotter

He was also a consultant of

..
IbLd., 15 May 1945, p. 3; 1 July 1945, p. 3.

333

the OCD in its Psychological Warfare Commission.

60

William L. Shirer

concurred with all these attempts of "stamping out Nazism among prisoners of war".

61

The VC-GATU, which was also headed by Faber, concerned itself
with the reeducation of POW's rather than with an inspection of Germany,
which was more safely requested by the INC.

Faber was especially in-

censed over the p.olicy of releasing the officers before the other men.
The Office of the Provost Marshal General and its POW Division adhered
strictly to the stipulations of the Geneva convention.
also did not have to work.

The officers

The preferential return of some fifty

thousand officers to Germany "as useless Nazis" seemed unjust to Faber.
He had also problems with distributing the German American in the
camps.

The censorship office of the POW Division objected to "the

extreme anti-Nazi views" of the Popular Front paper.

They might be

"misunderstood" by the POW's and "encourage political dissension" among
them in violation of the Geneva convention.
American was admitted to the camps.

Eventually, the German

Faber considered two hundred twelve

subscriptions in one camp alone as a success.

The NVZ had to overcome

similar objections to its distribution in the camps.

62

Another safe issue for the Popular Front was the economic system
of postwar Germany.

Russia did not expect to gain anything from a

60

Ibid., February 1944, p. 12; 1 May 1944, p. 2; 15 May 1944,
p. 9; 1 June 1944, p. 5.
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German deindustrialization.

Schreiner editorialized that Morgenthau-

like plans competed with National Socialism in using racism as a theory
of political domination.

Their brand was Vansittartism which claimed

.
tat
t h e German peop 1 e h a d ~nnate
h

.

aggress~ve

.

.

~nst~ncts.

63

I none o f

the forums of the German American which was entitled "What about
Germany?", Schreiner shared the speaking assignments with William
Dodd,Jr., the later ambassador to West Germany.

Their joint topic was

"Germany's economy --destruction or nationalization?".

Schreiner

considered the second alternative as the only promising approach to
the problem of the German question.

He advocated nationalization,

without compensation, of the large estates, the big banks, the key
industries,and foreign trade,in order to destroy "the economic war
criminals".

This nationalized sector could be left under Allied con-

trol as long as international security required.

This degree of nation-

alization would not amount to socialism which was for Schreiner objectively the most appropriate system for Germany, but it was politically
undesirable.

Socialism had to leave precedence to the maintenance of

peace, that is, of the East-West coalition of the United Nations.

The

system of Schreiner would be a good compromise between the interests
of Western capitalism and Eastern socialism.

Deindustrialization would

bring destitution to nearly thirty-five million workers.

They would

willingly accept arms from abroad and fight in the interests of a
great power which Schreiner did not specify.

A Vansittartist solution

would accomplish the opposite of its desired objective.
63

Ibid., February 1944, p. 6.

It would de-
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prive Germany of "the basis for becoming a peaceful, democratic
state".

64

The Popular Front generally appreciated the anti-Vansittar-

tist attitude of the GLD on the economic issue.

A GAAAL meeting of

January 1944 passed a resolution that deprecated "blanket slurs against
representatives of the Social Democratic Party of Germany".

In this

case, it defended Seger and Marek whose book "Germany, to be or not to
be" had been criticized by the Vansittartist Society for the Prevention
of World

~.J'ar

III.

65

The territorial issue became the main ideological dividing
line between the Popular Front and the 9ther German and German American
socialists.

The former tried desperately to find positive interpreta-

tions for the decisions of Teheranl Yalta, and Potsdam.

It dealt with

.territorial issues only in toto as the dismemberment of Germany which
it was safe to reject.

But when equivocation became impossible,as on

the question of the new Eastern frontier of Germany, it sided with the
Soviet Union.

After the Conference of Teheran, the German American

impressed on the German Americans, the German emigrants and their organizations "the responsibility of supporting the decisions of the Moscow
Conference of Allied foreign ministers".

The latter agreed mainly on

closer Allied military cooperation a few months before the opening of
a Western front.

64
65

But the Popular Front paper centered its attention

rbid., 1 December 1944, pp. 5, 9.

Ibid., 1 February 1944, p. 12; the Society for the Prevention
of World War III was founded in December 1943. It was headed by Rex
Stout,a writer of detective stories, and included such emigrants as
Friedrich ~vilhelm F'orster and Emil Ludwig.
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on side issues.

The statement about the severe punishment of war

criminals encouraged the German American to believe in an Allied "distinction between them and the rest of the Germans, clearly and unmistakably".

The Popular Front paper claimed that the Moscow decisions

disappointed those who advocated the condemnation of the German people
as a unit and the dismemberment, deindustrialization and unlimited
military occupation of Germany.
ble and the easiest to refute.

These were the strongest terms possi-

66

Later, the Popular Front unreservedly hailed the decisions of
Yalta and Potsdam.

67

The annual Eastern Conference of the VC-GATU in

April 1945 proposed to organize support for the decisions of the Yalta
Conference.

68

The German American was mainly interested in the main-

tenance of the UN alliance which meant collective

secu~ity

for Russia.

Without the United Nations, the Soviet Union would be confronted with
"a new cordon sanitaire".

69

The German American criticized the NVZ

and the New Leader for publicity in that sense which anticipated the
Cold War.

It also deplored the anticommunist reaction of Shuster to

the Yalta Conference.

The UAGD official dwelt on "the Elbe line" as

the future divider between the Western and "the Russian part of Germany".

70

The Popular Front socialists were uncomfortable with this
66

German American, December 1943, pp. 5, 6.
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anticipation of the Cold War.

They protested against this discussion

of "a dismemberment of the German unity and a destruction of the German
national future".

But the new Eastern frontier and the transfer of

German populations were accepted as consequences of German aggression.
The German American observed that the Allied powers could not "find any
extenuating circumstances for the misdeeds of the Germans against other
countries".

.It emphasized "the responsibility of the German people"

which had not redeemed itself by an antifascist uprising.

71

In the GAAAL, there was dissension over these issues.

Jaeger

thought that the whole German people was responsible for the National
Socialist atrocities and rejected the idea of extenuating circumstances.
He motioned to dissolve the GAAAL rather than getting involved in a
discussion of postwar and especially territorial issues.
German majority did not put the motion to a vote.

But the pro-

Instead, the name

of the League was "temporarily, at least" changed to German American
Anti-Fascist League.
issues.

Kruse pressed for the discussion of the sensitive

He opposed "a purely punitive dismemberment of Germany" but

considered the transfer of East Prussian Estates to Polish farmers as
.

equ~ta

bl e. 72
Its lack of territorial nationalism excluded the Popular Front

from association with the other German and German American socialists.
The Popular Front emigrants participated in the Council for a Democratic Germany which split, however, over the Eastern territorial
71

.
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question.

The German Labor Delegation was equally exclusive in follow-

ing the opposite ideology of the Popular Front, an uncompromising anticommunism and nationalism.

It pinned all its hopes on the Western

Allies, especially the United States, at a time when the latter was
still tied to Russia in the UN alliance.

In this sense, the GLD an-

ticipated the times of postwar Western inflexibility which contributed
to the results against which it polemicized.

CHAPTER IX
THE GERMAN LABOR DELEGATION: REORGANIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
Reorganization was necessary to give credibility to the plans
for reconstruction.

But the GLD was handicapped in its quest for reor-

ganization because of the position which it had assumed in the German
socialist emigration and which it was unwilling to abandon.

To make

matters worse, the GLD experienced serious internal difficulties.

They

were precariously resolved with the resignation of its chairman and his
replacement by two co-equal chairmen.

Each of them represented a fac-

tion within an already small GLD, a state of affairs which contributed
to the problems of reorganization and reconstruction.

The GLD reorgan-

ization took the form of a Landeskonferenz (National Convention) in
July 1943.

It arrived at this format by fighting off pressures from

within itself and from the Sopade for a genuine reorganization, that is,
of a democratic expansion and an intersocialist cooperation.
National Convention did not reach new members.
idate the old GLD.

Thus, the

It did not even consol-

Individual members at the conference spoke sometimes

in their own name only.

The conference generated little momentum.

ensuing initiatives of the GLD lacked persistence.
Under these circumstances, the GLD plans for reconstruction
were inconsistent.

The majority of the GLD tried to deal with its

fears of a victorious Soviet Union by bespeaking the panacea of a
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German revolution, that is, of a political revolution without much
socialist content.

The more socialist minority was not interested in

a rather bourgeois revolution.

It accepted early an Allied occupation

of Germany as the outcome of military defeat.

The controversy between

these· two groups marked the National Convention and the later initiatives
of the GLD until, towards the end of 1944, some of the optimists despaired of their revolutionary hopes.

In this emergency situation, the

GLD and the NVZ centered on the territorial issues of postwar reconstruction.
Germany and
rity.

They ignored American proposals for a dismemberment of
focused on the Russian threats to German territorial integ-

They sought refuge in the advocacy of an Atlantic community and

warned the Western Allies against appeasing the Soviet Union.
Easter Declaration of 1945 expressed these concerns.

Their

In this anticipa-

tion of the Cold War, the GLD and the NVZ were a few years ahead of the
times. When the American government continued to compromise with Russia
at the expense of Germany, they finally became anti-American.

They

turned against Washington which was the pillar of all their plans for
postwar reconstruction.

In this impulse of self-destruction, the GLD

nearly hanged itself with its own ideological rope.
At the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943, the GLD was nearly
paralyzed by intrigues.
a critical state".

He regarded it no longer as "a corporative represen-

tation of the party".
1

Stampfer thought that the Delegation was "in

1

It consisted then only of ten members, including

Stampfer to Sopade, 25 August 1942, Matthias and Link, Mit dem
Gesicht nach Deutschland, Nr. 133, p. 561.
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Rinner who had rejoined it.

The main problems within this small body

concerned "purely personal things like the qualification in intellect
and character" of certain members, mainly of its chairman Grzesinsky
and of its secretary, Katz.

Everybody objected to the continued chair-

manship of the former because of his "indomitable supervisor temperament".

More than half of the GLD members, including Rinner, but not

Stampfer, also wished to discard Katz.

If this majority would not

change its mind, there would be, in Stampfer's assessment, "no cooperation and no activity at all".
this situation".

He did not know "how we will get out of

As a temporary solution, he tried to collaborate with

Katz and Brauer without the chairman.

He deplored the paralysis of the

GLD at a time of necessary reconstructive planning for which "we need
a reputable representation in the USA".

2

Then, Stampfer devised an ambitious proposal for a radical
solution of the GLD crisis which would only have compounded the complexity of the situation.

In his correspondence with the Sopade, he

sounded out their reaction to the revival of an old plan that he had
previously rejected when it was proposed by Rinner in 1941.

By 1942,

he thought that the foundation of a Sopade branch in the United States
might solve the personnel problems and the deadlock within the GLD.
For this purpose, he wanted to recruit four of the SPD executives in
the United States.
rebel.

He talked to Rinner and Aufnauser, the former Sopade

Aufhauser had in his estimation changed favorably and was on

2
stampfer to Sopade, 23 November 1942, Matthias and Link,
Nr. 136, p. 570; also Stampfer to Sopade, 10 January 1943, Matthias and
Link, Nr. 137, p. 574.
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good terms with him and Rinner.

Stampfer also defended Juchacz.

She

had, in his opinion, been badly hurt by the Sopade and had never received any apologies.

She was by 1942 "quite amicable with us". 3

the Sopade could not support this scheme.

But

In order to spare the sensi-

bilities of Stampfer, it did not reject his proposal outright but
countered with conditions he could not meet.

Ollenhauer brought up

the problem of the other elected party representatives in the United
States, Hertz, Dietrich, and Sollmann, who could not be included in an
American Sopade branch and would question· its arbitrary composition.
He also considered an understanding with Katz indispensable.

He hoped

that Stampfer would find a way of establishing "an undisputed Social
Democratic representation without alienating the GLD" which was impossible.

Stampfer theri reluctantly conceded that the idea of a

Sopade branch was "at this time not opportune".

5

The leadership problem of the GLD was resolved in early 1943.
At first, Grzesinsky rejected the suggestion by Aufhauser that he
resign.

He argued that he had not been elected to his position so that

he could not be removed from it.
tion.

Then he resigned without an explana-

For the two factions within the GLD, there were two candidates

for the succession.
3

Brauer was the candidate for the faction around

Stampfer to Sopade, 25 August 1942, Matthias and Link, Nr. 133,

p. 561.

4

Ollenhauer to Stampfer, 28 September 1942, Matthias and Link,
Nr. 134, p. 564.
5
.
Stampfer to Sopade, 23 November 1942, Matthias and Link,
Nr. l3y, p. 571.
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.
Katz which objected to Auf h auser
as t h e new c h aLrman.

6

In a compromise

solution which was "a phantasy of Katz", Brauer became the first and
..
.
Aufhauser
t h e secon d c h aLrman.

7

sidered to have "equal rights".

Eventually the two chairmen were con8

wondered how long it would last.

Stampfer disliked this solution and
But he thought that with it "a better

functioning of the organization was possible".

9

In 1944, Aufhauser

joined the Council for a Democratic Germany and became involved in a
severe confrontation with the GLD about unionist representation.
Brauer remained, then, as the only chairman of the GLD until the end of
the war.
After these preliminaries, the GLD was ready for some reorganization.

Because of outside pressure it arrived at its own choice by

eliminating in inverse order first the most far-reaching option, that
of intersocialist cooperation.

Twice already, it had associated with

the other socialist emigrant groups but only for financial benefits and
only after clarifying that the International Labor Propaganda Committee
of the Free World Association

10

and the inter-group council of the

American Labor Conference on International Affairs did not imply any
6

Stampfer to Sopade, 10 February 1943, Matthias and Link,
Nr. 140, p. 581.
7

Stampfer to Sopade, 1 March 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 141,

p. 585.
8

Stampfer to Sopade, 12 April 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 142,

p. 587.
9

Stampfer to Sopade, 10 February 1943, Matthias and Link,
Nr. 140, p. 581.

10

Julius Deutsch to Vogel, 30 November 1942, EK Mappe 42.

344
political recognition of the partner groups.

11

Ollenhauer could not see

the difference between the AFL and CIO sponsored American Labor Conference and the Union of German Socialist Organizations in London.

12

In

March 1942, he suggested that the GLD establish some political cohesiveness by following the anti-Vansittartist stand of the Londoners with a
public statement by the socialist emigrant groups in America.

The

Union had issued a joint policy statement in order to counter an anti.
13
nationalistic declaration by the Fight for Freedom Group Ln London.
But the GLD preferred to ignore the controversy over pacifist socialism.
Stampfer pointed out that there were only a few pacifist socialists in
the United States like Emil Ludwig and Friedrich Wilhelm Forster whom
the NVZ had always eagerly castigated.

He claimed that emigrant Van-

sittartism was hardly a problem in the United States and resented the
hints at a parallelism in the situations of the two countries of exile.
Less subtly he stated that "the declaration of the Union is not viable
• 1y b ecause
h ere precLse

~ve

•
• II . 14
are agaLnst
t h e UnLon

11

Stampfer to Sopade, 10 January 1943, Matthias and Link,
Nr. 137, p. 573; also: Stampfer to Sopade 10 February 1943, Matthias
and Link, Nr. 140, pp. 481, 582; Stampfer to Sopade 12 April 1943,
Matthias and Link, Nr. 142, p. 587; Varian Fry to Frank, 17 August 1944,
Frank Papers, box 8, folder F; Katz to Ollenhauer, 29 May 1943, Matthias
and Link, Nr. 145, pp. 595, 596.
12

ollenhauer to Heine, 27 June 1943, EK Mappe 82.

13

ollenhauer to Stampfer, 22 March 1942, Matthias and Link,
Nr. 127, p. 544.
14
p. 548.

Stampfer to Sopade, 22 April 1942, Matthias and Link, Nr. 129,
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The GLD also responded allergically to a membership meeting of
the London Union in late November 1942 which discussed plans for postwar reconstruction.

15

Stampfer militated especially against a speech

by Ollenhauer on this occasion about the possibility and the tasks of
a united postwar socialist party in Germany.

He saw the Social Demo-

cratic mission in the emigration in the preservation of the old party.
It was difficult to even acknowledge the other German socialist groups,
"first, because Karl Frank and Paul Hertz are here, and secondly,
because in the American labor movement a Social Democrat is already
considered as a dubious minority representative who is suspected of
communism or of pro-communism and is a nearly impossible figure".
The GLD was all too happy to oblige the AFL in this respect.

16

The

November meeting of the Union caused a counterinitiative by the GLD
chairman Brauer in a meeting of the German branch of the SDF in
January 1943.

He proposed to convene a general conference of Social

Democratic emigrants in the United States and suggested to invite the
Sopade chairman Vogel to this occasion.
with GLD policy.

This would identify Vogel

The meeting appointed a commission for pursuing the

idea of Brauer which led to the National Convention of July 1943.

17

Sollmann and Staudinger also suggested more tolerance towards
the other socialist emigrant groups.

The former wondered, in the summer

15

Ollenhauer to Stampfer, 26 January 1943, Matthias and Link,
Nr. 138, p. 576.

16

Stampfer to Sopade, 1 March 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 141,
pp. 583-585.

17

Stampfer to Sopade, 10 February 1943, Matthias and Link,
Nr. 140, p. 580.
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of 1943 whether the time had not come "to establish contact with the
Hagen Group••.

He acknowledged the success and the general good reputa-

tion of Frank. 18

At the end of May 1943, Staudinger made

recommendations on the question of reorganization••.

11

confidential

He considered ••the

clarification of our relationship to the other democratic socialist
emigrant groups 11 as very important.
th~

movement,

Only then would the American labor

public, and the government view the socialist plans for

reconstruction favorably.

Staudinger considered it

11

wrong and deceptive

to still consider today the party executive as the representation per se
of the German workers••.
11

He did not propose an outright union, only

a modus vivendi 11 which could best be found in joint discussions with

the other groups about postwar reconstruction.

These talks could lead

to joint declarations especially against "reactionary and conservative", that is, Vansittartist and monarchist, solutions.

He also con-

sidered ••a common attitude towards German communism11 possible.

He

thought that the NB organization had in the past adopted a much clearer
attitude against cooperation with German communists than the GLD members.
others.

He had discussed this question with Ehrmann of the AFGF and with
Also, the NB organization consisted of younger socialists whom

the GLD should not repudiate in his opinion.

He had found out that

many of the charges against the NB Group and Frank were not true.

In

general, he thought that personal attitudes towards Frank should not
18

Sollmann to Stampfer, 20 August 1943, Nachlass Stampfer,
part I B, Nr. 682.

p
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matter.

The latter should be treated as the leader of a significant

emigrant group.

19

The uneasiness of Staudinger, however, could not sway the GLD
into a more positive attitude towards the other socialist emigrant
groups.

Stampfer claimed that he had "worked in silence to synchronize

our attitude with yours [that of the Sopade in the Union] and to ~prove

~he

relationship to the groups".

20

But he conceded that the

London Union "causes us stomach aches enough" and insisted that the GLD
in conjunction with the Sopade

was "the only legitimate representative

of the old German labor movement".
lets".

21

Sopade.

The rest were "insignificant group-

The GLD resented their encouragement by the attitude of the
Stampfer asserted that "now is the time for us to be inflex-

"bl e " . 22

Katz requested a new letter of legitimation for the GLD from

~

the International Federation of Trade Unions.

In the absence of

Schevenels, his deputy Stolz deplored the conflict between the GLD and
Frank and made the reservation that his telegram to the National Convention might not be used "as a weapon in this conflict".

23

19

vertrauliche Vorschlage zur Reorganisationsfrage von Hans
Staudinger, May/June 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 146, pp. 596-601.
20

Stampfer to Sopade, 1 March 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 141,

p. 584.
21

Stampfer to Sopade, 12 April 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 142,

p. 587.

22

Stampfer to Vogel, 13 May 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 144,

p. 594.
23
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The GLD was only interested in drawing individual socialists
over to its side.

An Arbeitsgemeinschaft (Study Commission) of the

German branch of the SDF

part~y

served this purpose.

It was formed in

October 1942 and was supervised by Leeb, Glaser, and Alexander Stein,
who was on friendly terms with the NB organization.
discussions

deal~

Its reports and

among other things, with the defeat of fascism and

the role of the national and social fight for liberation and with the
physiognomy of the postwar world.
ted "if invited by us".

Members of other groups were 'admit-

But this commission could only make recommen-

dations and did not survive the National Convention.

Leeb~

disunity contributed partly to its failure.

24

According to
As another gesture,

a small political subcommission of the GLD headed by Wachenheim,
Aufhauser, and Braunthal, published a correspondence on the future
German labor movement and elaborated memoranda on postwar reconstruction.

The correspondence was open for contributions to all former

members of the SPD.
to our side".

In this way, the GLD hoped "to win NB members over

25

The Sopade and Staudinger also recommended the second option
for reorganization to the GLD.

Ollenhauer remonstrated with Stampfer

about flthe complete isolation of the GLD from the friends who have
come there from France".
crossroads.

26

Staudinger thought that the GLD was at the

It had not developed much of a political activity.

Yet,

24

also:

Rudolf Leeb to Ollenhauer, 19 October 1942, EK Mappe 71;
Leeb to Ollenhauer, 6 July 1943, EK Mappe 71.
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some of its members intended to fully politicize a committee for reconstructive planning that had only been a group of select emigrants.

But

the GLD made only a feeble attempt at expansion by forming a commission
for studying the question of new admissions.

The majority was for "a

gradual process in this direction" which Staudinger deplored.
that this decision would later be revised.

He hoped

In order to legitimize a

new political activity, the GLD had,in his opinion, to "open the door
to all those who ... feel that they belong to the old Social Democratic
movement".

27

But the GLD bucked the issue of a democratic expansion.

It only toyed with the idea of enlarging the Social Democratic committee by cooptation.

It showed some flexibility in the prospective

number of these cooptations but never implemented even this insufficient
degree of reorganization before the summer of 1944.
The pretensions of the National Convention caused its major
complications.

The conference was called by the GLD, the NVZ, and the

German branch of the SDF.

This array of organizations looked impres-

sive but it amounted only to the few members of the GLD.

The editors

of the NVZ were GLD members, as were the leaders of the SDF.

Yet,

this exclusive group wanted to express "the viewpoint of German Social
Democracy and of the free German labor movement".

28

In practice, it

neglected what members of this movement were available.

The Social

Democratic emigrants in the SDF had no democratic voice in policy
making.

For this reason, many Social Democratic refugees were not

27

Vertrauliche Vorschiage von Hans Staudinger, May/June 1943,
Matthias and Link, Nr. 146, pp. 596-601.
28

Katz to Ollenhauer, 20 March 1943, EK Mappe 61.
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interested in the SDF or the GLD.

The National Convention did not

change their status, a circumstance that kept a lid on their enthusiasm.
They were only expected to lend their presence to a scenario devised
to impress the American government, labor movement, and public.
Sopade was put in the same position.

The

The GLD remained emphatically

independent of the exile executive and claimed to represent the German
labor movement as much as the latter.

It did not mind the Sopade pleas

for a more democratic treatment of the Social Democratic emigrants and
rejected the Sopade policy of more inter-group communication.

Yet, it

expected Vogel to lend his dignitary presence to its conference.
latter was not interested in this kind of humiliation.

The

He replied

that he was "very depressed" about his disappointments with the socialist emigration and "mentally not flexible enough" to justify the ex-

.
. 29
pense o f a transat 1antLc trLp.

In any case, the JLC was unwilling

to provide the necessary means.
The GLD also wanted to attract the independent Social Democrats
like the executive Juchacz.

It invited "all Social Democrats who be-

longed to the Social Democratic Party before the takeover by Hitler".

30

This definition was ill chosen because it excluded the members of the
SAP and the ISK but not those of the NB Group, including Frank.

In

response to this invitation and to several personal inquiries, Hertz,
Hirschfeld and Juchacz discussed the condition of their attendance

29

Vogel to Stampfer, 6 April 1943, Nachlass Stampfer, part II,
section 17, Nr. 22.
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351
with Aufhauser.

They demanded some influence over the organization of

the convention in the form of official speaking assignments.

They also

hoped that the convention would be the first step towards a concentration of the various socialist groups.

Juchacz thought that the GLD

should have been put on "a democratic basis" several years ago in order
to justify its claim of a general German labor representation.

The

National Convention was, in her opinion, the last opportunity for reorganizing the GLD.

Only this intention would qualify the GLD to call

such a general conference.

31

But the GLD would have none of this.

Leeb claimed that the demands of Juchacz and her friends were too high.
They wanted equal rights in the preparation and in the discussions of
the convention, an elected Social Democratic
o f Fran k to t h e

.

convent~on.

32

committe~

and the admission

But Juchacz stated that minor concessions

from the GLD would have induced her and her friends to attend the convention.

Aufhauser refused to even interpret their demands to the

other GLD leaders.

He replied that it had been very difficult to make

the invitation as comprehensive as it was.

After that, Juchacz, Hertz,

and Dietrich declined "in the name of another seventy-two former members of the SPDn to participate in the conference.

They waited until

the end of June for this declaration in order to escape the charge that
they intended to interfere with the convention.

33

31

Juchacz to Vogel, 20 August 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 155,
pp. 622-626.

32
33
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Probably for publicity reasons, the National Convention floated
another proposal for cooptation, this time by fifty members.
replied that she would not be coopted.

Juchacz

Somewhat unrealistically, she

and her friends hoped that with some help from the Sopade the GLD would
expand more democratically.

She remonstrated with Vogel that the Sopade

had "never urged an imitation of the London example" on the New York
Social Democrats.

. was t h e u 1 t~mate
.
Th ~s

.

t~me

f or ~t.
. 34

Vogel answered

ambivalently that "the old organizational distinctions of the time
before Hitler or of the first period of the emigration ... have lost
much of their old significance 1' .

Yet, he did not want to uphold the

London example to the GLD because "our friends in the USA consider the
same policy of cooperation as impossible for personal and objective
reasons".

He hoped that the cooptation plan would make it possible to

"bury the old differences".

35

This was wishful thinking.

The GLD did

not even implement its limited plan.
The course of the National Convention and the GLD reports about
it did not harmonize.
went very well.

Stamp fer remarked that ''on the surface", things

There was "a strong sympathetic publicity".

Ollen-

hauer was told that "several hundred comrades" attended the conference ..
This meant that,to his surprise,there were more Social Democratic emigrants in the United States than in England.

Yet, there was still "no

Landesgruppe (comprehensive group) of emigrant Social Democrats" as in
England, possibly because many of the emigrants were in the process of
34
35

PP~

Juchacz to Sopade, 28 May 1943, EK Happe 8 2.

Vogel to Juchacz, 19 October 1943, Hatthias and Link, Nr. 157,
632, 633.
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becoming American citizens.
the future SPD.

36

Ollenhauer wondered what they could do for

According to Leeb, there were one hundred thirty

delegates and guests at the convention.

Juchacz stated that there were

sixty participants the first day and one hundred the second day.

They

37
. 1y f rom New Yor k to a natLona
.
1 conventLon
.
. t h at cLty.
.
came maLn
Ln

Some of them were older German Americans so that the organizers properly spoke of "German speaking" rather than German Social Democrats.
There was also a limited number of American guests.

The AFL was repre-

sented by a functionary from New York, the CIO not at all.
European labor groups did not attend.

Most of the

Adler replied that he could not

accept an invitation of only one German emigrant group.
the National Convention revealed the disunity of the GLn.

Most seriously,
38

There were

two or three subgroups represented by Aufhauser, Stampfer and Wachenheim.

Aufhauser, the one GLD

chai~man,

left the conference before its

conclusion because he disagreed with the summarization by Brauer, the
other GLD chairman.

These differences also expressed themselves in

the conference stand on German reconstruction, which will be discussed
later.
~he

National Convention was followed by a brief period of ini-

tiatives in the summer and fall of 1943.

A delegation to Washington

and two unsuccessful plans for further conferences constituted the
extent of the GLD efforts after July 1943.

Under these circumstances,

36

also:
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GLD plans for reconstruction lacked a proper basis.

The delegation

consisted of the two GLD chairmen Brauer and Aufhauser and of the executive secretary, Katz.

On August 17, they discussed the results of

the National Convention with Assistant Secretary of

State Adolph Berle.

They confused the latter with both the revolutionist and the gradualist
approaches to German reconstruction.

But they made it clear that the

Social Democrats should play the major role in postwar Germany.

They

called themselves the representatives of the major German democratic
forces of the past, present and future.

They emphasized their role in

the Weimar Republic and their "consistent war against Nazism" before
1933, a time when they actually had failed to perceive the seriousness
of the National Socialist threat and were preoccupied with the enemy
to the left.

They expected the American government to ignore the other

socialist emigrant groups as unreliable, even though the latter had
been.alert to the danger of National Socialism from the beginning.
But the Assistant Secretary did not commit himself.

39

He told Aufhauser

later that "this government does not make a practice of sponsoring or
otherwise giving official recognition to movements of the kind you propose, but rather permits them to lay their case before American public
opinion".

He referred the GLD chairman to his statement about American

policy towards exiled leaders in general which had appeared in the
press of August 30, that is, shortly after the visit of the GLD leaders
in Washington.

It based the American attitude on the precarious status

39 Au fh''
.
auser, Brauer, Katz to Ass~stant
Secretary of State
Adolph A. Berle, 30 August 1943, Institut fUr Zeitgeschichte, vol. Fb
225' p. 60.
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of exile groups.
jectured.

Their degree of support at home could only be con-

Berle emphasized that "the decision upon their claims rests

not in the hands of this government but in the hands of their own
people".

40

He meant that the emigrants were of little value to the

American government because they were supposed to have no constituency
in their home countries.
The plan for the two conferences were designed to further establish the role of the GLD in postwar reconstruction even in competition with the Sopade.

The GLD planned an international Social Demo-

cratic conference to follow up its National Convention.

In early

August it already tried to contact the Social Democratic group in
Sweden without .the mediation of the Sopade which had kept in close contact with the 1atter.

41

From Sweden it wanted to invite Fritz Tarnow,

the chairman of the Exile Committee of the German Trade Unions and
former vice president of the General German Trade.Union Federation;
Kurt Heinig, a former member of the Reichstag; and Emil Stahl, an SPD
executive; from England, Vogel, Ollenhauer and Hans Gottfurcht, the
leader of the German Trade Union Group; from Switzerland, Otto Braun,
the former minister president of Prussia, and Wilhelm Hegner, a former

.
Bavar~an

. .

m~n~ster

40

.
.
42
o f JUSt~ce.

..
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Secretary Berle to Aufhauser, 2 October 1943,
National Archives, Washington, State Department central files.
41

.

Ass~stant

Stampfer to Sopade, 7 August 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 153,

p. 617.
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.
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356
The other conference

~vas

to consist of "representatives of all

Democratic Germans", that is, representatives of the Democratic Party,
the Center Party, and other "liberal groups".

Among others, the GLD

envisioned inviting from the United States Bruning, Oscar Meyer, the
former president of the Democratic Party, Erich

Koch-Weser~

a Demo-

cratic Party member and former Reich Minister, and Paul Schwarz, the
former German Consul in New York; from Canada, Spiecker and Treviranus,
and, "possibly", from Switzerland, Joseph Wirth.

These were all poli-

tical figures of the past who played no more role in postwar Germany.
The conference was to organize "a permanent Council of Free Democratic
Germans".

43

It was to be a new Great Coalition similar to the Associa-

tion of Free Germans which was only a national organization that had,
however, not yet been dissolved.

The plan for this Council was urgent

because of the formation of the National Committee for a Free Germany
in Moscow.

According to Stampfer, the proclamation of the latter had

had the effect in America of "a rock avalanche crashing into a pond". 44
The GLD hoped to benefit from this reaction.

It even praised the

Russian approach to German politics and expected the United States to
give similar recognition to its emigrants.

The prospective Council

would not be a government in exile but it would "act as a trustee of
German Democracy".

It would have to maintain, its independence from

the American government but it could not function without "a certain
43
44
p. 618.

Ibid.
stampfer to Sopade, 7 August 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 153,
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moral assistance from the United Nations, especially the United
Statesn. 45

The GLD also expected visas for the foreign delegates from

the American government.
The latter responded cautiously to this plan of a Great Coalition, but still more positively than to the exclusively Social
Democratic demands of August.

The Division of European Affairs of the

State Department welcomed the prospective Council.

In a memorandum of

September 4, it noted that "it had seemed that the German Social Democratic exiles would never pull themselves together sufficiently even
to propose such an amalgamation and organization of their forcss".

The

European Division viewed the proposal with favor "because any move
which strengthens and consolidates any of the democratic and moderately
left

German elements will tend to aid us as we attack the problem of

postwar Germany".

The Social Democratic emigrants were "essentially

friendly to us and· ... represent the best of the Weimar elements".
The memorandum noted favorably that "no anti-Prussians of the Forster
type", nor any Bavarian separatists were included and that Sollmann,
too, was omitted.

It objected to Treviranus and Spiecker because of

their past friendliness with Otto Strasser.
the organizers not to include these two.

It advised to influence

46

But the State Department did not react to the NKFD as expected
by the GLD.

The European Division proposed to limit official support

45
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of the prospective Council to a minimum "for one consideration".

The

latter might be "construed as an imitation of, and rival to, the
'National Committee' in Moscow".

Even tacit American consent could

lead to "irritating complaints vis-a-vis the Russians".

The European

Division believed that "careful handling on our part can probably
obviate such an interpretation'.'.

But the State Department should only

make "a rather routine acknowledgement" of the GLD memorandum.
should repeat the official
1941.

It

policy which it had adopted in December

The latter expressed only "a sympathetic interest in movements

by aliens in this country".

For this purpose, the government need "not

go beyond watching the activities of this group [the GLDJ with a sympathetic air".
touc h

The State Department was glad "to have them keep in

• h us f rom

w~t

•

t~e

to

•

t~me

•

concern~ng

• propose d
t h e~r

• • •

act~v~t~es

II

. 47

Because of the sensitivity of the issue for the alliance, the
State Department wanted to obtain the views of the British government.
A telegram to the American Embassy in London stated that the initiatives
of the GLD could be "of advantage to us if handled in such a manner as
to avoid disturbing our relations with the Soviet Union".

The American

ambassador Winant was instructed to tell the Foreign Office that "normally, we would be disposed to lend considerable encouragement to this
group but

we feel that at this time it is most important to avoid

giving the impression that we are encouraging a possible rival to the
Free German Committee in Moscow".
47

The State Department believed that

H. Freeman Matthews to Berle, memorandum, Division o£ European Affairs, State Department, 7 September 1943, Institut f~r Zeitgeschichte, vol. Fb 225, p. 67.
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the United States and the United Kingdom should "follow the same line
in regard to this matter".
British government.

48

It wanted to share the risk with the

It reconunended, therefore, that "the German labor

people in Great Britain" should be brought into this organization,
which was not in the interest of the ambitious GLD.

The Department

thought that "it might even be possible to bring about cooperation
between this group and the German Free Movement in Moscow".

49

Thus,

the goals of the State Department ran exactly counter to those of the
GLD.

The latter was better off giving up its conference plans.

Stampfer had told the Sopade from the beginning that he did not believe
in the realization of these "very ambitious congress projects".

In re-

lation to the financial situation of the GLD, they appeared "nearly
• so
grotesque II to h ~m.

be foreseen.

But the failure of these plans could not easily

Stampfer usually tried to sit on both chairs.

Without official recognition and without the necessary harmony
and sense of purpose within itself, the GLD sombered through the last
two years of the war tvhich \vere important for reconstructive planning.
A year later, Seger tried again to win government approval of an
inunigrant rather than an emigrant project.

In September 1944, he pro-

posed to Secretary of State Cordell Hull an Advisory Conunittee of former
Germans.

It would reconunend administrative measures to the American

occupation authorities.

He believed that the latter needed such assist-

48

Department of State to American Embassy in London, 9 September
1943, National Archives, State Department central files.
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ance and "'auld best get it from naturalized Americans like himself.
His advice would be free from self-interest.

He would no longer run

the risk of being considered a Quisling by the German people, a worry
which dominated most emigrant plans usually as a way of dealing with
the American government.

Seger and other naturalized emigrants would

be mediators between the German people and the American government by
explaining the measures of the military government to the German people
and reporting back its reaction.

They would also assist in de-Nazifica-

tion, that is, they would recommend the proper perronnel for the initial

. .
.
51
1oca 1 a dm~n1strat1ons.
former GLD ambitions.

This proposal was very modest compared to

Seger was more interested in his own postwar

political career in this country than in the GLD.

He eventually became

an adviser in the Nuremberg trials but his project as a whole was not
accepted

py

the State Department.

With the failure of the plan for an international Social Democratic conference, the relationship between the GLD and the Sopade
became dormant again.

In May 1944, Ollenhauer remonstrated with Katz

for not having received a letter since the beginning of the year, nor
any information about the new Council for a Democratic Germany,which
will be discussed in the last chapter.
Sopade were also disappointed.

52

The financial hopes of the

The GLD was unable and unwilling to

mediate assistance for the Sopade.

The latter had received its last

51

Seger to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 11 September 1944,
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contribution from the JLC in May 1943.

It had consisted of $500 as the

second part of an allocation of $1,000 for 1942.
was also due to JLC disinterest in the GLD.

This state of affairs

In addition, the JLC did

not want to interfere in the affairs of the English Labor Party which
had limited itself to supporting only one Sopade executive under pressure from its strong Vansittartist wing.

During the first war years,

the GLD had remained aloof from the Sopade and from the socialist emigrant groups in America in the hope of attaining a dominant position
with the help of the American labor movement and the American government.

During the last two war years it was no longer possible to

rationalize the complete isolation of the GLD.
The GLD could not resolve its ideological differences which bedeviled its plans for reconstru.ction.

This state of affairs had

already become apparent in the speeches and resolutions of the National
Convention which held both the revolutionist and the gradualist approach.
The former was intended to cut the Gordian knot with a political revolution on whose liberal content there was an alleged popular consensus.
The latter conceded that a socialist republic needed much time for preparation so that there would first have to be a military defeat and a
total occupation of Germany.

The former approach was conceived in

terms of the revolutionary situation after the First World War which
had not been due to the planning of the SPD.
result of a popular state of mind.

It had 'come' as the

Supposedly, a repetition of this

situation was nearly inevitable so that it was not so difficult to
prove the existence of "the other Germany" and its readiness for a
second republic.

The general resolution of the National Convention

362

expressed emigrant solidarity with the European underground movement and
hope for its early success before dealing with the United Nations and
their victory which was also desirable.

53

The conference resolution

on the future governmental structure of Germany stated that "the conference would welcome the

outbr~ak

of the revolution".

This would

demonstrate the German will of liberation "which the world could not
refuse to respect".

54

Especially Stampfer and Aufhauser maintained the illusion of
the revolutionary potential of the German workers.
a popular outburst as in 1918.

It could lead to

Stampfer believed that "only a Social

Democratic revolution can save the German people".

He considered it

"dangerously _wrong to say today already that [the revolution] will not
come".

That would be arrogant.

Stampfer returned the charge of illu-

sion by calling "the belief that things could go back to normal after
such a war without a revolution, an illusion, the saddest of.them
all".

He maintained that the revolutionary soul of the German labor

movement still existed despite the destruction of its organizational
forms by Hitler.

But the German workers needed Allied help.

In its

way stood the growing Vansittartism which had even taken hold of the
British Labor Party.

The latter's conference of June 1943, one month

before the National Convention, had adopted an anti-German resolution
53 Resolution der Landeskonferenz deutschsprachiger Sozialdemokraten und Gewerkschaftler in den USA "zur politischen Lage'',
4 July 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 149, p. 608.
54 Resolution zum kunftigen Staatsaufbau Deutschlands, Sozialdemokratische Landeskonferenz in New York, July 1943, Sammlung Kurt
Glaser, Institut fu'r Zeitgeschichte, vol. I, pp. 83, 84.
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which Stampfer had denounced furiously.

He claimed that international

socialist solidarity with the German workers had always had positive,
if not definitive, results.

The Second International helped build the

League of Nations and secured German admission to the latter, as well
as German reconciliation with France at Locarno.

It had "dissolved,

one after the other, the strong fetters of Versailles".

A reorganized

international would do even better after the Second World War.
the only hope for world peace.

It was

It would be disastrous if ''the blind

nationalism which has succeeded in entering certain sections of the
International" would interfere in a second German revolution in the
way the communists interfered in the first one.

55

The viewpoints of Katz and Grzesinsky also fit into the picture
of a liberal German people with a revolutionary consciousness that
would not need any specific leadership, not even that of the underground movement.

In his correspondence, Katz liked to use the phrase

of "the so-called German underground movement".

If the latter did not

amount to anything, its socialist and possibly pro-communist cadres
could do no harm.

Grzesinsky implied that the German workers would be

more revolutionary if the Allies would commission the emigrants to
enlighten them.

He believed that the German people knew nothing

about the National Socialist atrocities or about the attitude of the
world towards Germany.

It thought it was fighting a defensive war.

Yet, Grzesinsky was convinced that "the great mass of the German
people, especially the formerly organized workers, oppose the war and
55
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the Nazi regime".

But the National Socialist terror contained any oppo-

sition, down into the production cells of the armament industry.

Never-

theless, he still hoped that "a revolutionary wave would arise from the
people and sweep away the Nazi regime"

56

In its resolution addressed

to the German people, the National Convention insisted that a military
defeat was inevitable and called on the amorphous
[Hitler] off!

to "shake

You only need to have the will

Liberate yourselves!

and you can shake off the Gestapo''.

m~sses

57

Many Social Democratic emigrants

hoped that the German situation would turn into a revolution "before a
soldier of the Allied powers stepped on German soil".

They expected a

combination of circumstances like military defeats, war weariness,
psychological warfare and positive war aims such as the territorial
integrity of Germany, to facilitate such a development.

Then, the

emigrants hoped that the Allies would stop their military advance and
await the outcome of the German revolution.

After that, they could

offer "formal peace treaties" to a new German government.

58

This

would have duplicated the events of 1918.
In the conflict between high expectations and actual developments, the Social Democratic attitude towards the Western Allies became
uncertain.

The GLD emigrants were generally happy with Allied military

56
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progress.

They hoped that it would demoralize the National Socialist

regime and disinhibit German discontent.
11

In January 1943, the NVZ

\vholeheartedly" welcomed the decision of unconditional surrender of

the Casablanca Conference.

The latter ruled out a deal with National

Socialist Germany an·d contained "a definitive Allied plan of offensive", that is, a second front in the West.
warfare.

59

Katz also approved air

He welcomed the efficiency of Allied bombing which would

destroy one industrial German town per mission, out of about fifty major
towns.

He realized that the bombs would not only hit factories but

"innumerable houses vJith all their belongings [sic]".

He approved of

"this unavoidable side effect" which would bring about "a greater
demoralization of the German social body" than mere industrial bombing.60

Stampfer thought that psychological warfare would be more than

.
f or b omb.~ng. 61
a su b st~tute

The NVZ criticized the decisions of Casa-

blanca for their silence on political and psychological warfare.

In

February 1943, Katz deplored the Allied tendency toward a national war
instead of a war of liberation which would also benefit "the enslaved
part of the German people".

He considered "the collective hate

against the enemy nations" as "a partial victory for Hitler".

He had

hoped for "something different" but he still had not given up on Washington and London.
59
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61
62
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Similar fears had surfaced during the National Convention.

In

its general resolution, the latter raised its "voice against any potential attempt to contain this movement", that is, the revolutionary
movement in Germany.

63

Grzesinsky hoped that "the strong plutocratic

circles of the democracies of the world will not tie the arms of the
German people".
tion of 1918.

The Social Democrats had been moderate in the revoluThey could have instituted "the dictatorship of the pro-

letariate" but had preferred a democratic republic.

With Allied help

instead of obstruction, the first republic could have endured.

vies tern Allies had another chance.

The

They should prepare for entering

into contact with the "democratic opposition" in Germany and offer
clear war aims.

The United Nations should apply the Atlantic Charter

to Germany without equivocation.

64

The Social" Democratic emigrants

did anything but admit their own historical mistakes.
The National Convention also planned for reconstruction in case
of a total occupation of

Germany.

The resolutions considered this

possibility only reluctantly in second place.
were made for that eventuality.

But many of the plans

In the case of the latter, they pro-

posed that "the German people be again given the opportunity for a
democratic development", more precisely, the German labor movement
63

Resolution der Landeskonferenz "zur politischen' Lage",
4 July 1943, Matthias and Link, Nr. 149, p. 609.
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Grzesinsky, Die staatliche Neugestaltung Deutschlands, die
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beside _a small democratic bourgeoisie, that exceptional part which had
not compromised itself during the Third Reich.

65

Even without a

revolution, the German labor movement had, in the opinion of the GLD
planners, the resources for building a second republic.

The Social

Democratic Party and the unions would rebuild themselves fast from the
local to the national level.

In the past, the German labor movement

had been "the only popular movement" that had supported democracy and
the republic.

They would again be "the pioneers of democracy in the

state and in the economy".

Aufhauser asserted that "the collectivism

of the German workers" had survived, despite Hitler and Rimmler, in
the productive units of the factories.
their "community of destiny".
be reconstructed without delay.

There, the workers maintained

On this basis, the postwar unions could
With their practice in self-government

and self-help, the workers would ''prepare the foundation of the future
democracy".

66

The Allies should not interfere in this development.

Their occupation authorities should only be accorded secondary
functions.
After the SPD and the unions, the civil administration could be
rebuilt on all levels so that a central administration could be formed
in a short time.

It

~vould

perform the task of disestablishing the

National Socialist administration without Allied help.

Grzesinsky was

especially explicit in his demands for purging the civil service on all
65
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levels.

He also proposed special local courts for the trial of National

Socialist criminals.

In the face of the National Socialist extermina-

tion policy, his idea of the death penalty for crimes like severe
• 1
ph ys~ca

•

m~streatment

II w~t
•

h a h ar d o b Ject
•
II
soun d e d

administration would cover all of Germany.

•

na~ve.
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The central

The Social Democratic plans

expected the same concessions from the Russians as from the

~Iestern

Allies.
The other major task of the central administration would be the
economic reconstruction of Germany.

This administration would assume

control of heavy industry, the chemical and electro-technical industry,
the large banks and the large estates.

This would be the special econ-

omic contribution of the second republic to a saf,er system.

It would

preclude the recurrence of a rise of reactionary forces with the help
of monopoly capitalism.
goods.

It would emphasize the production of consumer

Together with a policy of international economic cooperation,

this would lay the economic basis for a peaceful Germany.

A policy of

"public works of a gigantic order" would help to bring about permanent
full employment which would leave no appeal to potential reactionary
groups.

68
The National Convention had an interesting approach to emergency

provisions.

Resolution VIII expressed the fear of "civil war-like cir-

cumstances" and of "anarchy" in Germany if a revolution did not mater67

Grzesinsky, Die staatliche Neugestaltung Deutschlands, Einheitliche Besatzungsmethoden unter den Allierten, 4 July 1943, Sammlung
Glaser, vol. I, p. 120.
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ialize.

The term of

11

anarchy" circumscribed the old Social Democratic

fear of communism in case of severe economic distress.
recommended "social security" as the best antidote.

69

The resolution
For this purpose,

the United States was expected to provide "the necessary food and
clothing".

For the implementation of this aid program, resolution XI

offered the reorganization of the Konsum-Cooperatives.

They could be

an effective vehicle for the proper distribution of food and clothing.

70

Not even in this area of material dependency, were the Social Democratic
emigrants willing to cede much control to the occupation forces.
They were especially sensitive on the question of educational
reconstruction.

Resolution III denied that the doctrine of National

Socialism had had a devastating influence on the German people.

It had

only conquered "the mass of the party and of certain age groups".
Grzesinsky hinted that the young adults would be one of these groups
when he proposed to raise the voting age to twenty-five years.

Yet,

the convinced National Socialists of the 1920's and 1930's were, by
then, between thirty-five and fifty years old.

According to the re-

solution, not even the groups of the civil servants, the estate owners,
the officers, and the capitalists were National Socialist-minded.
had only followed their own social interests.

They

Under these circumstances,

the task of reeducation did not require foreign intervention.

It could

only be "the job of the democratic Germans themselves, that is, essen69
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tially of the workers".

The Allies should impose neither a high com-

missioner of education nor foreign teachers on the German schools.

The

emigrants also rejected "the importation of finished textbooks of democratic indoctrination".

In a reference to the moral failure of the

academic class, the resolution proposed "a severe restriction-of the
higher schools and of the universities ... but the full maintenance of
the Volksschulen (Public Grade Schools)".

The universities would only

be expanded after the children of the working class received equal
access to them.

71

To the Social Democratic solution of the German problem corresponded the internationalist solution of the European problem.

The

Social Democratic emigrants expected the rise of Social Democratic
systems in other European countrieso

A European federation would safe-

guard the democratic participation of Germany in the new order.
labor international would also be helpful.
their own would lead to a third world war.

A new

Any other solution than
72

The emigrants used this

argument frequently in order to impress their program on the American
government.

But the National Convention was unrealistic in its expec-

tation that the Allies would content themselves with a secondary role
after their victory and that either the American or the Russian government would favor a Social Democratic solution of the German or the
European problem.

The later Social Democratic plans for reconstruction

71
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were less rather than more flexible.
The memorandum which the GLD delegation handed to the Assistant
Secretary of State after the National Convention offered both approaches to reconstruction without transition.

The delegates told Berle that

"the Nazis in Germany are today a minority".

The anti-Hitler opposi-

tion included "all strata of the population" but "the industrial workers 11 constituted "the most active and powerful forces".
engaged in "a single common effort against Nazism".

They were

Even without their

organizations, "their spiritual fellowship 11 lived on.

They were ready

to take "direct action" against the Hitler regime in accordance with
military developments.

Information and encouragement from abroad could

prepare them "for the day of the great decision".

For this purpose,

the American government and the United Nations should establish "democratic war and peace aims", mainly by reaffirming and clarifying the
Atlantic Charter.

73

Then followed the statement that ten years of Hitler dictatorship and terror destroyed the German democratic organizations.
had to rebuild ''from the bottom up''.

They

The GLD delegates recommended to

Berle the reestablishment of the former self-governing local authorities and of the local trade union organizations ''immediately after the
defeat of Hitlerism''·

They were tuned in enough to the sensitivities

of the Assistant Secretary, not to mention the Social Democratic Party
specifically.
73

They claimed that the labor unions would not compete for

Au fh..auser, Brauer, Katz to Ber 1e, 30 August 19 4 3, Institut
fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. Fb 225, pp. 60-63.
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influence with other democratic groups like the Protestant or Catholic
Churches.

The implication was that the latter would be needed in a

Great Coalition against communism.

In this line, the GLD memorandum

omitted the other German socialist emigrant groups in the United States.
It also deplored that the German workers had to "endure day and night"
the radio propaganda of Moscow in addition to that of Gobbels.

It

assured Berle, ~vhose Department was sensitive to the alliance with
Russia, that the NKFD in Moscow found "no response whatsoever" among
the German workers who were interested in a democratic solution of the
German problem.

74

The GLD memorandum on the prospective conferences were less
explicit about either approach.

The conferences would be "an effective

way of organizing the Democratic forces within Germany to cooperate
successfully with the democratic forces of the United States".

The

Council of Free Democratic Germans would have the responsibility of
"communicating with the German people, thereby expediting the downfall
of the Nazi regime"

75

The controversy over the two approaches continued for the remainder of 1943.

It was carried on by both sides in the form of

editorials in the NVZ in a rare exhibition of democratic debate.

The

advocates of the first approach consisted mainly of the editors of the
NVZ:

Stampfer, Katz, and Seger, including Aufhauser, Fritz Karsen and

others.

To the proponents of the second approach belonged Frankel,
74
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Ibid.
Ibid.
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Wickel, Hamburger, Marek, and Tejessy.
between the two sides.

Braunthal tried to conciliate

According to Frankel, the reconstruction of

the German labor movement had to precede that of the second republic.
But it would take a while until which time the republic should be postponed.

German labor was too "disorganized" and "disillusioned" to

attempt a revolution.

He hoped that there would be no such attempt

which could only fail and demoralize German labor more completely than
it already was.

The latter should be rebuilt "from below" under the

settled circumstances of an Allied Military Government.

The Social

Democratic emigrants had the obligation of winning the American government over to such a pro-labor policy as "the only guarantee of a peaceful German development". 76

They should demonstrate to Washington the

democratic·development of Germany in historical perspective.
democracy had developed before the industrial age.

American

The first German

republic had depended largely on the support of labor.

A memorandum of

the AFL also pointed out these differences in an attempt to convince
the American government of the importance of German labor for postwar
.
d emocrat~c

.

reconstruct~on.

building from below.

77

Tejessy agreed with the strategy of re-

He considered the German underground movement as

.
78
too weak for a revolution.

Marek pointed out the difference between

the First and the Second World War.

In 1918, the German labor organi-

zations had remained intact to replace the imperial system.
76 Neue Volkszeitung, 18 September 1943, p. 7.
77 Ibid., 25 September 1943, p. 1.
78 rbid., 16 October 1943, p. 5.
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Second World War, there would be "an unprecedented anarchy" which would
preclude a repetition of 1918.

79

This group was mainly interested in

the social or socialist aspects of reconstruction which would require
planning and preparation.

It also conceded that the Western Allies

could not unilaterally determine postwar policy in Germany.
Katz was not interested in a social revolution which was "improbable" and "unnecessary" for the limited socialization of Social
Democratic reconstruction.

The latter involved only a fe>-7 thousand

families in a population of seventy million.

He thought that "a normal

democratic regime" could effect this change.

He rejected the fear that

a victorious Soviet Union would have a controlling influence in postwar
Germany.

He believed that the only way to prevent that was a political

revolution which would

~ake

place automatically.

He regarded the ap-

proach of Frankel as the product of "a defeated mind".

Katz was indig-

nant about the argument that 1918 could not be repeated because the
German labor movement was destroyed by Hitler.

He considered this

state of affairs as negligible because it was easily repairable.

He

thought that Frankel could not find "the proper proportion for the
defeat of the German workers since 1933".
plex of destructedness".

His antagonist had a "com-

In the view of Katz, "an interruption of ten

years [was] , historically speaking, relatively short".

He claimed

that "the political conviction" of the German workers in their totality
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had remained ''essentially the same''.
few months".

They could be reorganized ''in a

80

In this spirit, Katz praised American journalists like Walter
Lippmann and Dorothy Thompson.

The former opposed a total occupation

and an Allied Military Government for Germany.
contra 1 on 1y

.

strateg~c

He recommended to

lf . 81
.
centers an d 1 eave Germany to ~tse

Thompson

warned that an Allied occupation would prevent a civil war between
National Socialists and antifascists, and thereby hinder the natural
development of "a historical process''.
vised from her frontiers.

82

Germany could be better super-

This strategy would also keep the Russians

out of Germany,which was the main interest of the GLD.
Department did not want to affront the Russians.

But the State

It also distrusted a

Social Democratic kind of revolution.
The GLD Social Democrats could not indefinitely hold out for a
German revolution.

Eventually, Stampfer conceded his error in a curious

overstatement, 'full of bitterness.

In October 1944 he told a meeting of

the SDF in Chicago that "there is in Germany no power of the workers
at all. . .. The German workers are nothing but mute slaves".
them were in the army.

Most of

The factories which Stampfer had previously

considered as the cells that preserved the Social democratic tradition
were "crowded with foreign slave workers".
80Ib. d
~
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He pointed out that even
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the revolution of 1918 took place only after military defeat.
NVZ article, he discussed these "destroyed illusions".

83

In a

He conceded

that "the revolution which was necessary to save Germany and which is
still necessary if Germany is ever to have another chance of recovery,
did not take place".

As a consequence of this failure, "the Allied

camp [advocated] the recipes ... of the old nationalist and imperialist
. , II 84
power po 1 ~t~cs .

Katz could not admit his error directly.
was at no loss for apologies.

For a long time he

He claimed that "popular movements

against a modern despotic regime can only become visible at the moment
of its demise".

He compared this situation to the pressure of vapor

that becomes apparent only wheri the boiler explodes.
still considered all

c~iticism

Accordingly, he

about the absence of signs for a German

revolution as "superficial and, in nucleo, wrong".

85

He blamed the

absence of Allied war aims and of psychological warfare for the delay
of the predicted explosion and pointed out the dilemma of the antifascists in Germany.

Every German was partially loyal to his govern-

ment and vacillated between loyalty and rejection, opposition and
rebellion.

As a result, "this majority. of the inner-German antifascists

upholds by and large ... the line desired by Hitler.
matically the game of the Nazis".
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[I~

plays auto-

This kind of rationalization was
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Rede Stampfers vor der Social Democratic Federation in Chicago,
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not unusual for Katz.

He raved about the revolutionary German masses

and welcomed the bombing of the German cities where they lived.
blamed the Allies for the absence of a German revolution.

He

They did not

do enough to convert the undecided Germans so that they were justly
punished by "an unbroken German fighting spirit".

In February 1945,

he predicted that the end of Hitler would come "in October 1945 rather
than in July . . . or in April".

If the Allies wanted a quicker end,

they would have to rely on "the rest of the German people . . . . from
that corner could start any day the collapse of the whole Hitler
structure".

87

Yet, in his postwar memoirs, Katz claimed that the emi-

grants had "no illusions about how slim ... the chances were for an
overthrow attempt".

88

With the National Convention, the GLD finalized its attitude
towards the other socialist emigrant groups.

It maintained its compre-

hensive claim of representing the whole German labor movement, including
the unions.
union based.

This was crucial because its main American sponsorship was
The latter consisted of the JLC and the AFL.

But this

arrangement was challenged in the summer of 1944 by the attempt of
Aufhauser and Hertz of organizing a German Trade Union Delegation (GTUD)
in collaboration with the International Federation of Trade Unions, of
which the AFL was a member.

The latter was not satisfied with the GLD

which cared even less about unionist emigrants than it did about Social
Democratic emigrants.
87
88

Towards the end of the war, it made plans for

Ibid., 14 October 1944, p. 4.
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the reconstruction of the European trade union movement.

It became

interested in a separate German trade union representation in the United
States and initiated its formation.
The general secretary of the IFTU, Schevenels, acted in collusian with Hans Gottfurcht,who had formed the Landesgruppe deutscher
Gewerkschafter in Gross Britannien (exile group of German trade unionists in Great Britain).
London.

Its office was in the building of the IFTU in

Gottfurcht was not on the best terms with the only other emi-

grant unionist group, the Landesgruppe deutscher Gewerkschafter (exile
group of German trade unionists) in Sweden, under Fritz Tarnow Hho was
also the president of the Exile Committee of the German Trade Unions
and a former vice president of the General German Trade Union Federation.

With a cooperative exile group in America, Gottfurcht could

represent the German unionist emigration better with the IFTU which in
turn would have a bigger voice in the reconstruction
unions.

of the German

Gottfurcht approached Schevenels in March 1944 about the for-

mation of a German Trade Union Delegation in the United States.

89

Later,

Schevenels attended a conference of the International Labor Office, a
League of Nations adjunct, in Philadelphia.

There he met with Auf-

hauser, Hertz, and a few other unionist emigrants.

He commissioned

them to organize a trade union committee as a liaison body between the
IFTU and the American union federations, especially with the AFL.

90
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Despite his promise of also visiting the GLD in New York, he made the
mistake of ignoring the Social Democratic committee.

It was safe to

work with Aufh"auser who figured as "the man of Gottfurcht"

91

and with

whom the conservative Tarnow had refused to cooperate in the late
1930's.

The latter was not well informed about the plans for a GTUD

in the United States.

He had to be updated by Ollenhauer.

92

After their meeting with Schevenels, Aufhauser and Hertz organized a preliminary meeting of prospective members on 25 June 1944.

93

Gottfurcht and Schevenels expressed their strong support of these
efforts:

The latter agreed with the composition of the GTUD and

''strongly advised that your committee should be set up immediately as
an advisory committee to the International Federation of

Trade Unions

and to the American trade union organizations in view of solving .our
mutual problem of the reconstruction of free trade unions in Germany".
He also enjoined the prospective GTUD repeatedly "to collaborate closely and permanently" with the exile group of Gottfurcht.

94

After these

preliminaries, Aufha~ser and Hertz invited a wider circle of unionists
to join the GTUD and to voice their opinions in a second meeting on
September 23 about this new "subsidiary of the IFTU".
91
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The GLD took immediate steps to abort the formation of this new
unionist committee.

When it received from Hertz and Aufhauser the list

of the prospective GTUD members whom it had neglected until then, it
asked the latter to join the Labor Delegation.
Plettl, Paul Levi, and Willi Snell.

Among them were Martin

Plettl was amazed about the change

in the GLD attitude towards "unionists and out of town people not
wanted".

But he made clear his strict anti-communism and his opposi-

tion to Aufhauser, which made him accept the invitation of the GLD.

He

expected Schevenels to understand why "I and all my well known German
unionist friends do not want to collaborate with Aufhauser".

The latter

was "an ingrained opportunist" and separatist who had organized the
Independent White Collar Workers' Federation in the Weimar Republic,and
prevented the ADGB from becoming the comprehensive German union federation.

In the Czechoslovakian emigration, he had opposed the Sopade

. 96
with his group of the Revolutionary Socialists of Germany.
not been wanted in the GEADE.

He had

Plettl expected "the fellow traveler of

today" to become "the communist of tomorrow" if "the present chances of
Stalin" last, that is, a Morgenthau policy which would lead inevitably
to the Bolshevization of Germany.
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The attitude of Levi and Snell

towards the GTUD was moderate.
The GLD also wanted Ollenhauer to oppose the GTUD and to put
pressure on Gottfurcht and Schevenels.

But the Sopade did not want a

conflict with the IFTU and with the German unionist group in England.
96
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Ollenhauer considered "a purely negative attitude not as useful".

98

The Sopade itself coexisted with a separate union representation.
the United States, also, such a group could do "useful work".
be "appropriate that the members of our GLD
representation".

In

It would

join the [unionist]

Ollenhauer hoped that the GLD would establish "good

friendly and neighbourly relations from the beginning" even though the
GLD would have to readjust its identity.

He considered this advice to

be in the interests of postwar reconstruction and of the,need for a
consensus between unionists and Social Democrats.

99

The GLD complained that the Sopade did not understand the
emigrant situation in America. There was "no indication whatsoever why
the German Labor Delegation should not be considered as the representative of the old free German Labor Movement in USA, either by the AFL
or by the IFTUH.

100

The GTUD was organized by Aufhauser for aims that

were "strictly personal".

He had left the GLD for the Council for a

Democratic Germany where he was a member of the executive committee and
chairman of the labor subcommittee.
way o f

.

.

w~nn~ng

AFL

. .

recogn~t~on

The formation of the GTUD was his

f or t h e

.1 . 101

Counc~

surreptitiously because the AFL was anticommunist.
that Aufhauser pursued a United Front policy and was

This had to be done
But it was clear
11

apparently
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selected by the Moscowites to become the successor of Rosenfeld in the
United States 11

102

He made this "competitive maneuver" only

•

"in order

to shine in the Tillich Committee [CDG] as chairman of the unionist
group".

103

In the end, "the whole thing ... seems to be invented by

Tillich and Hagen".

104

The Council was the prime target of the GLD.

According to Katz, the latter objected only to cooperation with communists.
.

If Aufhauser left the CDG the GLD would cooperate with his
.

un~on~st

group.

105

Other arguments were equally contradictory.

Katz argued that

the GTUD was a political rather than a unionist committee.

It brought

together Social Democratic emigrants with members of the splinter
groups.

In this capacity, it was unnecessary because there was already

the Council for the Underground Labor Movement in the Axis dominated
countries of Europe.

This was the already discussed AFL advisory group

whose German contingent comprised emigrants like Brauer for the GLD,
Hertz for NB, Hans Hacke for the SAP, and Eva Lewinski for the ISK.

106

Yet, Katz had denied previously that this group had any political significance and was anything more than a bureaucratic channel for the
distribution of promised AFL funds.

The GTUD supposedly also jeopar-
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dized the German benefits from a one million dollar AFL fund for postwar
reconstruction.

But Ollenhauer still considered it "more appropriate"

for the unionist members of the GLD to participate in the GTUD.

107

Schevenels and Gottfurcht also maintained their support of the
GTUD.

The former insisted that the GTUD was "set up at my request and

by no means on the initiative of the Council for a Democratic Germany
or any labor subcommittee".

He had demanded that the GTUD be "abso-

lutely non-political" and open to all unionist emigrants.

The IFTU had

"never considered that the German Labor Delegation had any representative character whatsoever from the trade union point of view".

The

unionist emigration needed a separate American group in preparation for
unionist reconstruction.

The GLD had "never drawn a clear distinction

between political and trade union representation".

108

This view of

Schevenels was sound despite his inept handling of the issue.

The GLD

claimed trade union representation only for its own political purposes.
Gottfurcht was upset about the attitude of Katz who could not be de.
109
terre d b y any exp 1anat~on.
The GTUD needed the recognition of the AFL which accepted,
however, the interpretation of the GLD.

Matthew Wall, a vice president

of the AFL and chairman of the AFL committee on international labor
relations and union reconstruction, settled the issue with Schevenels.
His examination of the GLD material convinced him that the GTUD was
107
108
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planned as "a communist front subsidiary to the Council for a Democratic
Germany, a Popular Front organization ... corresponding to the Committee
for a Democratic Germany set up in Moscow [the National Committee for a
Free Germany]".

He believed that the GTUD was "set up solely for the

purpose of facilitating [the] capture by the Communist Party" of the
postwar trade union movement in Germany.

He told Schevenels that the

AFL endorsement of the GLD was still valid and urged him to withdraw
his endorsement of "the proposed Aufhauser delegation".

110

When the

efforts of the GLD and the AFL deterred a certain number of prospective
members from joining the GTUD, Schevenels defined this as
setback".

11

a serious

Yet, Sollmann, for example, was willing to join the GTUD

under the condition that it had nothing to do with the CDG.

111

Snell

had joined the GLD but urged the latter to. cooperate with the GTUD.
Schevenels attempted to change the minds of the reluctant unionists.
They were to receive copies of his correspondence which separated the
GTUD from the CDG.

Aufhauser and Hertz carried out this assignrnent,

112

which Katz cons ide red only as a "face saving" device. In the face of
AFL opposition, Schevenels admitted that he could do no more than
"register that, for the time being, it is impossible to have such a
German representation in the USA".
110

113

Katz felt reassured.

According

Matthew Wall, AFL to Schevenels, 9 November 1944, Nachlass

Plettl.
111

Sollmann to Ollenhauer, 11 October 1944, EK Mappe 122.
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Hertz to Werter Kollege, 12 January 1945, Nachlass
Plettl.
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Schevenels to GLD, 11 December 1944, Nachlass Plettl.
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to -him, the support of the IFTU was "for us, relatively worthless".

It

was doubtful whether the latter would survive the war for long.

He did

not believe either that the CIO would later recognize the GTUD.

The

former might even prefer the GLD to the latter.

The Labor Delegation,

itself, still intended to gain CIO recognition.

It had temporized only

in order to protect its relations with the AFL.

114

After the Conference of Teheran, the isolation of the GLD-grew.
In a reaction to the conference decisions, the Social Democratic committee turned its propaganda against the United Nations.

Inter-Allied

negotiations were signs of inter-Allied territorial deals at the
expense of Germany.

The GLD might as well have been suspicious of the

British and the American government.

But with all hope for a German

revolution gone, the Social Democratic emigrants had to rely exclusively
on the Western Allies.

They chose to ignore rumors about Western plans

for a decentralization of Germany which had surfaced in early 1943.
They could not know that, at Teheran, the United States had actually
submitted a plan for partition which was only shelved because the
Allies could not agree on any method of partition.

In particular,

Russia disliked it because the industrial centers in whose exploitation
she wanted to share lay in Western Germany.

In its dilemma, the GLD

preferred to see the territorial questions of Germany only in terms of
the Russian appetite.

At the time of the final battle for Germany,

it proposed a change in the United Nations alliance.

Its attitude

towards Russia was a mixture of inferiority and superiority feelings.

114
Katz to Snell, 27 January 1945, Nachlass Plettl.
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Katz claimed in his memoirs that the Social Democratic emigrants did
"not consider it inevitable that Moscow had to be conceded such a
strong influence in the reconstruction of Germany".
the editorial question:

115

"Must Germany become Russian?"

it with the proposal for an Atlantic community.

Stampfer asked

116

He answered

He claimed that there

was "in Europe from Poland to Portugal, a strong feeling of belonging
together with [America], becaus~ the awareness of an Atlantic civilization is alive, because the only thing which connects these mutually
antagonistic and resentful nations is the common sympathy for America
and t.he respect for America".

117

Thus, Western Europe could only derive

cohesion from a common anticommunism under the aegis of the United
States.

The latter was to be the mediator of "a Europe west of the

Russian border".

In its role of a disinterested and objec·tive referee,

it could clear up all territorial questions in Europe to the satisfac.tion of everybody including Germany.· The latter would be "democratic

. c 1ose re 1at~on
.
an d peace f u 1 ... ~n

. h western

w~t

. . 1.~zat~on
.
. 118

c~v~

II

In

the opinion of Stampfer, the Soviet Union needed not be afraid of a
Western Europe since Russia would remain for a long time the strongest
military power on the two continents of Europe and Asia.

Under these

circumstances, there was also no need for "a violent confrontation
llSibid., Nr. 444.
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muss bereit sein", Matthias and Link, Nr. 154, p. 622.
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Stampfer to Sopade, 9 March 1944, Matthias and Link, Nr. 161,
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between communists and Social Democrats in Germany".

119

Germany and

Western Europe would be neither Americanized nor Russified.
the postwar world would be global.

120

Yet,

Stampfer did expect America to

neutralize Russia in Europe for the benefit of Germany which would
eventually become,again, the strongest country there.
In order to be ready for its role of a detached protector of
Europe, the United States would have to change its attitude towards
Russia.

Stampfer asserted that alliances are only meant to last for a

certain time and that the end of a war was normally also the time for
confrontations between the victors.

He did not believe that the future

peace could be founded on a big power alliance.

It

required "an inter-

national democratic order", that is, the end of the wartime alliance
with Russia.

The latter coul"d be neither a member of a future "demo-

cratic federation of the world" nor of one of the subgroups of "a
.

democratic f e d eration o f Europe".

121

This meant the isolation of·

Russia from these two anticommunist federations.
NVZ

Some articles of the

discussed more moderate solutions of the German problem. They were

written by outsiders or Americans.

Hans von Hentig foresaw a postwar

world of two superpowers in which Germany would play a minor role
resembling neutralism of the Swiss type.
119
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Dorothy Thompson thought
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388

that such neutralism could prevent a division of Germany.

123

In their anticipation of a Cold War, some Social Democrats drew
parallels with the early Western attitude towards Hitler.

Stampfer

claimed that the Western democracies were as soft towards Russia in
1944 as they had been towards Hitler in 1939.

He was afraid that "the

consequences will not only be the same but much worse 11 •

Eastern Europe

would be lost to the Russians who would also nplay the first violin in
Berlin" in case of an occupation of Germany.

The Anglo-Saxons would

eventually only have the alternatives of retreating from the continent
or confronting the Soviet Union.
of Russia.

There was no sense in an appeasement

If the Western democracies kept shirking their anticommunist

duties, there might be "no other road for Germany than the road to
Moscow".

124

The warnings by Seger were more timely.

He waited until

June 1945 before emphasizing the growing spread of rumors about a war
between Russia and the United States.

He noted that the State Depart-

ment considered them intense enough to respond with an official denial
of any such plan.

Seger did not fully believe the assurances of the

liberal Assistant Secretary of State, Archibald McLeish, that a con.

t~nue

d Amer~can
.
Russ~an
.

.

cooperat~on

. dou b t. 125
was not ~n

By late 1944 and early 1945, the Social Democratic emigrants
could no longer ignore the changes in the American attitude and in
123
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American policy towards Germany.

126

They vented their frustration in

bitter denunciations but they could not come to terms with these developments because they had no alternative to reliance on the United
States in their plans for postwar reconstruction.

According to Seger,

the American public had reacted negatively to the Morgenthau Plan in
the summer of 1943.

By the summer of 1945, he acknowledged that a

large proportion of public opinion approved of a severe treatment of
Germany.

He defined the agreements of Potsdam as

between the

reconstruct~on

11

a compromise

of Germany and the policy of retribution

which a large part of American public opinion demanded".

127

Stampfer

was stunned by what he called "a mass conversion to Vansittartism".
• h surpr1se
•
note d w1t
t h at

II

t h e unexpecte d b ecomes rea 1•1ty 11 . 128

ted very bitterly to this change.

He

He reac-

When President Hutchinson of the

University of Chicago, in a graduation speech, termed the German and the
Japanese people as fully responsible for the war crimes, he wrote about
"the conquest of the United States by Hitler".
were of no help either.

129

The German Americans

They could be won over neither to the anti-

fascist cause nor to the patriotic cause of German territorial integrity.

In the view of Stampfer, "Germany has lost nothing and America

has gained nothing in these people".
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In their state of impotence, some GLD members resorted to
threats about the disastrous consequences of the wrong postwar policy .
When Churchill declared in February 1944, that the Atlantic Charter did
not apply to the enemies of the United Nations, Stampfer predicted that
no German would accept any annexations.

Differences of opinion would

arise only over the methods of restoring lost territories.

These

methods could be peaceful or violent but the advocates of revenge would
probably win out within "twenty, thirty, fifty years".

131

Stampfer

thought that there would be only "an interim of exhaustion" which
would not last very long.

132

A dismemberment of Germany would mean

"a catastrophy for all mankind.

For, if you divide Germany into ten

pieces you will have,some years later, ten Hitlers instead of one."

133

This nationalist reaction would operate in alliance with the Russian
Bolshevists.

Also, an unfair treatment of Germany might lead directly

to world domination by Russia.

Vogel termed the expression of a German

nationalist desire for revenge as idiotic.

He made concessions to

emigrants who felt compelled to deal realistically with Russia.

He

hoped that Stampfer and the GLD emigrants would understand if the
Sopade participated in a general emigrant representation which included
.
134
cat h o li cs, protestants, an d communLsts.
131

In his opinion, the NVZ did

rbid., 26 February 1944.
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not contain everything that he thought about the wide field of Russia
an d

.

commun~sm.

135

In response to the decisions at Yalta and Potsdam, some GLD
emigrants became anti-American.

Stampfer complained that Germany was

not only victimized by the territorial imperialism of Russia, but also
by "the commercial imperialism of America and England", which intended
. .
to e 1 ~m~nate German

.

econom~c

. .

compet~tLon.

136

He termed the plans for

the transfer of populations from German Eastern territories as insane
and blamed the Western Allies for their cooperation.

137

To him,

Potsdam was "a peace of dictatorship and of dictates", not a democratic,
permanent peace.

138

For Seger, who was then an American citizen, Pots-

dam was "not the realization of the principles for whose vindication we
carried on the war against fascism and National Socialism".

139

After

the war, Stampfer proclaimed that Social Democracy would not capitulate
to the victors of the Second World War.

140

Suddenly, he stopped

limiting himself to American political terms and remembered his socialist vocabulary.

In October 1944, Stampfer had already proposed "some

decisive st~s in the direction of planning and etatism" for the
135

vogel to Stampfer, Nach1ass Stampfer, part II, section 17,
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European postwar economy.

He thought that "it may be the historical

task of Germany to prove that a system of state ownership and planning
can be executed without hurting human rights and personal freedom".

141

After Potsdam, he claimed more resentfully that "the American stereotype of a private economy does not befit a people like the German
people".

The reconstruction of Germany and Europe could, in his opinion,

"almost only be executed in the Social Democratic spirit".

Germany had

to go "her own way between the American and the Russ ian way!'.

142

Shortly before his return to Germany in 1948, he philosophized that
Western civilization predated capitalism and would survive it.
the Social Democrats as the defenders of this civilization.
"capitulate neither to 'Wall Street' nor to the Kremlin".
Street, they would

d~fend

He saw

They would
Against Wall

"the rights of Europe to be as socialist as it

,
• ~ts
,
,
11
d es~res
to b e ~n
own ~nterests
. 143

Seger and Katz were equally

disappointed but they were more careful in their public statements.
The editorial attitudes of the NVZ could not escape official
notice.

At the German Desk of the OWI, Hans Hoffmann was upset about

the nationalism of the NVZ.

He scored the excitement about the possi-

bility of losing "an inch of holy German soil", in the case of his
memorandum, the city of Eupen on the German Belgian border.

When the

NVZ called its communist detractors the "Moscow Nazis", Hoffmann
141
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recommended the term of "New York Nazis" for the NVZ emigrants.

He

regretted the concentration on territorial issues by "men with an
/

originally true socialist and anti-Nazi background".
revoke the NVZ license for the POW camps.

He suggested to

The "vicious" propaganda of

the NVZ would only strengthen the National Socialist mentality of the
German

.

pr~soners.

144

Hoffmann regretted that the OWI had no legal

means of stopping NVZ circulation among German Americans.

He also

scored the anti-Russianism of the NVZ which was, in his opinion, partially caused by the territorial losses in the East.

He deplored this

unpatriotic attitude at a time when the Russian armies were needed to
defeat Germany.

145

Otherwise, the government continued to ignore the

GLD.

Despfte Social Democratic exasperation, the Easter Declaration
of the GLD was more realistic.

It was the only o£ficial follow-up

program on ·reconstruction since 1943.
then already a fact.

The occupation of Germany was

The Declaration proposed only moderation and

certain arrangements which were designed to prevent a division of
Germany.

It warned against completely separate zones of occupation

and recommended unlimited authority for the central Allied control commission with regional interallied control commissions in all parts of
Germany, including the East.

In this way, the Russians would have

to share any occupational authority and would always be outnumbered.
144
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This state of affairs should end as soon as possible with the establish.

ment o f a new German d emocrat~c government.

146

The Easter Declaration

opposed the cession of Eastern or Western territories that had belonged
to the Weimar Republic without the consent of the populations involved.
Beyond this primary concern, it dealt with industrial reconstruction
which was closely related to territorial integrity.

It wanted indus-

trial restriction limited to the purpose of ensuring German disarmament
without eliminating any branch of production like heavy industry.

For

a European recovery, German reparations alone would be insufficient.
They should be gauged to German economic capacity which would be very
low for some time to come.
time only".

They should also be made "for a limited

The GLD advocated reparations in kind in order to ensure

German and international financial stability.

The GLD opposed expli-

147
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.
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c~t

With its Easter Declaration, the GLD found even less response
than in 1943.

It was completely isolated.

With the war nearly over,

the State Department was even less interested in emigrant groups than
before.

It stated that it was "our policy now to play down these move-

ments and not to get involved in them if we can help it".

As a measure

of GLD weakness, the State Department was only concerned about the survival of the Social Democratic committee within the socialist emigration.

It noted that the Council for a Democratic Germany held "a

considerably stronger position than the German Labor Delegation" which
146

ostern 1945: Erkl~rung der German Labor Delegation, Matthias
and Link, Nr. 173, pp. 691-693.
147
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had refused to join in the emigrant coalition.

It considered the GLD

"at present ... too weak to offer much more than a target for attack".
It hoped that with sufficient AFL support the GLD could recover and
become a stronger element in the emigrant discussions on German recon.

struct~on.

148

The sponsor groups of the GLD also withdrew in an atmosphere of
rising anti-Germanism.

The latte·r could not fail to affect the Jewish

Labor Committee because it was intensified by the revelations about
the National Socialist extermination camps.
regret over these facts.

The GLD expressed little

It resented only the harm which their revela-

tion could do to its theory of "the other Germany".

In early 1945,

the NVZ,including Stampfer who was Jewish, believed that these revelations were mainly propaganda.

Hans von Hentig explained that the heaps

of corpses on the released pictures could be German Christians, victims
of Allied bombardments or of a typhoid epidemic in occupied Germany.

149

Katz resented "the agitation of certain circles" after the discovery
of the inhumanities in the camps.

He reported about "a counter cam-

paign" by the GLD, that is, a declaration by Americans like Varian Fry,
Oscar Garrison Villard, and Alvin Johnson, against the identification
of National Socialists and Germans.

150

Katz complained that the GLD

had "enormous difficulties with the Morgenthau wing of the JLC".
148
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he explained that the resentment of the latter was based on '"irrational feeling' that will disappear in a few months''.

151

But under the

circumstances, the JLC was not in a mood of making financial pledges
to the GLD for the reconstruction of the German labor movement.
The AFL would rather deal with the postwar German labor movement directly.

It was interested in conservative unions but not in a

Social Democratic party.

In the spring of 1944 already, Matthew Woll

wanted to use the attitude of the State Department as an alibi for
withholding support from the GLD.

For this purpose, he wanted to dis-

cuss GLD aid with the European Affairs Division.

The latter understood

that the AFL had "a lessening inclination to contribute financially to
the German Labor Delegation".

It advised against an involvement in the

affairs of the GLD,which suited the AFL.

152

Under these circumstances, the Easter Declaration elicited no
echo.

It was a document for the historical record as Grzesinsky, the

former GLD chairman, pointed out.

He was then associated with the

Council for a Democratic Germany together with Aufhauser, one of his
GLD successors.

They no longer recognized the GLD as the full Social

Democratic representation in the United States.

The former thought

that the Easter Declaration could have been a new start if·it had been
151
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signed "by everybody", that is, by the other socialist and non-socialist
emigrant groups.

153

a conciliatory mood.

Despite its isolation, however, the GLD was not in
It wanted to say what it had to say whether any-

body would listen or not.
The Easter Declaration was still based on the GLD interpretation of the theory of "the other Germany".

Thus, it rejected the idea

of collective responsibility as a justification for punishment in the
form of unfavorable settlements.

154

F. W. Wagner polemicized in the

NVZ against the suggestion of Marek that Germany serve the penalties
imposed by the Allies slowly and fully.

155

The best way of defying

collective notions would be the trial of the National Socialist criminals in special German courts.

The GLD fought with all possible

arguments the threats t9 its solution of the German problem.
wanted a replay of the liberal approach of 1918.

It still

Stampfer saw "no

signs of re-awakening mass movements except of the Social Democrats
and the communists".

He thought that the call of destiny would go

again to the Social Democrats as in 1918.

He hoped that "Social Demo-

cracy will remain the party of the educated elements of the working
class [sic] . . . . The nucleus of this new movement will consist of the
old one who succeeded to survive."

He called the Social Democratic

program of 1818 "our Declaration of Independence, ... our New Deal".
153
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The end of the latter had not so much been due to Social Democratic
negligence as to "the recurrent swings of a pendulum that ,.;ent back
and forth between revolution and reaction since 1789".

According to

this deterministic concept, the revolution of the common man had been
interrupted with each swing back but had nevertheless come closer to
final victory.

In Germany, that would come after the Second World War.

The latest reaction under Hitler had left the constitutional framework
of the first republic intact for the formation of the second and final
156.
one.
The Weimar constitution would automatically be in effect after
Hitler, unless the Allies wanted to continue the National Socialist work
.
157
o f d estruct~on.
tuent

.

nat~ona

The Easter Declaration claimed that only a consti-

1 assemb 1y cou ld c h ange t h e we~mar
.

.

.

const~tut~on.
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The GLD occupied a strange point in the ideological development
of the Social Democratic Party.

Its ancestors of the Wilhelminian era

had been considered "vaterlandslose Gesellen 11 (unpatriotic fellows).
Yet, the GLD changed from an antifascist committee into a nationalistic
group which William Shirer, a former supporter, castigated severely.

159

It did not foresee that in a conservative Western Germany, the Social
Democtats would again be regarded as a menace to the state.
The isolation of the GLD, which the Easter Declaration sympto156
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mized, inhibited also the plan of the Sopade for a reconstruction of the
party executive (PV) which would supersede the exile executive and also
play a role in postwar Germany.
designed for a return to Germany.

Like the Declaration, this plan was
The old PV would be back in Germany

before the reconstruction of the SPD.

It could be a bond between the

-nascent Social Democratic Party groups in the four zones of occupation.
It could also address the German people which was subject to the same
fragmentation.

But the plan of Vogel depended on the circumstances of

the emigration in the United States.

Of the twelve exiled PV members

seven lived in America, four in England, and one in Sweden.

In England,

only Vogel and Ollenhauer were original members of the Sopade.

Heine

was coopted and Geyer had resigned because of his Vansittartist attitude-.

Of

th~

seven American members, only Stampfer was with the GLD.

Rinner and Sollmann were isolated and had become American citizens.
The remaining four members, Aufhauser, Dietrich, Hertz, and Juchacz
were united in their disapproval of the GLD which had shut them out
from the National Convention in 1943 and had not consulted them in the
formulation of the Easter Declaration.

The GLD continued to oppose

their policy of Socialist concentration to which the Sopade had made
concessions.

It did not want to see these left wing Social Democrats

in a reconstructed PV which would have more authority than the anemic
Sopade.

Its members wanted to return to Germany on the merits of the

GLD without other ties.
Vogel tried to circumvent the crucial problem of the relationship between the PV members in America and the GLD.

After some deliber-

ation in the Sopade about the plan, Vogel sounded out Stampfer first in

400
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.
December 19 44 on this "somewhat 1ess p 1easant sub Ject .

was non-commital as usual.

The latter

Then, Vogel tested the reaction of the PV

members outside of England with a circular letter.

In his presentation,

he insisted on the legitimacy of the PV mandate of the last Reichskonferenz of the SPD in April 1933.

As a basis for PV reconstruction,

he elaborated on the participation of the Sopade in the London Union
without dealing with the attitude of the GLD.

As a basic political

consensus, he offered the anticommunism of the Sopade:

no cooperation

with communist emigrants and no recognition of the communist Free
.
161
Germany Comm~ttees.

historical record.

Vogel made his proposal to some extent for the

After its return to Germany, the Sopade could

report that "we made such an attempt and that it failed because of
the attitude of the other side".

He overcame his fear that some PV

members might interpret his plan "as a weakness" and took on the "unp 1easant II tas k o f

•

contact~ng

t h em. 162

Stampfer finally considered the

undertaking as "fairly hopeless" which was an inevitable assessment.

163

It sheds, however, some additional light on the problem of a Socialist
concentration in the United States and elsewhere.
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The independent PV members in America did find a joint approach
to the proposal by Vogel in the form of a counterproposal which neutralized the tactical advantage of Vogel.

For them, the reconstruction

of the PV was a symbol of the politics of the old movement.

They re-

jected the validity of the mandate of 1933 as a relic of this movement.
The Sl'D Reichskonferenz of 1933 had not intended "to confer such a
mandate for half a generation" during which the national and the international situation would change radically.
not anticipated then.

The Second World War was

The postwar situation required the unity of the

socialist movement which the PV could not bring about.

According to

this argument, "a mechanical reconstruction of the old party executive
would create the impression that "we consider ourselves as the legitimate leadership of a new Social Democratic movement in Germany".
According to the counter-proposal, the forces of the antifascist resistance would "create a new movement and give it form and content".

Even

if they survived in large numbers, "the forces of the old movement"
could not by themselves create a new party.

Also, the latter would

originate locally and rise "from below" so that it could not possibly
be led by a largely emigrant PV.

All the emigrants could give was

" a dv1ce
.
.
" . 164
an d ass1stance
The alternative plan proposed to further develop the cooperation that was begun with the Union in England, that is, apply it to the
American situation.

The Union should convert itself into the Auslands-

zentrale (center abroad) of the new German socialist movement.

164

In that

·
Sc h re1'b en von Au fh;.
.
. , Hertz un d
auser, D1etr1c,
Geme1nsames
Juchacz to Vogel, 25 May 1945, Matthias and Link, Nr. 175, pp. 698-700.

402
case, the PV members in America would approve an appeal to the German
workers.

The ideology for such a center would have to be "a renewed

confession of socialism" based on the revolutionary Sopade manifesto
of January 1934 and the manifesto of the Union of October 1943.

The

alternative plan advocated the unity of a new German labor movement,
the concentration of the socialist emigrant groups and a joint approach
to the German policy of the Allied governments.

It demanded that the

Sopade motivate the GLD to align with such a new center.
.
. of
c 1a~m
a 1 so d rop ~ts

.

represent~ng

t h e German

.

un~ons.

165

The GLD should
Juchacz

admitted that she did not think the Sopade capable of changing the mind
of the GLD.

She would also have considered it "disastrous if people

like Stampfer would significantly influence the political course over
there".

He was one of those Social Democrats who were so absorbed in

the defense of German national interests that they forgot their social.

~st

.

.

m~ss~on.

166

The Sopade rejected the counter-proposal.

If the mandate of

1933 was invalid, Vogel could not find the authority for establishing
a

.

representat~on

a b roa d . 167

This concern with formal authority was a

drawback of the German socialist emigration.

As long as the various

socialist groups agreed on a joint policy, they needed no further
authorization.
165
166
167

This democratic way would have accomplished more than

rbid.
Juchacz to Vogel, 29 May 1945, EK Mappe 58.

Vogel to Stahl, 17 July 1945, EK Mappe 142; also Vogel to
Stampfer, 17 July 1945, Matthias and Link, Nr. 177, p. 703.
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the interpretations of an old mandate.

But the controversy over the

latter recalled the ideological differences in the Weimar SPD which
also figured in the later debate over the causes of the Social Democratic defeat at the hands of National Socialism.

Neither side wanted

to make any concessions shortly before a possible vindication by·postwar
developments.

Aufhauser thought that the response of Vogel was "quite

insensible" and did not even merit an answer.
agreed.

169

168

Hertz and Juchacz

Rinner had not even responded to the first proposal.

This conflict over a rehabilitation of the party executive
exemplified again the negative influence of the GLD in the German
socialist emigration.

In its complete isolation, the German Labor

Delegation achieved nothing in German postwar reconstruction.

Some bf

its members returned to Germany and had significant political careers
on the basis of their conservative ideology which fit well into the
era of the Cold War.
168
169

..
Aufhauser to Juchacz, 16 July 1945, EK Mappe 58.
Hertz to Juchacz, 24 August 1945, EK Mappe 58.
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CHAPTER X
LIBERAL REORGANIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION:

THE AMERICAN

ASSOCIATION FOR A DEMOCRATIC GERMANY AND THE
COUNCIL FOR A DEMOCRATIC GERMANY
The American Friends of German Freedom devoted itself most
vigorously to postwar reconstruction.

This was due to its double

character as an American liberal and an emigrant democratic socialist
organization.

These two elements reinforced and complemented each

other ideologically.

The American liberals in the AFGF had a worldwide

approach to postwar reconstruction.
war can be fought to end all wars.

They revived the old dream that a
Their rationalist plan advocated a

democratic Western and Central Europe in unison with the United States.
Its centerpiece was a democratic Germany.

A peacetime United Nations

was to take the sting out of this arrangement for the Soviet Union and
allow for co-existence between the unequal worlds of liberalism and
communism.

The American liberals in the AFGF believed that this de-

sign would soon win mass support as the only peaceful system possible.
In order to prepare for this rise in their fortunes, they reorganized
the American Friends of German Freedom into the American Association
for a Democratic Germany in May 1944.

The former had served the pur-

pose of helping the German underground movement to reestablish German
freedom by overthrowing Hitler. The latter expressed the change in
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approach when the Allies were winning the war and were going to shape
the peace.

The AADG was formed to lobby with the American government

for a rational solution of all postwar problems of which a democratic
Germany was the major element.

The main flaw was the central impor-

tance which Germany played in this plan and the corresponding underestimation of the Russian postwar role and of the complications of
East-West relations.

When their rationality could not keep up with

events the liberals became the most ideologically motivated Cold
Warriors.

They were going to vindicate liberalism by containing the

Soviet Union.

This change of strategy also determined their policy of

reconstruction in postwar Germany.
The German arm of the AADG was an emigrant coalition that
could later resume contacts with democratic forces in Germany.

This

was the Council for a Democratic Germany which lasted from the spring
of 1944 until early 1946.

It included all emigrant groups but its

communist members were so few that it was not proper to call it a
Popular Front organization, as all of its contemporary critics did.
The pragmatic basis of this diverse coalition was the consensus on the
need for continued East-West relations which alone would make a peaceful
reconstruction of Germany possible.

In this scheme, all emigrant groups

had a place and a contribution to make.

The formation was hastened by

the appearance of the National Committee for a Free Germany in Moscow.
If the Western Allies would not sponsor an equivalent emigrant coalition,
the NKFD might gain an undue influence in German reconstruction.
Its origin and composition caused the main problems of the CDG.
Its financial dependence on the AADG tended to limit it to the role of
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an extension of the Association.
the NB emigrants.

This state of affairs fit the plans of

But the other groups, especially the Social Demo-

cratic emigrants, resented it.

Their unsuccessful attempts at making

the CDG more independent caused serious friction which put into relief
the misunderstanding on which the Council was based.

·The other groups

were handicapped by the circumstance that they were not organized outside the CDG like the NB emigrants.
coalition dominated by the AADG.

They had joined as individuals a

In the plans for reconstruction which

the CDG elaborated, the various groups made few concessions.

In a mood

of exalted nationalism, each of them added some of its favorite goals
to the CDG plans,including religious education in the case of the
Catholic emigrants.

On this basis, the Council was unable and unwill-

ing to face the hard realities of the German defeat and work
compromise of its divergent interests.

out~a

The questions of German war

guilt and of territorial cessions did not exist for the Council.

This

indicated that it expected the best of all possible worlds from the
victorious Allies.

It was shocked by the decisions of Yalta and

Potsdam and fell into the dilemma of disliking the results of a diplomatic arrangement that was the basis of its hopes for postwar Germany.
It took a few months before the CDG was able to work out a compromise
reaction to the decisions of Yalta.
this was no longer possible.

For the decisions of Potsdam,

The Social Democratic members reluctantly

joined the communist members in an acceptance of the Allied decisions.
But the NB members were unyielding in their opposition to the Russian
encroachments on Eastern Germany to which the Western Allies had
nevertheless agreed.

Frank and his friends left the Council in October
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1945 and the Association dissociated itself from its former creation.
The other groups failed to keep the CDG alive beyond early 1946.
The departure of Frank from the Council was caused by a change
of strategy.

In the new situation of international relations, he

wanted to return to Germany as a liberal envoy from America.

For this

purpose, the CDG which stood for East-West harmony was useless but the
Association could serve as a liberal backer of Frank.
therefore, to reactivate the AADG in the fall of 1945.
can government refused to let him return to Germany.

He proposed,
But the AmeriAfter 1945, the

'Association tried to win new liberal support in Germany where it made
many new contacts.

Since the general NB Group had been absorbed by

the new Social Democratic Party, it also wanted some recognition from
the SPD executive and from the AFL.

For this purpose, it was willing

to accept some former GLD members into its national committee.

In

order to facilitate this adjustment, Frank withdrew largely from his
positions in the Association.

But the SPD executive under Kurt~Schu

macher ignored the initiatives of the AADG.

In its postwar political

work, the Association criticized the occupation policy until 1948 when
the

American attitude towards Germany changed with the new

containment of the Soviet Union.
have found better times.

policy of

In that situation, the AADG could

But in 1951, it suspended its activities in

the atmosphere of inquisition of the McCarthy era.
The preparations for the Council for a Democratic Germany began
after the Free Germany Committee in Moscow issued its manifesto of
July 1943.

Frank was motivated by "the events in Europe" and thought

that "a group of reputed Germans and German Americans should attempt
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a sort of balance to the so-called German National Committee of Moscow".
He expressed his concern that the Russians pursued more than "transitory
tactical plans" with the Committee and proposed that something should
be done about "a strategy of potential German Russian separate actions".
In the absence of any counteractivity, the National Committee could

acquire undue importance and prepare a future socialist party "of unilateral dependence".

1

Frank thought that Thomas Mann was best qualified to bring and
hold together an emigrant coalition in America.

The latter had reacted

favorably to Frank's book "Germany after Hitler" and called it in a
letter of 13 July 1943, "the clearest, most reasonable and realistic
preview of the things in store for Germany".

He hoped that it would

have "a favorable regulative effect" on American politicians.

2

Frank

invited Mann to come to New York from California to discuss the formation of an emigrant council.
anybody before writing to him.

He told Mann that he had not approached
He thought that Mann should be the

president over a conference that was to work out an independent posi- ·
tion on German reconstruction.

The latter should "not foremost be a

counter-declaration to the Moscow National Committee, but an independent
declaration with a certain counterweight" against the Moscow committee.
Frank considered the prospective members of a

German emigrant council

1

Frank to Thomas Mann, 26 July 1943, Frank Papers, box 10,
folder 8; also, AFGF statement to the press about National Committee
Free Germany, 12 August 1943, Frank Papers, box 1, folder 1943.
2

folder M.

Thomas Mann to Frank, 13 July 1943, Frank Papers, box 9,
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as "a vanguard or at least as an outpost of German Democracy".

The

time for an independent opinion was especially propitious in 1943,
according to him.

The dialogue between the West and the East was near

conclusion but a compromise at the expense of Germany could still be
prevented, especially if the strong liberal potential of public opinion
in the United States and in England would rally to the cause of the
German

.

em~grants.

3

But Mann was evasive and postponed a visit to New

York until October.
The political views of Mann did not suit a prospective emigrant coalition.

He was also afraid of losing his intellectual privacy

if he got involved with political groups.

Mann was especially depressed

over the National Socialist crimes and was convinced that "only a genuine, sincere, purifying revolution ... could rehabilitate the German
people in the eyes of the world, of history and of itself".
pleased with the Moscow manifesto because it encouraged a
ution without any talk about socialism.

He was
German revol-

For this reason, he partici-

pated in a group of German exile writers in Hollywood who intended to
express their public support of the National Committee in Moscow.

But

when he wanted to add his independent statement he was overruled and
withheld his signature.

Mann was not interested in preserving the

German people from the consequences of its passivity.

He was little

inclined to become upset "over anything that might happen to Germany
after the defeat".

He granted the victors "the right to act according

to their inclinations 11 •
3

folder 8.

He considered :'the patriotic zeal" with which

Frank to Thomas Mann, 10 August 1943, Frank Papers, box 10,
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most socialist and other emigrants claimed that nothing detrimental must
happen to Germany as "not quite natural''.

Their call for a strong

German democracy was to him a call for "a strong Germany with a large,
efficient red army".

Despite his anticommunism and anti-socialism,

Mann thought that the Russian ambassador in postwar Berlin could assume
"the role of Lord Protector" so that the Allies would not commit "irreparable ... stupidities".

Mann was concerned about American inexperi-

ence in foreign policy but he was sensitive to the wishes of the American government.

The latter did in his opinion not want "unsolicited

advice" from "enemy aliens" and "premature antifascists''.

4

Frank tried unsuccessfully to overcome the resistance of Mann.
He told him that he would find out in Washington directly whether an
emigrant union was desirable.

On the other hand, he fought Mann's

consideration of American wishes with the argument that an independent
voice on German reconstruction was necessarily also independent of the
American government.

Since Mann was wary of the Moscow Committee he

could not object to "an independent counter-voice".

But he eventually

declined the role which Frank offered him. The latter thought that
"the intervention of Seger and Co." was instrumental in this refusa1.

5

Stampfer stated that Mann had a conversation with Undersecretary of
State Berle who thought that the German emigrants lacked contrition and
were mainly .interested in saving Germany from just punishment, an
4

Thomas Mann to Frank, 6 August 1943, Frank Papers, box 9,

folder M.
5
folder B.

Frank ·to \.filly Brandt, 19 March 1958, Frank Papers, box 8,
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opinion which Mann shared.

6

The latter did not even sign the initial

declaration of the CDG of March 1944.

He implored Niebuhr to postpone

its publication because the time had not yet come for emigrant intervention.

He criticized the declaration for its exclusive desire to

spare Germany and its concomitant insensitivity to the feelings of
those European peoples who had suffered most under German aggression.
In reference to a phrase of the declaration, Mann stated that

11

there

is no such thing as an unjust peace for Germany" regardless of the
eventual settlement.

7

Tillich was a more appropriate chairman for the CDG.

He was a

friend of Niebuhr which emphasized the connection of the CDG with the
NB sponsor organization.

His Christian Socialist views which he shared

with Niebuhr were in tune with the prospective CDG.

He believed that

Western society needed as much reform as Eastern society.

Only a gen-

eral transformation of the world could prevent another world war.

For

Tillich, democracy was "the fertile soil out of which the aggressing
forces have grown".

It has "created Communism" by defending social

injustice and has "nourished Fascism" as a tool against Communism.
Liberal democracy was a failure.
liberals
world".

Tillich considered "the status quo

as a great ... danger to the future of Europe and of the
The first war aim was therefore the transformation of Western

society.

A

safe social system should be based on "a planned economy in

which enough liberal elements are included to prevent another form of
6

stampfer to Sopade, 9 March 1944, Matthias and Link, Nr. 161,

p. 643.
7Thomas Mann to Reinhold Niebuhr, 23 April 1944, Nachlass Hertz,
reel 33.
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totalitarian tyranny".
order.

This was the internal aspect of the postwar

It was designed to guarantee the freedom of the individual by

protecting him against the exploitation of an unchecked liberal

economy~

The external aspect of Tillich's new order concerned the relationships between nations.

It was designed to guarantee the freedom of

each individual nation by protecting it against imperialist exploitation.

For this purpose, laissez faire nationalism had to end.

As the

second war aim, Tillich proposed a supernational unity of all countries
in the form of a federal union.
system of the nationalist era.

It was to replace the balance of power
Tillich considered a league of govern-

ments like the former League of Nations as incapable of preserving
peace.

In a federal union, each nation had to give up its military,

economic, and diplomatic sovereignty.
autonomy.

It could only retain a cultural

As a preliminary step, Tillich demanded "the federal union

of the European continent" which presumably included Russia.

But he

did not judge the prospects of a European union critically.

He real-

ized that the New European Order of National Socialist Germany had
aroused "a tremendous nationalistic reaction".

He warned that "if- this

reaction cannot be overcome together with the Nazi conquerors, no hope
for Europe is left".

But he believed that the rational forces of

history will be strong enough to overcome its irrational forces.
The participation of Russia in a European federation was also
a soluble problem.

Tillich believed that the Russian alliance with

"Why war aims? What war aims? ~{hose war aims?'; Paul Tillich
in The Protestant, pp. 8-22, n.d. , Frank Papers.
8

f'
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the West might "modify the totalitarian character of the Russian government".

The reciprocal effect was expected for Western society.

He

realized that such a development was not in the interest of British
imperialism or American capitalism.

The former was interested in the

continued division of the European continent, the latter in "a disintegrated and dependent Europe as a half-colonial hinterland for
American business activities". For these reasons, Tillich distrusted
an Anglo-American peace without the corrective of the Soviet Union.
The continued existence of the United Nations was vital for a federal
reconstruction of Europe around a peaceful Germany.

For this trans-

formation, Tillich counted on such diffuse elements as the British
Labor Party, the German underground movement and President Roosevelt,
who had called for freedom from fear and want.

The idea of a rapproche-

ment between Western and Eastern society was a somewhat mechanistic
speculation.

But this ideological confidence of Tillich was his source

of energy in organizing and running the CDG for which.he performed
11

the work of Sisyphus••.

His war aims were unrealistically dogmatic

but they coincided with the main aspirations of the CDG:

an undivided

Germany within a new European order and a Social Democratic Germany
with a planned economy.

9

The composition of the CDG was problematic.

Except for the NB

emigrants, the other members joined the Council as individuals which
left them at a disadvantage in claiming their share of control.

There

were SAP, ISK, Catholic Center Party emigrants, including the former

r
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GLD protege Thormann, and Social Democratic emigrants.
Aufhauser and Grzesinsky were former GLD chairmen.
disenchanted with the Labor Delegation.
11

Of the latter,

They were both

Aufhauser complained that the

small group" of the GLD lacked "the necessary unanimity in nearly all

politically important questions''.

He described the divergence of

ol'inions in the GLD as "a gap that cannot be bridged".

It was respon-

sible for "the sterility of the GLD in its political work".

Aufhauser

believed in "holding together the Social Democratic forces" by a centralist orientation towards the United Nations rather than a unilateral
inclination towards either the East or the West.
GLD to follow the example of the Sopade.

He had wanted the

At least, the advocates of

a Western and of a centralist position should have had equal rights.
Instead,. the former abused the latter.

For these reasons, he tended

towards the Council which had, in his opinion, a political potential
which the GLD should recognize.

The CDG could have effected a socialist

rapprochement which was for Aufhauser a valid goal in the international
situation of 1944.

For the sake of GLD unity, he went along with a

January decision about the abstention of the GLD from the Council.

But

he resigned from the Labor Delegation when its conservative members
used the Social Democratic Federation and its German branch for the
adoption of resolutions that denounced the Council as communist.

10

Stampfer played down the switch to the CDG of Aufhauser who was always
"anxiously concerned about being as radical" as necessary.
10

Like all

..
Aufhauser to GLD, 23 February 1944, Nachlass Stampfer, part I,
section 1, Nr. 25.

416
disciples of Breitscheid, Aufhauser had a leftist tendency which he
followed in every critical situation.
tunist by nature.

11

Grzesinsky was considered oppor-

But the loss of two chairmen to the CDG was a

serious blow to the GLD.
·It could have been avoided.
in the Council.

At first, the GLD showed interest

Starnpfer claimed that the Labor Delegation could have

formed an emigrant union.

It had been encouraged "by an influential

agency" which he did not identify.

12

Since the GLD did not move,

Tillich invited its representatives to preparatory discussions for the
Council.

The critical issue was "the admission of the Moscow faction",

that is, of the three communists

Bonheim~

Norden, and Schreiner.

The

GLD emigrants expected the Council organizers to choose between them
and the communists which was an unacceptable alternative.

In GLD per-

spective, this meant that the Council organizers preferred the commun.
13
1.sts.
After the first round, rejection, carne the second round,
denunciation.

Katz claimed that the formation of the CDG was "a pre-

arranged affair between the members of NB and the communists".

In his

description, the three communists and the three NB members were prepo~derant

in the nineteen member CDG.

fellow travelers, including Tillich.

Allied with them were five
Together they outnumbered three

renegade Social Democrats and five bourgeois emigrants whom Katz classi11

starnpfer to Sopade, 30 August 1944, Matthias and Link, Nr. 185,
pp. 656-658; also Nachlass Starnpfer, part I, section 13, Nr. 692.
12
13

Starnpfer to Sopade, 9 March 1944, Matthias and Link, Nr.
Ibid.

161.
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fied as innocents.

He believed that the CDG aimed at "breaking up the

democratic groups o f t h e German

.

.

em~grat~on

vating force of the Tillich committee".

II

.

14

Frank was "the moti-

He had accepted the communist

assignment of bringing as many Social Democratic and bourgeois emigrants
as possible into the Popular Front-like Council.

This was the condi-

tion for "full absolution" for Frank's departure from the KPD in 1928.
It seemed to Katz that Moscow had,given "the signal for a concerted
attack on everything Social Democratic''.

Even William Shirer, who had

become critical of the GLD, had allegedly received his information from
"the two communists Alfred Kantorowicz and Henry Kassirer", two emigrants in the German shortwave service of the Columbia Broadcasting
System.

He was an innocent who was "not talented enough to grasp the

full context" of what these two members of the CDG told him.

15

The NVZ

reprinted an article of the Jewish Daily Forward whose title "Moscow London - Mexico - New York" put the CDG in line with the communist
inspired Popular Front groups.

16

In his own NVZ article, Katz inter-

preted the formation of the Council as "the Stalin coup in New York".
The three communists in the nineteen member executive committee "guaranteed the conformity with the general line of the policies of Moscow".
The mass of the committee were like ants without a chance against the
Russian bear, that is, the small minority.
14
15
16

Whoever was not against the

Katz to Ollenhauer, 15 June 1944, EK Mappe 61.
Katz to Ollenhauer, 12 August 1944, EK Mappe 61.

Neue Vo lkszeitung, 8 April 1944, p. 3.
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CDG was for it.
Republic.
11

Distrust was not enough.

It had not saved the Weimar

For the sake of a second republic,the GLD had the duty of

active opposition" to the CDG.

17

After an opportunity for cooperation,

the Labor Delegation ended up in extreme opposition to the Council, an
attitude that was not without risks for the

GLD.

Several observers were concerned about the GLD and its attitude
towards the CDG.

The Sopade deplored the divisive effect of the Coun-

cil on the Labor Delegation.
ation.

Ollenhauer advised moderation and cooper-

He did not fully accept the version of Katz.

He could not

detect any communists among the signers of the CDG declaration.
made "only one remark" on the issue.

18

He

He did not expect Katz "to draw

any practical consequences from it" but he asked him "to take it into
consideration".

Ollenhauer did not believe that the NB members played

the game of the communists.

He considered it useful that "we base our

good or bad relations to neighbor groups in the emigration on facts
that can be ascertained at any time".

He thought that the NB Group

had changed and that it was more Social Democratic than in the 1930's.
He advised Katz "to consider the situation for once in this perspective''.

19

Even Sollmann thought that it was "a mistake that you [the

GLD] did not establish contacts in time with Hagen".

He was impressed

by the liberal American support for the NB Group and had repeatedly
advised Seger to seek a rapprochement with the latter without sue17
18
19

Ibid., 6 May 1944, p. 4.!
Ollenhauer to Kurt Heinig, 23 May 1944, EK Mappe 83.
Ollenhauer to Katz 2 27 July 1944, EK Mappe 83.
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cess.

20

The State Department concluded that the Labor Delegation had

been outmaneuvered.
AFL assistance.

It \vas interested in

.;1

recovery of the GLD with

On the other hand, it did not want 11 two strong German

groups, at loggerheads with each other and backed by rival American
organizations 11 , that is, by the AFL and the CIO.
11

This might serve only

to sharpen the conflict between American citizens over an issue which

• pr imarL• 1y one o f f oreLgn
•
' ' II 21
LS
an d enemy orLgLn
But Katz was optimistic.

He thought that the Social Democratic

signers of the CDG declaration were still on the side of the GLD, which
had advised them against this step but took
action against them.
even to Katz.

for the time beingn no

The content of the declaration was acceptable

But the Social Democratic signers would eventually wake

up to the sinister designs of the CDG.
refusal of

11

Katz was also happy about the

uthe most important personalities of the German emigra-

tion ... to associate with the CDG:
Lowenstein 11 •

Bruning, Sollmann, ... Hubertus

Together with the GLD, these individual emigrants repre-

sented 11 95% of the >veight of the German democratic anti-Nazi emigration11.22

As long as these symbols of the Great Coalition remained

aloof, the GLD felt safe even though it could accomplish little in an
isolation that Sollmann and Lowenstein did not favor.

23

20

Sollmann to Hertz, 28 January 1943, Nachlass Hertz, reel 35.
21 .·
Memorandum on the relations of the GLD to the AFL, 24 May
1944, Department of State central files, National Archives.
22

Katz to Ollenhauer, 15 June 1944, EK Mappe 61.

23 H b t
'
. to S tamp f er, 9 Fe b ruary 1944 ,
u er us P rLnz
von 1··
owensteLn
Nachlass Stampfer, part I, section 10, Nr. 477; also: Ibid. Lowenstein
to Stampfer, 24 March 1944, Nr. 478.
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The Network only slightly outdid the GLD in denouncing the
Council.

It was published by Ruth Fischer with the help of Adolph

Weingarten and others and specialized in the detection of international,
that is, Moscow-led, communist conspiracies.
victim of the Comintern.

Fischer was, herself, a

In the early 1920's, her dominant ultra

leftist faction had lost its influence in the KPD in the wake of a
power struggle in the Russian Communist Party.

The Network treated all

signers of the CDG declaration as active members and issued an elaborate
classification of them.

The first group consisted of ten "German com-

munists under the discipline of the Communist Party of Germany, the
American· section of which is controlled by Hans Berger", the brother of
Ruth Fischer.

It included Schreiner, Bertold Brecht, Bonheim, Alfred

Kantorowicz, Norden,

a~d

Karl Obermann.

Then, there was a group of

important.contact men, a group of communist literati, artists, and
theatrical people, a group of fellow travelers, and a group of Social
Democrats converted to the Moscow cause.

There were also the members

of so-called independent groups organized by former communists like
Frank, Walcher, Sternberg, and their friends, Hertz, Juchacz, Kirschmann,
Erich Schmidt, and others.

In this distorted presentation, all the

emi~

grants associated with the CDG were either communist or communist
related.

24

Aufhauser was insensed about the propaganda front between

Trotzkists and Social Democrats, that is, the Network and the NVZ.

He

severely rebuked Stampfer who should have been the guardian of the
24
The Network, New York, [n.m.] 1944, published by Ruth Fischer,
Frank Papers.
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Socia 1

.

Democrat~c

.
.
1'~sm. 25
tra d.~t~on
o f JOUrna

The CDG had tried to fore-

stall some of this negative publicity, especially that of the NVZ.
This had been the purpose of its open approach to the GLD which Frank
had never expected to join the Council.
Otherwise, Frank was satisfied with the early results.

After

the initial declaration of March 1944, he thought that the affairs of
the CDG were "more positive11 than could have been expected "from such a
mixed society".
for a while".
contacts.

He anticipated that the Council would "hold together
In that case, it would "bring us a number of better

That is the minimal goal".

26

More significantly, Frank

thought that the CDG was "in its composition a mirror of the political,
social and intellectual forces that must be the basis of a democratic
Germany".

In that case, it afforded the NB Group a new legitimacy and

could serve as an Ersatz (substitute) government in exile.

27

This was

an overstatement.
Without the GLD as the only other well organized emigrant group,
there remained only the strong relationship of the Council with the
NB sponsor organization.
pose of the CDG.

This unilateral orientation confused the pur-

It was unclear which of the two groups served the

other or whether they were to be equal partners.

The NB sponsor organi-

zation started out playing the role of the parent in control of the

25

.•
Aufhauser to Stampfer, 12 April 1944, Nachlass Stampfer,
part I, section 1, Nr. 24.
26

Frank to Henrv Ehrmann, 15 March 1944, Frank Papers, box 10,

folder 8.
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Memorandum by Tillich, October 1943, Nachlass Hertz, reel 20.
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purse-strings.

As soon as the CDG had proven feasible the liberal

American friends of the NB Group expanded their organization.

On

18 May 1944, they established the American Association for a Democratic
Germany during a conference at the house of Roger Baldwin.

28

Eventu-

ally, the AADG was to become a mass organization and play in America
the role which the CDG was expected to play in postwar Germany.

As a

more substantial committee, it was ready to sponsor the Council without
being absorbed'by that task.

Principally, the Association assumed the

financial assets and liabilities of the American Friends who had raised
from $11,000 to $19,000 annually between 1940 and 1943.
their accounts were balanced, if low.

In May 1944,

29

The new Association would "support the Council financially
without limitations".

It

established~

joint budget with the Council

which was fixed at the somewhat high amount of $34,000 for the first
year.

This was indicative of the high ambitions of the AADG.

financial realities were more modest.

But the

The joint fundraising program

contained an emergency plan for the collection of $2,800.

Between

May and September 1944, the Association raised $2,349.46, of which more
than $1,000 came from old sources of the American Friends.
Council collected only $375 up to September 1944.
28
29

31

30

The

The proposed joint

Niebuhr to [ n.n.] , 23 December 1942, Nachlass Hertz, reel 20.
David F. Seiferheld to Hertz, 11 August 1944, Nachlass Hertz,

reel 20.
30

Agenda of meeting of executive committee of the AADG, 25 May
1944, Nachlass Hertz, reel 20.
31

cDG

Finanzlage, 21 September 1944, Nachlass Hertz, reel 20.
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budget for the first quarter amounted to only $4,228 and was later reduced to $3,651.

Between March and July 1944, the Council received

only $405.10 so that a substantial percentage of the budget was reserved for the AADG.

The latter also paid for the telephone, paper

and translation costs of the CDG which was left only with the expenses
for stamps, the publication of its Bulletin, and the part-time work of
the AADG secretary.

Yet, by September 1944, it had a deficit of $350

which meant that the Association did not as fully provide as planned.

32

Soon, the competition between the various groups in the CDG
came to a head.

The Association held back with funds while a group

around Grzesinsky claimed that the former needed no funds for other than
CDG purposes.

The AADG was only to be an auxiliary of the Council

specializing in fundraising and leaving the political work to the
Counc~"1

. 33

The Grzesinsky group blamed the Association for insufficient

financial support which was responsible for the political inactivity of
the CDG at a crucial time.

They thought that "the decisive hour is now

and not in three or four months".

The summer of 1944 was "the time for

our Council to enter into a stage of utmost activity"'.

The CDG should

"gain publicity ... with a well prepared program for the construction
of a peace-minded and trustworthy postwar Germany".

The Grzesinsky

group, therefore, sent "an urgent plea for immediate support of our
Council" to the Association "as the sponsors of our Council".
32
33

They

Ibid.

Otto Pfeiffenberger to David Seiferheld, 27 July 1944, Frank
Papers, box 7, folder 1.

424
needed $500 to $1,000 "most urgently within the next few days in order
. Lncrease
.
d
to b eg~n

• • •

actLvLt~es

11

. 34

Despite this financial dependence, the Grzesinsky group wanted
to establish the independence of the CDG.
work of the Council

11

It wanted to conduct the

hand in hand but not together with the AADG".

It

wanted an independent executive secretary for the CDG because the
secretary of the AADG represented

11

a certain faction in the CDG11 •

The

Council report to the Department of Justice deliberately omitted the
name of the AADG.

The Grzesinsky group recommended that the latter be

dropped also from the statutes of the Council.
Association to pay for this independence.
cost about $300 to $400 a month.

Yet, they expected the

The separate office would

Another $400 to $500 were necessary

for the publication of the weekly or semi-monthly bulletin.

This

amounted to about $1,000 for each of the next three months.

The

Grzesinsky group was aware that "we have no right to demand anything".
Their letter was meant as a plea to the Association "to whom we already
owe so much 1' .

By the end of August, they complained again about insuf-

35
f.LnancLa
. 1 support f rom t h e AssocLatLon.
· ·
. .
f LcLent
Niebuhr was exasperated over the claims of the Grzesinsky
group.

He requested in the executive committee of the AADG that the

financial relations between the Association and the Council, be changed.
The obligations of the former to the latter should be
than unlimited 11 •
34
35

11

limited rather

The Council should raise its own funds. The Associa-

Ibid.

Grzesinsky, Pfeiffenberger to AADG, end of August 1944,
Nachlass Hertz, reel 20.
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tion should hand over to the Council only those funds that it raised
explicitly for the work of the CDG.

It should accept the proposal for

a separate office of the Council and should offer the latter a special
sum for implementing this change immediately.

Niebuhr considered fur-

ther discussions in the finance committee of the CDG, of which he was a
member, as "useless" and asked the American committee of the CDG to
con duct t h e f urt h er

.

.

negot~at~ons

36
. h t h e Assoc~at~on.
. .

w~t

He admitted that "the financial arrangement was only part of
the problem." The rest concerned the question of whether the Association
was an independent organization with other tasks beside the sponsorship
of the Council.

It concerned, also, the question of "giving the Asso-

ciation a broader basis which changes the impression that it represents
only the former organization of the AFGF under a different name" ..
Niebuhr advised to communicate and discuss his recommendations separately with Tillich, Bcinheim, Aufhauser, and a few others who were
probably less antagonistic towards the Association than the Grzesinsky
group.

The next meeting of the Council should then decide about the

new political and financial relations between the Association and the
Council.

Until then, "we must be completely passive".

Members of the

AADG should not participate in committee meetings of the Council.
Association should not assist in the publication of the Bulletin.

The
37

The Grzesinsky group tried also to win more control by investing
the authority of the Council in a system that would function like a
36

Niebuhr to executive committee of the AADG, 23 December 1944,
Nachlass Hertz, reel 20.
J? Ibid.
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government in exile.
'~ut

The CDG should not be a large study commission

a political group

the outside".

that is capable of fast initiatives towards

In August 1944, the group submitted a statute to the pro-

cedural committee which proposed an executive committee of seven members representing all the factions in the Council.
ship should be limited.
with few rights.

The general member-

Sympathizers could be accommodated as advisers

The statute opposed the foundation of local chapters

with a say in the affairs of the Council.

38

The Grzesinsky group disliked the response of Tillich to their,
plan.

The latter wanted the CDG to attract "as many new forces as

possible".

He thought that the proposed system was "too club-like and

inadequate for a very dynamic movement".
faction principle".

He also opposed "the technical

He considered the membership of the Council in the

summer of 1944 as "a small clique" and proposed to broaden the basis of
the CDG.

Besides full members, there should be members who would only

partially participate in the affairs of the Council.
ever, have full voting rights at the plenary sessions.

They would, howTillich would

also have preferred three executive committees instead of one.

39

But

the Grzesiri.sky group disliked this kind of a "mollusk-like" system.
They thought a diffuse arrangement was perhaps expedient in the beginning.

But it became later partly responsible for the indecision and
38

Grzesinsky, Pfeiffenberger, Erwiderung auf Kritik von Tillich
in der Vorlage des Geschaftsordnungsausschusses fur ein Statut des CDG,
end of August 1944, Nachlass Hertz, reel 20.
39
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.
. .
~nact~v~ty

of t he

counc~"1 . 40

By January 1945, Tillich conceded the need

for a political committee of seven members with equal representation.
Besides himself, this body should consist of Aufhauser, B'arwald,
Budzislawsky, Frank, Haussman and Schreiner.

41

An attempt at forming

a committee of only four members that would exclude Frank, or only
allow him to alternate attendence with Aufhauser, was rejected.

42

Under the circumstances of factional fights in New York, the
foundation of a local CDG chapter in Chicago failed.

It was undertaken

by the Chicago businessman Walter W. Marseille, a friend of Frank.

He

was a member of the AADG and was close to the Chicago chapter of the
Union for Democratic Action.

In July 1944, Frank was to come to

Chicago to speak at a luncheon meeting for prospective CDG sponsors in
Chicago.

The UDA wanted the.meeting to be called in the name of the

Chicago CDG chapter which Marseille considered premature.

But for both,

the purpose of the meeting was fundraising for the Council even though
the invitations did not mention it.

After this occasion, Marseille

continued raising funds for the CDG in the summer of 1944 among his
"American friends and business acquaintances".

His story for the Field

Foundation, for example, was that "the money is for the Council and that
the Association is the Council's sponsor and financial trustee'' so that
checks were to be made out to the Association.
4

Thus, a Chicago chapter

°Friedrich Haussmann to Tillich, 29 August 1944, Nachlass Hertz,

reel 20.
41

Protokoll der Verwaltungsausschussitzung des CDG, 11 January
1945, Frank Papers, box 9, folder M.
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walther Victor to Frau Hauptmann, 7 January 1945, Frank
Papers, box 9, folder V.
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would have contributed to the control of the AADG over the Council.
relations of Marseille with the CDG were therefore difficult.

The

Marseille

soon complained about "the poor handling of the correspondence at the
New York end".

According to him, "every Chicagoan" who dealt with the

Council made the same experience.

Eventually, the Marseille group de-

cided to cease working for the CDG because of "matters of principle"
which will be discussed in the following section on reconstruction.

43

Under these circumstances, Marseille did not pursue his work
for better relations between the German Labor Delegation and the
Council.

He had urged Snell, Marek, and F. A.

Hermens, who belonged

to his group, to reason with Seger and other GLD members and demand
from them "a more positive attitude towards the Council".
~he

Snell was

Chicago chairman of the German American Congress for Democracy,

which was a GLD foundation.

He had "a kind of five years' plan to

bring the Social Democrats of his group together with us [the Marseille
group]".

But Marseille realized that Snell was practically alone "with

his relative friendly attitude towards the Council".

He advised Frank,

therefore, to win over some of the influential people of the GACD,
'bl e. 44
. h was b y t h en LmpossL
.
wh LC
The "matters of principle" of the Marseille group exemplified
the shortcomings of the CDG plans for reconstruction.

Because of its

precarious composition, the Council had to postpone the clarification of
43

Walter Marseille to Frank, 19 July 1944, Frank Papers, box 9,
folder M; also: Marseille to Tillich, 25 May 1944, Frank Papers,
box 9, folder T.
44
folder M.

Marseille to Frank, 26 June 1944, Frank Papers, box 9,
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basic issues until they were forced upon it by events.
not digest them.

Then, it could

Marseille considered most important the topics of a

collective German responsibility and of East Prussia.
the realities of the postwar situation for Germany:

They comprised
What was the atti-

tude of the Allied Victors and what would be their policies towards
Germany?

Because of their omissions, the CDG programs lacked a politi-

cal basis.

They were unrealistic maximum statements of what would be

the best possible fate for postwar Germany without regard to Allied
interference.

The panacea of the CDG was a postwar United Nations.

Frank urged "the incorporation of the vanquished nations including
Germany under equal sovereignty into the world organization 11

•

45

The

Council members thought that a continued cooperation between East and
West constituted the best international circumstances for their kind of
reconstruction.

They did not consider the alternative of Allied deals

at the expense of Germany.

The initial CDG declaration of March 1944 stated that "any kind
of unilateral settlement in Europe
world wide conflicts".

would lay the foundations of new

But within a multilateral system, there would

be no risk in giving Germany :'political leeway from the beginning", and
in leaving the German ecomony and German territorial integrity alone.
There was a hint that "the German people will have to bear the consequences of the war into which Hitler has driven them". 46

But these

45

Frank, Proposal for a statement by the AFGF, 1943, Frank
Papers, box 1, folder 1943.
46
p. 649.

Program of the CDG, May 1944, Matthias and Link, Nr. 163,
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consequences were painted in moderate colors.

There was no reference

to the destruction caused by the German armies or to the crimes of
National Socialist antisemitism.
The declaration did not deal with basic issues because there
was no consensus on postwar realities within the Council.

The bourgeois

and the NB members maintained the fiction of "the other Germany".

There

was no justification for territorial cessions .because there was no
collective responsibility.

The communist members temporized.

In their

Popular Front mood, they went along with the majority position.

But

sub rosa, they believed in a German war guilt and related it to a new
settlement of the Eastern borders.

The Marseille group opposed this

position from the beginning and wanted a clarification even if it drove
the communists out of the Council.
related.

It denied that the two issues were

Marseille thought that the Council should insist on a dis-

tinction between the National Socialists and the German people "in
the sense that National Socialism is not the genuine expression of the
German national character".

But it should admit that the German

people had "failed tragically in the fight against fascism".

Beyond

the question of individual guilt, "there exists the collective responsibility of the German people".

The CDG should concede that "the

German people must in its totality accept responsibility for the crimes
that were committed in the name of the German people 11 •

For Marseille,

this admission was a matter of self-respect without which the German
people could not return to a status of equal rights among the countries
of Europe.

He considered it a matter of pride to reject secondary ex-

planations like the severity of the Versailles treaty or the appease-
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ment policy of the West in the 1930's.

If the German people was in-

capable of assuming responsibility for its recent past, "a more than
temporary occupation" would be morally justified.

Marseille also pro-

posed that the CDG take a more positive attitude towards reparations.
The German people should forego any improvement of its living standards
beyond the state of reconstruction in the devastated European coun.

tr~es.

47
This was more of a German American position.

For the sake of

moral decency, it demanded a German mea culpa and a change of mind
that would help to clear the German name.
as possible.

Atonement should go as far

But all this was necessary in order to forestall the

loss of East Prussia and a communist expansion to the West.

Under the

proper circumstances, the CDG could request that the Atlantic Charter
app~y

also to Germany.

48

It would have the right and the duty to

oppose any cession of German territory.

Marseille rejected the argu-

ment of Tillich and Frank that the issues in question needed more time
for study.

He concluded that Frank believed "in postponing and cover-

ing up of differences for organizational reasons".
not even submitted to a Council meeting.

His motions were

Under these circumstances,

he was no longer interested in a CDG chapter in Chicago.

He was will-

ing to raise more funds for the American Association "if it meant anything apart from the Council".
47

49

The latter could do without the

Marseille to Tillich 25 May 1944, Frank Papers, box 9,

folder T.
48
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Marseille group.

But an emigrant coalition without communist members

could not expect to find any favors in the eyes of the Soviet Union.
On the question of German war guilt, the CDG still expected to
be vindicated by a German revolution.

It was not yet ready for a con-

sensus on dismissing that eventuality.

For this reason also, the

initial declaration was so noncommittal.
h~user,

In July 1944, Barwald, Auf-

Frank, Schreiner, and Walcher submitted a report about the

reconstruction of the German unions which still considered the short
range perspective of a revolutionary overthrow of Hitler.

They based

their hopes on the natural indestructibility of the Betriebsgemeinschaft (factory community of the workers).

Even without organized

unions, the workers of a factory formed a collective group which was
aware of its class interests.

The main evidence for this collectivism

was "the catastrophic decline of the Deutsche Arbeiterfront", the
National Socialist workers' organization.

This deprived the regime of

a permanent mass basis so that the endurance of the factory community
spelled almost in itself the doom of National Socialism.

Despite the

lack of any visible acts of resistance, "the collectivist mentality"
of the factory communities was reliable.

The latter constituted "quite

automatically a communal organization in itself without requiring an
outwardly visible form of organization".

For a long time, the German

workers had engaged only "in 'permissible' actions" that kept the collective spirit alive.

They were interested in improving working

conditions with "flowers in the factory windows" or with better light.
They proposed perhaps na modest Christmas bonus" or a weekly payment of
wages rather than every ten days.

They did all this in order to arrive

433
at ' 1 the solidarity of all workers in the factory".

In this way, they

achieved "the union of socialists, christian workers, communists
and ... discontented National Socialists ... with a hundred percent
completeness".

They would eventually fight for the overthrow of the

dictatorship "with the same solidarity".
no time and effort on isolated acts.

For this reason, they wasted

They thought about "the real,

decisive confrontation in as organized a way as possible".

50

Frank still thought that the Western Allies should assist the
underground movement and "take the lead ... in directing ... political
~ut

warfare' 1 •

the NB sponsor organization was aware that the American

and the British government did not favor the Russian approach of political-warfare.

The two governments wanted to "avoid any kind of a

gene·ral revolution before or after the mil.itary defeat" and planned "a
more or less permanent occupational regime"

51

But in this long range

perspective, also, the German problem could not be solved ''without the
active cooperation of the democratic forces of the German people".

The

reorganization of the unions would be "a simple and safe way of democratic consolidation".

The unions could represent "a democratic

organization of the people" which would crowd out the National Socialist
grass roots support and illegal underground organizations after the
defeat.

With their tradition of self-government, they could also fill
50
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the political vacuum before the establishment of a central administration.

They could take on interim governmental functions like the

distribution of food and the organization of health care, welfare and
. .
.
52
l oca l a d m~n~strat~on.

There was no controversy over the type of the new unions.
There would be an Einheitsgewerkschaft, a single comprehensive union
with a vertical and a horizontal federat structure.

Each industrial

branch would be organized in local, district and regional unions and
finally, in an industrial federation or Industrieverband.

Horizontally,

the local unions of every industrial branch would form the Local Cartel
or Ortskartell.

The Local Cartels would compose the District Group or

Bezirksverband; all of the latter, the central union federation or
Gewerkschaftsbund.

This structure would allow for more local autonomy

than during the Weimar Republic.

The new unions would be politically

comprehensive and religiously neutral.

They would -be a significant

improvement over their Weimar predecessors and could be better pillars
of democracy than before.

53

After the controversies over organizational matters, the CDG
elaborated specific memoranda for most fields of administration in
late 1944 and early 1945.
itself with a program.

It behaved like an executive that provides

The subcommittees of the Council corresponded

to the ministries of a government.
cuss the constitutional question.
52

Logically, the CDG did not disBut the implicit consensus was that

Bericht uber den Wiederaufbau einer Gewerkschaftsbewegung in
Deutschland, July 1944, Sammlung Glaser, val. I.
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the

Weimar constitution was still in effect and could be amended in

the light of the National Socialist experience.

The administrative

program of the Council was based on a few principles acceptable to all
members:

nationalism, centralism with some authoritarianism, and

socialism with varying emphases and balances in specific memoranda.
Some socialism was even acceptable to the emigrants of the Center Party.
The latter had never been a pro-business party, a function that was
left to the former nationalist parties in the Empire and the Republic.
The living standards of its constituency had not been above those of the
Social Democratic voters.

It had supported national programs in educa-

tion and healthcare which required a strong central government.
not been ideologically opposed to economic planning.

It had

Its special

religious and ethnic interests were respected in the CDG program.

They

were abetted by the principle of local and provincial self-government to
which the Council had to resort as a measure in its emergency planning.
In the field of the industrial economy, Aufhauser applied the
socialist principle in an interesting way.

He envisioned an economic

democracy which would avoid the bureaucratic domination of the economy
by the state as in the National Socialist or in the communist systems.
There would be constitutional economic organs consisting of elected
representatives from the employers, workers and consumers.

They would

determine economic policy directly by establishing a one or multi-year
plan to regulate production and consumption.

The state bureaucracy

would only execute the economic plans and directives of the economic
organs.

This execution would be

11

subject to the permanent supervision'·'

of the bodies of economic self-determination.

Aufhauser explicitly
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disqualified "the political parliamentary democracyr! from economic
planning.
of the

This "formal democracy" had failed in the past.

~-leimar

The parties

Reichstag made political concessions to eacwi&-ner at
'

the expense of the economy.

Aufhauser advocated "a separation of the

economic problems from the merely political, parliamentary discussion".
The economic organs would be vertically structured.

There would be

factory councils, local, district, and regional councils, and a national
economic council.

Aufhauser expected the occupation authorities to

consent in their own interest to the formation of these councils even
before the governmental organs of postwar Germany were reestablished.

54

The balance between local, regional and national economic control was a unique feature of the plan of Aufhauser.
only a socialization of the basic inaustries.

Also, he advocated

Between the all public

and the all private sector, there was to be a mixed economic sector of
factories owned partly by the state or by municipalities.

For indus-

tries with private monopolies, Aufhauser -proposed the traditionally
progressive idea of antitrust legislation.

He also recommended to pro-

teet the small and medium sized agricultural and commercial establishments which were the special concern of the bourgeois emigrants. 55
The agricultural plans of the CDG which were prepared by the
bourgeois emigrant, Joseph

Kaske~

contained several socialist ideas but

intended also to balance industrial democracy with agricultural
54
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democracy.

Some proposals were inevitable.

They had become general

antifascist property like the dissolution and resettlement of the
landed estates, one of the alleged pillars of National Socialism.

The

owners should be compensated "within narrow limits", that is, with a
modest life pension or an average sized farm.
remained a matter for compromise.

The type of resettlement

Kaskel claimed that "the question had

no political character; socialists and non-socialists have argued for
both forms" in the past, that is, for settlement by individual farmers
and for a collective system.

Actually, the CDG plan recommended to

limit the latter to a minimum.

It >vas unnecessary to transfer the

"centralist and uniformist" tendencies from industry to agriculture.
Production in the latter should constitute "a counterweight 11 to modes
of industrial production.

Agriculture should preserve "a more free

and individualist form of life in the sense of the Jeffersonian democracy".

Rural cooperatives were sufficient to afford the farmers

with the advantages of collective methods.

They should limit them-

selves to the provision of equipment, machinery and loans and to the
sale of livestock and commodities.

In special cases, collective

settlement would be appropriate as, for example, for city youths who
decided to live off the land.
mended.

The Palestinian collectives were recom-

The Russian collective should also be "studied even though it

operated under very different conditions."

There could also be a

mixed form of operation where the farmers would receive small parcels
of land for their private use.

In case of individual settlement, the

farmers would have to buy the new land at regulated prices \vith the
assistance of government loans.

They would be obligated to cultivate
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it and could not resell it.

56

Grain prices could not be "left to the free play of forces" in
the agricultural market.

The new German agriculture needed some pro-

tection in the form of stable rather than high prices.
achieved by a government import monopoly.

This could be

It would apply flexible

tariffs in accordance with world market prices rather than the high
tariffs of the past which had favored the Junkers.
grain could be stockpiled for years of scarcity.

Cheap imported
More grain could be

imported to benefit the workers and the export of industrial goods.
Even the agricultural planning of the CDG contained much centralism. 57
The latter principle applied especially to a new German government.

The CDG plans recommended local self-government as a principle

of "the political fights in Germany during the last century and at the
beginning of the present".

But they warned against particularist and

separatist tendencies and envisioned local self-government mainly as
an emergency measure of the first hour.
would create an administrative chaos.

In the long run, the latter
Necessary was "a coordinated

handling of administrative and economic affairs".

It was "indispens-

able" to maintain the ten Reichs-Spitzenbehorden (central agencies) and
other Reichs-Spitzenverwaltungen (central offices).

These were "absol-

utely necessary because their tasks can under no circumstances be
56
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delegated to regional and even less to local agencies".

Even conununal

self-government was impossible without "uniform administrative guidelines on the scale of the Reich".
the contemporary

~-lest

There was to be no federalism of

German type.

As precedents for this system -.;.;ere

enumerated the constitutions of 1848 and 1918.

58

The establishment of a new civil service could "satisfactorily
only be solved by a central agency 11 •

For a new start, a conunittee for

personnel questions was necessary which would effect the denazification
of the old civil service with the help of provincial and local committees.

The democratic attitudes of the civil service were more important

than a perfect administrative system.

For this reason, the German

antifascists at home and abroad should have the necessary freedom of
action.
I

The republican reliability of the judges was considered

especially vital.

The judges should lose their former privileges so

that they could be deposed or transferred like other civil servants.
Until enough new judges could be trained the judiciary should use a
larger number of lay people.

A Popular Court or Volkstribunal should

function as a court of republican review and supervision over the administration and the judiciary.

This supreme court could interfere in

any trial and alter or abolish a verdict based "on politically unreliable motives".

It would consist of forty judges and would be assisted

by regional tribunals.

The police should have "far-reaching 'dis-

cretionary' powers" like arrest without a warrant and preventive custody.
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In the fight against the National Socialist establishment and underground, its hands should not be tied "by misplaced generosity and
inappropriate sentimentality11 •

Against abuses, there was the right to

a complaint in court which could not be deferred.

59

The principles of centralism, socialism, and,sometimes,
nationalism applied also to CDG planning for health care, education
and information.

The Council plans advocated "a basic change in the

whole structure of the health care system".

This was especially urgent

because of the additional health problems of the postwar period with
which a local system could not deal.

The practice of the Weimar Repub-

lie had been "a good basis and a safe point of departure" for the
reconstruction of the postwar system.

But since 1933, the need for

health insurance and social security had

11

deepened enormously".

Denazification of the medical profession was important because the
latter had identified closely with the tenets of National Socialism.
All physicians who had been licensed by National Socialist insurances
should be dismissed since they were "all ... suspect of being National
Socialists".

The new Reichsminister for Healthcare had to decide

about reinstatements.

The exclusive recruitment of doctors from the

middle class which had been especially amenable to National Socialism
should end.

A comprehensive scholarship program would allow the chil-

dren of blue and white collar workers to enter the medical profession.
59
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" administered by a central office.
Education was to be
to be no state, that is, provincial autonomy in this field.

There was
The

11

class

character'' of secondary education "must be broken" by a social scholar.

s h ~p program.

61

The question of denazification was even more important
All teachers should be dismissed and then readmitted

in this field.

according to their behaviour during the Third Reich.
of the NSDAP or of the SS was to be permanently fired.

Any active member
The members of

the antifascist opposition should be favored as candidates for teaching.

All "democratic forces" should cooperate in elaborating new

school books.

The CDG objected to any Allied interference in the re-

construction of the German educational system.

The latter was "the

task of the German people itself, of which it cannot be relieved by
anybody".
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On the question of the future relations between church and
state, there was unanimity except on the issue of religious instruction.
In general, the principle of separation between the two organisms
would apply.

The state would not support the churches financially and

would not impose and collect a church tax.
neutrality from the churches.

It would demand political

They could "not sanction a specific

economic doctrine and a specific theory of property relations".

Reli-

gious instruction in public schools was an issue for disunity which
resulted in the presentation of two reports.
61

The bourgeois emigrants

cDG Komitee fur Erziehung und Wissenschaft, Massnahmen fur
den Wiederaufbau des Erziehungswesens, Sammlung Glaser, vol. II.
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some of whom were clerics, insisted on religious education.

They based

this demand on the democratic principle of religious freedom and on
the parental right to demand education.

They proposed an agreement

between the state and and various denominations that would be incorporated in a Reichsschulgesetz (National School Law).

It would resemble

the former concordat with the Vatican and should respect "the historical situation".

Religious groups should also have the right to

establish schools of their own.

The other report stated that the two

positions could "not be reconciled objectively, only tactically".

It

referred to "the School Compromise" of the Weimar constitution but
adopted a less compromising attitude for a postwar system.

Education

had to conform to the principle of separation of church and state.

But

this requirement need only be satisfied to the extent that the schools
nad no longer the obligation to provide religious instruction for which
attendance had been free.

They should offer this instruction only on

the explicit demands of the parents.

The churches should not have the

63
authority to enforce attendance . .
Concerning a free information system, the emigrants of the former Center and Democratic Parties had no ideological objections to an
anti-capitalist organization of the postwar German press and news
service.

Capitalism was considered as one of the breeding grounds of

National Socialism.

For this reason, the new press had to be "inde-

pendent of the influence of uncontrollable financial interests".
63
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served exclusively the purpose of public information and should exclude
profit-making private interests.
property rights.

Every newspaper was to submit to a public audit of

its income and general finances.
prohibited.

News was not a commodity protected by

The use of secret funds was to be

No single investor could own more than a fraction of the

capital of a paper publishing association.

The use of strawmen for

concentrating ownership was to be forbidden.

Advertisers should have

no influence over the editorial policy of a paper.

The government

should supervise the advertising activities of all papers.

One idea

was to ''communalize" the advertising business which meant making a pub.
1 ~c

.

serv~ce

. 64
out o f ~t.

Another guarantee for a free information system was a high degree of central control by the democratic forces during a postwar
interim period and by the new democratic German government thereafter.
A Kontrollinstanz consisting of active antifascists would license the
editors and the contributors of the newspapers and magazines.

The

"complete freedom [of the press] without control and without any protection against abuse" which had existed in the Weimar Republic \vas not
recommendable.

With its "general control", the new German government

would suppress newspapers that rejected the principle of the freedom of
the press.

The newsservices should not be provided by one or two pri-

vate agencies as in the Weimar Republic.

There should be a central news

agency with a monopoly over the collection of news.
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government should maintain this agency.

Later, it should become a co-

operative of all newspaper publishing associations. This centralization
within a democratic system was the best safeguard against a political
reaction.

Also, the new republic should monopolize broadcasting as the

Weimar Republic had done.

This method had proven successful.

The CDG

went too far in planning to prevent a recurrence of fascism by administrative means.
.

~nsu

ff.~c~ent
.

The Weimar Republic had largely failed because of the
. . 1ance o f ~. t s d emocrat~c
.

v~g~

.

part~es.
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Since the time for an antifascist revolution in Germany had
passed, even the partial implementation of the CDG plans hinged on
support by the American government.

But the latter was elusive.

reaction of the German Desk of the OWI was sceptical.

The

Hoffmann noted

the strange bedfellowship within the CDG of protestant theologians like
Tillich, leftwing authors like Brecht and Zuckmayer, Social Democrats
. and communists.

This "marriage" >vould not last.

It would founder on

"the typical German disunity" about practical matters.

Also, to Hoff-

mann, the initial declaration of the CDG sounded as beautiful as the
Weimar constitution which did not save the first German republic.

With

unacknowledged antisemitism and with some exaggeration, he objected to
the large number of German Jewish emigrants among the signers of the
declaration.

In his opinion, they jeopardized the reconstruction of a

country where antisemitism was rampant.

He put his finger on the

neuralgic point of lacking Allied support.
·
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Ibid.

At the same time, he sug-
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gested that the American government give "no support or advice whatever" to the CDG or any rival group.

66

The OWI should follow the

development of these groups "with watchful (though by no means unfriendly) eyes".

More important for the government was the organization of

German American support for the war and peace effort.

The reeducation

of Germany should also get its impulses from German American elements
and from rehabilitated German war prisoners in the United States.

Emi-

grant intellectuals like those organized in the CDG were too unrealistic
and had been absent from Germany for too long to do any good in this
area.
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With Allied victory certain, the State Department was not

interested in emigrant groups towards the end of the war.
In this situation, the CDG made a virtue out of a necessity.
Since it could not get any official recognition it declared that it did
not want to be a government in exile even though it acted like one.
The Council tried to exploit the positive side of its circumstances.
In a strategy meeting of August 1944, Barwald declared in his keynote
speech that the CDG should "avoid the impression that we wanted to form
a government based on the bayonets of the Allies".

The CDG kept insist-

ing that it was ';entirely independent and not sponsored by any official
government or party agency!!.

This was an appeal to German nationalism.

Also, the CDG decided to reverse its former practice and abstain from
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interference in American politics including the presidential elections.
It should not count on rewards for political support.
patriotic record was more important.

68

A perfect

An Allied occupation regime could

maintain order and tranquility but it could not prevent the rise of a
National Socialist underground.

As a first emergency measure, that

required the immediate participation of the democratic sections of the
German people in the government of the country.

Only a democratic re-

activization at the grass roots could control a National Socialist
f~Wehrwolf"

(underground).

The Allies could not circumvent the German

democratic forces and their emigrants.
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When Tillich was informed

that there might not be a new German government for some time to come,
he concluded that the CDG must "try to help the democratic movement in
Germany to impose itself".

70

The CDG wanted to rely on American public opinion.

Barwald had

.the illusion that it was "out of the question that the American people
will support a Vansittartist peace".

He proposed that the CDG prepare

for the end of the war by establishing new contacts with American
liberal groups and personalities.
larger basis of support".

71

It should attempt to ''win a much

Frank cultivated new liberal circles like

the New York State Citizens Council for a Durable Peace.
68

Its members

cDG, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 4. August 1944, Nachlass Hertz,

reel 20.
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were educational and civic personalities.

It intended to organize

citizens' groups in every corrununity within the state for the sake of
carrying out

11

the irrunense 'grass roots' job of planning and building

public opinion for the peace".

Its second annual conference in July

1944 in which Frank participated was sponsored by various state government departments and by such private organizations as the Carnegie
p o 1'~cy Assoc~at~on.
.
.
72
.
En d owment f or Internationa 1 Peace an d t h e F ore~gn

The CDG also contacted legislators like Congressman Charles M.
LaFollette.

73

The relations with the CIO seemed promising.

Paul R. Porter

corresponded with Frank about the resolution which he had drafted for
the CIO convention in Chicago in November 1944.

It proposed the re-

establishment of German trade unions irrunediately after the war.

Porter

also wanted Hertz and Aufhauser to attend the convention so that he
could introduce them to a number of CIO leaders.

But despite a strong

plea by Walther Reuther, who also corresponded with Frank, the convention adopted an alternative resolution with an indefinite CIO policy
on postwar German labor.

Porter attributed this development to the

opposition of communist CIO leaders.
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An interesting contact was the
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dinner meeting which Cornelia Bryce Pinchot, the wife of the Governor
of Washington, and Mrs. Dulles organized for Frank in December 1944
when he was on a visit in Washington.

It was attended by several

officials of the State Department, including the chief of the Division
of Central European Affairs, and by an official of the White House
staff.

They requested that there be no outsiders present, but conceded

that "it would be all right to ask the Vice President" who had expresse d t h e

. h to come. 75

w~s

Such examples were exceptional.
anti-German feelings.

There was more evidence for

The Writers' War Board,which served the OWI as

a clearing house for literary contributions to war information and
national morale, opposed the CDG out of patriotism.
reconstruction resembled a soft peace.

The idea of German

It was anathema to a propaganda

organization that wanted to rid the country and the world of the German
danger.

The president of the WWB, Rex Stout, a writer of detective

stories, believed that the German emigrant organizations paid "mere
lip service to the democratic ideal".

Before Hitler, all major German

parties had been "colored by Pan-Germanism" and agreed with the master
race theory including the Social Democrats and the communists.
must remain "on probation" at least for a generation.
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Germany

To this argu-

ment, Dorothy Thompson reacted with biblical generosity towards the CDG
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in the New York Post.

She proposed that if ten Germans could be found

who favored the CDG program, "then let us take the ten Germans".

77

Max Lerner refused to opt between the group of Stout and the CDG.
t h oug h t t hat eac h

. d e saw t h e trut h f rom a d.~ ff erent

s~

.

He

perspect~ve.
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Stout was also president of the Society for the Prevention of
World War III to whose advisory council belonged the historian Allan
Nevins and William L. Shirer.

In this capacity, he declared that the

signing of the CDG declaration was "the most unforgivable performance
of a group of American liberals in the history of our country".

He was

sure that the latter had not read the declaration and proposed that the
Germans who wrote it "ought to be shot".
device for Germany's escape".

79

He described the CDG as "a

The Western countries had been fooled

once by German democracy and should refuse to be fooled again by another
one.
ists".

It

would be only "a front for the manipulations of the militarThe Society of Stout was partly inspired by the German emigrants

F. W. Forster and Emil Ludwig.
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Nevertheless, American public opinion
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could in general only be anti-German after several years of an unnecessary world war.

The revelations about the German extermination policy

in the concentration camps cleaned up any remnants of American sympathy
for postwar Germany.

For too long, the German emigrants held illusions

about American public opinion and about the strength of American liberalism.

They should have realized earlier that their plans for recon-

struction had no legs on which to stand.
With the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam in February and July
1945, it became obvious that Allied cooperation would not work out in
favor of German reconstruction.
question.

This called the basis of the CDG into

If Germany were to be divided, plans for the reconstruction

of its Western half required an anticommunist liberal attitude which
the Council with its communist members

cou~d

not provide.

The apparent

uselessness of East-West cooperation for German reconstruction pulled
the ideological rug out from under the CDG.

The death of President

Roosevelt which occurred between the two conferences added to the pessimism of the liberal members of the Council.

After the conference of

Yalta, the latter agonized for several months over a joint comment on
its decisions.

Under the circumstances, the bourgeois and the NB

emigrants wanted to criticize the Allied decisions for their potential
harm to German national interests.

They tried to pin down the pro-

communist members to this reaction as a matter of consistency with the
initial CDG declaration which had objected to the ideas of collective
German responsibility and of a German dismemberment.

The issue was

therefore whether a Yalta article of the CDG should refer to this
declaration.

A compromise reaction could consist of a balance of
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criticism and praise of the Yalta decisions.
In the resulting tug of war, Tillich produced a compromise
statement in the form of an article for the Bulletin.

As a counter-

action, the publication of this Bulletin issue was postponed.

Hermens

conceded that the CDG could do nothing about the plans of Stalin but
he objected to giving the impression that it would "lick his (Stalin's]
boots".

He believed that the policy towards Germany would produce

"major friction" between the Allies which could cause a breakdown of
East-West cooperation.

In that case, "public opinion in this country

is liable to change" in favor of Germany.

The COG should stake its

hopes on such a reversal of international relations.

In the meantime,

the CDG and the AADG could provide the American public with proper
information.

This would counteract excesses of anti-German feeling

even if the government wanted "to inflame [these] sentiments".
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While

Tillich was ill, the meetings >vhich discussed a new Yalta article "took
a peaceful course".

Fran~who

was away teaching the spring semester at

an Illinois college, insisted in his correspondence on a reference to
the initial CDG memorandum.

Aufhauser and Haussmann, that is, a left

and right,ving member of the CDG, drafted a corresponding Yalta article.
When the latter was not mailed out either, "a serious situation" resulted.

The COG committee reached ::an impasse 11
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Committee members

like Aufhauser, Schreiner, Norden, and Bonheim did not attend, but
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mailed suggestions for changes in the prospective Yalta article.
Schreiner withdrew his consent to the article with the reference to the
1944 declaration.

B'onheim thought that so many things had changed that

the CDG could not stand by its position of 1944.

Norden took a view of

the guilt of the German people "which was ·contrary to the declaration
of the Council [of 1944 ]' 1 •

It implied that the German people should

submit to the consequences of defeat because it had failed to overthrow
Hitler.

83
After this, Hertz was convinced that the communist members acted

in unison and wanted to "thrmv out the basic prit:-ciples of the Council",
that is, German territorial integrity rather than East-West cooperation.
He felt that a failure of the CDG was preferable to "a capitulation" to
the communist members.

Hertz had a discussion with Anna Caples-Frank,

Taurer, Eliasberg, and Erich Schmidt.

He also awaited the reaction of

the absent Frank for the next Council meeting.

An anticommunist major-

ity seemed assured to which the communist members would hopefully submit.

But Tillich, Budzislawski, and Walcher took a centrist position.

Walcher objected to a reference to the manifesto of 1944.

He considered

it "wrong!' to protest against the Yalta decisions which were an accomplished fact.

The Council should not back away from the original

Tillich article.
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The eventual CDG memorandum on Yalta praised the

Allied determination to root out National Socialism and militarism in
Germany.

The Yalta decisions offered the hope for "a decent life for
83
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Germans and a place in the community of

nations:~.

On the other hand,

the memorandum objected to "a vivisection" of Germany that would cause
the death of the patient.

German reconstruction should not be jeopard-

ized by a new border that ignored "a historically developed economic
organism".

The loss of Eastern provinces would cause an imbalance in

the relationship between industrial and agricultural German areas .
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. To the decisions of Potsdam, the CDG could not find a joint
reaction.

Actually, the conference definitely dropped the idea of a

general German dismemberment and decided on a central German administration.

But the expulsion of the Germans from the Eastern provinces

had begun by July 1945.

The Western Allies acquiesced in the loss of

these provinces for Germany.

The CDG tried for months to work out a

compromise statement on Potsdam.

But in anticipation of a change in

East-West relations, the NB emigrants wanted an unequivocal rejection
of the Potsdam decisions.

The Social Democratic members under Aufhauser

still believed that cooperation with the Soviet Union was inevitable
and were willing to accept the decisions reluctantly.

In the process

of taking a stand on Potsdam, the existence of the Council was at stake.
By the end of September 1945, Tillich wanted to resolve the
issue.

He called for a plenary session of the CDG and for a meeting of

its executive committee from 20 to 22 September.

Certain members of

the executive committee, that is, Aufhauser, Barwald, Frank, Haussmann,
and Schreiner were to explain their views on Potsdam and on the future
85
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of the CDG in reports of ten to fifteen minutes.

Each one of these

members represented a specific group of the Council.

On the basis of

this discussion, Tillich wanted to draft a declaration which the CDG
and its executive committee could deliberate, amend and pass on 22 September.

He saw three alternative courses.

The Council could continue

to work as previously and redefine its tasks.

It could dissolve and

make a strong statement about the causes of its failure.

Or, it could

continue "on a larger scale" "tvith new tasks which Tillich did not explain.

For all three possibilities, the attitude of the CDG towards

Potsdam should be "the point of departure".
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Aufhauser and Budzislawski presented a centrist report which
would have been acceptable to the communist members.

It conceded that

"the German people has now to pay the price 1 i for failing to overthrow
the National Socialist regime and to prevent "the bloodiest of all
wars".

According to the report, "the democratization of Germany must

be viewed within the framework of the general political development as
it has been established ... by the various conferences, ... the decisions made there and the execution of these decisions".

But it

admitted that these conditions were "uncommonly severe:' and that ''nobody
can expect the German people to welcome [ them]".

In this way, Aufh.i"user

and Budzislawski sacrificed territorial integrity to the principle of
East-West cooperation.

The latter remained "the only guarantee for the

reconstruction of Europe and for a durable world peace".
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The two CDG emigrants noted, however, that there was friction
and tension among the Allies that could lead to a division of Europe.
It would be "objectionable and mistaken" for the two emerging power
blocs to precariously reconcile themselves at the expense of Germany.
International harmony should be better motivated than by an Allied
punishment of Germany.

In its internationalist spirit, the report

welcomed the formation of "antifascist Four Party Coalitions" in all
parts of Germany because "this wide United Front has proven' to be a
historical necessity in the most difficult hour of Germany".

These

coalitions resembled the composition of the CDG which should cooperate
with them in the reconstruction of Germany.

After reaffirming the

precedence of the internationalist principle, Aufhauser and Budzislawski moderately criticized the post-Potsdam situation.
"~.;;i.th

They realized

concern" that a population which had increased by ten million

refugees was supposed to live on a land reduced by the loss of prime
agricultural areas and on a limited industrial economy.

These disad-

vantages might jeopardize the economic viability of Germany.

Also,

the economic and administrative unity of Germany promised by the Pots.
h a d not yet
d am d ec 1 arat~on

. 1.~ze d . 87

mater~a

The centrist report did not accomplish its purpose of saving
the Council at the meetings of 20 to 22 September.

After months of

discussion, there was no majority for a rejection of Potsdam.
surprised even Frank.
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members of the Council had "our point of view".

88

This meant, however,

that a loss of two votes would change the majority into a minority
r..rhich is exactly what happened.

According to Frank, "the moral

pressure of the communist minority was decisive in this uncertain
situation11 •

89

embarrassing

Several Social Democratic CDG members were afraid of
11

certain groups in Germany", that is, the Four Party

Coalitions, especially that of Berlin which the CDG could no longer
expect to contact if it lost its communist members.

With

t~e

acquies-

cence of the CDG in the post-Potsdam situation, the bourgeois and the
NB members left the Council, some of the former already in August,
Frank in October.
The latter was very bitter in his denunciation of the Potsdam
decisions and of the CDG majority.

He believed that the treatment of

Germany by the Allies intensified the catastrophe that the National
Socialists had brought upon Germany.

It amounted to an enslavement of

Germany and a pauperization of its inhabitants.

Frank rejected the

argument of Bonheim, Norden, and Schreiner that the CDG manifesto of
1944 was outdated because a German revolution had not materialized.
They had known in 1944 that the chances for such a revolution would
decrease as the war went on.

Finally, "the revolutionary potential

suffocated in the wild terror of the National Socialist departure"
without the slightest encouragement by the Allies.

The latter did not

want a German revolution so that "then already, the treatment of
88
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Germany as a collectively guilty national unit was imminent'!.
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Regard-

ing his attitude towards communists, he thought that "on the continent,
at home, where they are definitely an important minority, it might be
necessary to cooperate with them in practical questions".

But he could

no longer see the need "to be bound abroad by their controllers and
retarders", that is, by Moscow.
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Regarding the Allied behaviour,

also, Frank centered on the sins of the communists, that is, the
Russians.

In his opinion, even a four party coalition like the CDG

should have been able and willing to score "the barbaric Russian
revenge policy of the first weeks and the general strategy of mutilation for which the Russians are more responsible than any one of the
victorious powers".

A CDG protest would have been a sign of courage

in a situation where even the Western Allies felt impotent.

92

Frank was already disinterested in the Council before it refused to reject the Potsdam decisions, a development which he had not
expected.

He admitted that Potsdam was "more a secondary problem".

He had hoped for a new mandate for the CDG from the nascent democratic
movement in Germany.
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It did not materialize, partly because of Al-

lied policy and partly because of the ineptitude of the Council.
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Because of Allied obstruction, there was "no general representation" of
a movement "which could take the German antifascists abroad into its
obligations".
tute.

Frank rejected the Four Party Coalitions as a substi-

They were, in his view, limited to Berlin and to the Russian

zone of occupation.

Frank would have welcomed an appeal to the CDG by

German democratic groups to condemn the policy of Potsdam.

In that

case, the CDG could have become a foreign lobby for German liberal
groups.

But the Council remained "an exiled group" which deserved no

further encouragement.

During the war, the mere existence of the CDG

as a free tribune for German democratic opinion was significant.
its potential was not fully realized.
the people who joined the Council".
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But

It was limited by ;'the nature of
There was "too much ... personal

ambition among most of its representatives and too little devotion to
the common cause".

Frank thought that the CDG could have overcome the

neglect of the American government:

"If it would have been a creative

group, the spark emanating from it would have ignited, nevertheless".
Its failure of receiving a postwar mandate was na verdict".

It was of

no more use and might change into "a kind of German Mazzini Society 11 or
just "a mailing address in New York".
of real chances is over".

Frank believed that "the period

Certain Council members like the Social

Democrats still hoped "to play some reconstruction role above and beyond their individual capacities''. But "they are waiting for a call
which will not come".
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The Social Democratic members of the Council were bitter about
the behaviour of Frank, with some justification.
past good will to make the CDG work.

They emphasized their

In the interest of unity, they

had "tolerated a series of incidents", that is, of "separate actions
and independent publications by Paul Hagen".

They had also resented

his "subjective orientation of the Association for a Democratic Germany" but had not insisted on an open discussion of the latter.

In
(

the matter of Potsdam, they forsook party political interests and submitted a compromise statement that should have been acceptable to a
well intentioned Left and Right.

They felt betrayed by Frank for whom

the Council was "an instrument for [his] special interests".
the CDG when it failed to serve his purposes.
issue of Potsdam as an opportunity.

He split

For this, he used the

He prematurely publicized his

personal viewpoint on the Allied decisions without regard to the
Council.

Then, he wanted to "impose on the Council his propagandis-

tically overstated view in its entirety".

When he failed, he quit.

96

Without the NB members and the AADG, the Council survived for
another four months but it did not really function.
Potsdam with the departed members.

Tillich agreed on

But he accepted the compromise

statement by Aufhauser and remained chairman of the CDG in the hope of
rebuilding it.
in October 1945.

The last meeting of the executive committee took place
It decided that the Council should continue but

should abstain from an outward activity until it could replace its
96
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losses with new members from the same groups, especially the Catholics
.

an d t h e b ourgeo~s
members of

11

.

em~grants.

97

But Tillich could not win over any

the Right and of the Catholic wing".

failed in persuading Pastor Forell to rejoin.

In particular, he

Then, he arranged for

a conversation between Niebuhr, Budzislawski, and Lips, in the hope of
healing the breach with the AADG.

When that failed, he proposed to a

meeting of the executive committee without a quorum the transformation
of the Council into a relief organization "as the only basis on which
a German political group in America could be formed".
observer,Otto Piper, agreed with Tillich.

98

The emigrant

For him, it had been pre-

dictable that the CDG would not work since "it was never the task of
the German emigration to form a government in exile".
favored the welfare idea.

99

But nobody

The Social Democratic members criticized

Tillich severely for his passivity at a time when "the most important
decisions in the world and especially in Germany" were at issue.
Tillich claimed that "any activity of the rump Council would have prevented the rebuilding of a full Council".

But the Social Democratic

members rejected the argument that he could not represent a Council
that consisted only of the two labor parties.

Then they left the

Council and made him responsible for its final collapse.

Tillich had

not been comfortable with the Social Democratic and communist members
97
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in the CDG.
ment.

He could accept them as a group submerged in a larger move-

This had been the point of his constitutional ideas about the

Council and his earlier quarrels in the latter field with the Social
Democratic members.

He considered the dissolution of the CDG as "an

. II 100
a d vantage f or a potentia 1 re f oun d ation on a d i ff erent, 1arger b as~s .
But the Council faded away at the time of its best opportunities.
Frank had been impatient with the CDG because of his personal
political ambitions.

By September 1945, he was determined to return

to Germany as a liberal.

He applied for a passport in London and, as

a formality, also in Washington "where I have no chance of being suecessful".

He found "after a long period of thinking about it", that

"I must make an attempt".
come worthless.
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As an American mandate, the CDG had be-

For this reason, Frank hoped. that the Council would

fail faster than it actually did.

The latter had looked, at first,

like "a model of a possible democratic reconstruction".
ber 1945, Frank needed a liberal sponsor group.

But in Septem-

He told Niebuhr that

"it is exactly with the vision of a returned German liberal ... that I
envisage again with more interest than ever a continuation of a group
like the American Association.
from Germany.

Frank proposed to reactivize the AADG "independently of

what the Council will do".
100
101

We will need a bridge to this country"

102

He wanted to free the Association from
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the handicap of the CDG by a complete dissociation.
he wanted to hasten the demise of the Council.

For this reason,

He proposed to Tillich

a transformation of the latter into a non-political ethnic organization
that could engage in German postwar relief.

He specified that "those

who want to be more politically active should be invited to enter the
.
. 11 103
Assoc~at~on .

Tillich declined because he was too closely identi-

fied with the idea of the Council to join the organization of one of
its member groups.

After September 1945, Frank intended to limit his

activity to the AADG.

In October, he quit the Council.

Frank made ambitious plans for the American Association.

During

the spring and sunnner of 1945, the AADG had "nearly come to a standstill".

It was isolated by the reaction to the revelations about the

Nazi atrocities.
f or f uture

. .

It had "absolutely no money" and was "kept on ice"

act~v~ty.
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In September, Frank saw already "some more

wind in the sails" of the Association.

He expected public opinion to

be "more articulate than it was during Potsdam".

From England would

come "voices of reason" like a critical editorial on Potsdam in the
London Economist.

Frank also asked Niebuhr to continue as chairman of

the AADG for another year.
for it.

He devised a new strategy and a new budget

The latter would amount to $500 to $600 a month.

account for pledges of half of this monthly sum.

Frank could

For a new propaganda

effort, he proposed to intensify the research section of the Association
and to issue some new publications so that there would be "one sincere
103
104
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reporting organization in New York".

The main new· publication was the

monthly Facts about Occupied Germany.

According to Frank, the more

important members of the AADG thought that "for a while it [the AADG]
will not yet be an important political group because the time has not
yet come for real mass support".

This meant that Frank expected the

American Association to become "a policy making pressure group"
105

eventually.

But the affairs of the American Association did not improve
that fast.

By the spring of 1946, its activities were still "ridicu-

lously limited" and "we muddle along with a budget of only about a
thousand dollars monthly".

But there was no question of giving up.

Frank insisted that "we can't do that and particularly [not] now".
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The American Association needed about two or .three thousand dollars
monthly.

It negotiated a fundraising agreement with the firm of Harold

L. Oram which worked "only for liberal causes" and with which the AADG
had previous relations.

The arrangement provided for "a minimum ad-

ditional income of about $20,000".

Before the final agreement, Oram

conducted a preliminary campaign because the Association, "after managing to remain solvent during the last eight months, is at the end -of
its rope".
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But the Association hoped that the $20,000 "together
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with our small other income, will permit a better start for the greater
task ahead ".
Reuther.

108

Frank a 1 so appea 1e d t o unLon
·
1ea d ers l'k
L e

v·Lctor

He became "a little impatient" with the latter and other

officials of the United Auto Workers and of the CIO, still hoping that
"one day_our numerous expectations upon your help will come true".

He

reminded Reuther that the American Association and its predecessor had
been working for ten years and that "you were never able to give us
more than moral support and sometimes ... little of that".

At the

return of a UAW official from Germany, Frank expected Reuther to help
arrange a fund raising affair that would net "a couple of thousand
dollars".
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Despite this optimism, the American Association had hard postwar times.

Frank failed to get permission from the War Department and

from the American Military Government for a return to Germany,which
practically ended his political career.

Despite this setback, the

AADG developed enough German contacts to claim something of a new
German mandate.

There were the NB members and friends in Berlin whom

the American Association and Frank encouraged successfully to oppose
a merger between the SPD and the KPD in Berlin.
"quite a network of contacts outside of Berlin".

It also established
There were the for-

mer London emigrants Schottle and Knoringen who later presided over
the SPD organizations in Wurtemberg-Baden and in Bavaria.

The AADG
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ject befQre you leave the country''.
AADG would dissolve.

111

In case of a negative answer, the

Frank agreed that the latter could "not for

a second time spend years of unnecessary frictions, this time >vith a
rea 1 party

,

execut~ve

II

.
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When Schumacher left without answering the telegram of Niebuhr,
the American Association was in a dilemma which Niebuhr and Frank saw
in different perspectives.

The latter did not consider the nonresponse

of the SPD executive as final.

He hoped to retain Niebuhr by with-

drawing himself from the AADG.

He thought that his continued promin-

ence in the Association was the main obstacle to relations with the
SPD.

His withdrawal could overcome "the present prestige touchiness

among the not really independent new German democratic leaders".

They

would do business with Niebuhr, Bingham, and Goldbloom, that is, with
a purely American Association.

In the postwar situation, Frank was

dispensable and would retire together with Hertz.
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He had already

been devoting much of his time to his psychological counseling practice
and to psychological and political studies.

The latter would give him

"a better understanding of some of the reasons for the lack of success
of such good causes as ours".

More personally, he felt that he had

been "weighed and found too light". 114
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The above changes were designed to overcome "Schumacher's
passive resistance".

In another message to the SPD chairman, the

Association should mention its shift to purely American representation
and its hope "for better cooperation with the Social Democratic party
executive".

115

In the meantime, the secretary of the AADG, Goldbloom

intended to visit Schumacher in Hannover after his attendance of a
conference of European socialists in Amsterdam in November 1947.

He

expected to get "some kind of an encouragement ... if not a better
'mandate'".
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the new SPD.

Frank did nothing to jeopardize good relations with
He even discouraged old NB friends in East Berlin from

reviving a conspirational NB Group against Russian political intolerance.

He refused to sponsor any such group from abroad.

Another

positive measure was the inclusion of the American Jewish laborite
Charles Zimmermann, who was favorably regarded by Lovestone, in the
national board of the AADG.

Niebuhr also had the idea of including

some members of the GLD in the Association.

Frank originally thought

that after the departure of several GLD members, there was "no worthy
personality of the former 'other side' in New York".

But a week later,

he changed his mind because he did not want to withdraw completely
from the AADG.

He resigned the vice chair:nanship but wanted to remain

on the national committee of the Association.

As a counterbalance, he

agreed that the Association should accept "some of the old Social
115
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Democrats" into its national committee and its board.
this would "make for a new start".

He hoped that

Furthermore, "if Schumacher can be

calmed down and if you [Niebuhr] decide to go on", then "something
strong must be done" to arrive at a friendly cooperation with the international office of the AFL under Lovestone.

Perhaps, Dubinsky, as

one of the vice presidents of the AFL could help in this endeavor.

117

When neither the SPD nor the AFL responded, the American Association went on working anyway.

Niebuhr upheld his decision to resign.

But in order to facilitate this s.tep, he conceded that the AADG should
continue without his leadership.
him.

Frank made a last effort to retain

He tried to win James Loeb of the UDA for getting together a

small delegation of Washington liberals which would ask Niebuhr to
reconsider his decision.

This group should also contact the State

Department and "get some definitive promise of cooperation".

Frank

thought that the American change of attitude towards Germany presented
a good opportunity for such an initiative.

The new American foreign

policy which heralded the Narshall Plan offered "a much greater chance
for a group like the AADG in [the] future".

Frank believed that "just

now, some kind of an AADG should be founded and not liquidated 11 • 118
Yet, for exactly this reason, he soon reversed his attitude towards
Niebuhr.

The latter might interfere with the further potential of the

Association which should not go down with him.

Frank became aware of

"the frustration and relative futility of his [Niebuhr 1 s] great sacri117 Ibid.
118
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fice of more than ten years chairmanship".
to try to retain him any longer.

He felt that it \vas unfair

He also wondered whether the com-

promise of Niebuhr was "enough of a basis" on which to continue the
Association.

Then, he told Loeb that he did "not think that a revival

of the Association

is tied with Reini's continuing services".

Since a pro-German attitude began to be "more fashionable" for American liberals, it should not be too difficult to replace Niebuhr ..
Frank objected only to Norman Thomas, whom the latter had recommended
as a successor.

A Thomas chairmanship would "limit the efficiency of

the group very much".
Thomas.

119

Frank asked Loeb to think of alternatives to

Eventually, Alfred Bingham, who had in the meantime served

with the American Military Government in Germany, became the new chairman of the American Association.

The-executive committee of the

latter was also reorganized to include Loeb, Thomas, and Shuster.
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In its postwar policy, the AADG had to fight an uphill battle
also, most of the time.

In 1945, the situation seemed hopeless.

Frank confessed that "the outcome of this war has ... disappointed me"
despite his attitude of realism and skepticism throughout the war.
This compelled him to revise his view of "the proportion of good and
evil" in human nature.

In personal terms, he was afraid that "there

is relatively little to be done in which we still can be of help during
119
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our lifetime".

This assessment was inspired by his ambition for a

postwar .career in Germany which soon foundered on the obstruction of
the War Department and the American Hilitary Government in Germany
which was in contact with the postwar SPD.
The AADG had to center on the more practical goal of proGerman propaganda.

Emigrants like Hermens and Piper had thought all

along that the CDG and the American Association should have limited
themselves to the latter task.

The two organizations should have

tried "to liberate American public opinion from the impact of wartime
stereotypes".

122

• 11 . 123
menta 1 ~ty

The issue was that of "countering the Morgenthau
For this job, Frank was eminently qualified as "the

most effective single writer among the emigres from Germany".
thought that "our most fruitful work should just begin".

124

Hermens
He had

even considered "the advisability of setting up a new group for
exactly this purpose" if the Association shirked its duty.

He held

the mistaken view that American public opinion was volatile and would
reverse itself "certainly within a year" 125
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The American Association agreed that "the country is very badly
misinformed about the real situation".

But after it was reactivized

it experienced "a certain futility in our present efforts ... it is
like trying to drain the ocean with a teaspoon".
Facts about Occupied Germany, and

cul~ivated

126

It published the

direct contacts with

union representatives and government officials.

In 1946, Frank urged

the United Auto Workers to go ahead with the plan of sending a delegation to Germany.

This should be done by a combination of UAW locals

if the national office could not do it officially.

Frank also asked

V. Reuther to take the initiative in establishing an American labor
committee with the purpose of supporting the democratic labor movement
in Germany.

A number of union and American Military government offi-

cials who returned from Germany reported to the AADG like William
Kemsley, George Fischer, the son of Louis Fischer, the Jewish labor
leader Charles Zimmermann, George Silver, and Alfred Bingham.
them were friends of the American Association.

Most of

Sometimes they parti-

cipated in meetings with prospective supporters of the AADG.

A special

action committee prepared a meeting with Senators and Congressmen in
Washington.

Also, Victor Reuther kept Frank informed about his in-

volvement in the shaping of a more liberal labor policy towards Germany
and in the selection of labor attaches for the Military Government.
He asked Frank for his views on these policies.
126
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attaches was Frank's friend, Paul Porter.

Before his departure, the

latter had also conferred with Katz and Brauer of the GLD in Washington. 127

This made the GLD officials think that "this contact

~vas

extended only to us, not to other groups in the political emigration"
like "communists, fellow travelers and United Frontists".

128

In its publications and its correspondence with the government,
the American Association severely criticized the American postwar
policy of economic stagnation and limitation of political activity in
Germany.

It wanted the American government to give up its use of

Germany as a pawn of international power politics and to assume the
leading role in the struggle for world democracy.

The new framework

of AADG ideology was East-West confrontation rather than cooperation.
The American Association hoped to win new support from American·liberals who had become anticommunist rather than remain anti-German.

The

AADG believed that Germany was then "at the principal frontier and
point of contact between the communist world and the free world". 129
Germany became "the battleground where the struggle for a democratic
world has reached its most acute stage".

The American Association told

President Truman that it considered the West "in imminent danger of
defeat" on the German battleground.

It urged on the President the

adoption of "a minimum program of economic revival" in Germany.
127
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included the importation_ of raw materials on credit and nthe essential
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It welcomed the economic merger

of the American and the English zones in an economically more feasible
bi-zone.
This

11

positive policyn required also the establishment of a

unified and democratic Germany and its integration into Western Europe
and the Western World.

131

But this was an unrealistic goal of liberal

propaganda. The main concern of the American Association was that the
American government counter the Russian plan for the conference of
foreign ministers in London in December 1947.

The latter proposed the

withdrawal of all Allied troops from Germany, national elections and the
establishment of a central government.

The AADG felt that the Russian

government wanted to use the rejection of its plan as a pretext for
including Eastern Germany into the Soviet system.

Free elections were

impossible while the SPD was illegal in the Russian zone.

The Russian

proposals concealed ';behind fair words a plan for the ext ens ion of
totalitarianism to all of Germany''.

Yet, their propaganda appeal would

create the impression that the Western powers were responsible for the
division of Germany.
In this way, the American Association put pressure on the American government.

It offered Secretary of State Marshall its own plan

for bringing about a result opposite the Russian intentions.

130
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statement of policy of the AADG, April 1947, and Statement
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Eliasberg.
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proposed to end Russian influence in Eastern Germany by a transitional
arrangement.

The latter would abolish the four zones and replace the

military governments with "one civilian international control body
for all of Germany".
United Nations.

The latter would be under the direction of the

This international control council would call free

elections and distantly supervise a new German democratic government.
With such a plan, the United States could demonstrate to the German
people that "its aim is the protection and extension of freedom
throughout the world".

132

Later, the American Association was afraid

that the American government might be settled with responsibility for
the division of

Ge~~any

because of its insistence on extensive state

rights in a federal system.
mainstay of any

.

Amer~can

A central German government should be the

.
133
program.

If that were not possible, the

Western powers should set up a Western Germany which should include
Berlin.

The AADG also demanded "the revision of Germany's tentative

Eastern boundaries in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic
Charter".

But its anticommunism did not interfere with its champion-

ship of German progressivism.

The Association opposed the revival of

a German army even for the sake of a better Western defense against
communism.

It considered a new military establishment as a threat to

the German democratic forces.

134

It also deplored American obstruc-
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tion of economic codetermination for the German unions, a goal that
was finally achieved in West Germany in 1974.

135

With the European Recovery Plan, the American government
adopted the outlook of the AADG.

The latter credited itself with

having contributed to this development.

Its

program finally received

the mass support for which the liberals of the American Association
had hoped.

Their organization should then have been in business and

actually planned to expand.
its work

In the spring of 1950, it believed that

of influencing public opinion and the policies of the State

Department had to continue.

It even felt that "the urgency of the job

to be done calls for expansion".

It planned to go beyond research and

publicity and organize "branch activity throughout the country".

With

its headquarters in New York, .a representative in Washington was
"desirable".
Germany that

The AADG also planned to establish a representation in
~vould

maintain close contacts with German democratic

leaders and influence American officials in Germany.

The American

Association had never been so dynamic and confident since the end of
the war.

It felt even that "the effectiveness of American promotion

of German democracy depends to a large degree on the support which
will be given to the American Association for a Democratic Germany.
The stakes are high.
135
136

We cannot afford to fail". 136
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Yet, half a year later, in January 1951, the AADG suspended its
activity.

The official explanation contradicted the feeling of indis-

pensibility of 1950.

I t stated that the issues of 1951 'tvere "not

those for which this Association was organized to deal".

137

Actually,

after the war years of victimization by German emigrant anticommunists,
it fell victim to the new native anticommunism of the McCarthy era to
which the ideology of the American Association had contributed.
The plan of the NB sponsor organization for reorganization and
reconstruction did not work out.
did not play its expected role.
towards Germany, the

The Council for a Democratic Germany
In the face of the Allied policy

American Association revised its attitude to

postwar international relations.

It became anticommunist and advised

the American government to follow this switch from East-West cooperation to confrontation.

But '"hat became the government was fatal to the

American Association.
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CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION
The German socialist emigration in the United States ended up
as divided as it had begun, with accordingly minimal political results.
The Popular Front as a communist concept could not unite this emigration.

It anticipated a second world war and aimed at the defense of

the Soviet Union in the form of an end to American neutrality at a
time when the German American and emigrant socialists still had the
illusion of a domestic solution to the German problem in the form of
an overthrow of Hitler.

Before the belated split of the Socialist

Party of America, there was at first some Social Democratic cooperation
in the Popular F-ront which was abetted by the comprehensive nature of
the secondary German American labor organizations.

But after 1936,

the conservative socialists had their own political group in the Social
Democratic Federation and their own publication in the Neue Volkszeitung.

Then they engaged in an endless tug of propaganda war for the

secondary labor organizations which they could not even win after
September 1939 when they came into their aggressive own with the diplomatic end of the Popular Front.
The official Social Democratic group of the German Labor Delegation hoped to accomplish great things without any socialist cooperation.

For this purpose, i t tried to monopolize the socialist and

unionist American sponsorship to the exclusion of the New Beginning
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emigrants and their friends.

It clung to the illusion of a majority

opposition in Germany based on liberal, democratic masses which would
only need some encouragement from abroad in the form of radio propaganda.

In this spirit, the GLD continued the Social Democratic tradi-

tion of coalescing with bourgeois groups even though the emigration of
the latter was insignificant in the United States.

In this country,

some GLD members hoped for a majority labor party with a progressive
common denominator in which their German American Congress for Democracy could play a role.

In order to follow its conservative political

line and protect the personal ambitions of its members, the GLD maintained a complete independence from the Sopade from which it derived
its initial authority.

During the rescue crisis of 1940 and 1941, it

was anxious to keep the remaining Sopade executives, as well as the
majority of the Social Democratic refugees in Southern France, out of
the United States.

It also created problems for the rescue work of

the American Friends of German Freedom, the American NB sponsor organization.

These divisive politics were a major reason for which the

American labor sponsorship lost interest in the German socialist emigration.
The NB emigrants did not believe in a general revolutionary
spirit in Germany and had no confidence in bourgeois groups.

They

considered underground organization as essential and proposed a socialist concentration, that is, a reunification of all Social Democratic
groups, which could, cu occasion, cooperate with the communists in a
pragmatic way.

For the rejection by the GLD, they tried to compensate

with the formation of international socialist emigrant coalitions.

But
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without more German emigrant cooperation, they were not successful in
the pursuit of their goals.
For the planning of German reconstruction, the emigrant and
German American socialists did not cooperate either even though the
Office of War Information tried to promote their unity in the United
Americans of German Descent.

The GLD dropped out of that group because

it did not want to deal with the second German American Popular Front.
Its own reorganization failed to establish the emigrant support necessary to impress the

American labor sponsorship or government.

ingly, the GLD plans for reconstruction were unrealistic.

Accord-

In the hour

of Allied victory, they advised the American government to conduct a
cold war against Russia to forestall German territorial losses.
While the GLD refused to accep_t the probability of an Allied
occupation of Germany, the NB sponsor organization planned for a total
German defeat.

It considered East-West co-existence as necessary for

a lasting peace.

Under this assumption, it initiated the Council for

a Democratic Germany, a comprehensive German emigrant coalition with
executive aspirations.

The GLD refused to join, but two of its former

chairmen and several other Social Democratic emigrants did so with the
result of a serious division of the Social Democratic emigration.

From

the postwar power balance in Europe, the Council hoped to reap a compromise solution for Germany and Central Europe in the form of a Social
Democratic system.

But its lack of full emigrant representation and

its refusal to resolve internal ideological differences at the expense
of its maximal national program led to its dissolution when the Allied
decisions of Potsdam revealed Western acquiescence in Russian terri-
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torial acquisitions.

Under these conditions, the American Association

for a Democratic Germany as the main sponsor organization of the Council
switched to an anti-Russian policy that urged containment of the Soviet
Union on the American government.

In this purpose, it was more speci-

fic and realistic and also more persistent than the GLD which still
rejected a rapprochement with the NB organization.
It would have been difficult for the German socialist emigration in any case to win much consideration by the American government.
But instead of doing everything possible to further such a purpose, it
did everything possible to obstruct it.

The fact that the American

government procrastinated in permitting the return of socialist emigrants to Germany was partially due to their impractical politics.
Frank was not allowed to return at all.

The significance of the German

socialist emigration in the United States for postwar German socialism
is difficult to assess.

The GLD anticipated the anti-communism of the

postwar German Social Democratic Party under the leadership of Kurt
Schumacher, who was succeeded by the less stern but unimaginative
Ollenhauer, the former Sopade executive.

At the end of the Cold War,

Willy Brandt brought the more realistic, broadminded and conciliatory
tradition of the former dissenting Social Democratic emigration to the
leadership of the

Social Democratic Party.
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